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The multilateral negotiations aimed at securing international cooperation on climate change 
and its mitigation have widely been criticised as a political deadlock since the establishment 
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992. Since 
the formation of the UNFCCC, the United States of America (USA) has being recognised as 
both an essential, but also as a highly controversial actor within the negotiations due to its 
historical responsibility for anthropogenic climate change and relative structural power which 
has allowed it to wield immense influence in the negotiations. Because of energy’s essential 
input into all economic sectors, any attempts to mitigate climate change will influence a 
sector that is essential for a country’s economic strength. Within these processes, there is a 
link between energy policy and the UNFCCC negotiations.  
The overarching research aim of this interdisciplinary study is to understand the historical 
interaction between the USA’s energy policy and its negotiating position in the UNFCCC. 
Within these dynamics, understanding how different administrations attempt to balance 
competing policy goals are pivotal in understanding these dynamics within domestic and 
international constraints. This study analyses this by conducting a historical case study of the 
USA’s position in these negotiations and how its energy policy interacts with this. This study 
makes use of the neoclassical realist framework to understand the cooperation of the USA 
through the interaction between its energy policy and its position in the UNFCCC 
negotiations within two levels of analysis, that is the unit- and structural-levels, referring to 
factors found at the state-level and the international distribution of power respectively. The 
policy positions and energy policies of the administrations of George H.W. Bush (1989 – 
1993), Bill Clinton (1993 – 2001), George W. Bush (2001 – 2009) and Barack Obama (2009 
– 2017) are investigated through the interaction of the unit- and structural-levels. A historical 
overview indicates the challenges that succeeding administrations faced in grappling with 
contradictory policy objectives in accordance with the perceived costs of various policy goals 
at both the domestic and international levels and its implications for their position and ability 
to cooperate within the UNFCCC.  
The thesis has indicated that the history of the United States’ position in the negotiations and 
the analysis of the influences on this position reveal that simple mono-causal explanations 
cannot satisfactorily attribute the differences amongst US administrations therein. As such, 
since 1992, successive US administrations have displayed varying degrees of cooperation 
 
 
towards the UNFCCC that have been based on the domestic and international distribution of 
power, and policy-makers’ perception of the related costs and benefits of pursuing a set of 
policy goals. The research has established that since the 1970s, efforts to design US energy 
policy to factor in environmental externalities have resulted in haphazard progress as two 
ideational frameworks emerged, one that viewed economic growth and environmental 
regulation as compatible, and another that promoted the opposing view, which has resulted in 
stalemate and a cyclical approach complicating the interaction between US energy policy and 
its position in the UNFCCC. Within these dynamics, domestic constraints, à la the two-level 
game, place an important limitation on US participation and ratification of climate change 
agreements and its energy policy and highlights the important role played by domestic 
institutions with bipartisan politics and ideology forming a staggering fissure. The thesis has 
found that rather than an objective set of criteria, policy-makers are influenced by a complex 
range and interaction of factors in their approach to energy policy, international negotiations, 
as well as international opportunities and threats. Within these dynamics, the structure of the 
international system is essential in understanding state behaviour. The thesis confirms that the 
influence of the distribution of power in the international system therefore complements 
domestic factors in analysing the motivation and behaviour of policy-makers acting on behalf 
of the state, although it is imperative to understand how its influence is filtered at the unit-
level. Understanding the historical context permits deeper insights into the multi-dimensional 
influences on decision-makers. It is therefore necessary to delve into the historical origins of 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1 General Introduction  
Climate change has emerged as one of the central policy challenges facing decision-makers 
requiring a solution that cannot be based on domestic action alone, but that requires a 
concerted global effort. Since 1992, efforts to address this issue in a multilateral forum as 
embodied by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
have been met with stalemate and incremental progress as the negotiations remain divided 
(Harris, 2008:455, 671; Keohane and Victor, 2010:2). At its crux, divergent groupings of 
nations seemed unable to reach a pragmatic agreement to mitigate climate change through the 
reduction of greenhouse gases (GHGs). Thereby, two issues remained unresolved: which 
mitigation targets should each country assume, and secondly, how to share the reduction of 
emissions in a fair and equitable manner amongst states (Bodansky, 2001: 29 – 33; Newell 
and Paterson, 1998: 681; Collins, 1991:340). As such, analyses of the UNFCCC negotiations 
and states’ positions therein have been characterised by controversy and complexity. 
Throughout the history of the UNFCCC negotiations, the United States of America (USA) 
has occupied a unique position therein and has being recognised as both an essential, but also 
a highly controversial actor; given that it has been both a catalyst but also an impediment 
within these negotiations. During the 1990s and early to mid-2000s, its insistence on the use 
of nationally determined actions instead of quantified, legally-binding emission targets, and 
that developing nations limit their emissions (Agrawala and Steinar Andresen, 1999:464), 
have drawn severe criticism from other countries and civil society organisations. This led to a 
decade long impasse with the Paris Agreement of 2015 been heralded as a major step forward 
as the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) were the result of a long negotiation 
process and are both nationally-determined and non-legally binding, thereby meeting the key 
demands of the United States (Centre for Climate and Energy Solutions, s.a.; Stavins and 
Stowe, 2016:1). Hence, for the negotiations to be successful, the cooperation of the USA in 
designing a treaty as endorsed by the scientific community that would prevent dangerous, 
anthropogenic climate change is essential. Critics, however, have strongly admonished the 
USA for its laggard and often obstructionist role throughout the history of the global climate 
change negotiations and the associated tasks of tackling global climate change mitigation. 
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What complicates any analysis of the USA’s position is that the politics of climate change in 
the United States are highly contested and complex offering numerous examples as well as 
counter-examples of action and inaction. The USA’s role is thus far more complex than what 
critics may be willing to acknowledge as it is a nuanced actor with a set of conflicting, multi-
dimensional interests. Within these conflicting patterns, it is not clear why historically 
consecutive administrations adopted different foreign policies towards the UNFCCC and 
what had influenced the USA’s position in these negotiations.  
Anthropogenic climate change is mainly caused by fossil fuel-based energy since it is 
predominantly the GHGs released by the energy supply sector since the 1750s that are 
responsible for 35% of total GHG emissions (IPCC, 2007:516; Shaffer, 2009). In order to 
mitigate climate change, and avert the worst of its consequences, the reduction of GHGs 
through a socio-economic transition to a low carbon energy system is demanded by a set of 
actors. However, this is a challenge for the USA because for over a century it has depended 
on the production of fossil fuel energy to maintain its industrialisation and impressive 
economic growth. A historical overview indicates that throughout the twentieth century, US 
energy policy has been centred around fossil fuel production and use, which resulted in low 
energy prices for consumers and industries, offering it a source of comparative advantage in 
international markets. However, with the oil crisis of 1973, energy policy became a major 
federal preoccupation, presenting a set of conflicting and multi-dimensional issues for 
decision-makers to solve. Since the 1970s, various administrations have struggled to balance 
various policy goals which have included maintaining economic growth and the 
competitiveness of US industries, while integrating various environmental objectives, 
including climate change, into US energy policy design. With conflicting and an ever-
increasing set of policy goals, decision-makers have found it progressively more difficult to 
evaluate and meet competing policy objectives in a comprehensive policy design at both the 
domestic and international levels. Within this configuration, successive administrations 
would attempt to design US energy policy to meet contradictory objectives related to the 
perceived costs and benefits of various policy goals. Thereby creating a comprehensive 
energy policy that could be congruent with the objectives of the UNFCCC has been a 
challenge for these administrations.  
Analysts point out that the current fossil-fuel based energy system is facing three 
interconnected challenges, that of climate change, energy access and energy security (Cherp 
et al., 2011; Grubler, 2012: 8; Meadowcroft, 2006:59). Both domestically and internationally, 
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the climate change negotiations are divisive. Not only do they require trade-offs to be made 
between certain policy designs, economic growth, and energy use, but they also involve 
questions surrounding the redistribution of costs and benefits across and within states as well 
as the appropriate role for government within an already difficult negotiating atmosphere.  
The contested nature of the mitigation of climate change, and the need to transform the global 
energy system, aggravated the political conflicts within the negotiations (Bulekeley, 2001; 
Shaffer, 2009; Yergin, 2012). Because energy is at the core of a well functioning society, 
economic performance, development and a host of other functions all depend on the secure, 
affordable and reliable access to energy sources and services. Per consequence, energy policy 
remains at the epicentre of economic growth and international relations because of the global 
trade in energy carriers, competitiveness requirements and carbon leakage presenting trade-
offs and conflicting national objectives.  
1.2 Problem Statement and Rationale 
The USA remains a central actor in the UNFCCC negotiations whose behaviour is often at 
odds with the objectives of this regime, and not surprisingly the analysis of the UNFCCC 
negotiations and the US position therein has been characterised by both controversy and 
complexity. As will be highlighted in the Literature Review section, the scholarship which 
investigates the US position in the UNFCCC tends to depend on either unit- or structural-
level variables when analysing this research area (Keohane and Victor, 2010; He, 2010; 
Roberts, 2011; Bailer and Weiler, 2015; Weiler, 2012; and Fisher 2006), rarely has there been 
an attempt to combine and understand how the two levels of analysis impact this position. 
Numerous studies have also been either technical or economic studies (Pearson and Foxon, 
2012; Fouquet and Pearson, 2012; Mediavilla et al., 2013; Shaffer, 2009:18; Stoddard, 
2013:1). There is also an insufficient understanding of how the historical development of US 
energy policy within these two levels interacts with the US position in the UNFCCC, and 
which offers decision-makers a set of conflicting objectives. Thus, there is a significant gap 
in the scholarship that this study wishes to fill in order to gain a more comprehensive 
understanding of the interaction between the USA’s energy policy and its position in the 
UNFCCC. 
Any attempt to understand the United States’ position in the global climate change 
negotiations has to reckon with a number of contradictory options facing decision-makers as 
they attempt to design an energy and foreign policy, much of which is the result of historical 
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circumstances. In recent years, climate change mitigation
1
 has become one of a number of 
competing policy objectives within energy policy thereby adding to this complexity (IEA, 
2011:11). This is poignant since at the international level nations attempt to deal with the 
challenge of anthropogenic climate change while remaining economically competitive; 
thereby energy policy cannot be separated from broader foreign policy goals. Keohane and 
Victor argue that, “As a result of any nation’s actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
meaningfully, to secure reliable energy supplies, or to stabilise energy prices will be affected 
by the actions of many other countries.” (2013:97; Yergin, 2012). As such, states occupy a 
central role in evaluating and meeting competing policy objectives at both the domestic and 
international levels. A historically detailed analysis can reveal important continuities but also 
differences in decision-makers’ approach to these issues and the factors that led to their 
stance. This study aims to enhance our understanding of the challenges faced by policy-
makers when making choices amongst contradictory policy goals and its interactions with 
their positions in international negotiations (Bailer and Weiler, 2015).  
1.3 Research Aim  
The overarching research aim of this interdisciplinary study is to understand the historical 
interaction between the USA’s energy policy and its negotiating position in the UNFCCC for 
successive administrations. This study draws heavily on historical analysis and is guided by 
neoclassical realism as its theoretical framework to understand these dynamics. In order to 
better understand the interaction between US energy policy and its position in the UNFCCC 
this study explores how a combination of the structural-level, that is the distribution of power 
in the international system, and the unit-level, that is domestic factors, influence these two 
policy areas and to gain insight into how these two arenas interact. 
Thus, understanding the balancing amongst competing policy goals is pivotal in gaining 
insight into these dynamics. While complementary and alternative explanations of state-
energy relations exist in the literature
2
, there is a limited understanding of the manner in 
                                                          
1
 Although climate change mitigation represents an extensive environmental challenge for governments to form 
consensus on, it is by no means the sole such challenge facing multilateral cooperation; with waste disposal, air 
pollution, inadequate access to water and coral reef degradation forming equally pressing challenges and 
depleting the global commons (First Carbon Solutions, 2019; Carbon Brief, 2011).  
2
 These alternative explanations range from the lock-in and path-dependent effect of technological and 
institutional co-evolution (Foxon, 2002; Arthur, 1989; Walker, 2000; Unruh, 2000; Bekhout, 2002); regulatory 
framework (Jacobson and Lauber, 2006); socio-institutional factors affecting policy-making (Laird and Stefes, 
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which energy policy interacts with state behaviour within an international negotiating forum 
such as the UNFCCC.  
1.4 Literature Review 
The main focus of this interdisciplinary, historical research is the position of the USA in the 
UNFCCC negotiations and its interaction with US energy policy. Thereby, this literature 
review provides an overview of two related fields that are of importance to this study, 
namely: cooperation, or the lack thereof, in the UNFCCC, and which factors account for the 
USA’s position in the UNFCCC. It further subdivides these two issue areas according to 
studies that can be grouped according to level of analysis, that is either the system- or the 
unit-level in discussing and synthesising scholarly work, and mainly focuses on the literature 
in IR. It then discusses the gap in the literature review, these being energy policy, and ideas. 
This interdisciplinary study is anchored theoretically in IR, but as will be explained later in 
this chapter, it also draws on concepts in the policy process literature. 
1.4.1 Cooperation and the Global Climate Change Negotiations 
The UNFCCC negotiations’ historical impasse in the lead up to the Paris negotiations of 2015 
draws much debate amongst scholars interested in interstate cooperation. The puzzle of 
interstate cooperation
3
 is quintessential to IR, and numerous scholars (Keohane, 1982, 2016; 
Jervis, 1978; Grieco, 1988; Martin, 1992, Mearsheimer, 1994 – 1995; Young; 1989, and 
Krasner, 1976) endeavour to investigate what impedes or encourages this cooperation and the 
efficacy of international institutions in enhancing cooperation. In an attempt to understand the 
global climate change negotiations, many studies focus either on the unit- or the 
international-system as the level of analysis to account for states’ positions and related 
outcomes therein, most never attempt to integrate and show the interaction between the two. 
In this regard, the publication of Robert Putnam’s seminal 1988 article presented the 
following puzzle, “Domestic politics and international relations are often somehow 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2009); state-business relations and the structural influence of capitalism (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004; Salamon 
and Siegfried, 1977; Markussen and Svendsen, 2005); and institutional as well as technological governance 
(Hisschemoller et al., 2006)  
3
 Since the 1960s, the internationalisation of environmental problems has become a prominent feature of the 
global agenda with a corresponding growth in multilateral cooperation and international regimes to solve this 
problem (Schreurs and Economy, 1997:5).  
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entangled, but our theories have not yet sorted out the puzzling tangle. It is fruitless to debate 
whether domestic politics really determine international relations, or the reverse. The answer 
to that question is clearly ‘Both, sometimes.’ The more interesting questions are ‘When?’ and 
‘How?’” To identify a plausible answer to this question has been a key problem for numerous 
scholarly endeavours. Fearon further elaborates on the influence that domestic politics exert 
on foreign policy and concludes that there are two principal ways in which domestic politics 
exert such an influence on states constrained by the structure of the international system, 
either i. if a state is taken to be a unitary, rational actor, a domestic explanation would 
identify a suboptimal foreign policy relative to a normative standard because of the 
interaction and interference of actors
4
 within the state (1998:291); or ii. that within the 
structure of the international system, the particular characteristics of the state, besides its 
position in the hierarchy of power amongst states, determines its foreign policy (1998:292).  
Within these dynamics, the global climate change negotiations are a multi-faceted process 
with an indefatigable set of themes that it covers from justice, power politics, poverty 
eradication, sustainable development, and regime effectiveness. Unlike other environmental 
problems, climate change is a unique problem, making it difficult for parties to form 
consensus. Scholars offer various explanatory frameworks for the stalemate in the climate 
change negotiations ranging from lack of political cohesion underpinned by conflicting 
national interests (Groen and Niemann, 2012; Vihma et al., 2011; Caparrós et al., 2004); 
political economy determinants especially related to the presence of energy-intensive 
industries in the economy (Steves and Teytelboym, 2013; Newell and Paterson, 1998:692); to 
institutional factors and diversity (Keohane and Victor, 2010; Heller, 1996); global inequality 
(Parks and Roberts, 2008); and alternate conceptions of climate justice (Fisher, 2012); 
historical responsibility (Friman and Linnér, 2008) and equity (Heyward, 2007). The 
negotiations have likewise been studied through a multitude of conceptual frameworks 
                                                          
4
 Within this framework, foreign policy objectives are not determined singularly by government officials but 
rather through the interaction between different actors, particularly those with vested interests (Katzenstein (b), 
1977:892).  Policy networks consisting of private as well as public sectors influence the objectives of foreign 
policy (Katzenstein (b), 1977:892). At times these interactions will be fused with state ideology (Katzenstein 
(b), 1977:892 - 893). Katzenstein further explains that, “The centralization of state and society and the 
differentiation between them affect the character of the policy networks and policy instruments.” (Katzenstein 
(b), 1977:894). Different varieties of historically-developed domestic structures will influence the type of 
political strategies pursued by policy-makers in the international context (Katzenstein (b), 1977:907, 920).  
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ranging from the risk society thesis (Bulkeley, 2001); gender (Dankelman, 2002; Hemmati 
and Röhr, 2009), the role of state and non-state actors (Auer, 2000); private and state 
governance (Falkner, 2003), sustainable development (Sanwal, 2012); neo-Gramscian power 
relations (Levy and Egan, 2003), geopolitical divisions (Patterson and Grubb, 1992:310; 
Falkner, 2010; Terhalle and Depledge, 2013), and the division between the North and South 
wherein conflict of interest concerning socio-economic development and global inequality 
reflects different perceptions of justice and equitability, access to resources and development, 
as well as a redistribution of power and wealth in the global political economy (Huang, 
2009:435 – 437; Roberts, 2001: 501, 503).  
1.4.2 Structural Influences 
As an introductory comment in their editorial introduction to the journal Climate Policy, 
Michaelowa and Michaelowa (2012:527 - 528), drawing on standard economic theory
5
, write 
that since climate change mitigation, as a public good
6
, is an example of a prisoners’ dilemma 
wherein countries can benefit from others’ mitigation efforts while not complying, there is an 
incentive to free-ride which makes it difficult for countries to cooperate since each fears 
being taken advantage of by others since the benefits from global emissions mitigation are 
both non-excludable and, non-rival. Keohane and Oppenheimer’s (2016) investigation into 
this problem revealed that there are a number of issues that complicate multilateral 
cooperation related to climate change. From a realist perspective in IR, the anarchic structure 
of the international system means that there is no centralised authority capable of enforcing 
action and since climate change is a public bad, each country’s contribution to the global 
problem will only inflict a limited amount of negative consequences to itself, thereby 
countries have an incentive to ignore the externalities of their decisions on others (Keohane 
and Oppenheimer, 2016:143). Further complicating these issues, is the notion of burden-
sharing which is understood as referring to fairness and equity in apportioning the costs and 
                                                          
5
 It should be noted that while the definitions developed within economic theory are very valuable, the thesis 
will not be utilising the terms outlined in this sentence within the boundaries of economic theory, but rather, 
within the research aims developed in section 1.3. 
6
 A public good has as its defining characteristics joint supply as well as non-excludability, and it is this 
excludability quality of a public good that promotes the free-rider problem (Conybeare, 1984:6). Even though 
work by economists on public goods has informed IR theorists’ analysis of these, the thesis does not directly 




benefits of implementation within the negotiations (Keohane and Oppenheimer, 2016:143). 
Keohane and Oppenheimer (2016:144) thus suggest that cooperation between states is 
impeded because of the high costs involved wherein states can be disadvantaged if other 
countries do not comply with the agreement.  
Writing from a neorealist perspective, Grundig (2006) assesses the impact of relative gains 
concerns on international environmental cooperation. Relying on comparative statistics 
within an n-actor game model of three issue-areas in international environmental cooperation 
consisting of ozone depletion, international trade and climate change, his study demonstrates 
that when the relative gains within such negotiations are big enough to be security relevant, 
cooperation is impeded and in contrast cooperation increases where relative gains concerns 
are small resulting in varying degrees of compliance amongst states within each respective 
issue area (Grundig, 2006:782). Grundig (2006:798) concludes that “The model suggests that 
we should see less cooperation in the case of global warming than in the case of ozone 
depletion, as in the latter case there is no relative gains concern due to the fact that the 
economic impact is not significant for a states’ security, while there is such an impact in the 
former case.” In international negotiations, the issue area matters and states will be concerned 
over the degree to which cooperation will impact their security.  
Presenting an alternative to realist theory that he refers as to institutional bargaining, Young 
(1989:350, 352, 359) criticises its assumption that the distribution of power in the 
international system accounts for collective outcomes wherein international regimes merely 
correspond to the interests of powerful states, especially hegemons, who are necessary for the 
creation of regimes. Yet, many studies negate Young’s criticism. The changing structure of 
the international system, based on states’ material power positions, has influenced their 
positions, alliance formation and cooperation. Roberts’ analysis of the US position in recent 
climate change negotiations argues that from a World Systems Theory (WST) perspective the 
USA’s participation in the negotiations and its inability to secure an agreement, can be 
attributed to its economic and political decline in relation to China, which occurred in the 
context of the fragmentation of developing countries and the weakening of the European 
Union (2011:776). The negotiations were thus fragmented as a result of increasing 
multipolarity, and competing notions of justice that were debated between developed and 
developing countries (2011:779). Keohane and Victor (2010:1), incorporating a liberal 
institutionalist perspective, indicate that part of the challenge of governing the limitations of 
the effects of climate change is that there is no integrated, comprehensive regime for this 
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purpose. Instead, there exists a regime complex, which is a set of unintegrated yet connected 
regimes to manage the governance of the effects of climate change (Keohane and Victor, 
2010:1). This regime complex is likely to endure without the emergence of a comprehensive 
regime because of the differences in state’ interests over this issue area (Keohane and Victor, 
2010:1, 3). 
A structural perspective has likewise been used by He (2010:6) to analyse China’s increasing 
influence in the UNFCCC negotiations which is attributed to its rising status in the 
international system. China's climate change diplomacy has now become a key component of 
its foreign policy because of the issue's global strategic significance. Domestically, the issue 
has been linked to the need to facilitate fundamental changes in the pattern of development 
while internationally; Chinese ascent translates into increased participation in the shaping of 
the international environmental regime and to exert more influence over the rules of 
international affairs. As a result, a two-level game ensues wherein China had to balance 
between its domestic pressures and international ambitions (He, 2010:6 – 7, 10). Likewise, 
Hallding et al. (2013) have pointed out that the Brazil, South Africa, India and China 
(BASIC) countries’ cooperation in the climate change negotiations is based on their shared 
identity as developing countries who are concerned about their socio-economic development 
and the potential limitations that an acceptance of ceilings on GHG emissions will have for 
their ability to develop in a carbon constrained space. Therefore, studies that analyse the 
structure of the international system agree that a lack of enforcement authority, non-
compliance as well as cheating, and the high costs and disadvantages involved in the 
UNFCCC negotiations limit cooperation therein while states’ positions in the international 
hierarchy will influence their position in the negotiations. Overall, studies agree that what 
impedes cooperation is a lack of a central authority in accordance with a structural 
explanation. 
The Paris Negotiations were an important watershed moment in the history of the global 
climate change negotiations, and per consequence multilateral cooperation. Andresen et al., 
(2016) analysed the effects of international institutions and the extent to which they 
contribute to problem-solving effectiveness by analysing the possible impact on the EU and 
international carbon markets through process tracing. Their analysis highlights that the Paris 
Agreement has the potential to increase countries’ mitigation ambitions. Young has a more 
cautious approach, arguing that the INDCs that were developed towards the Paris 
Negotiations are insufficient in preventing the 1.5 degrees Centigrade rise necessary to avert 
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catastrophic climate change. As such it is necessary to find the means to enhance ambition to 
prevent further temperature rise (Young, 2016). Bernauer et al., (2016) observe public 
opinion surrounding domestic constraints and uncertainty and the possibility that public 
opinion impacts public policy within an empirical study on China. Their analysis highlights 
that, “The main policy implication we can draw from this evidence is that, to the extent the 
Chinese government is interested in pushing ahead with ambitious and thus costly GHG 
reduction policies, it should be able to leverage segments of public support in order to 
overcome domestic obstacles to GHG mitigation policies” (Bernauer et al., 2016:161).  
1.4.3 Unit-Level Influences 
Since the international system lacks a central authority that is capable of forcing states to 
adopt environmental protection measures, states adopt different policies to regulate 
environmental problems (Sprinz and Vaahtornta, 1994:77). Sprinz and Vaahtornta (1994:78) 
suggest that such variance is the result of interest-based explanations, defined as the factors 
found at the sub-national level, in this instance, these being the economic costs of pollution 
abatement and the level of a state’s ecological vulnerability towards pollution, rather than the 
position that a state occupies on the international hierarchy which is the traditional view of a 
structural explanation. Their study indicates that in the negotiations for the Helsinki and 
Montreal Protocols, countries positions’ are further differentiated by civic attitudes towards 
the environment, industry lobbying, ecological political parties and the significance of 
environmental support for electoral victory in certain countries (Sprinz and Vaahtornta, 
1994:104 - 105) 
If the UNFCCC negotiations have been marked by stalemate for the span of their duration, 
Dai (2005) takes an alternative view by analysing what leads to successful compliance in 
international environmental regimes. He investigated a case study of the Long Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) Convention which was established in 1985 amongst 
twenty-one European countries to reduce their sulphur emissions by 30% by 1993 (Dai, 
2005:363). Although these efforts presented a classic collective action problem because of 
the concentrated costs and diffuse benefits that would be distributed with the potential that 
states will free-ride, his line of argument is that a two-level game ensues where divergent sets 
of domestic actors that are set to either gain or lose from compliance place pressure on central 
decision-makers to pursue their interests in the negotiations (Dai, 2005:363). In this instance, 
those actors that could gain because of compliance were able to exercise leverage over 
policy-makers and as a result “compliance can be rational even if the country as a whole pays 
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for it more than benefits from it” (Dai, 2005:364). The distribution of power in society 
matters since environmental agreements entail a distribution of costs and benefits across 
society, distributive politics will play an important part in determining to what degree and 
how environmental agreements will be endorsed and complied with. Under such 
circumstances, there is no straightforward formula towards determining compliance nor are 
different stakeholders’ positions necessarily static. Thereby, Goldstein (1996:541), 
investigating the dispute-settlement procedures contained within the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), argues that a neglected aspect of the two-level game literature, 
is that domestic groups often compel states to join international regimes in order to advance 
their particular interests with which, “Here, the answer to a commonly asked question of why 
nations would agree to specific rules of international conduct is that these rules present a 
solution to a domestic problem.”  
Although the area of cooperation and regime effectiveness is of importance to the analysis, 
this research is more interested in the factors that lead states to adopting a particular position 
in multilateral negotiations. While studies analyse how to enhance cooperation (Keohane and 
Victor, 2010; Bagozzi, 2015), other scholarly endeavours attempt to understand why states 
have particular negotiating positions (Bailer and Weiler, 2015), and how this enhances or 
limits cooperation. Bailer’s study (2012; see also Bailer and Weiler, 2015; Weiler, 2012) used 
a quantitative approach, with the aid of negotiation analysis to discover why certain strategies 
were used by various governments during the UNFCCC negotiations in Copenhagen. Regime 
type and economic power are often found to account for states’ negotiating positions 
alongside interest group pressure which forms an important intervening variable that can alter 
a state’s negotiating position (Bailer, 2012:535). His findings suggest that states which are 
democratic tend to be more cooperative and are less likely to use a hard negotiating strategy 
(Bailer, 2012: 546). Nonetheless, with increased pressure from domestic interest groups, 
democratic states are more likely to become less cooperative and use hard negotiation 
strategies (Bailer, 2012: 546). Therefore, a state’s political economy and political system bear 
an influence on the position that it adopts within the UNFCCC. While broad in its scope, such 
a study negates important cross-country differences by relying on such a large n-case study. 
While this research helps explicate states’ positions in the climate change negotiations, it 
tends to ignore critical variables related to a country’s political economy and the resulting 
costs and benefits that the redistribution caused by mandatory mitigation policies will incur.  
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1.4.4 Climate Change and Environmental Politics: Interplay of Structural- and Unit-
Level Influences  
In the US context, Robert Falkner has provided the most sophisticated and integrated attempt 
to explain the USA’s foreign environmental policies and the dual influences of its position in 
the international and domestic systems. Falkner suggests that the shift in the USA’s 
environmental leadership of the 1970s and 1980s is indirectly attributed to its hegemonic 
position within an international system that has changed from a bipolar to a unipolar structure 
(Falkner, 2005:585). He points out that since the 1992 UNCED conference, US foreign 
policy has become “hostile” to the enforcement of stringent environmental controls (Falkner, 
2005:585). However, Falkner argues that US hegemony plays an indirect role in its pursuit of 
foreign environmental policies, rather direct influences can be found in domestic sources 
within the interplay between domestic interest groups and the fragmented US political 
system, thus combining state-society, state structure and a government bargaining model 
(Falkner, 2005:586, 593). In particular, the federal structure of the US system leads to 
“deadlock between competing institutional interests” and the ability of the United States to 
accede to international environmental agreements (Falkner, 2005:593). A second variable that 
Falkner identifies is pluralist interest group politics whereby, “Because of the openness of the 
foreign policymaking process and the active involvement of domestic interest groups in the 
environmental field, the US role in global environmental politics would be incomprehensible 
if nonstate actors were not taken into account.” (Falkner, 2005:594). 
Although it is more developed than other studies, there are a number of shortcomings to his 
approach. Falkner adopts a broad understanding of environmental issues whereas climate 
change is a far more complex and nuanced environmental problem than those of earlier eras. 
In earlier decades, the US had far more stringent environmental laws relative to other 
countries, so it was in its interest to enforce stringent environmental treaties. Secondly, even 
though he gives significance to domestic factors, his analyses glosses over many of the 
contradictions and nuances of US involvement in environmental negotiations and negates 
many of the differences between administrations. 
There are studies which have investigated how US climate politics at the unit-level have 
influenced its position in the UNFCCC negotiations (Fisher et al., 2013:524). Most scholars 
agree that the federal structure of the US political system influences its domestic and 
international climate policies (Jones, 1991; Farber, 2008; Selin and VanDeveer, 2009). 
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Christiansen’s (2003:350 – 356) study found that US climate policy was impeded by a 
combination of factors which he identified as the federal structure of the US political system 
and its separation of power; cost uncertainty referring to the uncertainty that activities aimed 
at reducing GHG emissions will have on the US economy; scientific uncertainty; and the role 
of interest and lobby groups which have a more ambiguous role with some companies 
strongly resisting the abatement of GHGs while others support such measures. By contrast, 
Selin and VanDeveer (2007:17, 22) identify climate policy-making at the state and municipal 
level as influencing increased federal-level policy-making on climate change which will be 
modelled on existing sub-national policies through networked actors who influence policy 
making by policy diffusion and learning, and demonstrating the feasibility of the policies, 
thereby identifying the sources and change of US foreign policy at the sub-national level. A 
study by Fisher et al. (2013:525) analysed how Congressional politics contributes to climate 
change policy in the US using network analysis by identifying coalitions of actors who have 
similar policy core beliefs, otherwise known as ideological networks (Fisher at al., 
2013:230). This revealed how over time positions towards climate change in the US Congress 
shifted by identifying emerging cliques that alter in terms of supporters and opponents of 
climate change policy (Fisher et al., 2013:537). Over time, ideological networks have 
changed in the US Congress towards climate change with a move beyond the traditional 
bipartisan divide over climate change (Fisher et al., 2013:537 - 538). Vezirgiannidou (2013) 
employed framing, which is defined as alternative “ways of presenting the problem” as an 
analytical framework to understand the interaction between various policy goals in US energy 
policy wherein decision-makers “framed” climate change to influence the policy process by 
presenting it as an issue connected to energy security and economic growth in order to 
increase constituent support. This is however a problematic approach. At the rhetorical level, 
all administrations claimed that they supported climate change as an environmental, energy 
security, and economic growth issue, while Congressional, as well as federal, politics have 
ebbed and altered in their support for climate change over time. Overall, Lutzenhiser (2001) 
identified resistance stemming from Congress and powerful vested interests as impacting 
these policy efforts. 
While the afore-mentioned studies focused singularly on factors at the domestic, or unit, level 
in influencing US policies towards both domestic climate policy and the UNFCCC, a number 
of studies have used Putnam’s two-level game to examine the United States’ position in the 
global climate change negotiations to indicate how President George W. Bush used the 
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USA’s political climate to legitimate his unilateral and hawkish approach in international 
relations which included climate change (Downie, 2013; Lisowski, 2002; Sprintz and Weiß, 
2001). These studies emphasise the influence of different actors at the domestic level in 
influencing the executive, whether departmental, and bureaucratic actors (Downie, 2013) or 
vested interests (Lisowski, 2002). Problematically these studies are often inconsistent in their 
analyses and emphasise domestic level variables while leaving unanswered questions 
concerning the influence of the international system on countries’ negotiating positions. The 
USA’s refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol has been attributed to Bush’s particular foreign 
policy that is based on leadership understood as “going  it alone” whereby his administration 
differentiated itself from the Kyoto model by designing what they perceived to be a more 
realistic and pragmatic alternative (Eckersley, 2007:315). This foreign policy stance was 
pursued even more strongly because of the particular energy policy that the Bush 
administration wished to enact, one that was strongly supportive of increasing domestic fossil 
fuel production in the midst of concerns that efforts to mitigate climate change would 
increase the price of US energy and have negative ramifications for the strength of the US 
economy and the international competitiveness of US industries.  
In this regard energy, specifically the USA’s dependence on fossil fuels, its natural resource 
endowment and its energy infrastructure, has played a major role in constraining its domestic 
and foreign climate policies (Fisher, 2006:469). It has been difficult to change US energy 
policy in spite of a generally agreed need to reduce US dependence on petroleum (Bang, 
2010:1645). There is a disagreement amongst scholars about this issue area. This policy 
impasse is attributed to the role and design of institutions, the ideological gridlock within the 
separation of power and resistance to a transition away from fossil fuels for economic reasons 
(Bang, 2010:1645, 1647). Byrne et al. (2007) account for the differences between state and 
federal level governments’ support for energy and climate policies. They trace these 
divergences to the structure of the US federal system which at the federal level allows vested 
interests greater access to and input into the Congressional policy-making process; while at 
the state level, direct citizen access allows civic attitudes to influence support for climate and 
energy policies; as well as policy-makers’ perception of the economic benefits of enacting 
such policies at the state-level (Byrne et al., 2007:4566 - 4568). Nonetheless, this is still 
puzzling as this does not indicate why state-level support has not trickled-up to the federal 
level in spite of wide-spread support for climate change policies and mitigation. To illustrate 
this, Lowry (2008) studied the difference between energy policy and environmental policy in 
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the US context and claimed that the former incurs a greater distributive effect than the latter, 
which produced different policy outcomes (2008:1196). He concludes that different policies 
produce different kinds of politics, and that such changes result in different kinds of politics 
and policy outcomes (Lowry, 2008:1196).   
1.4.5 A Discussion of the Role of Energy Policy 
Although examining a different country, one analysis that offers a different explanation 
relates to the securitisation of energy resources, and their perceived costs and benefits. In the 
pursuit of competing policy priorities, Michaels and Tal (2015) found that Israel moved away 
from its climate policy with the discovery of natural gas reserves which shifted the calculus 
on climate change mitigation and potential economic gains. Such trade-offs are embedded in 
decision-makers’ perception that energy security essentially entails a continuous supply of 
fossil fuels which undermined mitigation in favour of fossil fuel production and economic 
growth within an altered energy profile (Michaels and Tal, 2015:480 – 481). This showcases 
the difficulties involved in implementing a comprehensive climate and energy policy in view 
of competing policy priorities (Michaels and Tal, 2015:481). Thereby, in the hierarchy of 
policy goals, energy security undermines climate change (Michaels and Tal, 2015:484). 
At both the local and global level, energy and national interest intersect (Wirth et al. 2003). 
Energy is a critical input of economic processes and is essential to economic and social 
development making it a crucial input for the realisation of sustainable development, ranging 
from the alleviation of poverty to the limitation of environmental degradation (Bohi and 
Toman, 1996; Nussbaumer et al., 2013:101). This results in the close relationship that exists 
between the state and the energy industry at the domestic level, which allows the state to 
assimilate an interventionist role in energy policy in order to maintain energy security (Helm, 
2002:174; Helm, et al., 1988; Raman, 2013). However, the role of the state and its policy 
objectives in this policy area have altered over time. 
While various authors offer a number of explanations for the climate change negotiations’ 
impasse, energy policy remains an underexplored variable within most analyses. Nussbaumer 
et al. (2013:101) argue that the energy system is facing two major challenges, these being 
“the need to ensure the supply of affordable and reliable energy while at the same time 
drastically curbing related greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Those issues are intrinsically 
intertwined.” However, most studies that analyse these challenges focus on technological and 
economic problems and solutions to climate change and energy security (Krey and Clarke, 
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2011:1131, Kim, 2014; Kerr, 2007; Heller, 1996; Lilliestam et al., 2012; Hübler and Steckel, 
2012; Cherry et al., 2014:562; Alquist and Guénnete, 2014; Zhang et al., 2014; Mah et al., 
2013; Wittmann; 2013). While such studies make an important contribution, they pay 
insufficient attention to the historical context that these issues are embedded in and that offer 
a set of opportunities and constraints to these problems and solutions.  
Recent scholarship has thus begun to pay closer attention to the connection between the goals 
of energy security and climate change (mitigation) in energy policy (Cherp et al., 2013). 
While some scholars argue that there may be overlap between energy security and mitigation 
policies, especially in the area of innovation (Kim, 2014), the precise role that renewable 
energy might play in climate change mitigation is highly uncertain while its precise role in 
enhancing energy security also remains unclear, although in the long-term, well-designed 
policies which reduce the dependence on fossil fuels by diversifying technology and fuel 
choice can improve energy security (Krey and Clarke, 2011:1132; Trainer, 2013; IEA, 
2007:13). While the production of cheap natural gas through hydraulic fracturing was a key 
policy driver a few years ago, in recent years, energy policy has been influenced by the 
decrease in renewable energy prices which has emerged as a key policy driver towards 
decarbonisation globally (IRENA, 2018:4). An important contribution was made by the 
World Energy Council who developed the concept of the energy trilemma, defined as the 
management of three related aspects of energy systems: energy equity, environmental 
sustainability and energy security (World Energy Council, 2019:11). The ability to achieve 
the necessary coherence between these aspects requires the cooperation between social and 
economic factors, governments and private organisations as well as natural resources and 
consumer behaviour (World Energy Council, 2019:11). 
A recent study by Kropatcheva (2014) which focuses on Russia’s energy weapon and power 
as a case study has argued that states’ energy choices must be situated within a broader global 
context whereby technological breakthroughs and the introduction of new energy 
commodities, such as shale gas, are beginning to impact and transform global energy 
relations and policies. This highlights that the deliberations on the trade-offs between various 
domestic and foreign policy goals would be problematic, complex and bound by a political 
process. Shaffer points out that “energy and politics are intrinsically linked. A country’s 
ability to access energy supplies and the ways in which it uses energy crucially determines 
the state of its economy, its national security, and the quality and sustainability of its 
environment.” (Shaffer, 2009:1). Yet, this important area of interaction remains understudied 
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in Political Science and International Relations (IR) – especially in terms of the wider 
implications that this interaction has for multilateral negotiations (Shaffer, 2009:18). Per 
consequence, this area of investigation remains limited when applied to the sphere of the 
global climate change negotiations. Most studies that link the climate change negotiations to 
energy policy are principally technical and economic studies or if they do this, it is done very 
weakly and quite rarely (Pearson and Foxon, 2012; Fouquet and Pearson, 2012; Mediavilla et 
al., 2013). Yet energy policy consists of multiple, and often contradictory goals and, as will 
be highlighted in the thesis, it is not clear how decision-makers make sense of these.  
To some degree, most scholars have agreed that the US policy process and associated 
outcomes are determined by the federal structure of US politics. Moreover, their studies 
indicate that at the unit-level, it is difficult to separate independent variables, with most 
studies emphasising a multi-causal interaction of factors as influencing US domestic and 
foreign policies. Moreover, studies are divided over the effects of the incursion of vested 
interests (Falkner, 2005; Lutzenhiser, 2001) or ideological gridlock (Fisher et al. 2013) in 
influencing policy outcomes. While providing a beneficial analytical perspective, 
nevertheless, over the last three decades a number of studies have recognised that subjective 
beliefs can form important causal mechanisms in political outcomes, whether at the 
international or domestic level. To understand the role of ideas, advances in this regard have 
been made in the policy process scholarship. At this point, it is important to emphasise that 
this study is theoretically grounded in IR but has contributions added to its theoretical 
framework through the emphasis on policy goals and the importance of ideas from the policy 
process scholarship which the following section elaborates and which are understood within 
the parameters of the discussion thus far. 
1.4.6 The Policy Process Literature 
The policy process literature focuses mainly on factors found at the unit-level which bear an 
influence on domestic policy outcomes. While recognising the importance of a variety of 
factors in influencing the policy process and outcomes, the process of policy change is an 
ambiguous one, and early scholarship argued that policy changed as a result of social 
pressure wherein governments formulated policy merely in response to social conflict 
(Bennet and Howlett, 1992:275). In contrast, a new stream of scholarship emphasised the role 
of ideas in influencing the policy process offering a stronger analytical ability than traditional 
social conflict-based theories (Bennet and Howlett, 1992:276).   
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Policy-makers’ ideational prisms, consisting of ideas and ideology, help to influence the 
policy process by establishing “road maps” which guide a course of action, by limiting policy 
options once they are institutionalised, and by influencing the interactions amongst policy-
makers (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003:126 - 127). These ideas help to determine the type of 
goals and instruments that a policy will consist of as well as the nature of the problems that 
these must deal with (Hall, 1993:279). In parallel, the concept of the policy paradigm shift 
was introduced by Peter Hall in his seminal 1993 article in order to indicate how ideas 
dominating particular policy paradigms influence policy change (Hall, 1993; Kern and 
Kuzemko, 2014:513; Baumgartner, 2013:239). In his reference to the philosopher of science, 
Thomas Kuhn, Hall indicates that first and second level change correspond to normal 
policymaking, that is change that does not challenge the overall terms of a policy paradigm; 
while third order change is different in that it exhibits a radical alteration in the overall terms 
of policy (Hall, 1993:279). From an analytical point of view, by identifying the different 
kinds of policy change, it is possible to locate these changes relative to one another (Hall, 
1993:279). Thus, radical shifts in a policy paradigm accompany alterations in three related 
areas of policy: (i) the instrument settings, (ii) the policy instruments and (iii) the hierarchical 
order of policy goals
7
 (Hall, 1993:279).  
Jones and Baumgartner (1993), while having a similar thesis, highlight the impact of “the 
interaction of the “venues” of political authority and the “image” of the policy, or the ideas 
associated with it” and discuss rival policy “images” in a similar vein to Hall’s idea 
(Baumgartner, 2013:240). Other studies would emphasise the interaction between perceived 
interests, institutions, and ideas in order to indicate how actors’ interests are influenced 
during the policy process (Béland, 2009). However, policy paradigms are not merely static 
frameworks that influence the policy process and result in policy outcomes in a reductionist 
manner (Béland and Cox, 2013). Instead, Béland and Cox (2013:193) argue that,  
“…policy paradigms have been studied for representing more than fads or 
fashions. For these scholars, policy paradigms embody political struggle, 
specifically, the struggle among competing ideas (and the actors carrying 
them) about how best to address policy problems. How paradigms grow in 
popularity, how they endure, and how they are supplanted by new ideas are 
                                                          
7
 For the purpose of this study, the main focus will be on policy goals. Policy instruments will not be 
investigated as these are outside the scope of this particular study and will only be mentioned occasionally. 
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known to represent the changing political fortunes of powerful actors in a 
society…to highlight the study of policy paradigms as a way to understand 
power and the role of ideas in policymaking.” 
Although in this perspective, the process of decision-making is multifaceted and is influenced 
by cultural, economic, political and social factors, the distribution of power among 
participants in the decision-making process and their ability to influence both decisions and 
non-decisions is integral to understanding policy outcomes (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963:632; 
Bachrach and Baratz, 1962:947 – 948; Arts and Van Tatenhove, 2004).  Lasswell and Kaplan 
(1950:75) note that, “the concept of power is perhaps the most fundamental in the whole of 
political science: the political process is the shaping, distribution, and exercise of power”. 
Power is thus the pervasive feature and common denominator of both domestic and 
international politics, but it is distributed differently in the two spheres.  
The scope of the literature review has provided an overview of many studies that have 
contributed to our knowledge of states’ positions in the global climate change negotiations, as 
well as the factors that influence policy outcomes within the domestic and international 
settings. However, there are two serious oversights in these scholarly endeavours that this 
study wishes to explore. While the literature has highlighted various dynamics of the climate 
change negotiations it has insufficiently linked these emergent trends to the socio-historical 
development of energy policy as a configuration of the material and ideational. Nor have 
these studies consistently analysed the interaction between two levels of analysis. It is argued 
here that understanding states’ response to the changing trends within their energy policies 
will assist in understanding states’ positions within the UNFCCC negotiations
8
. Over the last 
twenty years concerns over climate change have required that policy-makers face trade-offs 
in their attempt to find a solution to these two processes. Because energy policy must achieve 
a number of contested goals leading to a hierarchy of policy priorities, the mitigation of 
climate change may be subsumed by competing objectives seen as the foundation for social 
and economic well-being (Frei, 2004:1253). In addition, studies focus on short time frames in 
their analysis of US climate policy and its position within the UNFCCC which often leads to 
limited conclusions. By undertaking a historical study, this research can trace the 
development of US energy policy and its position within the UNFCCC, and thereby be able 
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to better contextualise the interactions between the two policy areas as well as indicate 
continuity and change amongst successive administrations’ stance towards these policies.  
1.5 Theoretical Framework 
The analytical framework
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International Relations, and more specifically Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) to account for 
the particular foreign policy decisions of states using general theoretical assumptions 
(Wohlforth, 2012:42; Hudson, 2005:1). FPA operates at a level of analysis that is concerned 
with analysing the motives of state behaviour, and thus combines international and domestic 
factors to understand such outcomes (Hill, 2003:7 - 10). Hudson and Vore (1995:210) thus 
argue that, “In effect, FPA provides an alternative to the “black-boxing” of the inner 
workings of nations common to actor-general theories. It unpacks the box by examining 
foreign policy decision-making. In effect, FPA takes a foreign policy decision-making 
approach to the study of IR.” While a number of strands of realist thought exist (Walt, 1998), 
this work argues that it is neoclassical realism, as a variant of the FPA approach, which is the 
most optimal approach in analysing outcomes in international climate change negotiations 
and energy policy which will be further elaborated on in chapter two.  
Gideon Rose argues in Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy (1998) that 
neoclassical realism, in juxtaposition to neorealism, takes into account both the internal and 
external variables in its explanation of state behaviour (Rose, 1998: 146). Neorealism, as 
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 Although this is not its focus, this scholarship has the potential to contribute to neoclassical realism as a 
theoretical framework and wishes to understand how a theoretical framework which is focused on traditional 
security threats makes sense of new trends such as climate change. 
10
 Most thinkers who identify themselves with this theoretical framework have in common their emphasis on the 
power struggle amongst states as determining the outcome of international relations and are predominantly 
pessimistic with regards to the elimination of conflict amongst states. 
11
 While the thesis makes use of neoclassical realism, it should be noted that since this is an interdisciplinary, 
historical study, its use of neoclassical realism is different to the way that this theory is employed in more 
traditional IR studies. That is, the use of this theory is carried out within a historical study and crucially since 
neoclassical realism represents a relatively recent analytical framework, scholars have used it in different ways 
to suit the aims of their studies, and moreover scholars such as Mastanduno (1991) and Kropatcheva (2014) 
have used it within qualitative analyses.  
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described in Kenneth Waltz’s
12
 classic Theory of International Politics (1979), states that it is 
essentially the structural influence of the international system which accounts for state 
behaviour (Donnelly, 2009:36). Waltz further specifies that it is the combination of anarchy 
and hierarchy in the international system that assembles the roles and positions of states 
therein thus erasing qualitative differences amongst them (Donnelly, 2009:36). The main 
differences between states within such a system are that of capability instead of function 
creating a hierarchically ordered distribution of capabilities (Donnelly, 2009:36-37). 
Accordingly, states are differentiated according to their power within such a system (Gilpin, 
1988:591). This creates the condition of self-help that marks the international system, where 
states can only count on themselves for the achievement of their goals, since there is no 
overarching body that can provide them with this assistance (Donnelly, 2009:36). 
Neoclassical realism criticises neorealism’s emphasis on systemic variables as the sole 
explanatory variables of state behaviour as such an approach negates how policy-makers 
interpret these systemic pressures which are bound to be differentiated from one state to 
another.  
Neoclassical realism posits that foreign policy is motivated firstly, by a state’s position in the 
hierarchic international system and the relative material power capabilities that it possesses 
and secondly, the influence of its power capabilities on foreign policy needs to be analysed 
by understanding how systemic pressure is interpreted through intervening variables at the 
unit-level understood to be domestic state structures and the perceptions of policy-makers 
(Rose, 1998: 146). Relative power capabilities thus constitute the boundaries of a state’s 
foreign policy according to this mode of thought (Rose, 1998: 146). Neoclassical realism 
therefore argues that it is necessary to examine the strength of the state vis-à-vis society 
“because these affect the proportion of national resources that can be allocated to foreign 
policy.” (Rose, 1998:147). The consequence of this is that states that have similar capabilities 
but diverse state structures will likely act differently on the international stage which requires 
a careful examination of the context within which foreign policies are created and carried out 
(Rose, 1998:147). States’ changing capabilities are used by neoclassical realists to understand 
the changing nature of “policymakers’ perception of external threats, interests and 
opportunities.” (Rose, 1998:156). Although critics argue that it is not as parsimonious as 
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 Although the thesis is aware that Kenneth Waltz is a neorealist, in those sections where there is a structural-
level analysis, the thesis will cite Kenneth Waltz to develop the theoretical insights in the structural-level 
analysis section as well as the neoclassical realist framework. 
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structural realism (Legro and Moravscik, 1999), by emphasising the role of internal variables, 
and state-society structures, neoclassical realism can offer a richer, more historically accurate 
analysis of state behaviour. While there is the risk that variables are integrated in an arbitrary 
manner, a careful consideration of the influences on the subject matter being investigated 
permits the study to have a coherent approach to its analysis. This will be expanded upon in 
chapter two. 
While the thesis as an interdisciplinary study draws upon the policy process literature, a brief 
reference will be made to three theoretical frameworks in the policy process literature and the 
rationale for not using these within the thesis. Public choice theory explains political 
behaviour through the application of principles embedded within neo-classical economics 
(Howlett and Ramesh, 2003:22). This model contends that political actors act rationally to 
“maximize their ‘utility’” and are influenced by self-interest in their decision-making related 
to public policy making (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003:22 – 23). On the other hand, actor-
centred institutionalism posits that political institutions are relatively insulated from the social 
context in which they are embedded and are furthermore guided by norms, rules and 
principles in determining their behaviour (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003:29). The state is 
therefore influenced by the establishment of government institutions and the historical 
progress of this institutional arrangement, which influence and limit future decisions (Howlett 
and Ramesh, 2003:29). A nuanced view is provided by principal agent theory which seeks to 
understand the reasons for policy failure where a gulf between the original political aims and 
subsequent administrative behaviour was evident in policy implementation (Howlett and 
Ramesh, 2003:191). The division between the aims of policy designers and the actual 
implementation by administrators arises from a complex interplay of factors such as 
intergovernmental collaboration and the autonomy of regulators when dealing with a 
particular policy problem and likewise the nature of the policy, all of which affect outcomes 
in a particular context (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003:191 – 192). While these theories provide 
invaluable insight to comprehending the public policy process, the study wishes to 
understand the interaction between international negotiations and a particular policy domain, 
in this case, energy policy, rather than understanding the policy process per se. 
While other approaches are valuable and can provide important insights, neoclassical realism 
was chosen as it could analyse the complex nature of the study under investigation, these 
being both the UNFCCC negotiations as well as energy policy. While neoclassical realism is 
anchored in IR within the overall context of realist theory, it is still sufficiently adaptable to 
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include unit-level variables, which would permit the study to achieve better insight into the 
interaction between US energy policy and its negotiating position within the UNFCCC 
process by investigating the influence of both structural-, but also unit-level variables. 
Thereby the thesis would gain a more comprehensive overview of this interaction. The thesis 
further relied on neoclassical realism as it is more appropriate to be used within qualitative 
and historical research (Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell, 2016:109, 110). Since neoclassical 
realism is a theoretical framework that emphasises the importance of structural-level factors, 
that is the distribution of power in the international system, in influencing policy outcomes, 
this gives it an advantage vis-à-vis theories that predominantly emphasise domestic factors in 
influencing such outcomes (Taliaferro et al., 2009:7). However, it has an added advantage 
over neorealism in its incorporation of unit-level variables within its analysis allowing this 
theoretical framework to be more nuanced, but simultaneously by placing emphasis on the 
structural-level it is able to show the complex interaction between the two levels, unlike 
constructivism which emphasises the role of ideas to a much greater extent (as, in fact, being 
constitutive of social reality), but neglects the role of material and structural power, as well as 
liberal institutionalism and its incorporation of the societal influence (Taliaferro et al., 
2009:289 – 290, 293 – 294). This offers neoclassical realism an advantage vis-à-vis these 
alternative theoretical frameworks and permits a more comprehensive and nuanced 
understanding of the subject matter being analysed. 
1.6 Research Design and Methodology  
The plurality of studies that have examined the complex interactions between energy policy 
and the UNFCCC negotiations have been for the most part exclusively economic or technical 
studies that tend to ignore historical path dependence, socio-political variables and have 
likewise focused on quantitative methodological approaches to the collection and analysis of 
data (Pearson and Foxon, 2012; Fouquet and Pearson, 2012; Mediavilla et al., 2013; Shaffer, 
2009:18; Stoddard, 2013:1). By contrast, the purpose of this research is to consider how 
energy policy interacts with the US position in the UNFCCC negotiations which will be 
studied by employing the theory-guided case study method (Bennett, 1996; Odell, 1996; 
Levy, 2008). To fill this research gap and supplement previous studies, this methodology  is 
based on a qualitative approach towards data analysis in order to study “cases as wholes” 
wherein context and history play a strong analytical role which leads to “highly detailed 
description” (Lim, 2010:18; Mouton, 2012:154). In Rose’s article he argues that the work of 
neoclassical realists shares a commonality in that they assume a common independent 
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variable which is relative power, and utilise a specific methodological approach consisting of 
historical analysis (Taliaferro et al., 2009:7).  
Qualitative research is guided by a particular methodological approach that is made up of a 
set of methods which conform to a certain logic (Babbie and Mouton, 2008:270). Thus, what 
is referred to as qualitative research
13
 is an “umbrella term” which consists of a number of 
approaches within this framework (Holloway and Wheeler, 2002:3). Qualitative research 
methodology strives for in-depth description and an interpretive understanding of the 
phenomena been studied and to understand these processes within their specific historically-
bounded context (Babbie and Mouton, 2008:270, 273, Holloway and Wheeler, 2002:8). Per 
consequence, description has to be rich and detailed and gain an understanding of actions and 
events within their context (Babbie and Mouton, 2008:271). Qualitative research has certain 
advantages because it reduces the likelihood of “data-induced measurement error” through 
the use of rich description making it possible to reduce simple coding error which is more 
likely in large-N statistical databases (Odell, 1996:75; Mahoney, 2007:128). Although 
realism falls within the positivist methodological approach, for the purpose of this study, 
following Kropatcheva (2014), this study employs neoclassical realism within a qualitative, 
historical approach whereby the study does not focus on proving a causal relationship 
between dependent and independent variables nor testing hypothesis but instead the emphasis 
is on exploring interactions and mutual influences within an interdisciplinary study. To gain 
insight into these dynamics, this interdisciplinary, historical study is theoretically based in IR 
but draws on concepts from the field of policy studies to better understand this complex 
terrain alluded to above. The case study
14
 research strategy is beneficial for the investigation 
of complex social phenomena like the historical development of energy policy and associated 
outcomes in international negotiations (Yin, 2003:2). While case study research is widely 
used, there is no single definition of the concept case study (Levy, 2008:2). For the purpose 
of this study, a case can be defined as “an instance of a class of events or phenomena...” 
(Odell, 1996:66).  
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 According to Kawulich (2004:96) qualitative data analysis involves the search for patterns and themes to 
emerge out of the data and the establishment of relationships between these (Miles and Huberman, 1984:216). 
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 The use of qualitative research methodology in the case study analysis will result in the data that is collected 
to be of a textual nature as opposed to numerical data that is intrinsic to quantitative research methodology. 
Differences between qualitative and quantitative methodological approaches can also be traced to philosophical 




Although analysts apply different terms to the variety of cases available, this study makes use 
of the interpretive case study (Lijphart, 1971:692), also known as the theory-guided case 
study
15
 (Levy, 2008:4). For the purpose of this research, the focus will be on understanding a 
particular case and interpreting a defined phenomenon rather than attempting to generalise 
(Levy, 2008; Lijphart, 1971:692). The strength of this approach is that it allows for an 
improved understanding of the most important issues characterising the phenomenon (Levy, 
2008:5). While a theoretical contribution is not the focus of this case study, it uses an existing 
theoretical framework to improve our knowledge of a particular case and by guiding 
empirical analysis and formulating the research questions (Lijphart, 1971:692; Mearsheimer 
and Walt, 2013:429; Levy, 2008:2). Although the concern is that it is not possible to draw 
general conclusions from a single case, the advantage of the case study is that by allowing the 
researcher to do an in-depth investigation of a phenomenon, it allows for the emergence of 
general propositions (Lijphart; 1971:691; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2013:429, 430). There are 
therefore three interconnected aspects that will be discussed in the rest of this section: the use 
of theoretical analysis within the case study method, historical analysis and analytic 
eclecticism.  
Since historical analysis is integral to the study, it should be noted that, “there is no single 
mode of historical research in IR.” (Hobson and Lawson, 2008:420). As such, the historical 
analysis within the thesis adheres to an understanding of the subject matter, while “this 
approach recognises the role of accident, contingency, agency, contextuality and particularity 
alongside that played by structure and continuity” (Hobson and Lawson, 2008:429). It should 
be emphasised that this study draws on a number of influences to illuminate novel areas of 
influences and patterns regarding the interaction between US energy policy with the US 
position in the UNFCCC negotiations. This broad overview does not permit the study to 
analyse the more fine-tuned and nuanced aspects of each administration within this subject 
area.  Such breadth of analysis also requires that concepts be carefully synthesised in order to 
form a coherent study as there is the risk of meandering between the key points raised. 
Nevertheless, the broad historical overview and conceptual integration allow the study to 
identify patterns and factors that may not have been as evident were a different approach 
utilised. The implications thereof for the theoretical analysis is that the focus is on two levels 
of analysis and the goals of US energy policy and their interactions with the US position in 
                                                          
15
 Other terms used to refer to a similar concept are disciplined-configurative (Eckstein, 1975); case-explaining 
(Van Evera, 1997) and interpretive (Lijphart, 1971) case studies (Levy, 2008:4).   
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the UNFCCC. Neoclassical realism is well-suited for studying the influence between these 
two arenas, these being international negotiations and a particular policy domain, in this case, 
energy policy, which should alleviate some of the weaknesses associated with the 
development of a historical study. Analytical induction, and specifically, in the form of 
retroduction, will form the qualitative method of analysis by relying on the theoretical 
assumptions of neoclassical realism (Babbie and Mouton, 2012:270, 643). Retroduction in 
this instance assists in analysing the emergent patterns in the data in order to understand the 
above subject matter (Babbie and Mouton, 2012:643).  
The use of this case study places emphasis on understanding. Moon (1977:184) highlights 
that understanding, as an approach in the social sciences, is essentially based on “grasping the 
meanings of human actions in terms of the practices or conventions of the society in which 
they are performed…”. This is in juxtaposition to positivism and its emphasis that 
explanations in the social sciences can be akin to the natural sciences and thereby human 
behaviour can be tested and hypothesised as part of general laws (Moon, 1977:184). Thereby, 
understanding aims to specify what events mean within broader patterns of interactions 
(Hollis and Smith, 1991:1-2). It should be noted that whenever “interpretation” is mentioned 
in the analysis, it is not akin to a hermeneutical or postsructuralist approach, but rather, 
“interpretation” is meant in the sense of theoretical application, where theory was used to 
“interpret” and understand the data (Mouton, 2012:167-168; Rule and John, 2015:4, Hobson 
and Lawson, 2008: 416). As such, the use of “interpretation” within the thesis is bound within 
the case study approach and its emphasis on theoretical application to understand the data 
(Rule and John, 2015:3; Ridder, 2017:299).  
Furthermore, the methodology employed by this study, in combination with neoclassical 
realism as a theoretical framework, is based on an interdisciplinary and historical approach. 
The reliance on a historical analysis entails that interdependence of factors in influencing 
policy-makers is highlighted in contrast to “identifying the ‘independent variable’ which 
affects (causes) changes in dependent variables”, especially in contrast to the ahistorical 
positivism that characterises much IR – although history is an integral aspect of much IR 
analysis (Buckley, 2016:880; Hobson and Lawson, 2008:418). In respect to the importance 
placed on the abilities of decision-makers to undertake choices when faced with structural- 
and unit-level constraints in neoclassical realism, a historical analysis likewise highlights the 
importance of the agency involved in policy-makers’ abilities to undertake decisions 
(Buckley, 2016:881). Narration is an important aspect of this historical approach, and when 
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placed within a historical analysis, provides an understanding of the context within which 
decisions took place (Dray, 1971:153; Koliopoulos, 2019; Suganami, 2008: 328 -329). While 
historical analysis is often associated with the critical-constructivist approach in IR, realist 
scholars, such as Robert Gilpin, have often made use of historical analysis (Koliopoulos, 
2019). Historical analysis is essential to neoclassical realism (Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell, 
2016). As a historical study, the analysis was careful to develop a narrative that outlined the 
major turning points in US energy policy history, the history of the US position in the 
UNFCCC negotiations, and the interaction between these two areas.  Given the breadth and 
complexity of these research areas, a careful assessment had to be undertaken when 
evaluating the adequacy of different sources to narrate the findings (Buckley, 2016:882). 
Within historical analysis, source criticism is essential (Buckley, 2016: 882 - 883). Source 
criticism is based on critically assessing a source based on its internal reliability, and 
introducing checks through the triangulation of data (Buckley, 2016: 882). Furthermore, the 
independence of the source, whether it represents a trustworthy representation of the facts, or 
whether it is geared towards vested interests, should be established (Buckley, 2016: 883). 
The interdisciplinary nature of this study entails its analysis of a subject matter that is 
characterised by its inability to be fully comprehended by a single discipline and thus, “A 
(mono)disciplinary approach, be it a psychological, economical or technical one, is too 
limited to capture any one of these challenges.” (Tobi and Kampen, 2018:1210). Thereby, the 
study relied on IR, energy studies, policy studies and historical analysis to enhance the 
comprehension of the niche subject areas of energy policy and the global climate change 
negotiations. The research design therefore had to be sensitive to the multifaceted nature of 
the subject area being analysed over a historical period (Tobi and Kampen, 2018:1210). 
To analyse the data that had been collected, both official and non-official sources consisting 
of newspaper articles, policy documents, academic, governmental and think tank reports, 
were grouped by era to determine the major turning points in each epoch for the subject 
matter being analysed. The data was then interpreted through the use of theoretical 
application. Since this is a historical study, the sources analysed were categorised by era 
whereby the key policy goals of each era and position towards the UNFCCC by successive 
administrations was distinguished. The bipartisan Congressional Research Service, which 
provides legislative assistance to members of Congress (Congressional Research Service, 
s.a.), was relied on to gain insight into the key milestones in the history of US energy policy 
and position in the UNFCCC. Triangulation was imperative for the reduction of bias (Heale 
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and Forbes, 2013:98). To enhance triangulation, the thesis relied on the use of two or more 
sources to verify the key historical and theoretical claims made therein (Heale and Forbes, 
2013:98). These Congressional Research Service reports were further triangulated with 
newspaper articles, policy documents, academic, governmental and think tank reports. Since 
energy policy goals were integral to the study, the thesis had to reference government reports 
and policies; however, these were never used uncritically and always cross-checked with 
other sources as listed above for areas of agreement and disagreement to develop a rich and 
unbiased description of the policy areas being analysed. 
While neoclassical realism is associated with soft positivism, this research is closely linked 
with analytic eclecticism, understood as, “Analytic eclecticism does not constitute an 
alternative model of research. It is an intellectual stance a researcher can adopt when 
pursuing research that engages, but does not fit neatly within, established research traditions 
in a given discipline or field.” (Sil and Katzenstein, 2012:412).This should not be confused 
with an “anything goes” approach, but rather a carefully thought out strategy that does not 
permit itself to be boxed-in by disciplinary and epistemological boundaries. 
1.6.1 The Selection of the Case Study 
One of the principle challenges for case study research is the selection of an appropriate case 
for investigation (Bennett, 2006:340). As such, Lijphart (1971:693) stresses that “The 
different types of cases…should be kept in mind in selecting and analyzing a single case.” To 
mitigate this, the careful theory-guided selection of cases allows the study to achieve the 
desired level of control (Landman, 2008:28). In this regard, the selection of this case study 
was considered along a variety of dimensions to draw relevant and meaningful conclusions 
from the analysis. Since the case study design will be used to understand the interaction 
between US energy policy and its position in the UNFCCC negotiations, such a selection 
requires that the case exhibit certain unique traits. The USA, as a global hegemon, occupies a 
unique position in the international system. Historically, the USA played an important role in 
the creation of the UNFCCC and other international regimes in the post-Second World War 
setting.  To avoid a random selection of countries, the choice of the USA was selected for 
additional reasons besides its hegemony (Przeworski and Teune, 1970:32). This case was 
selected based on the following factors: (i) the USA has been marked by a contradiction in its 
energy policy (The Economist 2012; 2014; IEA, 2007). (ii) While most new renewable 
energy capacity had been installed in the developing world (Krey and Clarke, 2011:1153; 
REN21, 2017: 19) this case study focuses on one of the major investors from the developed 
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world (UNEP, Bloomberg, 2013).  (iii) In 2013, it introduced ambitious targets to reduce 
GHG emissions and increase its share of renewable energy generation to meet energy 
demand leading to important policy transformations (IEA, 2013). (iv) It is a party to the 
UNFCCC and a member of the IEA, although crucially, the United States did not ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol. Nevertheless, (v) it has considerable clout in the climate change negotiations 
and is necessary for any effective action to be secured towards a legally-binding agreement.  
1.6.2 Limitations  
The usefulness of the case study method is that it allows the researcher to conduct more in-
depth analysis. This may also open important avenues for further research. An important 
characteristic of this research methodology is that it also tends to be flexible and is 
susceptible to modification during the research process (Cresswell, 2009:176).  A weakness 
cited with the application of this research design stems from its limited generalisability to 
other cases to draw adequate comparisons from (Mouton, 2012, Thies, 2002). Careful 
triangulation should help to greatly reduce bias (Thies, 2002: 362, 364).  
1.6.3 Data Gathering  
Although case studies do not require a specific type of data gathering method, because of the 
inherently complex nature of the international system, much of the data available in IR is 
problematic (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2013:429). To mitigate this condition, carefully 
considered research questions should be developed that guide the process of data gathering 
(Stake, 1995:68). This study generated the necessary data in order to draw its main 
conclusions by analysing a number of different sources
16
 and primarily relies on scholarly 
synthesis in terms of the data that is to be generated (Bearman and Dawson, 2013:253 and 
256; Tong et al., 2012:1). Specifically, data was gathered from the available secondary 
literature on the sources of US foreign and energy policy and the US position within the 
UNFCCC from scholarly journal articles as well as books, analysing both domestic and 
international politics surrounding energy as well as climate change. The research also 
investigated news articles from such reputable news outlets as The Guardian, the Washington 
Post, the BBC, the Economist and the New York Times in order to reconstruct pivotal events 
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 Cresswell further explains that qualitative research methodology also depends on the collection and analyses 
of several sources of data while patterns and themes emerge from their inductive analyses whereby the 
information is categorised into increasingly abstract concepts and relationships (2009:175 - 176). 
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of the eras covered by the research. For the collection of primary data, the American 
Presidency Project has a wide collection of presidential speeches that can substantiate 
firsthand accounts of the policies of each era. Moreover, the Department of State, the 
Department of Energy, the White House and Congress release declassified and historical 
documents from their archives which give a historically detailed account, if not ad verbatim 
narratives, that give an overview of the accounts relevant to a particular historical instance. 
Reports from departments such as the Department of State, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), Department of Energy, and the Council of Economic Advisers on US climate 
change and energy policies were also collected and analysed to develop a more thorough and 
contextualised understanding of the documents described above. These primary and 
secondary accounts are further substantiated by reports and accounts issued by the 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), Congressional Research Service 
(CRS), International Energy Agency (IEA) and Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB). 
Triangulation was an important aspect of data gathering and analysis. 
1.7 Conceptual Overview 
This conceptual overview provides brief definitions of key terms used within the study. It is 
organised according to an analysis of the concepts: perception, ideology, cooperation, policy-
makers and the various attributes of energy and its correlates. The thesis discusses perception 
of policy objectives related to their costs understood as “narrow, rational calculation” 
(Mastanduno et al., 1989:458 – 459; Brooks and Wohlforth, 2000 - 2001:13; Brooks and 
Wohlforth, 2002:97).  Due to the interdisciplinary nature of this study related to its focus on 
climate change and energy (Cass, 2017), the definition of perception
17
 had to be adapted 
somewhat for the purposes of the thesis. That is, perception here corresponds to “narrow 
rational calculation” wherein incentives influence behaviour by changing the relative costs of 
different kinds of decisions’ outcomes (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2002:97). Hence, the thesis 
uses the term “perception” in a modified manner than what is usually defined as “perception” 
in neoclassical realism which is understood as policy-makers’ assesssments of relative power, 
and indicates decision-makers’ assessment of the distribution of power in the international 
system, and whose focus is on international security (Ripsman, 2017). Since the study 
focuses on energy policy and the US position in the UNFCCC, the reference to “narrow 
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rational calculation” and the costs of different kinds of decisions within perception
18
 relates 
to the calculation by policy-makers of the compatibility between various policy goals, 
specifically the compatibility between environmental regulation and economic growth, where 
the cost for US energy is an important consideration especially with regard to its impact on 
the competitiveness and position of the USA relative to other states within the international 
distribution of power, and is influenced by the ideology of the administration, that is, 
Republican and Democrat, and the extent to which policy-makers believe these two goals are 
compatible. Thus, the responses to the cost of energy are used to gain insight into their 
influence on the ability of the USA to cooperate, or not, within the UNFCCC. Hence, while 
policy-makers are rational in the pursuit of their goals, this rationality is limited and 
influenced by ideology
19
 (Oskanian, 2016). The use of perception is restricted to the goals 
that an administration wished to enact and the compatibility therein between the goals of 
environmental regulation and economic growth, especially related to the cost of energy. 
The perception of policy-makers in the executive branch are influenced by a variety of factors 
ranging from the media and opinion polls (Mutz and Soss, 1997), the scientific community 
and scientific discoveries (Pralle, 2009), and vested interests (Ambrosius and Welch 1988). 
While there is a wide array of influences on policy-makers’ perception, this study will only 
be interested in highlighting the importance of political ideology in influencing the perception 
of policy-makers within the executive branch. Ideology is broadly understood as an 
individual’s orientation towards issue areas through a set of political beliefs (Sartori, 
1969:400). Within neoclassical realism, ideology has been shown to play an important role in 
influencing perception (Oskanian, 2016) and while showing how ideology influences 
perception is beyond the scope of the thesis and its broad historical overview, the importance 
of ideology for policy-makers’ perception is that it has important implications for power 
dynamics in neoclassical realism (Oskanian, 2016), and in the US context specifically and its 
political polarisation, the ideology of the two dominant parties, Democrats and Republicans, 
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has being shown to have immense influences on both climate change politics (McCright and 
Dunlap, 2011; Gromet et al., 2013) and energy policy (Adelman and Spence, 2017; Hess et 
al., 2016:20).    
Within the dynamics of international negotiations, Grieco (1988:600) provides the following 
definition of cooperation “International cooperation involves the voluntary adjustment by 
states of their policies in such a way as to help each other reach a mutually desired goal 
(Keohane, 1984, p. 51, cited in Grieco 1988:600)”. Within the thesis, cooperation is used in 
an expansive sense wherein the USA cooperates in the climate change regime, in this 
instance within the dynamics of the UNFCCC, whereby the USA’s cooperation is referred to 
in reference to other states, however as a shorthand thereof in the thesis, reference is also 
made to the USA’s cooperation with the UNFCCC. Within these dynamics, cooperation 
refers to meeting the UNFCCC’s goal of “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in 
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system.” (UNFCCC, 1992). 
When discussing policy-makers and/or decision-makers20 in the thesis, these terms are used 
in reference to policy-makers and decision-makers in the executive branch of government. 
The thesis is aware that there may be divergences between policy-makers within the 
executive branch towards various policy issues; however, for analytical purposes, such 
differences will not be alluded to within the analysis as they are beyond the scope of the 
thesis. Rather, policy-makers within the executive are treated as a coherent entity. Similarly, 
Congress, in its policy-making capacity, is treated as a coherent entity, even though there 
may be differences between individual members, while within the thesis, where appropriate, 
reference may be made to divisive issues within Congress, although this is not the main 
purpose of the thesis. 
Within this study, a complex policy domain related to energy and climate change in the 
United States is analysed and it is worth briefly providing an overview of the main 
conceptual aspects of these policy areas that the thesis analyses. The dissertation focuses on 
the US position in the UNFCCC related to its (in)ability to cooperate – this is often related to 
its insistence on the use of nationally determined actions instead of quantified, legally-
binding emission targets, and that developing nations limit their emissions. Within this 
context, climate policy is broadly concerned with the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions 
                                                          
20
 Policy-makers and decision-makers are used interchangeably in the thesis. 
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and adaptation to climate change (Tol, 2017:432) while energy policy refers to the regulation 
of energy markets by governments (Helm, 2002:174). In regards to energy policy, the study 
is interested in its domestic components related to the perception of the cost of energy and 
mitigation and the hierarchy and trade-offs between policy goals, while the international 
component of US energy policy, as a subset of foreign policy, is interested in the US 
hegemonic role in the global petroleum system between 1945 and 1979. In the US context, 
the domestic component of climate policy observes the mitigation of GHGs in the US 
domestic system, while the international component of US climate policy, as a subset of 
foreign policy and which is one of the main areas of interest for the thesis, refers to the 
USA’s foreign policy towards the UNFCCC (Oberthür and Ott, 1999; Marrow and Light, 
2019:13). Although references are made to the environmental dimension of energy policy, 
domestic climate policy does not feature very prominently in the analysis, however in the 
context of the Clinton and Obama administrations there is mention of climate policy in so far 
as it is important for US energy policy. Within this thesis, energy policy is broadly defined, 
mainly referring to the goals of energy security, low costs of energy and environmental 
regulation (Yacobbuci, 2016:1). As such, energy policy can have both domestic and 
international aspects. The design of energy policy in the United States has been a 
controversial exercise with the difficulties arising from the divergent perceptions surrounding 
what the hierarchic ordering of these goals should be with Yacobbuci explaining that, “For 
some, import dependence is the primary concern; for others, particularly those focused on 
environmental issues, it is a symptom of a general crisis that arises from indiscriminate 
consumption of fossil fuels. A particularly controversial aspect of the debate is the issue of 
global climate change, because burning fossil fuels produces large amounts of carbon 
dioxide, a greenhouse gas. Like the goals of energy policy, the means of achieving them have 
three dimensions: reducing consumption by increased energy efficiency; increasing domestic 
production of conventional energy sources, particularly oil and natural gas; and developing 
new sources of energy, particularly renewable energy and renewable fuels, that can replace 
oil and other fossil fuels…An issue that cuts across all these factors is the role of government. 
How much does and should government policy affect energy markets?” Within the US 
political context, energy policy is translated into numerous pieces of legislation which focus 
on a vast number of issues (Ratner et al., 2018:1). While a number of agencies influence 
climate and energy policy in the United States in terms of its design and implementation 
ranging from the Department of Energy, the EPA, Department of Transportation (DOT), 
Department of Agriculture, Department of Defense and the Department of the Interior (DOI) 
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along with states (CAR, 2016), this thesis focuses specifically on the role played by 
consecutive administrations in shaping US energy policy and its position in the UNFCCC at 
the federal level. 
When discussing energy the following qualifiers are introduced: primary energy refers to 
energy as it is found in its unprocessed state in the environment; secondary energy refers to 
processed energy ready for transmission or transportation; while final energy is used by 
consumers for consumption (Hulscher, s.a.). Energy commodities can be extracted or 
captured directly from natural resources (OECD/IEA, 2005:18). Energy in this paper is thus 
shorthand for energy commodities as energy in this form has international implications. The 
energy system refers to the interconnected network of production, transportation and 
consumption that changes primary energy sources for social use, at either the individual or 
communal scale, where the global energy system is the totality of such networks (Podobnik, 
2006:3). 
In the US context, there is a lot of confusion surrounding the concepts of energy dependence, 
energy independence and energy interdependence. Although it never materialised, the idea of 
achieving independence from perceived foreign interference would become a highly emotive 
rallying call of every presidential run-up (Nivola, 2002:24; Terzic, 2012:2). Even as energy 
independence remains a highly ambiguous and problematic statement, the meaning of 
independence in political rhetoric often refers to either no petroleum consumption or imports 
(Greene, 2010:1614). While most analysts dismiss energy independence as incoherent, 
unrealistic and undesirable, energy independence remains a prominent rhetorical device to the 
trauma induced by the oil crises to the national sense of security and well-being that every 
presidential administration refers to (Greene, 2010:1614; Sovacool, 2007:5505 – 5506; 
Terzic, 2012:2; Yergin, 2006:71). Energy independence has the allure of freeing American 
policy decisions, including its defense, national security as well as foreign policy, from the 
constraints imposed by petroleum producers (Greene, 2010:1614; Miller, 2010:107). 
Nonetheless, political debate continues to centre around ways to reduce US dependence on 
foreign petroleum imports, which is viewed as reducing US vulnerability in its policy domain 
(Miller, 2010: 107). 
There is a great deal of confusion surrounding the concept of energy crisis which has been 
used extensively and loosely (Lindberg, 1977:3). It is not clear what the crisis actually is, and 
whether there was one crisis or numerous crises, and hence which problems policy was meant 
to address: did the problem relate to the vulnerability of the supply of energy, or its cost, or 
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its demand, or of international interdependence (Lindberg, 1977:3). In addition, one of the 
repercussions of the energy crisis was the broadening of the concept of security in both 
academic and policy circles. The new context of the oil crises presented a challenge to 
traditional notions of security: while conflict has an identifiable threat object, the oil crises 
introduced issues that were at once abstract but also tangible, such as economic and industrial 
competitiveness and energy security (Ikenberry, 1986:105). Thus, the conceptualisation of 
energy security is differentiated by perspective because as societies came to face new 
challenges, each historical epoch added a new nuance to the concept (Sovacool and Brown, 
2010:80). A qualitative shift occurred in this era in the conceptualisation of energy security as 
petroleum was no longer merely an element of military strength but had also become a 
critical component of economic growth (Graf, 2010:334). Instead, economic and social well-
being were recognised as critical components for the survival and security of the state (Graf, 
2010:334). 
1.8 Chapter Outline 
Chapter 2 - Neoclassical Realism: Theoretical Origins, History and Evolution 
This chapter commences by providing a historical overview and an analytical framework of 
the main varieties of realism to characterise and justify the use of neoclassical realism. The 
chapter then describes the development of neoclassical realism as a synthesis of classical and 
structural realism. An outline is then provided of the main concepts that neoclassical realism 
will explore to enhance our understanding of the main themes investigated by the thesis.   
Chapter 3 - The Emergence and Development of US Energy Policy up to 1989: 
Petroleum, Hegemonic Ascent and Crises 
This chapter traces the historical origins and evolution of the USA’s energy policy in the 
beginning of the twentieth century and the rise of its position in the global petroleum system. 
It discusses the emergence of two paradigmatic approaches to the energy crisis of the 1970s 
and the era’s environmental constraints. It then discusses the return to traditional energy 
policy regarding its main assumptions and objectives under the Reagan administration in the 
1980s.  
Chapter 4 - The George H.W. Bush Administration 1989 – 1993: The End of the Cold 
War and the Greening of Energy Policy 
36 
 
This chapter discusses the emergence of climate change on the US political agenda in the 
1980s. It then analyses the emergence of climate change mitigation as well as the eras’ main 
challenges and its tension in regards to the design of US energy policy and the difficulties the 
George H.W. Bush administration encountered in establishing a comprehensive energy policy 
and the constraints it faced at the Rio Earth Conference in designing the UNFCCC.   
Chapter 5 - The Clinton Administration 1993 – 2001: The Achilles Hill of the Economy 
This chapter discusses the position of the Clinton administration towards energy policy and 
the UNFCCC. It discusses its attempt to establish a BTU tax on the heat content of the fuel as 
well as the Climate Change Action Plan (1993) to meet the challenge of economic growth and 
environmental regulation, while also meeting the goal set by the UNFCCC. The Clinton 
administration’s involvement in the design of the Kyoto Protocol is discussed and the reasons 
for its inability to ratify this agreement.   
Chapter 6 – The George W. Bush Administration (2001 – 2009): Risks to Continuous 
Supply in the 2000s 
This chapter discusses the Bush administration’s decision to repudiate the Kyoto Protocol in 
2001. It further analyses the Bush administration’s Report of the National Energy Policy 
Development Group (2001) and the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT2005) in reaction to 
the era’s challenges and the implications thereof for this administration’s position towards the 
Kyoto Protocol. 
Chapter 7 - The Obama Administration (2009 - 2015): Energy Policy, Climate Change 
and the UNFCCC 
A discussion of the energy policy developed by the Obama administration during its two 
presidential terms is analysed. An overview of the differences in the Obama administration’s 
cooperation towards the UNFCCC in Copenhagen (2009) and Paris (2015) and the manner in 
which the development of its energy policy influenced this is provided. 
Chapter 8 – Conclusion 
This chapter provides an overview of the study’s main conclusions, its weaknesses and 
general remarks. A recommendation for future research based on the study’s findings will be 
discussed. The historical overview undertaken by the study will illuminate important 
similarities but also differences between the administrations, and trace the developments of 
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the synergies and trade-offs between US energy policy and its position at the UNFCCC over 
the successive decades.  
38 
 
               Chapter 2 
Neoclassical Realism: Theoretical Origins, History and 
Evolution 
2.1 Introduction 
The puzzling interplay between structural- and unit-level variables and resultant policy 
outcomes has produced a prolific debate amongst IR scholars. The level of analysis problem 
(Singer, 1961) and the tension between the structure and the agent
21
 (Wendt, 1987) hearkens 
to the very root of theorising in IR about the origins and consequences of state behaviour. 
Decision-makers need to be able to make sense of a wide range of interactions that occur at 
the domestic and international levels when formulating a coherent set of policies. 
Neoclassical realism, which is a synthesis of classical and structural realism, attempts to 
account for how foreign policy is influenced by the anarchic structure of the international 
system whose influence is filtered through the unit-level variables found at the domestic 
setting. Neoclassical realism emphasises the dominant effect of the structure of the 
international system according to neorealism while maintaining classical realism’s emphasis 
on the intervening role played by domestic-level variables. That is, when foreign policy 
deviates from optimal, rational formulation, neoclassical realism argues that unit-level 
variables and ideational structures are responsible for the deviation. To provide an overview 
of this interaction between unit- and structural-level variables in determining foreign policy 
outcomes, the subject area to which the theory is applied is energy policy and multilateral 
environmental negotiations.  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the basic assumptions of neoclassical 
realism, how it is differentiated from both classical and structural realism, how it will be 
applied to the subject matter under consideration and what the possible strengths and 
weaknesses of this approach are. With this in mind, the chapter begins with a discussion of 
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 Wendt explains this as, “Despite their many differences, however, the "agent-structure," "parts whole," "actor-
system," and "micro-macro" problems all reflect the same meta-theoretical imperative-the need to adopt, for the 
purpose of explaining social behaviour, some conceptualization of the ontological and explanatory relationship 
between social actors or agents (in this case, states) and societal structures (in this case, the international 
system).” (Wendt, 1987:338 – 339) 
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the most important assumptions of the theory as well as to describe additional elements that 
are important for analysis such as the national interest, political economy, vested interests, 
and multilateral negotiations. It then presents a brief discussion of neoclassical realism’s 
interaction with energy policy and climate change followed by a discussion of the possible 
strengths and weaknesses of this theoretical framework. 
Neoclassical realism, and its predecessors classical and structural realism, belong to the 
realist school of thought, which is the oldest and most prominent theoretical framework in 
International Relations (IR), making these rest on a number of related assumptions which 
include: the state
 
is the primary actor in the international system; the international system is 
characterised by anarchy, understood as the absence of a global government or sovereign, 
which drives international competition and conflict; the struggle for security and material 
power amongst states remains the essential characteristic of the international system, a 
system which is inherently full of uncertainty and scarce resources leading to interstate 
competition; states pursue power
22
 because they seek survival with power the only guarantee 
of attaining survival; power, in turn, rests on the material capabilities at a state’s disposal; 
state behaviour  will correspond to their relative power distributions; and international change 
can be explained by change in the distribution of power. Within the subject matter under 
consideration, the link between the combustion of fossil fuels and the phenomenon of 
anthropogenic climate change has made imperative multilateral efforts to deal therewith 
while the consumption of energy resources had been vital for economic growth, therefore 
attempting to find consensus around the objectives of energy policy has become a 
controversial policy process. The application of neoclassical realism may shed much light on 
these complex interactions. 
2.2 Realism: History, Evolution and Variations 
Neoclassical realism emerged within a particular historical context and in reaction to two of 
the dominant variants of realism
23
, namely classical and structural realism, thus developing 
into a synthesis of the two frameworks. This section will delve into the historical origins of 
                                                          
22
 For a comprehensive discussion of the concept of power, see Baldwin (1980), Interdependence and Power: A 
Conceptual Analysis.  
23
 This thesis uses the term realism to broadly refer to a theoretical family that share a set of similar assumptions 
about state behaviour in the international system. This reference includes the varieties of realism which includes 
classical, structural, neoclassical, defensive and offensive realism. 
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realism in order to trace its development and define the nuances of its main assumptions in 
terms of their application within each strand of the theory. To accomplish this, this will 
require a description of the main strands of realist thought as these progressed throughout the 
twentieth century. This accounts for the particular composition of neoclassical realism, and 
how and why it tried to synthesise, while also compensating for the shortcomings, of both 
classical and structural realism.  
Realism is the dominant theoretical framework in the discipline of International Relations 
(IR). While there is some variation amongst the different assumptions employed by realists, 
there likewise exists commonality as to how these are processed together for the purpose of 
theory construction (Schmidt, 2005:523). To understand the linkages amongst these various 
phenomena, the chapter turns to a discussion of neoclassical realism and its composition as a 
means to make sense of these variables.   
2.3 Classical Realism: Assumptions and Shortcomings 
Realism is the oldest theoretical paradigm in IR whose core assumptions can be traced to 
Thucydides’ The History of the Peloponnesian War (431 BC), Niccolò Machiavelli’s The 
Prince (1513), Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651), Hugo Grotius’ Law of War and Peace 
(1625), and Carl von Clausewitz’ On War (1827) (Lebow, 2006:57 - 62). Throughout its 
history, these scholars’ ideas have demonstrated a certain unity. While a diversity of 
individuals have contributed to the intellectual discourse on international politics throughout 
the centuries, as an analytical school of thought, realism, as the overarching theory in IR, 
emerged in its modern version in the aftermath of the First World War (Burchill and 
Linklater, 2005:6). In particular, two works stand out as creating realism’s theoretical basis in 
the twentieth century, these being Hans J. Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations (1948) and 
E.H. Carr’s The Twenty Years’ Crisis (1939) (Burchill and Linklater, 2005:1).  
Much like its Marxist and liberal counterparts, realism must be viewed in principal as a 
philosophical tradition rather than a coherent theoretical framework which can be 
substantiated through verification (Lobell et al., 2009:14; Popper, 1962:240). Within this 
tradition, the core assumptions shared by realists throughout the centuries consist of a 
pessimistic conception of human nature, an emphasis on the limits to progress and political 
transformation which is imposed by an egoistic human nature, and the continuity of conflict 
in history (Lobell et al., 2009:14). Interstate competition is a constant element that does not 
wane. This is perhaps the most important contribution of realism wherein all human 
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interactions are ultimately characterised by the quest for power (Mearsheimer, 2006:72; 
Donnelly, 2005:30). This quest for power is also reflected at the interstate level, where 
interstate competition for power and resources is a continuous portrayal of the international 
system. This section will briefly introduce two central ideas that are necessary to grapple with 
for the comprehension of neoclassical realism, these being power and domestic structures. 
In contrast to idealism, realists emphasised that historical and contemporary examples 
indicated no harmony of interests existing among peoples especially in a context 
characterised by competition over access to resources (Guzzini, 1998:20). These theorists 
emphasised that events that occur at both the domestic, as well as international level, are 
ultimately connected and reinforcing and are “understood… as outcomes of similar and 
reinforcing patterns.” (Lebow, 2006:54). Inspired by classical Greek tragedies, classical 
realism asserts that the pursuit of power is a hallmark of all socio-political spheres (Lebow, 
2006:52). Human beings, by their very nature, are driven to pursue power, a pursuit which 
influences all social relations at all levels, both domestic and international. Classical realists 
thus stress the cyclical nature of history where periods of order and stability are normally 
thwarted by actors who seek power and who do not believe themselves to be subject to any 
form of social restraint (Lebow, 2006:53). While stressing the pursuit of power at the 
international level, classical realists, are not averse to the influence of ethics on behaviour and 
motivation (Lebow, 2006: 52). Yet, even ethical and moral pursuits are ultimately trumped by 
brute power. As a consequence, all politics will ultimately be characterised by the same 
motivations and dynamics (Lebow, 2006: 54). 
While classical realism accepts the anarchic nature of international politics, it still maintains 
that there is an element of similarity between international and domestic politics (Lebow, 
2006:55). That is, classical realists emphasise that all politics, whether domestic or 
international, is ultimately driven by the same human motivations (Lebow, 2006:55). 
Morgenthau asserted that domestic and international politics had one commonality: both were 
a struggle for power (Morgenthau, 1968:36). However, while the struggle for power in 
domestic politics has been contained by norms, laws, customs and institutions, such 
containment is less enforceable in international politics (Lebow, 2006:55).  
This same variation can also be applied to the domestic sphere (Lebow, 2006:56). Classical 
realists stressed that domestic politics influenced foreign policy and the behaviour of states. 
By emphasising social and ideational structures, Morgenthau showed how in strong societies, 
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such as Britain and the United States, the struggle for power could be channelled through 
institutions and practices, whereas weak societies, such as Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany, 
the same brutal struggle for power was evident as in international politics, therefore, 
“communities and the identities they help to create and sustain are the most critical 
determinants of order at home and abroad” (Lebow, 2006:56). What this also indicates is that 
powerful states cannot be restrained by appeals to ethics, multilateral institutions or law but 
will irrespectively pursue their national interest (Lebow, 2006:53, 58). According to classical 
realists, the national interest is thus defined in terms of power (Lebow, 2006:58).  
What distinguished classical realism in the twentieth century from earlier thinkers had been 
the concerted effort by Morgenthau and Carr to establish a theory of international politics. 
From a theoretical perspective, their intent was to infer and understand the general principles 
and laws which explained outcomes and interactions in international politics amidst what 
appeared to be unrelated and disparate historical circumstances (i.e. progressing from the 
particular to the general); the second was to create a set of theoretical concepts that could be 
used to explain these general patterns, and the third was to qualify the best means to conduct 
political recourse in a setting where the race for power was all consuming. (Burchill and 
Linklater, 2005:1) Therefore, the ability of a state to survive will be ensured by its alliances 
and material capabilities (Lebow, 2006:55 - 56). Primarily classical realists attributed these 
traits to human nature as opposed to exogenous factors. It is their contention that innate 
human nature influenced international relations that neorealists would challenge.  
2.4 Neorealism 
It may be inferred that there are two main divisions in realism, these being between system-
centric and state-centric realism (Gilpin, 2001:16). In 1979, Kenneth Waltz
24
 published his 
classic Theory of International Politics which was a milestone in realist thought and the 
discipline of International Relations laying the foundation for system-centric realism. In 
contrast to classical realism
25
, Waltz’s theory is defined by two major alterations in realist 
theory, these being an emphasis on the system, instead of innate human behaviour attributed 
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 While Waltz is widely considered as the most important contributor to neorealism; he is by no means the only 
one (Bhansali, 1987:631). 
25
 It was Richard K. Ashley who first referred to classical realism when he differentiated between the theoretical 
framework that had been developed by Kenneth Waltz in Theory of International Politics (1979) and his 
predecessors (Taliaferro et al., 2009:16).  
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to individuals or states, in explaining outcomes in international relations, and the second 
being a scientific approach to theoretical construction influenced by the philosophy of 
science. In his classic text, Waltz laments that within the discipline of International Relations, 
the term “theory” is often used far too liberally
26
 (1979:1). Instead, any work that provides an 
account that is more than mere description is ascribed as theory (Waltz, 1979:1). Waltz 
explains that theories explain laws, laws referring to a relationship between variables 
(1979:1). Perhaps the best way to understand the difference between neorealism and classical 
realism, is that the latter accounts for outcomes in world politics by focusing solely on unit-
level explanations, that is the internal characteristics of states, while neorealism asserts that in 
order to explain these outcomes, unit-level variables need to be situated within the effects of 
the structure of the international system (Waltz, 1988:617). By pointing out the necessity of 
integrating the international system as a causal explanation, neorealism invalidates the 
assumption that unit-level variables are sufficient in explaining outcomes (Waltz, 1988:617). 
Waltz’s contribution to the development of realism had been his ability to draw out clearly 
what had been the structural effect of the international system on the units thereof, or the 
behaviour of the state (Baldwin, 1993:3). His work was thus differentiated from earlier texts 
through his conception of power and his emphasis on states as being the units of the system 
(Baldwin, 1993:3). That is, the position of states within this system is the explanatory, or 
independent variable, which explains their behaviour (Gilpin, 2001:16; Waltz, 1993:45). 
Because of the effect of the system, states try to maintain their position therein (Waltz, 
1993:49). By pointing out the necessity of integrating the international system as a causal 
mechanism, neorealism invalidates the assumption that unit-level variables are sufficient in 
explaining outcomes (Waltz, 1988:617). 
The international system is therefore defined by two main principles, these being anarchy and 
the distribution of capabilities among states (Waltz, 1990:29). This structure will in turn be 
transformed by alterations in “the number of great powers”
27
 referring to the rise and fall of 
great powers and the number of power poles (Waltz, 1990:29). The alterations in the number 
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 Waltz explains that in this discipline, a theory is usually applied to a body of knowledge that transcends 
simply describing the subject matter under its investigation (1979: 2).  
27
 Polarity refers to the number of great powers which are present in a system (Donnelly, 2005:38). The exact 
effects of polarity in international relations continues to be a source of debate amongst theorists as to whether a 




of great powers that a system contains will have consequences for other units’ calculations, 
behaviour and interactions with other states (Waltz, 1990:30). The second major aspect of 
structure refers to the distribution of power among states (Waltz, 1990:31). While it is correct 
to assume that other variables such as ideology, or economic strength do play a role in 
influencing state behaviour, this theoretical framework rests on power
28
 as being the prima 
facia variable in determining international outcomes (Waltz, 1990:31; Mearsheimer, 
2006:72). 
At the core of realist theory are power and interests (Keohane and Waltz, 2000 – 2001:204).  
In an anarchic international system, where states are legally equal as captured in the political 
concept of sovereignty, the only difference amongst states is their position of power in the 
international system as measured by their material capabilities. Power thus becomes both a 
means to an end, and an end in itself. This helps to explain the continuously competitive 
nature of international politics since countries with conflicting interests compete to attain 
these with power being the sole assurance that such interests can be reached in an 
international system with no overarching authority (Waltz, 1967:3). This of course, is not to 
ignore the contradictions of power and its role in the international system. Accordingly, 
Waltz illustrates that, “If power is identical with the ability to control, then those who are free 
are also strong; and the freedom of the weak would have to be taken as an indication of the 
weakness of those who have great material strength. But the weak and disorganized are often 
less amenable to control than those who are wealthy and well disciplined. The powerful, out 
of their strength, influence and limit each other; the wealthy are hobbled by what they have to 
lose. The weak, on the other hand, bedevil the strong; the poor can more easily ignore their 
own interests. Such patterns endure and pervade the relations of men and of groups.” 
(1964:887 – 888). 
This system, instead of being hierarchic is anarchic. Being anarchic, there exists no authority 
higher than the state. What does differentiate states in such a system is their power 
capabilities, and the distribution of capabilities that units will possess in this system will be 
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 Structural realism is further divided between offensive and defensive realism (Mearsheimer, 2006:72). The 
main disagreement between the two camps concerns how much power should a state pursue (Mearsheimer, 
2006:72). Defensive realists such as Kenneth Waltz would argue that it is not prudent for states to pursue too 
much power (Mearsheimer, 2006:72). Offensive realists such as John Mearsheimer adopt the contrasting 
argument that there should be no limit to how much power a state pursues since power is the only guarantee of 
survival (Mearsheimer, 2006:72). 
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differentiated across epochs and systems (Keohane, 1986:166). To explain external state 
behaviour, structural realism formulates that it is necessary to examine the relationship 
between the behaviour of the state and the distribution of power in the international system 
(Keohane, 1986:165). Because of this distribution of power in a system, we may expect that 
smaller countries will act differently to larger, more powerful states, and with alterations in 
the balance of power, alliances will change because of this shift in power relationships 
(Keohane, 1986:165). The distribution of power in Waltz’s theory is therefore a variable 
which assumes a central role in this structural theory (Keohane, 1986:166). As a result, the 
most powerful actors in this system have the most important capabilities in this system 
(Keohane, 1986:166).  
The balance of power occupies a central role in Waltz’s work (Keohane, 1986:171). 
Structural realists argue that it is the anarchic structure of the international system which 
makes all states race to accumulate power and security (Mearsheimer, 2006:73). Power, in 
turn, depends on the material capabilities that a state possesses (Mearsheimer, 2006:73). They 
further emphasise that a corollary of material capabilities
29
 is latent power which describes 
the socio-economic factors that leverage military power (Mearsheimer, 2006:73). States must 
therefore resort to a self-help system because they cannot rely on any other state when their 
security is threatened to realise their goals (Waltz, 1979: 118). The state will have to resort to 
use whatever means is at its disposal to achieve its purposes (Waltz, 1979:118). Under an 
anarchic system states that do not apply the principle of self-help will be vulnerable relative 
to other states and be unable to prosper (Waltz, 1979:118). Fearing this vulnerability and the 
potential negative ramifications, states will therefore revert to the establishment of balances 
of power (Waltz, 1979:11) 
2.4.1 A Critical Appraisal of Structural Realism 
While structural realism has widely been accepted as the dominant theoretical framework in 
IR, it has likewise been open to scathing criticism. The most pertinent of these criticisms is 
that this theory is unable to account for change in the structure of the international system 
(Bhansali, 1987:632). Waltz’s equation of power with military capabilities has also been 
lauded as both a one-dimensional conceptualisation of power and a conceptualisation that is a 
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 The material capabilities that a state possesses refers mostly to tangible military assets such as nuclear 
weapons or armoured divisions, by contrast latent power refers to socio-economic variables such as population 
size and aggregate wealth (Mearsheimer, 2006:72). 
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dangerous incentive for state behaviour in the international system as America’s traumatic 
involvement in the Vietnam War would demonstrate (Bhansali, 1987:632). Likewise, power 
is a difficult term to conceptualise and operationalise and there are serious impediments to its 
measurement in the international system (Bhansali, 1987:633). Waltz’s inspiration from 
disciplines such as economics, while making neorealism from a purely scientific perspective, 
more rigorous and parsimonious, has nonetheless undermined the analytical and explanatory 
richness of realism (Bhansali, 1987: 633). Keohane complains that, “Indeed, his theory is so 
general that it hardly meets the difficult tests that he himself establishes for theory.” (1986: 
172). While Waltz’s theory may be logically rigorous and parsimonious, his idea that all 
states behave alike because of the incentives provided by the system was difficult to justify 
on both empirical and philosophical grounds.  
In addition, one of the most glaring criticisms aimed at neorealism is its dismissal of domestic 
politics in influencing state behaviour. While classical realists emphasised the importance of 
domestic structures in influencing international outcomes, Waltz argued that the pressure 
exerted by the structure of the international system made all the units act alike in so far as all 
these states want power, security and a relative advantage. Realism’s assertion that the state is 
a unitary actor has drawn fierce criticism whereby it is pointed out that it is the interplay of 
various parts of the state, which leads to outcomes in international relations (James, 
1989:218). Thus, neorealism’s assumption that the state is a unitary actor, which behaves in a 
rational
30
 manner when interacting with other states, is hard to justify (James, 1989:218). 
Critics point out that instead of a single actor behaving in a rational unitary manner, the state 
is in fact a complex structure consisting of conflicting rival groups and organisations with 
policy altering on the basis of the alterations in the division of power in society (James, 
1989:219). Similarly, a significant criticism that has been levelled against structural realism is 
its assumption that governments are able to navigate their policy response to international 
issues in isolation from societal pressure and wield effective control over their bureaucracy 
(Katzenstein, 1976:13).  
2.5 The Origins and Main Assumptions of Neoclassical Realism 
The seeming inability of neorealism to adequately explain the relationship between the state 
and domestic society; and how foreign policy was developed within the constraints imposed 
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by this relationship in an anarchic international system, created a conundrum (Taliaferro et. 
al, 2009:1). In 1998, Gideon Rose published a paper in which he coined the term neoclassical 
realism to classify and synthesise the work of a new generation of realist scholars such as 
William C. Wohlforth, Michael Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones, Jack Snyder, Thomas Christensen, 
Fareed Zakaria and Randall Schweller who challenged the core assumptions that neorealism 
rested on and expand its internal logic
31
 (Taliaferro et. al, 2009:5 – 6; Zakaria, 1992:178). 
While anarchy and the distribution of power remain central explanatory variables in these 
scholars’ framework, they insisted that unit-level variables are indispensable to the 
comprehension of state choices and actions (Lindemann, 2014:35). Neoclassical realism 
therefore attempts to understand the internal process that states undergo to produce a set of 
policies and actions (Lindemann, 2014:37). Two important considerations arise from this: (i) 
do states have the willingness to “react to systemic constraints and incentives” and, (ii) do 
states have the ability to react to these constraints and opportunities (Lindemann, 2014:37). . 
Analytically, this overview forms part of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) since neoclassical 
realists stress that foreign policy is grounded in the concrete circumstances that states are 
embedded in and which needs to be analysed using the abstract assumptions of neorealist 
theory and the emphasis that is placed on power politics that characterises all forms of social 
interaction (Wohlforth, 2012:39, 42).  
The separation of domestic and international politics in the analysis of interstate interaction 
has traditionally being a defining characteristic of neorealism (Zakaria, 1992:179). 
Neorealists suggested that it is the structure of the international system which determines 
states’ foreign policy (Zakaria, 1992:180). Within this framework, the international system 
remains constant and “imposes the same limitations on states” yet states respond differently 
to its influence (Katzenstein (a), 1977:597; Zakaria, 1992:180). The question is why? Critics 
point out that a monocausal reliance on structure as being the sole determinant of 
international behaviour and interests was inconclusive and negated the effect of alternative 
domestic explanations (Sterling-Folker, 1997:2). Domestic politics, the internal structure of 
states, form an important intervening variable that accounts for these differentiated outcomes 
(Katzenstein 1977(a):588; Zakaria, 1992:198). This may be contrasted with other theories 
such as Liberalism and Marxism, which argue that the motivation for foreign policy is based 
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the international system, and the impact that this has on “patterns of international outcomes such as war and 
peace.” (Rose, 1998:144). 
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on a state’s domestic structure, hence in order to change foreign policy, it is necessary to alter 
the distribution of power amongst domestic actors (Zakaria, 1992:180).  
While structural realism treated the state as a “black-box” variable, classical realism indicated 
that international and domestic variables exert a complex interplay of pressures on the state 
(Putman, 1988:433). In illustrating the specific case study of the 1973 oil crisis, Katzenstein 
asks the poignant question as to why when faced by a common threat states pursued such 
different strategies (Katzenstein (b), 1977:880). What are the reasons for this divergence in 
foreign policies across states (Katzenstein (b), 1977:880)? To answer such criticism, an 
important contribution to this theoretical framework from classical realism has been its 
adoption of domestic politics and ideational structures as explanatory variables (Rathbun, 
2008:295; Rose, 1998:146). Thus, neoclassical realism evolved in reaction to both structural 
realism and classical realism: it tried to make up for the shortcomings of both which provides 
greater theoretical efficacy and more dense analyses. While neoclassical realism agrees with  
structural realism’s assumptions regarding the influence of the anarchic nature of the 
international system and the limits that this imposes on states’ policy choices, it hearkens 
back and incorporates classical realism’s concern with the state and its relationship to 
domestic society (Taliaferro et al., 2009:19). That is, states will maladapt to systemic 
constraints when domestic constraints intervene (Lindemann, 2014:37). In order to 
supplement neorealism’s sparse account of the actual behaviour of states and the 
effectiveness with which rational states will react to the incentives provided by the system, 
Rose argues that both external and internal variables must be elements of the theory (1998: 
145 – 146).  
While neoclassical realism remains a structural theory at its core, it has done away with the 
“billiard ball” conception of the state, whereby any differences amongst states are erased by 
the structure of the system as Waltz contended. Rathbun argues that the incorporation of 
ideational and domestic variables are essential factors that help to influence the extent to 
which a state will be able to use its latent power (Rathbun, 2008:296). At this point, it may be 
necessary to better account for how these factors are situated in relation to the structure of the 
system.  
While ideas and domestic structures have an important influence on a state’s policy choices, 
it is ultimately the international system which remains the dominant constraint in these 
interactions as it will bias, or rather mitigate, state behaviour against the influence of 
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ideational and social structures (Rathbun, 2008:296). Therefore, a state’s foreign policy will 
be an outcome dominated by the state’s position in the international system and most 
importantly by its relative material power capabilities (Rose, 1998:146). But, the impact that 
power capabilities have on foreign policy will not be linear and uniform, but complex and 
indirect because the incentives provided by the system have to be interpreted through these 
intervening variables found at the level of the state (Rose, 1998:146). It is this combination of 
overarching structural effect and interpretation through intervening variables that categorises 
this theory as neoclassical realism (Rose, 1998:146). Taliaferro et. al (2009:4) indicate that, 
“Specifically, it seeks to explain why, how, and under what conditions the 
internal characteristics of states – the extractive and mobilization capacity of  
politico-military institutions, the influence of domestic societal actors and 
interest groups, the degree of state autonomy from society, and the level of 
elite or societal cohesion – intervene between the leaders’ assessment of 
international threats and opportunities and the actual diplomatic, military, 
and foreign economic policies those leaders pursue.”   
2.5.1 Neoclassical Realism, the State and Domestic Variables 
Both classical and neorealism have been criticised for their inadequate conceptualisation of 
the state (Taliaferro et. al, 2009:5). A priori, it is obvious that there is a relationship between 
domestic and international levels of analysis in determining policy outcomes and state 
behaviour. However, while this link appears obvious, Putnam reminds us that the real 
challenge is to discover when and how this relationship determines policy outcomes 
(1988:427), and to what extent. Putnam’s analysis articulates that it is necessary to first 
assume that the state is concerned with meeting the challenges of both international and 
domestic pressures (Putnam, 1988:431). Such a perspective illustrates that the structure of the 
system, as Waltz contends, does not conclusively determine the content of either domestic or 
foreign policy (Putnam, 1988:432). Far from being a unitary, rational actor that pursues the 
national interest
32
, decision-makers as a shorthand for the “state”, often have strong 
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 Most examinations of the sources that influence the behaviour of the state in the international setting cite most 
prolifically for both theoretical and analytical purposes the national interest (Nincic, 1999:29). While there is 
disagreement over the precise meaning of the term, the pivotal function of the term is teleologically normative 
(Nincic, 1999:29). Because of this normative function attached to the concept, it has a dual meaning namely a 
commendatory and descriptive one (Nincic, 1999:30). The commendatory aspect of the term refers to the ethical 
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disagreements amongst themselves about what the national interest is and what it is that the 
international system demands (Putnam, 1988: 432). These decision-makers often have 
conflicting pressures exerted on them from both domestic and international sources 
complicating any analysis that posits one analytical level over the other (Putnam, 1988:433). 
Reconciling the problematic relationship between the two fields of analysis and the direction 
of causation concerning these two aspects of the state has been a problematic and 
inconclusive one (Agnew, 1994:54). Putnam warns that, “…we need to move beyond the 
mere observation that domestic factors influence international affairs and vice-versa, and 
beyond the simple catalogues of such instances of such influence, to seek theories that 
integrate both spheres, accounting for the areas of entanglement between them” (1988:433). 
Thus, neorealism’s contention that all states, regardless of what their domestic political 
structures are like, will advance the same strategies when confronted by similar incentives 
produced by the system is a difficult one to maintain in light of empirical and logical 
observations (Taliaferro et al., 2009:18 – 19). This framework is further weakened through its 
neglect of such alternative factors such as ease of the mobilisation of resources, agenda 
setting and the policy environment.  
To hearken back to the foundations laid by classical realism, neoclassical realism continues 
with the realist tradition of identifying the state
33
 as the primary actor in the international 
system (Taliaferro et al., 2009:24). In principal, realism understands the state as a set of 
institutions enclosed by a geographic locale that has the legitimate monopoly on violence 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
standards by which the concept is to be judged while the descriptive component refers to the empirical content 
that the concept alludes to (Nincic, 1999:30). Related to this aspect, the concept is further designated by two 
additional qualifiers. The idea that the concept is connected to a description of interest marks it with the allusion 
to a legitimate claim on behalf of the greater national good that surpasses narrow ideological or factional 
interest, and the harmonisation of national policies in line with the national interest (Nincic, 1999:30). Within 
the realist tradition, the conceptualisation of the national interest is derived from its assumptions about the 
international system and its units (Nincic, 1999:30). Security is the most pressing foreign policy issue for states 
because of the anarchic nature of the international system which makes states vie for power (Nincic, 1999:32).    
33
 The idea of the sovereign state has its origins with the 1648 Peace of Westphalia (Schrijver, 2000:65). Since 
these origins, the concept of sovereignty has undergone a number of transformations and presently includes a 
number of important qualifications (Schrijver, 2000:65). Schrijver observes that, “The sovereign State is still 
widely perceived as both the main instrument for implementing such newly-established rules and the main body 
to be held internationally accountable for their observance.” (2000:65). In spite of arguments laid forth by 
critics, the state remains an essential actor in international relations. 
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within its territory against internal and external aggressors
34
 (Taliaferro et al., 2009:24). In 
keeping with the logic of structural realism developed by Waltz, neoclassical realism 
employs a top-down conception of the state whereby it is the system which determines the 
external behaviour of the state (Taliaferro et al., 2009:25).  
While the logic of neorealism presents the guiding assumption with regards to the state’s 
external behaviour, neoclassical realism develops this assumption by extrapolating that 
differences in regime type, relative material capabilities, geopolitical variety and internal 
social structures present intervening variables through which the logic of anarchy is 
interpreted as either constraints or opportunities (Taliaferro et al., 2009:26). However, the 
relationship between the state and society within neoclassical realism is a complex one, 
whereby an analytical distinction between the state and society, à la Max Weber, remains 
(Taliaferro et al., 2009:26). It is necessary to recognise that neoclassical realism does 
acknowledge that the state, in this instance understood to be the “politico-military institutions 
and top officials of the polity” as entirely autonomous from society (Taliaferro et al., 
2009:26). 
However, Taliaferro et al. (2009:27) go on to explain that there is an encroachment on the 
autonomy of the executive in various national contexts which limits the executive’s ability to 
accurately evaluate and respond to shifts in the balance of power. Policy responses, therefore, 
are the culmination of a “state-society” struggle and synchronization (Taliaferro et al., 
2009:27). Neoclassical realists are also aware that some states do not behave, and develop 
policies, in a unitary manner where strong divergences exist at the elite level concerning the 
magnitude and extent of international threats alongside, “persistent internal divisions within 
the leadership, social cohesion, and the regime’s vulnerability to violent overthrow all inhibit 
the state’s ability to respond to systemic pressures.” (Taliaferro et al., 2009:27).  
Neorealism, reminiscent of the rational actor model, rests on the assumption that the 
behaviour of states is rational and goal-orientated (Katzenstein, 1976:8). According to this 
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 Agnew (1994:53) explains that there are two conceptualisations of the state in political literature. The first 
definition refers to a set of central political institutions that have the legitimate use of power. The second 
conceptualises a territorially bounded entity within which the state has the legitimate use of power. While the 
first definition has been most prevalently employed in studies analysing domestic political behaviour as well as 
state-society interactions, the second has been most frequently employed in the discipline of International 
Relations (IR) where the geographically enclosed sovereign state and the interaction between these states are the 
prime locus of the discipline (Agnew, 1994:53).  
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line of thought, decision-makers are insulated and autonomous from society and the 
bureaucracy (Katzenstein, 1976:8). Structural realism thus defined the state as a unitary, 
rational actor; however without indicating how the interaction between the state and society 
determines policy outcomes (Katzenstein, 1976:8). It could be inferred that when it comes to 
an international crisis like the energy crises, a system-level theory would assume that 
similarly powerful countries would adopt similar policies to deal therewith (Katzenstein, 
1976:19). The historical record reflects that following the energy crisis, advanced 
industrialised states adopted dissimilar policies to deal with the crisis. By systematically 
incorporating domestic level variables it becomes evident that states’ energy policies will 
differ as a result of “the structural constraints of domestic policy networks” attributing an 
explanatory role to domestic and systemic variables (Katzenstein, 1976:19).  
By closely examining both state behaviour and policy outcomes, studies began to move 
beyond the dichotomy of either systemic, understood as the international-level, or domestic 
explanations for foreign policy outcomes and state behaviour (Fearon, 1998:289). Instead, 
understanding the interaction between system-level and domestic-level variables in 
determining policy outcomes became a new academic endeavour. While domestic level 
variables have been assigned a secondary place in the neorealist explanatory framework, 
since the 1990s there has been a greater emphasis to integrate them as causal mechanisms 
within the realist theoretical framework (Sterling-Folker, 1997:1; Zakaria, 1992:179).  
Elements of domestic level variables may include legislative and executive branch relations, 
the media, political parties, political culture, public opinion, interest groups, weak-state 
strong-state dichotomies, bureaucratic politics, as well as type of government and politics 
(Sterling-Folker, 1997:2). System-level and domestic-level variables exert a causal influence: 
it is the system which determines a state’s objectives while domestic variables determine the 
means available to states to pursue these objectives and their interpretation (Sterling-Folker, 
1997:4).  
Anarchy, within structural realism, makes states concerned with their survival and “rewards 
and punishes certain behaviours to this end” (Sterling-Folker, 1997:5). While states may have 
many interests which they attempt to attain, all of these are superfluous if a nation cannot 
attain the basic element of survival and per consequence, self-help is an imperative 
characteristic of state behaviour if they are to attain their survival (Sterling-Folker, 1997:5).  
Katzenstein reminds us that, “The rationale of all strategies is to establish a basic 
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compatibility between domestic and international policy objectives.” (Katzenstein (a), 
1977:588).  
As discussed, while neoclassical realism rests upon the integration of unit- and structural-
level variables, there is the risk that these variables are integrated in a haphazard manner. 
Since this study is interested in the interaction between US energy policy and its position in 
the UNFCCC, this interaction has to be carefully evaluated within the integration of unit- and 
structural-level variables discussed above to understand this complex dynamic. To reduce the 
risk of haphazard integration, unit-level variables based on the federal level structure and 
differing perceptions are integrated by tracing the link between a) the goals of energy policy 
and b) the US position within the UNFCCC, along with the impact of the distribution of 
power at the system-level on the goals of US energy policy and its position in the UNFCCC. 
By identifying the interaction between these factors and the distribution of power in the 
international system it becomes evident how a monocausal explanation is unable to 
adequately account for policy makers’ support for a particular set of policy goals. Understood 
within the context of neoclassical realism, this permits the theoretical contours of this 
framework to gain better insight into the contradictory pressures exerted on policy-makers at 
both the unit- and structural-levels. This would permit the study to achieve better insight into 
the interaction between US energy policy and its negotiating position within the UNFCCC 
process by investigating the influence of both structural, but also unit-level variables, thereby 
gaining a more comprehensive overview of this interaction. 
2.5.2 Neoclassical Realism, Power and the Global Political Economy 
The end of the Cold War drew many analysts to the premature conclusion that realism would 
no longer be effective as a theoretical framework in a new era where global markets and the 
promotion of human rights would influence international behaviour; and a cascade of actors 
beside the state would pursue power and influence internationally
35
. Perhaps one of the most 
glaring criticisms directed at realism is its supposed disregard for economic issues.  However, 
this is more an oversight on the part of its critics about the history and logic of realism, rather 
than concrete fact. While it is correct that classical realists such as Morgenthau and Kissinger 
subsumed the importance of economic issues when national security was threatened by the 
Soviet Union and Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) during the specific context of the 
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Cold War, realists have always pressed the importance of economic power because wealth 
and power are inseparable (Gilpin, 1984:293).  
Structural realism’s analysis of the global political economy may be defined as the influence 
of anarchy, the defining characteristic of the international system, “on the exchange of goods 
and services among states” (Gowa, 1994:31). Realists became increasingly concerned about 
the relationship between power and economic issues as the Cold War became tepid during the 
1970s which had allowed new economic issues to gain prominence such as the effects of 
foreign direct investment (FDI), trade as well as money on domestic, and at times, security 
policy (Gilpin, 1984:293). In an anarchic international system, governments will often 
intervene in trade relations because of national security considerations (Gowa, 1994:38). 
These assertions are consistent with Gowa’s study which found that free trade was more 
likely between states that have political-military alliances and an international system 
characterised by a bipolar rather than a multipolar order (Gowa, 1994:31). This was not a 
new addition to the realist paradigm as a historical examination of the realist tradition will in 
fact reveal that realism has always been interested in “the economic dimensions of statecraft” 
which can be traced as far back as Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War (Gilpin, 
1984:293). This includes such long-standing themes as the political manipulation of 
economic influence, the independence of national economies as well as conflict concerning 
energy resources (Gilpin, 1984:293). In The Twenty Years Crisis, E.H. Carr alluded to the 
centrality of information and economics as “weapons of power in international relations” 
(Bhansali, 1987:633).  Realists have long recognised that there is a vital connection between 
global politics and global economics (Gilpin, 1984:293).  
Gilpin in fact asserts that a liberal international economy has three important attributes which 
together compose the political framework for the global economic system (1984:296). The 
most prominent of these is a hegemonic power, or at least a group of liberal powers, that have 
the capacity to impose the rules of a liberal economic structure (Gilpin, 1984:296; Krasner, 
1994:18). The second dimension is their commitment to common security, economic, as well 
as political interests which forges a mutual alliance amongst these states (Gilpin, 1984:296). 
And lastly is a common ideology committed to liberal economic values (Gilpin, 1984:296). 
The most revelatory historical example showcasing this political framework can be traced to 
the end of the Second World War where the establishment of American hegemony, an 
ideological stance qualified by the economic principles attributed to Keynesian welfare 
economics and an anti-Soviet alliance were for this historical epoch its defining features 
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(Gilpin, 1984:296). Other important historical examples that hearken to the close connection 




 centuries when the 
national interest was regarded as a balance-of-payment surplus and advantageous trade 
(Gilpin, 1984:294).  
From a political economy perspective, realism
36
 characterises world politics by the fragility 
of the balance of power and the inherent conflict of interests that exists among nations 
(Krasner, 1994:14). It attempts to substantiate how a state’s power or interest helps to 
determine the outcome of distributional conflicts, or zero-sum games (Krasner, 1994:14). 
This school of thought has underscored how rules which regulate capital flows, foreign aid, 
communications and trade are not neutral and distribute inequitable costs and benefits to 
different nations (Krasner, 1994:17). Therefore, issues which relate to distributional effects in 
the international system will provoke the most conflict internationally (Krasner, 1994:17 - 
18). Because the international system is anarchical, the effects of this distributional inequality 
will be influenced by a state’s power capabilities (Krasner, 1994:18).  
There is also an implicit acceptance that technological innovation
37
 is an important 
contribution to economic growth and in turn will amplify the power of the state (Drezner, 
2001:3). Reaching new technological frontiers that provide comparative advantage in turn 
helps the state attain greater power, or even, hegemonic status (Drezner, 2001:3). Long-cycle 
theorists have indicated that hegemonic powers arise because they had been the first to 
innovate new technologies in strategic sectors (Drezner, 2001:4). The propensity though is 
that innovation rests on a number of preconditions namely size of the market, factor 
endowments, industrial organisation, and an entrepreneurial culture as well as a decentralised 
state structure (Drezner, 2001:6). States have historically been centrally preoccupied with 
fostering innovation because of the link between innovation and economic growth in 
industrial states (Drezner, 2001:6). Specifically, a long-cycle historical analysis indicates that 
it is breakthroughs in innovation which occur in leading sectors that have the greatest impact 
on economic growth and by extension state power (Drezner, 2001:6). The historical 
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 The concept of technological innovation can refer to activities which entail the creation of a novel product; a 
production process whose efficiency has been enhanced and/or the establishment of a new organisation process 
for production and distribution (Drezner, 2001:6).   
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experience further indicates that a state becomes hegemonic when it occupies a near-
monopoly in the process of innovation in its leading sectors (Drezner, 2001:6).   
2.5.3 Ideas and Perception 
Although ideas
38
 feature prominently in neoclassical realism, they remain somewhat 
undefined in most scholarly analyses and moreover key terms such as ideas, beliefs, and 
ideology are often used interchangeably (Rose, 1998; Rathbun, 2008; Kitchen, 2010:119). 
Moreover, ideas are used in neoclassical realism in a limited manner, with their influence 
being important in regards to a state’s ability to use its latent material power (Rathbun, 
2008:296). While structural realism with its emphasis on materialism stresses objectivity and 
places emphasis that decision-makers have an accurate understanding of the distribution of 
power which is directly transmitted into foreign policy outcomes, neoclassical realism 
indicates the complex nature of the relationship between the structure of the international 
system and decision-makers’ ideas and perception
39
 thereof (Rathbun, 2008:296, 299). 
Ideas, as independent variables, are traditionally understood to be the theoretical jurisdiction 
of the liberal and constructivist theoretical frameworks in IR (Gilpin, 1996:3). How can a 
realist theoretical framework then, with its emphasis on material explanations and interest, be 
accommodated to a framework that emphasises ideas and ideology as influencing policy-
makers? Ideas can serve the interest of power. Per consequence, policy-makers need to make 
choices as to how to accommodate conflicting interests and how to secure and increase their 
state’s relative power. In this view, policy-makers face a wide continuum of policy choices 
often involving a trade-off between economic capability and military security infusing the 
process with a certain amount of ambiguity (Brooks, 1997:471).  
Realism emphasises that an alteration in state behaviour is accompanied by “adaptation to 
external constraints” which is informed by alterations in relative power (Wohlforth, 
1994/95:96). Within this configuration, it is policy-makers’ assessment of power that will 
determine both their interpretation of international events and alterations as well as the 
accompanying course of action that they will embark on (Wohlforth, 1994/95:97). Crucially, 
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realists do not discount the role of ideas, rather, ideas are integrated into the logic of realism 
to account for a particular set of outcomes.  
Within this analytical framework, the imperative is to understand “the mechanism through 
which capabilities are translated into actions” and there are numerous factors that will 
influence these assessments of capabilities (Wohlforth, 1994/95:97). Therefore, the manner in 
which decision-makers perceive events will influence their response (Wohlforth, 
1994/95:98). The international system therefore exerts an indirect effect on outcomes, unit-
level variables will determine the precise form these will take on. Waltz points out that while 
the international system may be relied on to explain the emergence of a general pattern of 
behaviour such as the outbreak of war, in order to explain the particular occurrence of a 
phenomenon and its substance, it is necessary to rely on first and second images as immediate 
causes rather than permissive causes (2001:232 – 233).  
Neoclassical realism appropriates ideas and perception to fit the logic of realism wherein 
neoclassical realism uses ideas and perception to define power and whereby ideas are also 
central for the utilisation of self-help in an anarchic international system (Rathbun, 2008:300, 
301). Ideas must therefore be understood within the constraints of relative power (Rose, 
1998:157). Ideology and perception, as part of ideational constructs, are thus used in a limited 
sense for the purpose of self-help and are influenced by the structure of the international 
system (Rathbun, 2008:303). Systemic pressures are processed through the perception of 
decision-makers (Rose, 2008:158). Within neoclassical realism, perception is often defined as 
decision-makers’ assessment of relative power, and provides an explanation of how policy-
makers respond through this assessment to objective reality and therefore the focus within 
these analyses is “how perceptions of the balance of power affect state behaviour” which 
highlights why it is often difficult for decision-makers to adequately respond to the objective 
reality related to the distribution of power in the international system since decision-makers’ 
perception influences their “calculations of cost and risk” and which may result in either 
“underbalancing or the adoption of other nonbalancing strategies” (Glenn, 2009:525; 
Schweller 2004:165, 169; see Rose, 1998:147).  
Within IR, one of the most well-known neoclassical realist scholars working on the 
intersection between ideas, perception, the structure of the international system, and policy 
outcomes is William C. Wohlforth (1994/95; 2000 - 2001
40
). The structural realism that had 
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been developed by Kenneth Waltz (1979) expounds that unitary states react to the material 
incentives provided by the international system and rationally adopt policies in light of the 
incentives provided by the system. Although it allows for a parsimonious analysis, this 
nonetheless is a very narrow definition to fully explicate the role of ideas in influencing 
outcomes (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2000 - 2001:12). Thereby Brooks and Wohlforth (2000 - 
2001:13) argue that, “We restrict our analysis in two critical ways. First, we define material 
incentives solely in terms of the costs of maintaining the status quo. Second, we define 
material costs exclusively as economic costs… We limit the analysis to economic costs partly 
for reasons of parsimony, partly so that our analysis is falsifiable, and partly to ensure that 
our examination stands clearly in contrast to the ideational explanations outlined above.” 
Using deductive reasoning, it is therefore possible to analyse policy-makers’ reaction to 
structural change based on their position in the international system (Brooks and Wohlforth, 
2000 - 2001:13). Brooks and Wohlforth thereby indicate that there is a connection between 
ideas and the international context (2000 - 2001:13). That is, “The starting point of most 
models of ideas and foreign policy is the existence of a causal gap between material 
incentives and the behavioural response – a gap that only ideas can fill… Consider first the 
relationship between decline and elite perceptions of decline. For material change to affect 
policy, it must be perceived. The connection between material change and perceptions of that 
change cannot be instantaneous, however: Observers can only know that they are living 
through a "trend" if the phenomenon has been under way for several years… The above 
evidence indicates that decline, perceptions of decline, new ideas, and new policies were 
closely related.” (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2000 - 2001:27, 33).  
Therefore, the importance of perception is that it helps policy-makers to filter a vast amount 
of complex information (Eun, 2013:373), especially within the research area of the thesis 
regarding information related to complex energy and climate change issues. Within this 
analysis, perception is influenced by ideology, referring to an individual’s orientation towards 
issue areas through a set of political beliefs (Sartori, 1969:400), and moreover; the 
compatibility between various policy goals, specifically the compatibility between 
environmental regulation and economic growth, where the cost for US energy is an important 
consideration. While the classic definition of perception in neoclassical realism refers to 
decision-makers’ assessment of the distribution of power in the international system 
(Ripsman, 2011), the thesis has adapted the use of “perception” to the one traditionally relied 
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on in neoclassical realism. Since the study focuses on energy policy
41
 and the US position in 
the UNFCCC, the reference to “narrow rational calculation” and the costs of different kinds 
of decisions within perception relates to the calculation by policy-makers of the compatibility 
between various policy goals, specifically the compatibility between environmental 
regulation and economic growth, where the cost for US energy is an important consideration 
and how it will influence the competitiveness and position of the USA relative to other states 
in the international distribution of power, with the importance of the ideology of the 
administration therein highlighting their approach to the compatibility between the goals of 
environmental regulation and economic growth (Oskanian, 2016). The definition of 
perception as “narrow rational calculation” (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2002:97) relates to the 
costs of energy and implies that policy-makers approach policy problems as rational actors 
that have a set of goals that they wish to attain albeit with limited information. Moreover, 
rationality implies that, policy-makers “possess ‘consistent, ordered preferences, and . . . 
calculate costs and benefits of alternative courses of action in order to maximize their utility 
in view of these preferences.’” (Grieco, 1988:496).” In this context, ideology is important 
since it influences how policy-makers calculate the cost of energy and whether environmental 
regulation is compatible with economic growth. Within the US context, the main ideological 
divergences between the Republican and Democratic parties towards energy policy are 
differentiated between the emphasis on limited government regulation of the economy and a 
reliance on market instruments supported by the Republican party as opposed to a greater 
regulatory role for government in the economy which is favoured by the Democratic party, 
although it is important to emphasise that there are differences within these parties towards 
these issues (Hess et al., 2016:20; Uslaner, 1989). Other important differences between the 
two parties relate to the scientific consensus surrounding anthropogenic climate change and 
the means to deal therewith (Funk and Kennedy, 2016:1). 
2.5.3.1 Ideas and the National Interest  
The concept of the national interest, the raison d’état, forms an important element of realism 
and has been used within the theory as an explanatory variable (Burchill, 2005:4, 32; 
Kratochwill, 1982:10). Classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau defined the national 
interest in terms of power which acts as a continuous guide to policy-makers and usually 
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 It should be noted that energy policy choices are multi-dimensional and it is not claimed that perception 
influences all policy goals (Uslaner, 1989:73).   
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alludes to the “protection and security of the physical, political and cultural entity called the 
nation” against other states (Burchill, 2005:35 - 37). The idea that certain actions were 
constrained by the international system was embedded in the national interest according to 
this mode of thought (Kratochwill, 1982:4). Kratochwill underscores that, “Implicit in this 
notion was the recognition not only that political action was constrained by an international 
system but that the failure or success of a policy could crucially depend on its compatibility 
with certain ‘rules of the game,’ which served as a common framework for all sovereigns and 
allowed decision makers to pursue conflicting goals without falling into a totally unregulated 
struggle.”(1982:4). Because of the anarchic nature of the international system, the most 
important national interest according to realists is that of the attainment of security 
understood as territorial integrity, strategic power and physical survival (Burchill, 2005:47).  
Therefore, according to the logic employed by realism, the national interest is synonymous 
with the attainment of security and power (Burchill, 2005:8). Its connotation with national 
security and aggregate power has meant that the national interest has traditionally being used 
as a justification for certain policies and as a result influences what policies states are likely 
to adopt (Burchill, 2005:9; Kratochwill, 1982:2 – 4, 9 - 10, 24). However, the reality is more 
complex. While classical and neo-realists emphasise either domestic or structural factors 
respectively as influencing the composition of the national interest and what it will be used to 
justify, neoclassical realists, in contrast, emphasise that it is a combination of domestic and 
structural elements which influence the national interest (Dueck, 2009:139 – 140). That is, 
while the international system may exert pressures on all states, unit-level variables will 
influence how decision-makers will react to these constraints which often results in negative 
outcomes in a state’s pursuit of its foreign policy objectives (Dueck, 2009:139 – 140).  
With regard to the national interest, Putman points out that decision-makers have 
disagreements about the meaning of the national interest and associated response to the  
pressures exerted by the international system making it difficult to design and justify policies 
(1988:432). Far from being a clear guide to policy or representing the national good, the 
national interest is an ambiguous, normative concept. While the idea of the national interest 
may allude to the notion of decision-makers acting in the name of the public good whereby 
the interests of all members of the state are met, in reality, this is much more complex then 
such a narrow definition would allow (Burchill, 2005:47). Problematically, the national 
interest can be linked to ideological manipulation and national culture making it difficult to 
separate legitimate policy objectives from those supported for the sake of vested interests 
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(Kratochwill, 1982:9; Brands, 1999:241). Although security and power remain the pinnacle 
aims of the national interest, within a particular context the national interest is not 
synonymous with a single value but rather is a composition of a hierarchy of interests of 
which security is the most important (Kratochwill, 1982:6; Brands, 1999:239 - 240). There is 
therefore no clear idea of the national interest or how to attain it.  
Because of this interaction, the state becomes a conduit for the pursuit of control and power 
by various groups (Katzenstein (a), 1977:601). Vested interests manipulate state structures 
for their benefit while rival social groups who lack the organisational structure to access and 
transform policies have to endure any repercussions (Zakaria, 1992:182). Because of the 
presence of vested interests in the polity, state actions are often geared towards meeting the 
needs of these groups which accumulates great benefits to this particular group while 
generating costs that are distributed unto the rest of society (Zakaria, 1992:182). Vested 
interest groups such as big business and the military “hijack the organs of government for 
their selfish goals. The taxpayers who foot the bill lack the organization and access to the 
state apparatus that would allow them to lobby successfully for their interests” (Zakaria, 
1992:182). Because of the dominance of and exclusion of various social groups there is much 
indication that the national good and the public interest are problematically addressed by 
foreign policy (Katzenstein (a), 1977:601). 
This illustrates that decision-makers do not have an objective set of criteria for evaluating the 
national interest but that instead, they are influenced by ideational and ideological rationale as 
well as the incursion of vested interests (Burchill, 2005:10). The national interest is thus 
politically contested and has different consequences and motivations which are challenged by 
different sectors of society (Brands, 1999:246). Furthermore, the national interest has 
implications for the structure of the global economy which has developed because of the 
combined impact of the national interest and interstate interactions (Gilpin, 1975:37). From 
the perspective of the national interest, political and economic interests are intertwined and 
have a reciprocal relationship (Bergsten et al., 1975:4; Bulmer, 1994:69).  
2.5.4 The Neoclassical Realist Approach to Power and Security 
Power remains a defining characteristic of the neoclassical realist framework since the 
struggle for security and power amongst states is a defining characteristic of the international 
system, a system which is inherently full of uncertainty and scarce resources (Lindemann, 
2014:33; Scmidt, 2005:523; Taliaferro et. al, 2009:4). However, the actions that states will 
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pursue will correspond to their relative power distributions (Taliaferro et al., 2009:4).  
Neoclassical realists continue to emphasise that ultimately international relations is marked as 
a continuous struggle for power amongst nations (Lindemann, 2014:33; Schmidt, 2005:528). 
As such, states respond to and are influenced by the distribution of power in the international 
system.  
Such an assertion is based on the assumption that power
42
 is ultimately the currency that 
enables states to attain their interests in the international context (Lindemann, 2014:33). 
Because the international system is anarchic, states must resort to self-help in order to ensure 
their survival, the acquisition of power being the most important element guaranteeing this 
survival and ensuring self-help (Lindemann, 2014:33). While the struggle for power defines 
the various strands of realism, there is some ambiguity as to what power is and how it should 
be defined, operationalised and measured (Scmidt, 2005:523, 526). While neoclassical 
realists accept structural realists’ assumption that the structure of the system compels states to 
pursue power they insist that unit-level variables will have an influence over how states will 
interpret and pursue this and how such incentives will be filtered through the domestic 
political system to produce the final outcome and policy (Schmidt, 2005:528).  
It is by studying the interaction between power and policy that neoclassical realists emphasise 
the necessity of analysing the context within which foreign policy is developed to understand 
the complex relationship between both variables (Rose, 1998:147). Neoclassical realists 
indicate that a number of intervening variables influence the state and international outcomes 
which allows them to give a different explanation for the role of power in international 
relations (Schmidt, 2005:528). Within this framework, unit-level variables form intervening 
variables through which the incentives provided by the system are interpreted, thereby 
producing subsequent policy outcomes and state behaviour, in spite of apparent relative 
power distributions (Wohlforth, 1994/95:95). This assertion is based on an observation that 
while a state’s foreign policy may be circumscribed by its relative material power capabilities 
this is an imperfect relationship (Rose, 1998:147). That is, there is no perfect correlation 
between the state’s material capabilities and foreign policy outcomes (Rose, 1998:147). Put 
otherwise, among numerous policy choices, why does a state make choice A as opposed to 
choice B? As a result, it is necessary to evaluate the structure of the state relative to its 
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 While there is some disagreement over whether power should be understood as relational or the control of 
certain resources (Scmidt, 2005:529), it is not the purpose of this thesis to comment on this debate.  
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society as this will help to determine the national resources that can be galvanised towards 
foreign policy objectives (Rose, 1998:147). Because of the involvement of domestic groups, 
decision-makers’ ability to “extract national power”, or follow through on their preferred 
decisions, will ultimately be circumscribed (Lindemann, 2014: 37 – 38). This will help to 
account for why states that have similar capabilities, but different state-society relationships 
will act differently when confronted by similar incentives and constraints (Rose, 1998:147). 
In commonality with other varieties of realism, neoclassical realism begins its analysis by 
emphasising the importance of the distribution of power in the international system 
(Lindemann, 2014:38). The conceptualisation of power endorsed by neoclassical realism is 
the “material conception of power”
43
 (Schmidt, 2005:543). Neoclassical realism makes a 
distinction though in its estimation of foreign policy outcomes by emphasising that material 
capabilities alone cannot account for policy outcomes (Schmidt, 2005:543).  
Ultimately, it is the combination of domestic variables alongside material capabilities which 
determine the aggregate power that a state will be able to utilise (Schmidt, 2005:543; 
Lindemann, 2014:37). Policy-makers’ subjective understanding of their states’ power is the 
most important element for their manoeuvring on the international stage (Schmidt, 2005:544; 
Wohlforth, 1994/95). This is in contrast to structural realism which emphasises an objective 
relative distribution of power in the international system (Schmidt, 2005:544).  
To tie all these loose ends together, realists argue that a state’s goals are determined by its 
capabilities; its interests ultimately reflect its power which conceptually operates on two 
levels, firstly, state interests reflect the distribution of power domestically and internationally, 
and secondly power determines what a state is practically capable of achieving (Zakaria, 
1992:188; Wohlforth, 2012:37; Hill, 2003:2). States will use their power to pursue their 
national interest with disregard for moral imperatives and at times international security. 
While this may describe an important facet of international interactions, this still says very 
little about what power in international relations actually is, or how domestic politics 
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that, “…it is not the mere possession of power resources that matters, but the ability to convert them into actual 




influences it. There still remain unanswered questions regarding what makes one nation 
powerful relative to another (Morgenthau, 1968:107)? Nonetheless, power can only be 
measured in relative and not absolute terms because it will determine what a nation may 
achieve relative to other nations in the international system.  
Realism continues to be overly concerned with the security of the state and its foreign policy 
(Legro and Moravcsik, 1999:5; Katzenstein, 1976:4). Since the international system is 
characterised by anarchy whereby there is no central, hierarchically-organised authority, 
security is the primary goal of all states. However, to avoid reductionism, it is important to 
understand that the anarchic nature of the international system does not determine how states 
will respond to threats. To understand the role of Waltz’s structural level within neoclassical 
realism, at most, the international system acts as a permissive rather than a necessary cause 
(see Waltz, 2001). Thereby, the structure of the system provides incentives to policy-makers 
and presents a combination of constraints and opportunities which policy-makers must 
interpret and adjust to, as such, “The environment gives no guidance regarding how best to 
obtain security, nor does it demand that only particular processes may exist.” (Waltz, 1979:92 
in Sterling -Folker, 1997: 19). Realism does make the distinction that any change to a state’s 
security should be understood in relative and not absolute terms (Katzenstein, 1976:9). Some 
realists argue that in a hierarchy of national interests, security and survival take precedence 
over all others. Neoclassical realism stresses that policy-makers’ decisions concerning 
national security will not merely be determined by systemic elements but will be influenced 
by “the domestic political process” since decision-makers are constrained in their ability to 
determine security policies but must consider the domestic constraints thereon (Schweller, 
2004:167, 174). Often, decision-makers and domestic groups diverge about the means to 
respond to a threat, thus leaders have to consider both domestic support and the type of threat 
when considering policy options (Schweller, 2004:174).  
2.5.5 Multilateral Cooperation  
Structural realists argue that international institutions reflect the distribution of power 
amongst states (Mearsheimer, 1994 – 1995:7; Martin, 1992:783 - 784). Because of the 
influence of powerful states, international institutions exert minimal impact on states’ 
behaviour; rather what international institutions can achieve is determined by states’ self-
interested calculations (Mearsheimer, 1994 – 1995:7). The anarchic nature of the 
international system makes it difficult to cooperate and come to an agreement that is in line 
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with the common interests of all states involved (Jervis, 1978:167). Rather, powerful states 
will pursue their own interests and will design international institutions to maximise these. 
Ultimately, states will attempt to maximise their “relative power positions over other states” 
because this increases the state’s security in relation to other states (Mearsheimer, 1994 – 
1995:11 - 12; Mearsheimer, 1995:82).  
While cooperation amongst states is possible in an anarchic international system, this is a 
challenging prospect to attain because of two reasons, the propensity to cheat and relative-
gains considerations (Mearsheimer, 1994 – 1995:12; Powell, 1991:1303; Grieco et al., 
1993:729). States will therefore focus more on their relative gains which increases the degree 
of conflict, rather than their absolute gains, a position associated with neoliberal 
institutionalism (Powell, 1991:1303). Since states are concerned more with their relative 
gains, gains and losses tend to be seen in zero-sum terms (Powell, 1991:1303). Relative-gain 
concerns will determine to what degree and with whom states will be willing to cooperate 
while the fear that other states will cheat will inhibit cooperation for fear that other states will 
gain a relative advantage (Mearsheimer, 1994 – 1995:12 - 16). Anarchy will also propel 
states to compete amongst one another (Grieco, 1988:485). Under such circumstances, 
cooperation is difficult to achieve since each state is concerned about being exploited by 
another state (Jervis, 1988:318). Although states may want to cooperate, since each fears 
being exploited by another state should it do so, there is an incentive for all states involved to 
not cooperate (Jervis, 1988:318). States’ self-interested calculations will therefore be 
influenced by their domestic structures and perception of their position relative to that of 
other states in the system.  
In multilateral environmental negotiations, the distribution of costs to actors and different 
conflict groups entail ramifications that more often than not negate their perceived benefits 
(Gilpin, 1996:10). Since these negotiations will have cost implications for various social 
groups, states have an incentive to resist these costs and free-ride while transferring these to 
other states (Gilpin, 1996:10). Although all states may gain absolute gains, states will be 
more concerned with gaining relative gains and the distribution of production and labour 
capabilities in the interstate system (Gilpin, 1996:10). As a result of these intertwined factors, 
states disagree over the rules and nature of international regimes that distribute a set of costs 
and benefits in the international system (Gilpin, 1996:10). This begs the question, to what 
extent would states sacrifice global benefits to maintain a relative advantage?   
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Problematically, Jervis (1988:325) illustrates that, “Sometimes we can deduce preferences 
from the structure of the system, as Realism suggests. But even a structural theory of 
international politics as powerful as Waltz's has trouble producing many precise deductions. 
As the endless arguments about the national interest remind us, only rarely can descriptions 
and prescriptions of what the state will or should prefer be drawn from its objective 
situation… More broadly, one does not have to be a Wilsonian or a Marxist to argue that the 
goals states seek, the costs they are willing to pay, and the instruments that are believed 
appropriate can be deeply affected by the nature of the state.” It is often easier to treat the 
state as a rational, unitary actor when security issues are at stake; however when conflicts 
arise over non-security issues such as trade, the state can be guided by other actors such as 
classes, groups and sectors (Jervis, 1988:325). Apart from the intrusion of special interest 
groups, the beliefs and ideologies of decision-makers can also assist them in determining 
their interests, thereby “The effect is that under circumstances in which some statesmen will 
believe that mutual cooperation is beneficial, others will see it as a trap.” (Jervis, 1988:326).  
Structural realism has for the most part ignored the decision-making level of analysis, hence 
it is important to differentiate the circumstances under which beliefs can influence decision-
makers’ perception of outcomes (Jervis, 1988:336). In spite of structural realism’s 
assumptions, there are many factors beside objective evaluations that determine cooperation 
(Jervis, 1988:340). Often, it is decision-makers beliefs about the efficacy of alternative 
policies that influence the decision to cooperate or not (Jervis, 1988:340). The great puzzle 
that is presented to the theorist is to evaluate when hurdles to cooperation are due to the 
system or beliefs (Jervis, 1988:340). 
2.5.6 Neoclassical Realism and Energy: A General Overview 
While a general account has been provided of the history and evolution of realism; at this 
point, it is useful to attempt an initial account of neoclassical realism’s theoretical stance on 
energy policy. One of the initial challenges that the study experienced in this application is 
realism’s stance on and explanation of non-military threats in the international setting. While 
there have been numerous examples of state’s engaging in conflict over access to energy 
sources, this is a peripheral element of the study’s investigation. However, the law of 
thermodynamics, combined with the geographic concentration of particular energy resources 
such as petroleum and their negative environmental externalities posits energy in a unique 
position in the political-economy framework. Ultimately, industrialised societies are energy 
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dependent. And it is this creation of an industrialised civilisation so utterly dependent on 
energy through the combustion of fossil fuels that has been a source of economic growth but 
also threatens the delicate balance between man and nature that this civilisation centres on. 
The last energy transition introduced by the technological innovation of the Industrial 
Revolution gave the impetus for increased economic output, colonialism and under certain 
conditions hegemony (Podobnik, 2006; Debeir et al., 1991). For social, military and 
economic reasons, the state has been the essential actor in this configuration (see Macdonald, 
2012).  
For realism, energy can be understood to be a source of power and material capability, and 
survival. Likewise, energy is a tool in the self-help method that states have to rely on in a 
system characterised by anarchy and hostility (Kropatcheva, 2014:2). States will be 
fundamentally concerned with enhancing their energy security and their energy capabilities 
(Kropatcheva, 2014:2). As a result there has historically been a close association between the 
state and energy industries (Kropatcheva, 2014:2; Macdonald, 2012). Gaining access to and 
developing end-use technology is likewise a crucial aspect of these latter dimensions. The 
result of our dependence on fossil fuel technology and energy has resulted in the phenomenon 
of global climate change. The state’s ability to meet the interrelated challenges of economic 
growth, energy security, energy poverty, development and climate change mitigation places it 
in a somewhat contradictory position. The state will be forced to contend with domestic and 
international pressure in its attempt to find solutions to these problems.  
Modern energy derived from fossil-fuel based production and consumption as well as 
anthropogenic climate change are linked. The combustion of fossil fuels produces greenhouse 
gases
44
 (GHGs) which are responsible for anthropogenic climate change. This will be 
differentiated across cases since “Country studies emphasise large national differences in 
underlying attitudes towards energy and the greenhouse effect.” (Grubb et al., 1991:911). 
Although the objective may be clear, the ability to limit GHG emissions is dependent on 
factors such as the nature of a country’s political culture, its economic system and 
philosophy, the stage of its development, its energy infrastructure, its institutions and 
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 Because of the complexity of climate change and its mitigation, effective mitigation is unattainable should 
each actor act in its own self-interest (IPCC, 2014:4). According to the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), 
total anthropogenic GHG emissions have increased continuously between 1970 and 2010 (IPCC, 2014:4). Of 
this total amount, industrial processes and fossil fuel combustion were responsible for 78% of the total GHG 
increase from 1970 to 2010 (IPCC, 2014:5). 
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attitudes as well as its political culture, all of which are determined historically and by the 
availability of inexpensive domestic energy reserves making these elements path dependent 
(Grubb et al., 1991:911).  
In addition, to improve the theoretical framework, this section will elaborate on a concept that 
is central to the enhancement of the analytical coherence of this study. To suit the purposes of 
this study, the focus within energy policy will be on “the overarching goals that guide policy 
in a particular field” (Hall, 1993:278) which are understood in its broadest sense and will be 
integrated with the two levels of analysis to better understand the manner in which the goals 
of US energy policy and the goals of the UNFCCC are in congruence or not, and to suit the 
extensive historical analysis of this study. Since the 1970s, there are three goals that 
historically have influenced US energy policy, these being maintaining low energy costs for 
the enhancement of economic growth, ensuring a secure supply of energy and environmental 
protection (Yacobucci, 2016:1). Within energy policy, these goals have often been in conflict 
with one another, an exercise made more complex when trying to find areas of overlap with 
the goals of the UNFCCC. This will allow the study to trace the development of US energy 
policy and the congruence or incongruence of the goals of energy policy with those of the 
UNFCCC. By integrating these within the two levels of analysis, it is possible to indicate the 
multi-faceted interaction between the goals outlined above and their implications for US 
cooperation within the UNFCCC. It should be noted that goals and objectives are used 
interchangeably within this study and that at times mention will also be made of policy 
instruments where appropriate.  
Within this context, most states consider energy as an issue of national security and design 
policies with this in mind (Katzenstein, 1976:35). However, policy-makers also have to 
continuously balance these considerations amongst other policy priorities, as well as the 
continuity of supply vis-à-vis any negative externalities. Moreover, they need to consider the 
relative power position of other nations with regards to scarce energy resources and their 
geographic concentration, the role of various internal government departments, energy as 
well as related policies, developments in energy innovation, the role of domestic and 
international energy companies as well as their and other countries’ energy mix. The 
remainder of this section will further elaborate on energy policy. 
Much like any policy area, it is no misnomer to observe that energy policy consists of 
numerous, often conflicting objectives (Surrey, 1992:209). In the most obvious sense, 
constructing an energy policy that is able to accommodate a number of competing policy 
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goals is daunting and involves trade-offs between competing aims (Bamberger, 2003:4). The 
lesson of this for theories of International Relations is that “Monocausal arguments founder 
on the fact that policy-makers usually have more than one set of reasons for their actions and 
see intimate linkages between different categories, which are often isolated in scholarly 
writing.” (Bergsten et al., 1975:5).   
The concept of energy policy evokes a great deal of confusion (Lindberg, 1977:4). The 
traditional conceptualisation of the concept defines it as the activities carried out by 
government and industry in relation to a number of stages in the supply of energy sources 
such as petroleum, coal, electricity and natural gas (Lindberg, 1977:4). Over time, the 
conceptual boundaries have been widened in light of new challenges related to environmental 
constraints, income distribution, foreign policy as well as national power and security, and 
implications for the economic and political power within states (Lindberg, 1977:4). In a 
modern nation-state, achieving a coherent and rational energy policy is highly improbable 
due to the presence of conflicting interests and values, limited information, and constraints on 
government power (Lindberg, 1977:5). The complexity of this situation is captured by the 
following definition of energy policy, 
“Energy policy is understood here … to be a programmed 
strategy, based on the forecasts of energy consumption and 
assessments of supply capabilities, and delivered in a number 
of ways: regulation (price controls, import controls, etc.), 
market-orientated instruments, and by way of the services of 
government agencies and enterprises. Like all sectoral 
policies, energy policy subsumes other policy goals, 
including those of industrial, regional and social policy. It is 
also influenced by foreign policy objectives.” (Finon, 
1994:1).          
A basic definition of energy policy refers to government intervention in energy markets for 
the supply of energy and “to improve the performance of energy markets” (Helm et al., 
1988:42; Helm, 1991:2). Such a definition, while fairly narrow and conservative, offers the 
advantage that it points to traditional concerns regarding macroeconomic stability and the 
need to consider the technical and economic details related to the demand and supply of these 
various fuels. However, what such a definition also brings to clarity is that energy policy is 
70 
 
also composed of numerous, often conflicting goals, related not only to economic and 
technical details, but also to other policies, especially those that are politicised in nature.   
There are a number of changes to have occurred in the global energy system over the last four 
decades which had important implications for energy policy. These developments have been 
caused by the changing relationship between consuming and producing countries, new 
sources of consumption and production, the introduction of new fuels and technological 
breakthroughs. Likewise a number of constraints, especially related to environmental 
externalities, began to influence practices surrounding energy extraction and use. Some of 
these changes in the global energy system can be traced to the oil crisis of 1973 while others 
represent new sources of constraints and opportunities. The ability to make sense of change 
in energy systems is a complex activity because of the differences between various energy 
markets (Ratner and Glover, 2014:1). Most of the time, these markets operate independently 
of one another, although there are instances where they impact trends amongst one another, 
making energy markets interconnected but not entirely (Ratner and Glover, 2014:1). 
Energy is a unique commodity, unlike many others, in that it is a prerequisite for the 
functioning of all sectors of the economy and human well-being (Helm et al., 1988:42). 
Historically, energy policy has been concerned with fuel choice and security of supply 
(Helm, 1991:1). Within this framework, energy security has been the primary rationale for 
government intervention in energy policy (Finon, 1994:3). While, governments have been 
involved in decisions concerning fuel choice since the end of the Second World War; the oil 
shock of 1973 redefined energy policies to improve energy security (Finon, 1994:3). The 
consequence of this is that the energy policy framework in the post-war period has being 
inconsistent (Helm, 1991:2).While governments attempt to design policies that can mitigate 
against possible supply interruptions, the justification for government’s intervention in fuel 
choice was typically also confounded with other political objectives such as national self-
sufficiency while governments also distorted the price of energy to achieve a wide variety of 
social objectives making the design of energy policy a politicised process in terms of the 
objectives governments want to attain (Helm, 1991:3; Dilnot and Helm, 1987:26).  
Nevertheless, the overarching rationale is that governments intervene in energy markets for 
security of supply because of energy’s pervasive role and presence in the economy (Helm, 
1991:4). If disruptions of energy services occur, its effects are experienced at every level of 
the economy since “energy is complementary to other economic activities” therefore supply 
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interruptions “cause disproportionate disruption in the economy” (Helm, 1991:4). The 
consequence of this characteristic is that any consequences of failure in the energy market 
exceed failure in other sectors (Helm, 1991:4). A variety of exogenous factors have 
influenced government’s stance on various fuels (Helm, 1991:2). In response to energy 
security threats, governments undertook different roles, sometimes regulatory, at others 
market-orientated, emphasising different fuels and technologies, both local and foreign in 
order to meet the challenge of energy security. The role of government was thus defined by 
the type of threat, how they understood the threat and the accompanying interpretation of the 
means to achieve energy security.  
Although government intervention in energy policy is justified by appeals to energy security, 
understanding the precise influence and role of energy security in energy policy formulation 
and interaction amongst other policy goals is made more complicated by the fact that energy 
security is a normative concept. Different conceptualisations of energy security exist based 
on the particular geology, national objectives, technologies, fuels, ideology and geography of 
the institution or state that is being analysed or that sets policies in place to attain this goal 
(Sovacool and Brown, 2010:80; Ciuta, 2010:124; Sovacool, 2011:1). Nonetheless, the most 
widely accepted definition of energy security conceptualises it as “access to secure, adequate, 
reliable, and affordable energy supplies” (Dyer and Trombetta, 2013:300). Simultaneously, 
the concept has also not remained static but had to be able to make sense of new challenges 
which differ from epoch to epoch (Sovacool and Brown, 2010:80). 
Part of the complexity in defining energy security may be linked to the politicised and 
multifaceted nature of energy itself (Sovacool, 2011:6). Most scholars adopt a particular 
definition of energy security as a means of justifying certain policies and actions (Sovacool, 
2011:3). Because of its highly politicised nature, energy security is also susceptible to 
ideological manipulation (Valentine, 2011:59). This particular study emphasises the 
importance of the state and its interests as remaining the essential referent of energy security 
(Dyer and Trombetta, 2013: 297). However, what these various definitions of energy security 
illustrate is that they are closely linked to ideological motifs (Valentine, 2011:60). When 
policy-makers attempt to construct either a foreign or domestic policy that aims to ensure 
energy security, it quickly degenerates into an ideological contestation rather than a 




2.6 A Criticism and Defence of Neoclassical Realism 
Critics of realism would argue that realism should be relegated to the theoretical scrap heap 
of history. In the modern era, there is no place for realism’s stance on crude power in a world 
of interdependent states, economic expansion, and where other actors beside the state have an 
impact on international behaviour. Transnational threats have also made obsolete realism’s 
insistence on war and related military threats. However, a lot of the criticism
45
 that has been 
directed towards realism often treats realism as a caricature rather than a thoroughly 
comprehensive and complex inter-theoretical debate.  
There are a number of criticisms that have been levelled against neoclassical realism 
(Lindemann, 2014:35). The first is that classical realism includes domestic-level variables in 
an ad hoc manner (Lindemann, 2014:39). As a result, as a theoretical framework, it does not 
appear to be parsimonious and precise in its ability to predict outcomes that would enable the 
falsification of hypothesis (Lindemann, 2014:39). Critics further maintain that realism suffers 
from an inability to predict outcomes and is unable to anticipate change in international 
relations (Wohlforth, 1994/95:100 – 105). They further leverage that the behaviour exhibited 
by states internationally is inconsistent with realist theory (Wohlforth, 1994/95:100 – 105).  
Neoclassical realism has been criticised for dealing with anomalies within the realist 
paradigm by redesigning realism in such a way that it loses its theoretical consistency thereby 
becoming less coherent, less distinctive and less determinate (Legro and Moravcsik, 1999:6). 
In this manner, critics point out that neoclassical realism has diluted the core assumptions of 
the realist paradigm (Legro and Moravcsik, 1999:6). By including state-society relations and 
ideational structures, which are assumed to be the traditional theoretical domain of liberalism 
and constructivism, critics point out that neoclassical realists deal with theoretical anomalies 
by restructuring realism in a manner that is inconsistent with its overall theoretical stance 
(Legro and Morvcsik, 1999:6). In contrast, proponents argue that neoclassical realism is a 
necessary theoretical advancement of structural realism and that no theory has sole use of any 
variables (Rathbun, 2008:294). Rather, variables should be used in such a way so as to fit the 
overall logic of the theoretical framework (Rathbun, 2008). They argue that domestic 
structures and ideas form an important element in a state’s ability to advance its latent 
material power (Rathbun, 2008:296). While states act as unitary and rational actors under the 
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influence of the structure of the international system in response to a threat that undermines 
their security, states’ policies will be influenced by other factors should a threat of lesser 
magnitude be present (Rathbun, 2008:307).  
Regarding international cooperation, liberal institutionalists would argue that international 
cooperation may be enhanced through international institutions (Grieco, 1988:486). However, 
a major constraint on the abilities of states to cooperate that is not fully taken into 
consideration by liberal institutionalism is the importance of relative gains (Grieco, 1988: 
487). Thus, while liberal institutionalists would argue that states can cooperate when 
international institutions reduce the risk of cheating, a realist framework would highlight that 
states are more concerned about relative gains because of the implications for their security 
(Grieco, 1988:487).  
Neoclassical realists like other realists insist that the state is the main actor on the 
international stage. However, unlike structural realists they do not black-box the state but 
instead indicate how the influence of vested interests and ideology can often temper with the 
notion of the national interest and policy at the expense of the state’s security and wider 
notions of the social good. Perhaps a more difficult question relates to how neoclassical 
realism treats non-traditional security threats such as energy policy and climate change. As 
non-military threats, what position do these phenomena occupy in the neoclassical realist 
framework? While it may be argued that energy is not a traditional threat, it is still widely 
acknowledged to be a matter of national security, while climate change threatens the very 
foundations that primordial human needs are based on, namely food, water and a secure 
habitation. Neoclassical realism is better suited for questions concerning political economy 
because of its incorporation of vested interests, ideology and domestic structures which can 
influence energy policy’s stance on issues of security and mitigation as well as a state’s 
position in multilateral negotiations. In addition, neoclassical realism
46
 is more suitable for 
qualitative and historical research (Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell, 2016:109, 110) as 
highlighted by the studies done by Mastanduno (1991) and Kropatcheva (2014). 
Although, as critics point out, there is the risk that variables are combined and analysed in an 
arbitrary manner, its adaptability allows this theoretical framework to identify intricate, 
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multifaceted interactions such as the interaction between US energy policy and its position in 
the UNFCCC. To avoid a random selection of variables, unit-level variables based on the 
federal level structure and differing perceptions are integrated by tracing the link between a) 
the goals of energy policy and b) the US position within the UNFCCC, along with the impact 
of the distribution of power at the system-level on the goals of US energy policy and its 
position in the UNFCCC. It is therefore possible to trace the historical development of US 
energy policy and its interaction with the US position within the UNFCCC. As the theoretical 
framework facilitates the identification of nuanced interactions, it is able to reveal the 
opportunities, challenges and contradictions of reconciling US energy policy and the 
UNFCCC position within the US federal political context and executive
47
  policy-makers’ 
perception regarding the cost accrued to the US economy. This relates to the estimation of the 
costs, benefits and trade-offs between mitigation and other policy goals within the ideational 
divide in the US political system over these issues. 
The strength of neoclassical realism is its emphasis that it is the combination of the structural-
level, that is the distribution of power in the international system, and unit-level variables, the 
variables found at the state-level, as influencing interstate dynamics (Ripsman, 2017). It may 
be worthwhile to provide a more concise overview of these two aspects of neoclassical 
realism. As previously discussed, neorealism places emphasis on the distribution of power in 
the international system as determining interstate dynamics. The distribution of power in the 
international system is the most essential determinant of interstate behaviour as it influences 
the constraints and opportunities that policy-makers will respond to (Ripsman, 2017). 
However, the opportunities and constraints provide by the international system are not always 
sufficiently clear. As Ripsman (2017) summarises, “This level of flexibility assumes that 
states face no domestic constraints when making national security decisions.”. Thereby, it is 
necessary to understand how the influence of the distribution of power is filtered through unit-
level variables. As such, the necessity of structural explanations as argued by Kenneth Waltz, 
within neorealism, is summarised by Ripsman (2017) as follows: 
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“Explanations of patterns of international behavior, such as the 
recurrence of war, that were based on conceptions of human nature or 
the nature of states (his first and second images of international 
politics) were, at best, incomplete, as human nature theories could not 
explain why war does not always occur, while theories of national 
difference could not explain why states with different political 
systems behave similarly in similar circumstances. Furthermore, first 
or second image theories were insufficient because the prescriptions 
that followed from them required changes in the relations between 
states, which implies that the problems themselves stemmed from the 
nature of the international system, his third image. In contrast, third 
image theories, focusing on anarchy in the international system and its 
consequences for states, were the most efficient explanations of war 
and other macropolitical outcomes between states, and they were 
sufficient as they required no reference to the types of states involved, 
human nature, or the particular leaders of particular states.” 
Over time, change in the distribution of power and capabilities in the international system 
will alter interstate dynamics (Ripsman, 2017; Kirshner: 2010:54). The resultant security 
implications will compel states to pursue alliances against rising competitors to balance 
against them so as to ensure their survival and security (Ripsman, 2017). States will therefore 
implement those foreign policies that will enhance their position within the structure of the 
international system, “Since their very survival is at stake if they fail to secure themselves 
properly from without in an anarchic international system, where the slightest misstep could 
lead to defeat in war, the incentives are extremely high for states to focus on external stimuli 
and craft foreign policies to respond to them appropriately.” (Ripsman, 2017). Within an 
anarchic international system where the power relations between states alter, security and 
power are the ultimate goals of foreign policy (Kirshner, 2010:55; Walt, 2017). Security, 
which is defined in a narrow sense in realist theory, is understood as referring to the state and 
its territorial integrity whereby the state is capable of defending itself (Walt, 2017). Given 
that the international system is anarchic, states must rely on self-help to ensure their security 
since there is no other authority that would be able to promote the security of the state (Walt, 
2017). Although realists may offer a number of explanations for the scarcity of security in 
international relations ranging from the conflict of interest amongst states and differences in 
domestic political systems in addition to the anarchic structure of the international system, 
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they point out that numerous factors can also increase or decrease this security problem 
(Walt, 2017). Moreover, states will respond to a change in the distribution of power because 
of the potential impact thereof for their security (Walt, 2017). 
Neoclassical realism shares neorealism’s assumption that states primarily respond to the 
threats and opportunities presented by the structure of the international system (Ripsman, 
2017). Yet, neoclassical realism indicates that the influence of the structure of the 
international system, that is the distribution of power therein, must be filtered through unit-
level variables (Ripsman, 2017). States are not always capable of perceiving international 
threats and opportunities accurately (Ripsman, 2017). While states may be principally aware 
of the structure of the international system, in and of itself, structural variables alone do not 
influence interstate behaviour and dynamics, at most these are permissive causes (Kirshner, 
2010:56). Hence, although aware and responding to structural constraints and opportunities, 
policy-makers must still determine the manner in which they will attain their goals and how 
they will respond to constraints (Kirshner, 2010:57). As such Kirshner (2010:57) summaries 
this dynamic with the following depiction, “Rather classical realists also understand that state 
behavior is shaped by the lessons of history (right or wrong), ideas (accurate or not), ideology 
(good or bad), and that states make choices influenced by fear, vulnerability, and hubris, 
usually in the context of considerable uncertainty.” Power is thus an essential aspect of a 
state’s ability to attain their objectives and meet the security challenge posed by competitors 
(Kirshner, 2010:58).  
Neoclassical realism relies on the complex understanding of the state as illustrated in 
classical realism; however, while maintaining the emphasis on the primary structural 
constrains and opportunities imposed by the distribution of power in the international system 
(Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, 2009:23). Neoclassical realism defines the state as a set of 
institutions located within a “geographically bounded territory” which has the “monopoly on 
legitimate rule within that defined territory. Neoclassical realism presents a ‘top-down’ 
conception of the state, which means systemic forces ultimately drive external behaviour.” 
(Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, 2009:25). Imperatively, the structure of the state, in the 
sense of the institutional make-up and relations between the executive and legislature, have 
an important influence on the kinds of policies that may be enacted in response to the 
changing distribution of power (Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, 2009:27). Since this theory 
is essential to understanding the US domestic system, a brief outline is provided of the key 
aspects of the US political system. The United States of America has a federal political 
system whereby its government is divided into three branches consisting of the executive, 
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judicial and legislative branches with each branch of government limiting the power of the 
other (CAR, 2002:11 – 12; CAR, 2010:10). The President’s power is limited relative to 
Congress under Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution (The Constitution of the 
United States, 2007:8; Skodvin and Andresen, 2009; Depledge, 2005:2). As a result, in order 
to ratify treaties, the president must have the support of two-thirds of the US Senate (Hovi et 
al., 2010:4; Depledge, 2005:2; Bang et al., 2012:756). 
Within the USA’s federal system, the US Constitution provides little overview of the precise 
interactions between the executive and Congress in regards to the manner in which 
administrative agencies may be established (Garvey and Sheffner, 2018:1). Nevertheless, 
Congress has the ability to create and influence the federal bureaucracy under Article I of the 
Constitution, Article II, Section 2 and Article I, Section 8, and therefore “Acting pursuant to 
its broad constitutional authority, Congress may create federal agencies and individual offices 
within those agencies, design agencies’ basic structures and operations, and prescribe, subject 
to certain constitutional limitations, how those holding such offices are appointed and 
removed” (Garvey and Sheffner, 2018:1). Most Congressional power over these agencies 
originates from Congress’s ability to enact legislation and yet, likewise, the Constitution also 
enforces limitations on Congressional power through “express grants of power in the 
Constitution, which thereby establish internal constraints on the federal government’s 
authority” whereby the Constitution allocates unto Congress a set of very defined powers, 
and the Constitution and relevant case law further impose limitations on Congressional power 
vis-à-vis the states (Nolan et al., 2018:2; Thomas, 2013:1). In relation to the particular subject 
matter of the thesis, environmental protection programmes may be designed as well as 
implemented at all levels of government, although the different government agencies, state 
authorities, the executive and Congress do have different roles (Congressional Budget Office, 
1988). 
As has been expanded in section 2.5.3, perception is a necessary element of the neoclassical 
realist framework. Perception is imperative since it influences the manner in which policy-
makers understand complicated information (Eun, 2013:373). Moreover, as has been 
discussed, ideology, understood to be an individual’s orientation towards issue areas through 
a set of political beliefs, influences perception (Sartori, 1969:400). Ideology therefore 
influences policy-makers’ understanding of the compatibility between various policy goals, 
especially the compatibility between environmental regulation and economic growth, where 
the cost for US energy is an important consideration (Sartori, 1969:400). While the traditional 
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definition of perception in neoclassical realism is understood  to be policy-makers’ 
assessment of the distribution of power in the international system (Ripsman, 2011), the 
thesis has adapted this definition of “perception”. Since the study focuses on energy policy 
and the US position in the UNFCCC, the reference to “narrow rational calculation” and the 
costs of different kinds of decisions within perception relates to the calculation by policy-
makers of the compatibility between various policy goals, specifically the compatibility 
between environmental regulation and economic growth, where the cost for US energy is an 
important consideration and how it will influence the competitiveness and position of the 
USA relative to other states in the international distribution of power, with the importance of 
the ideology of the administration therein highlighting their approach to the compatibility 
between the goals of environmental regulation and economic growth (Oskanian, 2016). The 
definition of perception as “narrow rational calculation” (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2002:97) 
relates to the costs of energy and implies that policy-makers approach policy problems as 
rational actors that have a set of goals that they wish to attain albeit with limited information. 
It has been concluded within a number of analyses that within the US political system, the 
ideological position of the Republican and Democrat parties impacts energy policy (Adelman 
and Spence, 2017; Hess et al., 2016:20) and climate change politics (McCright and Dunlap, 
2011; Gromet et al., 2013).     
The dependent variable in this analysis is the interaction between US energy policy and its 
position in the UNFCCC as is observed in chapters 4 to 7. This interaction refers to the 
calculation by policy-makers of the compatibility between various policy goals, specifically 
the compatibility between environmental regulation and economic growth, where the cost for 
US energy is an important consideration and how it will influence the competitiveness and 
position of the USA relative to other states in the international distribution of power, with the 
impact of the administration’s ideological position impacting their stance towards the 
compatibility between the goals of environmental regulation and economic growth 
(Oskanian, 2016). 
2.7 Conclusion 
Theories are integral to any attempt to understand how the world functions. They are 
constantly present, whether explicitly or implicitly, in any consideration of what appear to be 
a bewildering array of disparate events. Realism, as the dominant and the oldest theoretical 
paradigm in International Relations, has faced alterations in the twentieth century that would 
enhance the ability of the theory to account for international behaviour and also advance the 
79 
 
debate about its efficacy and relevance in International Relations. In spite of criticism, 
realism has proven to have a tenacious grip as a theoretical construct. At its core, realism 
presents a world wherein states are the most important actors who are both unitary and 
rational, must pursue power and the national interest, while the international system is 
marked by the absence of a hierarchic power structure defining the system as anarchic, which 
stimulates competition for security and power amongst states (Donnelly, 2005: 29 - 30).   
Neoclassical realism, which incorporates both structural- and unit-level factors, presents a 
more nuanced understanding of policy outcomes. Policy-makers are simultaneously faced 
with pressure from the international system as well as domestic factors. Their ability to 
navigate this terrain will be influenced by their interpretation of threats and opportunities as 
well as the conflicting pressures exerted by the domestic and international spheres. A 
coherent energy policy is an important element of a state’s material capabilities. Because of 
the importance of energy input into all social and economic processes, an adequate energy 
policy framework is crucial if states are to amplify their strength and power and maintain 
their security in the face of challengers, wherein the mitigation of climate change is a further 
complicating factor. Because energy policy consists of goals which compete with and at 
times contradict other policy objectives, decision-makers have to make trade-offs. 
Neoclassical realism indicates the manner in which policy-makers interpret threats and 
opportunities and their abilities to respond to these. Vested interests, ideology, the structure 
of the political system, the path dependence of energy technology as well as alterations in 
economic and technological systems will influence and interfere in policy-makers’ ability to 
design an energy and foreign policy that can respond to these challenges – although it should 
be noted that these are outside the scope of the subject matter. Neoclassical realism, with its 
incorporation of these influences, can offer a more intricate overview of the interplay of 
factors found at the structural- and unit-levels found within the subject matter being analysed. 
Hence, neoclassical realism is argued to be the most optimal theoretical approach to be used 






The Emergence and Development of US Energy Policy up to 
1989: Petroleum, Hegemonic Ascent and Crises 
3.1 Introduction 
The USA occupies an essential role in and its energy policy has important implications for 
the global energy system (Yergin, 1979:84). For decades it has been one of the biggest 
consumers and producers of energy resources such as petroleum, coal as well as natural gas, 
and pioneered renewable energy technologies. It also had a firm foothold in the global 
petroleum system with the commodity introduced as a key element of the global political 
economy, and by extension the USA’s role in the Middle East and the rest of the world up to 
the 1973 oil crisis. Throughout the twentieth century, petroleum and fossil fuels were 
paramount for the USA’s economic growth. Understandably, petroleum became a defining 
feature of US energy policy to the detriment of alternative fuel choices, while policy-makers’ 
fears regarding US dependence on imported petroleum increased. Since US hegemony 
depended on its role in the supply of cheap Middle Eastern petroleum, this dependence on 
petroleum was maintained. However, the USA’s growing dependency on foreign petroleum 
has been met with unease and associated as a threat to national security by various 
administrations since the end of the Second World War due to the economic disruption this 
incurs and the risks that this poses to US national security. During this era, since the US 
government had to be concerned with its domestic market, specifically low energy prices for 
consumers and industries, but also maintain a role in the global energy system which was 
petroleum-based, US energy policy developed a dual nature creating a set of contradictions.  
Up to the 1970s, the United States had what appeared to be abundant domestic energy 
resources, to which the peripheral role of the federal government in energy policy 
formulation suited the context. This all changed with the oil shocks of the 1970s. The Yom 
Kippur War in October 1973 was the watershed moment that altered the country’s energy 
context into a crisis by creating the most severe energy shortage that the United States 
experienced since the Second World War, while the price of petroleum would quadruple 
between 1973 and 1974. Various administrations have struggled to enact policies that could 
bear the higher costs that this accrued to consumers and the associated decrease in the 
competitiveness of US industries while interacting with Congress over these issues within the 
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US federal political system. The rise of increased federal regulation in energy policy became 
a highly politicised and contested issue. With the already dire situation of the 1970s, 
environmental considerations further complicated attempts to ameliorate this situation.  
All these issues would play out within the kaleidoscope that is American politics. Beginning 
with Richard Nixon, since 1973, there were a series of legislative proposals issued to reduce 
petroleum imports, and enhance its substitutes, while increasing energy efficiency standards 
(Bohi and Toman, 1993:1093). Although these measures evolved with the Ford and Carter 
administrations; however, the Reagan administration once again enacted a series of measures 
reminiscent of the energy policies of the pre-1973 era. As such, the development of the 
USA’s energy policy progressed around a series of contested ideas; that is while certain 
teleological goals were present; there was no set method that was the obvious policy choice 
in this attainment. The sheer scale of choice surrounding energy resources makes energy 
policy a particularly daunting challenge. The task for each successive administration became 
increasingly complex as each era presents increasingly multi-dimensional challenges to 
energy policy. Therewith, an energy policy reflects the particular ideas as well as challenges 
of each era. Fundamentally, US energy policy cannot be understood in isolation from its 
hegemonic position, and the ideational division found within its domestic political system. 
This historical chapter traces the origins and development of the USA’s domestic energy 
policy and the rise of its hegemonic position in the global petroleum system. It then illustrates 
how the USA’s energy policy reacted to new events and challenges and the associated issues 
that complicated this laying the foundation to assist in understanding subsequent 
administrations. Towards this aim, this chapter proceeds with a discussion of the concept of 
energy policy, followed by a synopsis of the main assumptions that US energy policy has 
been based on. It then traces a historical overview of the development of US energy policy up 
to 1989. 
3.2.2 The Assumptions Guiding US Energy Policy  
Over the twentieth century, the United States has been characterised by remarkable economic 
growth and prosperity, even though it has lacked an industrial policy and a comprehensive 
federal energy policy, yet it has attained an unparalleled level of economic and industrial 
strength in spite of their absence (Tomain, 2007:1202). Historically, the USA did not have a 
federal energy policy which connected “various energy industries with each other…the 
development of natural resources throughout their various fuel cycles.” (Tomain, 2007:1203).  
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Moreover, energy policy was not coordinated with environmental policy in spite of the 
adverse environmental consequences that are associated with energy consumption and use, 
the former being mostly concerned with production and the latter with protection, although 
carefully designed policies may find congruence between the two, however many times there 
have been trade-offs (Tomain, 2007:1203; Landsberg, 1980:77; Kelliher and Farinella, 
2009:621 - 623). The traditional perception of policy-makers in the USA was that energy 
production and correlated economic growth was incompatible with environmental protection 
(Melosi, 1987:167). Tomain
48
 (2007:1203) asserts that the USA’s energy policy, rather than 
being comprehensive and coordinated, is founded on three economic assumptions: 
i. Private industry, markets and capital are the basis for innovation and wealth, 
therefore competition rather than government regulation is required. 
ii. There is a correlation between energy production and economic productivity 
therefore, the more energy is produced and consumed, the stronger the economy 
will be.  
iii. Economies of scale are needed so that more energy will be produced and at the 
lowest price, i.e. “bigger is better”. The price of energy would decrease as 
refineries and utilities increased in size.  
These assumptions have interacted with three issues that have been contested in US energy 
policy: the attainment and mix of energy sources, the redistribution of income and costs, and 
the role of government and regulation, leading to policy impasse (Yergin, 1979: 84, 89 – 90; 
Landsberg, 1980:77; Hodel, 1991:10). US energy policy has thus been challenged by 
competing ideational frameworks in regards to how best to secure economic growth and 
security (Landsberg, 1980:790). While, these assumptions have guided US energy policy and 
have strengthened the US economy to a degree, since the 1970s these assumptions have been 
increasingly challenged by a number of events.  
Under each administration, the USA’s energy policy had been politicised for a particular set 
of reasons. What may be surmised is that new technologies, fuels, nascent industries and new 
patterns of consumption altered patterns of economic growth allowing states to rise and fall. 
Moe (2007:1) goes on to explain that, “Small differences in growth rates between countries 
will in the long term gravely change the balance of power between them.” (Moe, 2007). In 
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order to comprehend the nuances of the above-discussion, these ideas will be applied to the 
development of energy policy in US history.  
3.3 US Energy Policy in the Pre-1973 Era  
The origins of US energy policy can be traced to the beginning of the country’s Industrial 
Revolution which laid the foundation for the regulation of the production and distribution of 
its resources (Tomain, 1990:356). These regulations were created in response to the 
emergence of nascent energy markets and industries which originated in the mid-nineteenth 
century (Tomain, 1990:356). During this period there emerged the relationship between 
federal regulation and private energy industries which would characterise US energy policy 
over the next century (Tomain, 1990:356).  However, energy was initially produced at the 
local and regional levels at the end of the nineteenth century which ensured that decisions 
regarding policies were carried out at the local and state levels (Tomain, 1990:357).   
The USA did not have a policy framework that united the various energy industries
 
and in 
spite of efforts to the contrary, this policy framework never materialised into a 
comprehensive and coordinated federal energy policy (Tomain, 2007:1201, 1203). This is 
ironic as the United States’ economic growth and prosperity since its industrialisation in the 
mid-nineteenth century rested on the consumption of abundant fossil fuel energy, yet no 
coherent policy existed that could successfully maintain this nor establish a long-term 
prospect that could accommodate the various contrasts of the USA’s energy legislation 
(Tomain, 2007:1201). Up to the 1970s, cheap petroleum for economic growth was the centre 
piece of US domestic and foreign energy policy. The introduction of petroleum in military, 
transportation and economic activities corresponded to the rise of US hegemony. 
At the start of the twentieth century, American society began to be increasingly characterised 
by the assimilation of “large-scale, capital-intensive, centralised, interstate energy production 
and distribution, first in oil, then in electricity” (Tomain, 1990:358). Two major changes 





, while the second transition was characterised by “a transition from local and 
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2014:7975). 
50
 Energy consumption in the United States altered from 70% wood in 1870, to 70% coal in 1900, to 70% gas 
and petroleum in 1960 (O’Connor, 2010:3). This is articulated in relative terms, in absolute terms, with the 
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state to regional and national markets” which paralleled the changes occurring in energy 
industries (Tomain, 1990:357). 
3.3.1 Structural Influences 
Technological innovation and economic trends play important roles in driving interstate 
competition as states compete for power and security within the anarchic international 
system. While such trends begin at the unit level, they have important implications for the 
distribution of power between states. In 1911, Winston Churchill, who at the time was the 
United Kingdom’s Home Secretary, shifted the United Kingdom’s navy from coal to 
petroleum giving it a military advantage over Germany, at the time their main European rival 
(Yergin, 1991:11). This decision made petroleum a strategic element, and a vital component 
of modern warfare. This had a number of far-reaching consequences that in many ways 
shaped the twentieth century. The introduction of new technologies in the beginning of the 
twentieth century had important implications for the expansion of military strategies and 
operations, as well as social development. Aside from these military considerations, in the 
late nineteenth century, the creation of the internal combustion engine had been pivotal in 
making petroleum a necessary input for modern transportation (Smil, 1994:168). The internal 
combustion engine and diesel adaptations introduced the necessity of accessing petroleum 
and maintaining its continuous supply in order to power these technologies and succeed in 
military operations (DeNovo, 1955:641). 
Such dynamics need to be situated within the logic of anarchy which compels states to 
compete against one another in order to ascend in the international system and to ensure 
security for themselves through self-help. Led by technological and military momentum, it 
was during this period, following in the footsteps of the British under the leadership of 
Winston Churchill, that the USA under the leadership of president Woodrow Wilson 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
exception of wood, US consumption of coal, gas and petroleum has increased over the past century for all fuels 
(Ratner and Glover, 2014). For example, petroleum made up 40% of the total energy consumed in the USA 
since 1950, a figure that has remained largely unchanged (Ratner and Glover, 2014:6). The consumption of 
natural gas, by contrast, was four times greater in 2013 than in 1950 (Ratner and Glover, 2014:24). The 
consumption of coal on the other hand has more than doubled since 1950 (Ratner and Glover, 2014:28). In 
1950, nearly 25% of the residential and commercial sectors consumed coal, a figure which dropped to 1% by 
1980 (Ratner and Glover, 2014:28). The electric power sector which consumed less than a fifth of coal 
combusted in 1950 represented 90% of  coal consumption by 2013 (Ratner and Glover, 2014:28). This 
consumption is further differentiated amongst sectors (Ratner and Glover, 2014:7).  
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converted its navy fleet to petroleum (DeNovo, 1955:641; 656). While US policy-makers 
were concerned about the future supply of petroleum for the navy, at this point these worries 
remained marginal as the United States was the only industrialised country in the world that 
had significant domestic reserves of petroleum (DeNovo, 1955:646). Instead, since sufficient 
reserves existed, the issue of how to procure these at an adequate price for the navy was a 
significant challenge that US policy-makers faced (DeNovo, 1955:649).   
These considerations would play a decisive role in the rise of US hegemony. Although the 
United States had the world’s largest economy since the 1880s, it was not until the end of the 
Second World War that it emerged as a hegemonic power having far greater material 
capabilities in the form of natural resources and an industrial base, in comparison to its 
European counterparts (Zakaria, 2008:26, Clark, 2009:24; Ikenberry, 1989:377 – 378). The 
interstate system is dynamic
51
, marked as it is by the uneven growth of power amongst 
states
52
 which defines this change in relative hierarchic power as the driving force of 
interstate interactions (Gilpin, 1988:591). Within the international system that is organised as 
a hierarchic order amongst states based on their power capabilities, a hegemon
53
 can be 
defined as a state which is an unchallenged dominant power (Gilpin, 1988:592). Within this 
rise and fall of states, and the unique attainment of hegemonic status, the sources of state 
power are not static, they can be transformed (Gilpin, 1988:603). A hegemonic state 
establishes the institutions and rules of governance within the international system for a 
particular era alongside the values and ideas that these will be based on thanks to its superior 
power capabilities (Ikenberry, 1989:377 – 378). In the post-war era, the United States used its 
hegemonic power to establish the rules and institutions of the international political and 
economic order known as the Bretton Woods system as a means to address the problems that 
led to the Great Depression and the Second World War (Ikenberry, 1989:380). Thereby, US 
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 Change in the international system refers to the alteration of the hierarchy of states within that system and 
their ensuing patterns of relations (Gilpin, 1988:596). Within the international system, systemic change is 
therefore the inequitable growth of power amongst the dominant states therein (Gilpin, 1988:596).   
52
 The structure of the international system is defined as the distribution of power amongst states (Gilpin, 
1988:592). 
53
 Contrast this definition to the critical position assumed by World Systems Theory which defines a hegemon as 
a state that is economically and militarily more powerful than other core states within a capitalist system that is 
based on the accumulation of capital and crucially its “leadership is also an ideology that legitimates domination 
and exploitation.” (Chase-Dunn, 1994:362). 
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hegemony established a new system of interstate dynamics and interactions based on its 
leadership, 
“The US became an active institution-builder after World War II - not 
as an alternative to US supremacy, but as an expression of it. This 
rather novel strategy of hegemony rested upon a rejection of both 
America’s own isolationist past and the imperialist precedent set by 
Great Britain during its nineteenth-century period of international 
ascendancy. Hegemony is a type of authority in which the privileged 
position of the leading state rests not upon coercion alone, but also upon 
the institutionalized consent of other states. As Bruce Cronin 
(2001:107) puts it: ‘‘hegemony is a form of leadership, not 
domination.’’ US policymakers sought to channel the exercise of 
American power through a set of rules and institutions perceived as 
broadly legitimate by most participating states.” (Skidmore, 2005:209). 
The rise of US hegemony occurred in the context the international distribution of power 
characterised by a bipolar system which emerged after the Second World War, with its main 
rival being the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) which would influence alliance 
structures and interstate competition (Podobnik, 2006:93). The end of the European-centred 
international system and the emergence of the bipolar Cold War structure and its alliance 
formation provided the framework within which the dynamics of the global political 
economy operated in and which further complicated these energy relations as the United 
States and the USSR vied for dominance in their respective spheres - a geopolitical rivalry 
which also played out in the energy system (Gilpin, 2001:5). In order to establish a stable 
alliance consisting of western European countries and Japan
54
 vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, the 
USA had to ensure stable economic growth in its alliance partners which required supplying 
these countries with cheap petroleum (Podobnik, 2006:93). Under this new petroleum-
dominated system, the once coal-dependent economies of Western Europe and Japan became 
dependent on petroleum and petroleum became the dominant primary energy source 
throughout those countries not dominated by the Soviet Union (Odell, 1994:209).  The 
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 The Bretton Woods System, the economic order introduced in the aftermath of the Second World War, was 
dependent predominantly on the cheap supply of energy sources, mainly petroleum, to fuel economic growth in 
the post-war alliance of Europe, Japan and the United States.  
87 
 
countries of the eastern bloc were likewise supported by the Soviet Union to solidify Soviet 
control over the alliance (Podobnik, 2006:93). As a hegemonic state, the USA would occupy 
a strategic military and economic role in this regard as it protected the flow of Middle Eastern 
petroleum to its allies (Singer, 2008:1). Thereafter, with the end of the Second World War, 
energy consumption drastically increased relative to other periods. 
Per consequence, in the post-World War Two era, petroleum became associated with the rise 
of American hegemony (Odell, 1986:27). By providing sufficient stability at the international 
level, American hegemony was able to facilitate the necessary investment in infrastructure as 
well as the transportation of these energy resources (Podobnik, 2006: 92 - 93). Within this 
energy system, economics, foreign policy and military power would converge with the USA 
emerging as the facilitator of the unrestricted, abundant and cheap supply of petroleum on the 
global market as both an expression and enhancement of its hegemony (Yergin, 1991:410). 
Since states compete not only militarily but also economically to maintain their security and 
power within an anarchic international system, with this military and economic competition 
often reinforcing one another, such a configuration would allow US military and economic 
power to converge allowing the two to be fundamental for its hegemonic rise as it oversaw 
the cheap supply of Middle Eastern petroleum to its allies to solidify its power and influence 
within this alliance structure (Waltz, 1993:45). 
American consumption of foreign petroleum would also begin to increase during this period, 
while its domestic production diminished, ultimately reaching a plateau in 1972 (Klare, 
2004(a):10). While foreign petroleum would make up only ten percent of US consumption in 
the 1950s, this number would increase to eighteen percent in the 1960s and would double in 
the 1970s (Klare, 2004(a):10). By the 1970s, the United States depended on foreign 
petroleum in order to maintain economic growth
55
 (Klare, 2004(a):10). As US petroleum 
imports grew in the post-War years, subsequent administrations would begin to view this 
growing dependency with unease and associate it as a threat to national security; thereby 
energy security and national security would be forged together in American military and 
foreign policy (Klare, 2004(a):12). This spurred the US government to employ strategies to 
maintain a continuous supply of petroleum from the Middle East to the United States and its 
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 The puzzle that the 1973 and 1979 oil crises presented was that the oil shocks were not so much caused by a 
lack of availability or even a reduction in the global supply of petroleum, but rather the price at which petroleum 
was set by producers (Bohi, 1987:21). The price of petroleum, rather than its availability, which was 
characterised by imports of foreign sources of petroleum, caused the oil shocks of the era. 
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allies which was enabled by its hegemonic position (Klare, 2004(a):12). Since growth in 
petroleum imports and regional security concerns were deemed to be inevitable, the 
Roosevelt administration established strategic military and diplomatic relations with Saudi 
Arabia and a continuous military presence in the Persian Gulf which was secured by means 
of “collective defence agreements” which were structured to insulate the region from Soviet 
interference (Klare, 2004(a):12; Odell, 1986: 32). As the Cold War heated up, Presidents 
Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower would issue the Truman and Eisenhower 
Doctrines respectively as a means to secure the Persian Gulf’s petroleum as part of their Cold 
War strategy (Klare, 2004(a):12). Amid concerns over rising inexpensive petroleum imports, 
the Eisenhower administration introduced a quota system between 1959 and 1973, justified as 
a matter of national security, in order to protect domestic interests (Ross, 2013; Yang, 
1977:4; Bohi and Toman, 1993:1093). Petroleum thus became the USA’s greatest strength, 
but also its greatest weakness.  
Although domestic influences would have an important impact, the USA’s approach to its 
role in the global petroleum system was driven by external causes (Waltz, 1993:50) – to 
attain the status of hegemony, that is its role in the global energy system were used to attain 
its global objectives. It allowed the United States to secure a strategic influence over the 
Middle East, as well as over its allies in Europe and Japan. This occurred within the bipolar 
order of the Cold War, wherein competition for resources and military as well as ideological 
superiority were characteristics of the competition between the USA and the Soviet Union, a 
zero-sum game, within the international system (Waltz, 1993:50).  
By the mid-Twentieth century, petroleum emerged as a vital component of economic growth 
and military power. Within the economic, military and technological configuration of the era, 
petroleum became a necessary component of US hegemonic rise through its enhancement of 
US military and economic capabilities, as well as its influence over the Cold War alliance 
structure, and per consequence the need to maintain the continuous supply of petroleum 
became a policy priority. Although it had domestic reserves, US imports began increasing 
and petroleum became a source of vulnerability as the USA’s dependence began to increase 
on this resource, a policy concern made more acute within the bipolar order of the Cold War, 
and the rivalry between the USA and the Soviet Union therein within the anarchic 
international system and the consequences thereof for US security and power, as the USA 
had to maintain its hegemony while guaranteeing security for itself through the logic of self-
help. It was the USA’s rise as a hegemon in the post-World War Two setting that facilitated 
89 
 
its influence over both the petroleum system and likewise the interstate system within a 
bipolar rivalry. Petroleum was thus imperative for American hegemony and its pursuit and 
maintenance of power in the anarchic international system through military and economic 
means. US hegemony, and the power it wielded vis-à-vis other states, thus spurred and also 
enabled the USA to develop and attain its objectives, the continuous supply of inexpensive 
petroleum to itself and its allies. Yet, the same resource that facilitated US power 
internationally became a key vulnerability with increasingly dwindling domestic supplies and 
a growing dependence on foreign sources of petroleum. This would have important 
implications for subsequent administrations and their policies. 
3.3.2 Domestic Influences 
With the strategic importance of petroleum established, since the 1930s, the global petroleum 
industry was controlled by a small group of American and European petroleum companies, 
collectively known as the Seven Sisters, which monopolised the extraction and production of 
petroleum (Ross, 2013; Odell, 1994:208). During the inter- and post-war period these 
companies dominated the market and were able to stabilise the global petroleum industry 
(Ross, 2013). It was during this era that a close relationship was forged between the US 
petroleum industry and American national interests as the inexpensive access to and supply 
of petroleum became synonymous with security in US foreign policy thus enhancing the 
notion of the importance of the access to and supply of this cheap petroleum for US power 
and security for its military and economy within an anarchic international system (Odell, 
1986:27; Yergin, 1991:410, 412).  
Before the oil crisis of 1973, US oil companies had invested in excess of $10 000 million in 
the global petroleum industry which presented a third of US FDI at the time (Odell, 1986:27). 
By becoming instrumental to US power and security in an anarchic system dominated by a 
bipolar rivalry and alliance structure, any threat to this investment was inter alia viewed as a 
threat to US national interests as well (Odell, 1986:27). This motivated the strategic 
relationship between the US government and American petroleum companies which was 
structured by the US government to achieve three related objectives internationally: the first 
was to achieve the security of global petroleum supplies for the US domestic market as well 
as for its allies; the second was securing the economic stability of American allies, while the 
third was selling US cultural values for ideological purposes (Odell, 1986:28). These 
conditions meant that international petroleum companies in the pre-1973 era were able to 
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carry out their operations around the world under the blanket of US diplomatic and military 
protection (Odell, 1986:219; Yergin, 1991:410, 412). This had considerable strategic and 
economic advantages for the US government. In the USA, these petroleum companies were 
instrumental in accumulating considerable wealth and commercial breakthroughs by the start 
of the twentieth century (Podobnik, 2006:47). It is hardly surprising that within this 
petroleum system, the US Department of State also engaged in diplomatic efforts to promote 
US ambitions and interests relating to petroleum and related strategic interests in the Middle 
East and Western Europe (Odell, 1994: 208). Moreover, the US government supported its 
petroleum companies against other European powers and their companies to protect US 
strategic interests, and per consequence power, against potential rivals (Odell, 1994: 208).   
Since economic strength played such a critical role in the rise of US hegemony, decision-
makers would have to be especially cognisant of those factors that would enhance the 
competitiveness of the US economy. This had implications not only internationally as has 
been discussed, but also domestically. Alongside these international petroleum companies, 
domestically, in the post-War period, the Texas Railroad Commission
56
 played an important 
role in stabilising petroleum prices and in 1955 accounted for approximately 42 percent of the 
USA’s petroleum production (Hamilton, 1985:99). In the immediate post-War years, the 
Texas Railroad Commission and other associated state agencies were effective in their ability 
to balance the supply and demand of petroleum arising from cyclical economic factors and 
the variability in petroleum discoveries and imports (Hamilton, 1985:100). However, this 
pattern could not be sustained indefinitely and by 1947 the petroleum industry was 
experiencing severe under-capacity in petroleum transportation and drill-wells due to the long 
lead times involved in the investment of petroleum (Hamilton, 1985:100). The result of this 
was that by 1948-1949, the USA was to experience its first major recession since the end of 
the War (Hamilton, 1985:100). In addition to these domestic pressures, the United States was 
also an integral actor in the global petroleum market and used its policy to limit production in 
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 In the 1930s, the rule of capture resulted in wasteful and competitive petroleum production which led to the 
Texas Railroad Commission “controlling allowable oil production” (Baker, 2010:60). However, producers and 
refiners began producing and shipping petroleum to evade the restrictions set by the TRC, more state regulations 
and laws were established to prohibit this (Baker, 2010:60). In spite of these efforts, these laws and regulations 
were insufficient to curtail the above-mentioned activities and thus in 1935; the Connolly Hot Oil Act was 
established to prevent the shipment of petroleum outside of the TRC system (Baker, 2010:60).   
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the East Texas oil fields in order to “stabilize global oil markets” - a position that in the last 
few decades has been exercised by Saudi Arabia (Ross, 2013).  
Throughout the twentieth century, policy-makers in the United States have attributed a 
special status to petroleum since it was imperative for US security and power with its value 
being grounded in terms of its overall social importance rather than its market price 
enhancing the importance of cheap petroleum for US economic strength and therefore the 
enhancement of US hegemony (Bohi and Toman, 1993:1093). At the outset of the Second 
World War, the United States was a net exporter of petroleum and was the dominant actor in 
the petroleum industry due to its proven reserves and production capabilities which at the 
time surpassed that of Saudi Arabia (Yang, 1977:9). As with most other commodities, at the 
federal level the US government controlled the price of petroleum during the Second World 
War (Hamilton, 1985:101). By setting the price at $1.25 per barrel, demand for petroleum 
would increase by a two-fold during this period indicating altered patterns of increased 
energy consumption and a gradual shift away from coal
57
 at the federal level (Hamilton, 
1985:101). Because of the automobile industry’s sole dependence on petroleum, petroleum 
surpassed coal’s share of total energy use which occurred by roughly 1950 when petroleum 
was responsible for 38% of US energy consumption while coal consumption was 35% of 
total primary energy
58
 (O’Connor and Cleveland, 2014:7; Ratner and Glover, 2014). This 
upsurge in the consumption of petroleum had some unintended consequences. While the 
United States had been the world’s leading petroleum producer, the accelerated production of 
domestic reserves was quickly diminishing these and increasing the United States’ reliance 
on imports (Klare, 2004(a):12). As the Second World War was coming to an end, the 
increased imports of petroleum became an issue of national security and thus had to be 
protected and accessed through the use of military power under the presidency of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt (Klare, 2004(a):12; Singer, 2008:1). 
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 Increased consumption of petroleum instead of coal was driven by (i) the reconstruction of war-torn Europe 
which was principally based on petroleum, and (ii) the shorter working hours that coal miners secured which led 
to a fifteen percent reduction in coal production (Hamilton, 1985: 101). 
58
 Although coal made up approximately 45% of primary energy, the dependence of the automobile sector on 
petroleum meant that petroleum use in the United States remained roughly stable in the post-War period (Ratner 
and Glover, 2014). Although the percentage of coal and petroleum of the total primary energy mix was nearly 
the same, by the 1960s, the percentage of coal in the energy mix declined to 20% in contrast to the 35% of the 
energy mix that it represented in  1950 (Ratner and Glover, 2014).  
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By 1950, the USA produced and consumed more than 60% of total world petroleum (Bohi, 
1987:22). In order to encourage domestic production, the domestic petroleum industry was 
granted special tax treatment for many years, and simultaneously production restrictions were 
placed on the domestic industry so that the market price would remain at a certain level (Bohi 
and Toman, 1993:1093). Because of its large share of total petroleum production and 
consumption, global petroleum pricing practices were merely an extension of the US pricing 
structure wherein federal petroleum import controls and state market-demand portioning 
determined the price of US petroleum (Bohi, 1987:22). Because petroleum prices during this 
period were relatively stable, the price of all other energy commodities was stable, “and 
hence price was not a visible determinant of energy consumption and production decisions” 
(Bohi, 1987:22).  
The USA’s hegemonic position in the petroleum system, yet abundant domestic reserves that 
could be supplied at a cheap price by domestic petroleum companies had consequences for its 
energy policy. In the pre-1973 context when energy reserves were relatively abundant and 
cheap, the US federal government had a limited role in the design of energy policy
59
 
(Department of Energy, 1994:3). What role the federal government did have was mostly 
limited to mitigating amongst the interests of a diverse set of private actors involved in the 
production, distribution and transmission of various fuels, and state and local authorities; 
while long-term planning was mainly devolved to the above-mentioned private and state as 
well as local actors (Department of Energy, 1994:3). Even though the federal government 
was aware of the importance of energy for its national security, it limited its intervention in 
the market with the exception of national emergencies such as the outbreak of both World 
Wars (Department of Energy, 1994:3). The 1970s’ oil shocks would change this 
understanding of the appropriate role for government. 
During this era, energy supply was the jurisdiction of the private sector which consisted of 
the “production, distribution, marketing, and pricing policies except where ‘natural 
monopolies’ could not guarantee fair prices…When free market conditions were absent, 
federal regulations were established to control energy prices” (Department of Energy, 
1994:3). Instead, the federal government’s role was confined to research and development in 
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 Although, energy policy in its present usage did not exist in the US prior to the 1970s, since the Industrial 
Revolution, there did exist efforts to regulate the production and distribution of various fuels and to provide 
support to the related industries and markets (Tomain, 1990:356). 
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areas designated as the public interest; and to promote energy programmes that could 
enhance the supply of economical and abundant energy (Department of Energy, 1994:3). 
Within the federal government, a variety of federal departments were involved in energy 
management culminating in an ad hoc approach that was developed as these departments 
were concerned with particular fuels and technologies and their relative characteristics, 
strengths and weaknesses rather than an all-encompassing approach to “energy” per se 
(Department of Energy, 1994:74).   
Since the access to and supply of cheap petroleum was viewed as an integral aspect of US 
energy policy, the complex interplay of politics, economics and technology would have 
consequences for petroleum and energy markets and the interplay of petroleum with other 
sources of energy, especially renewable energy and coal. In 1952, the Truman administration 
was advised by the Paley Commission
60
 to develop solar energy, as well as alternative 
sources of energy, as a means to limit the USA’s increasing dependence on Middle Eastern 
petroleum imports (Strum, 1984:37). The Report strongly advised the United States to avoid 
becoming dependent on Middle Eastern petroleum and instead, it should increase research for 
solar energy and the development of synthetic fuels (Strum, 1984:38). The Commission 
urged that, “direct utilisation of solar energy is…perhaps the most important contribution 
technology can make to the materials shortage.” (Quoted in Strum, 1984:38). The 
Commission likewise recommended the establishment of an energy agency (Strum, 1984:38). 
These recommendations were subsequently reinforced by the National Security Resources 
Board (NSRB) in 1952 which recommended research into the utilisation of unconventional 
energy sources such as solar energy, wind energy, tidal energy and atomic energy (Strum, 
1984:38).  
Before it was able to look into the feasibility of these recommendations, the Truman 
administration’s run in office finished (Strum, 1984:38). Although Eisenhower’s Council of 
Economic Advisers were supportive of these recommendations, the Eisenhower 
administration however, would not increase federal support for solar energy and synthetic 
fuels, with funding for solar research being restricted to $100 000 per annum during the 
1950s in spite of calls to increase this funding to $1 million per annum (Strum, 1984:37 - 38). 
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 The Truman Administration created the Materials Policy Commission, which was named after William Paley, 
its chairman, as the Paley Commission, to investigate strategic material shortages as a result of the Korean War 
(1950 – 1953) (Strum, 1984:38). 
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The reason for this was that the Eisenhower administration wanted to restrict federal 
regulation of the economy and the development of energy (Strum, 1984:38 -39). The 
prevailing view was that the United States had sufficient supplies of energy and that 
consumers were to have the choice of whether they wanted to make use of alternative energy 
sources (Strum, 1984:39). The administration was averse to the development of synthetic 
fuels due to concerns that this may lead to an over-supply of fuels and consequently reduce 
the price of petroleum (Strum, 1984:39). Accordingly, the National Petroleum Council (NPC) 
pressurised President Eisenhower to stop the federal government’s support for synthetic fuels 
which had consequences for solar energy research thus restricting the allocated funding to 
$100 000 per annum (Strum, 1984:39).   
Although there was dissent
61
, the prevailing viewpoint amongst decision-makers was that the 
United States had sufficient domestic reserves of fission energy and fossil fuels, and that 
additional supplies could be procured from the Middle East, likewise the US economy 
depended upon investment in fossil fuels, and that solar energy was not conducive to the 
prevailing investment framework since it would disrupt existing investments and was 
insufficiently profitable (Strum, 1984: 47, 48, 49). Nevertheless, the Department of Defense 
was interested in solar legislation and supported its research and development, especially for 
military operations, but they were opposed by the Department of Commerce, the Bureau of 
the Budget, the NSF and the Department of the Interior at the federal level (Strum, 1984:48).  
Thus, decision-makers in the Eisenhower administration did not perceive solar energy to be a 
realistic component of the USA’s energy policy, especially if this required federal 
government intervention (Strum, 1984:49).  Rather, it was left to the market to determine the 
development of energy (Strum, 1984:49). Although the Eisenhower administration wanted to 
reduce federal expenditures, its decision to restrict federal support for synthetic fuels and 
solar energy helped to increase the USA’s dependence on foreign petroleum imports (Strum, 
1984:49).                                                                                              
There were similar implications for coal. Although coal and petroleum play different roles in 
the US economy, with coal being primarily used for electricity generation while the 
transportation sector is reliant on petroleum, by the mid-twentieth century, coal was replaced 
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 Senator Alan Bible urged the recommendation as a means to enhance the USA’s energy supply and draw 
level with countries such as Japan, the USSR, France and Israel which were supportive of solar research and 
development (Strum, 1984:45).                 
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by petroleum and natural gas as the USA’s dominant primary energy fuels with coal 
representing 35% and petroleum representing 38% of consumption at the time, with the 
consumption of coal being reduced to 20% by 1960 while petroleum consumption increased 
(Ratner and Glover, 2014; Tarlock, 1985:349; Priest, 2012:239; Hakes, 2012:19). At the time, 
the coal industry asserted that the nation’s replacement of coal with petroleum and natural gas 
was a temporary measure which would subside by 1960 (Tarlock, 1985:349). Unlike the 
petroleum industry, the coal industry did not request any form of subsidies that would restrict 
supply, but rather that the government should stop subsidising the petroleum and natural gas 
industries (Tarlock, 1985:349). In parallel to this effort to stop subsidies, the coal industry 
supported the establishment of a synthetic fuels programme, a request that was opposed by 
the petroleum industry (Tarlock, 1985:349). Moreover, the coal industry began requesting the 
establishment of a federal fuels policy that would oversee the interests of the coal industry 
during the Kennedy administration, but the petroleum industry opposed the establishment of 
such a policy (Tarlock, 1985:350). Throughout this period, the petroleum and natural gas 
industries played an active role in preventing the federal government in strongly subsidising 
the coal industry and limiting a debate regarding a non-petroleum based energy policy which 
would strongly feature coal (Tarlock, 1985:349). What enhanced the relationship between the 
federal government and the petroleum industry was that their interests were similar since 
petroleum was a strategic component of the USA’s hegemonic position and enhanced US 
power due to its importance for the USA’s economy and geopolitics (Tarlock, 1985:349 - 
350). 
Yet, the contradictions of such an approach could not be minimised for long. Up to the 1960s, 
US energy policy was based on the assumption that energy was ultimately a commodity that 
had to increase economic growth, and as a result environmental constraints related to energy 
production and use were relatively marginal issues (Melosi, 1987:167). Since the 
environmental costs related to extracting and processing were not factored in, the price of 
energy in the USA was artificially low (Melosi, 1987:167). During those times when 
unhindered exploitation and production did encroach on environmental conservation efforts, 
the main ideational division in policy  centred around issues related to the role of government 
in the design of policy and whether the control and development of natural resources should 
be public or private (Melosi, 1987:167). However, by the 1960s, increased environmental 
awareness began to place pressure on the traditional assumptions upon which US energy 
policy was founded which had implications for the perception of the relationship regarding 
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the role of energy for economic growth and environmental regulation within the US federal 
system (Melosi, 1987:168). 
3.4 Energy Policy in the Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations: 1973 – 1979  
Although the energy system in the pre-1973 era was characterised by relative stability, there 
were episodes where tensions in the Middle East raised alarm about the impact this would 
have on the price and supply of petroleum (Yergin, 1988:114). Iran’s nationalisation of its 
petroleum industry in 1951, followed by the Suez Crisis in 1956, and again in 1967 following 
the Six Day War, all led to initial petroleum shortages; yet these were mitigated by the USA’s 
sufficient unused production capacity to bolster supplies in the US and elsewhere thereby 
stabilising global petroleum prices (Yergin, 1988: 114; Ross, 2013). Throughout these 
upheavals, because of its abundant reserves of domestic energy sources ranging from coal, to 
petroleum to natural gas that its domestic industry could supply at an adequate price, the 
United States was sufficiently buffered from these shocks (Meyer, 1973:7).  
This condition would change after the Six Day War of 1967 (Yergin, 1988:114). Three 
factors were responsible for the price stability in the petroleum market of the 1950s and the 
1960s: the surplus capacity exhibited by the East Texas oil fields, “the Bretton Woods system 
of fixed exchange rates”, and the Seven Sisters agency (Anglo-Iranian, Gulf Oil, Royal Dutch 
Shell, Standard Oil Company of California, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, Standard 
Oil Company of New York and Texaco) - as the confluence of these factors ensured that 
continuous global production was maintained to fuel post-War rebuilding and ensured the 
necessary political stability through their monopolisation of the post-War petroleum industry 
“with tax breaks and the threat of military action to keep oil flowing to their citizens” in order 
to maintain petroleum supply to fuel the Bretton Woods System that underscored European 
and Japanese reconstruction thereby stabilising global prices and enhancing economic growth 
under US hegemony (Ross, 2013; Merrill, 2012:201, Pratt, 2012:145, 148-149, Priest, 
2012:236, James, 2017:5). As Podobnik (2006:92) explains, “…the meteoric rise of the oil 
system was made possible by the convergence of specific geopolitical, commercial and social 
factors. Under the protective umbrella a new U.S. hegemonic order, major corporations were 
able to create a fundamentally new kind of energy regime. ” With the Cold War escalating 
between the Soviet Union and the USA, their influence over the respective regions under 
their control was increasing as a result, and petroleum was a key aspect of this control 
(Podobnik, 2006:93). The multinational petroleum companies were essential in the access 
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and transportation of necessary petroleum supplies to enhance the economic growth of 
Western Europe and Japan in the post-War era and were able to exercise great influence over 
the supply of petroleum in their respective jurisdictions before the nationalisations of the 
1970s (Podobnik, 2006:93; Pratt, 2012:148). US policy-makers were focused on building a 
Western-alliance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union which was dependent on “stable economic 
growth” in these regions (Podobnik, 2006:93). In turn, this economic growth was dependent 
on the supply of inexpensive petroleum (Podobnik, 2006:93). The inexpensive petroleum 
produced in Texas in the post-War era was instrumental in fuelling the USA’s own economic 
growth (Merrill, 2012:201).     
 These three factors were made obsolete by the 1970s when Richard Nixon delinked the 
dollar from the gold standard, the Seven Sisters lost their dominance in the oil industry, the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (OPEC) influence increased, the rise of 
independent petroleum companies who were offering more concessions
62
 to OPEC such as 
greater participation in production enterprises and increased taxes, and no spare capacity 
remained in the East Texas oil fields (Ross, 2013; Odell, 1986:225; Yergin, 1979:84). Rising 
nationalism in the Middle East in the decade preceding the 1973 oil crisis stirred by the 
perceived dominance and influence exerted by American petroleum companies in the area, as 
well as geopolitical conflict, would pressure the nationalisation of the petroleum industry 
which further worsened these trends (Odell, 1986:32). Demand for petroleum substantially 
increased because of fast economic growth, and the inexpensiveness of petroleum, while 
there was also little investment in other energy sources from a geographically diverse 
background (Yergin, 1988: 114; Yergin, 1979:84). The result of this
63
 was that by the 1970s 
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 In the pre- and post- Second World War era, the concessions which US petroleum companies accrued allowed 
these companies to maintain sovereignty over the territories within their jurisdiction (Odell, 1986:34). Thereby, 
these companies were able to explore without host government interference and should such exploration lead to 
the discovery of petroleum, these companies could unilaterally choose whether or not to exploit these resources 
and to what extent (Odell, 1986:34). The host governments agreed to a small royalty payment and a percentage 
of the profits which were determined by the companies (Odell, 1986:34).     
63
 In the post-war years, a delicate balance existed between producing and consuming countries, with oil 
companies facilitating an intermediary role in this relationship (Levy, 1974:694). While the oil companies were 
the dominant players in the oil industry until the mid-twentieth century, this role would be minimized as 
producing countries wrested control of production in their territories and nationalised their oil industries (Levy, 
1974:690, 694 – 695). Their position in the supply chain allowed them to use oil as a political weapon and 
provided them with geopolitical influence and immense profits (Ross, 2013). What facilitated the origins of the 
US energy crisis was that the development of domestic energy supplies was no longer sufficient to meet demand 
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there was no spare capacity in either the United States or anywhere else outside of the Middle 
East that could serve as a buffer against disruptions when US petroleum production peaked 
and “thus, when a new Middle East war sparked the Arab oil embargo in October 1973 and 
the first ‘oil shock,’ there were hardly any additional alternative supplies around the world on 
which to call.” (Yergin, 1988: 114; Dorian et al., 2006:1984).  
By the 1970s, US hegemonic control of the petroleum system was not only challenged by 
Soviet interference and the continued need to maintain military and economic advantage over 
the USSR in the bipolar order, but also by rising nationalism in the Middle East and the rest 
of the developing world, as well as environmental problems which, in contrast to the previous 
challenges, were of a more intricate nature, touching on economic modes of production and 
consumption that were at the centre of US power in the international system. As a 
consequence of previous policies and trends, by the 1970s, political and market conditions 
were noticeably different than in the immediate post-War period. The dependence of 
industrialised countries on petroleum increased due to economic growth and the advent of the 
automobile, creating a lock-in effect. By the 1970s, petroleum dominated industrialised 
nations’ energy mix and was supplying 30 percent of the industrial sector’s power and about 
25 percent of electricity generation, while the transportation sector was wholly dependent on 
petroleum (IEA (a), 2014:14). Under these conditions, energy security became a prominent 
political and policy issue after the oil embargo of 1973 (Yergin, 1988:110). In the 1970s, the 
main theme that US energy policy was concerned with was reducing the USA’s dependence 
on imported petroleum (Yergin, 1979:84). What was controversial was how this would be 
achieved and which fuels should be part of the energy mix (Yergin, 1979:84).  
Although the 1973 energy crisis sent shock waves through the system, it already became 
apparent prior to the 1973 crisis that the United States was vulnerable to disruptions 
(Department of Energy, 1994:5). In 1971, President Nixon warned that existing trends - if left 
unabated - would lead to an energy crisis (Department of Energy, 1994:5). On the fourth of 
June 1971, Richard Nixon announced the clean energy policy and indicated to Congress that 
accessing “sufficient energy in acceptable form” was becoming increasingly problematic and 
that it was necessary to promote clean energy supplies in order to enhance economic growth 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(Meyer, 1973:7). As demand for energy was projected to increase over the 1970s and 1980s, combined with the 
inability of domestic production to meet this growth, the USA would become increasingly dependent on foreign 
supplies of petroleum (Meyer, 1973:7). The combination of these factors would create an adequate environment 
for the oil shocks of the 1970s.  
99 
 
and the country’s socio-economic needs (Morton, 1973:66). This was a pivotal moment as it 
marked the first time that a US president addressed Congress on energy issues (Lapp, 2014). 
By this time, the inherent contradictions of the USA’s energy mix were becoming all too 
apparent. As Lapp (2014) points out, “Coal is plentiful but sulphurous, natural gas is clean 
but scarce, oil is near its domestic pumping limit and uranium is a suspect arrival on the 
energy scene.”   
The Nixon administration outlined what the appropriate role for government under such 
circumstances should be which was maintaining the role of private industry but 
simultaneously nesting an area for government therein (Morton, 1973:67). The objective was 
to design a policy that could provide a dependable as well as adequate supply of energy that 
was capable of ensuring the nation’s security as well as economic prosperity to maintain the 
USA’s hegemonic position and enhance its material capabilities and security (Morton, 
1973:65). Although Nixon requested the establishment of a department of natural resources 
and energy, Congress did not approve such a proposal
64
 and paid it little heed within the 
various congressional committees throughout 1973 (Department of Energy, 1994:5).  
Throughout 1973 Richard Nixon continuously warned about the United States energy 
situation but it was the Yom Kippur War in October 1973 that transformed the country’s 
energy situation into a crisis by creating the most acute energy shortage that the United States 
experienced since the Second World War and marked a turning point in the post-war era 
(Department of Energy, 1994:5 – 6; Meyer, 1973:7; Nordhaus, 1980:341). On the 17
th
 of 
October 1973, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
65
 exercised its market 
power and restricted its production and export of petroleum to the United States and its allies 
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 Although no Department of Natural Resources was established, in August 1971, price controls were put in 
place on the price of domestic petroleum resources, which were managed by federal regulations (Tatom, 
1979:14). These regulations were put into place because of increasing shortages which themselves were caused 
by price controls (Tatom, 1979:14). 
65
  The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was created to be an association that aims to 
protect its members’ national interests with regards to the production and export of petroleum (Amuzegar 
1974:221). Its creation by its original five member states was done in reaction “against arbitrary and unilateral 
decisions of the major oil companies” as well as the import quotas introduced by the Eisenhower administration 
in 1959 (Amuzegar 1974:221; Yang, 1977:4). As these states were dependent on income from the sale of 
petroleum to supplement their foreign exchange, the petroleum companies’ apparent disregard for their national 
interest by continuously reducing the price of petroleum, would spur OPEC’s political behaviour in the 
petroleum market (Amuzegar 1974:221).    
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who supported Israel during the Yom Kippur War (Greene, 1991: 127; Ross, 2013; Hamilton, 
2009:220). After the oil embargo, the price of petroleum would quadruple between 1973 and 
1974 (Brown et al., 2006:6). This sudden price increase firmly established the USA’s 
vulnerability to oil supply disruptions and the degree to which its economic and social 
activities, its hegemony and security in an anarchic system, depended on an unrestricted 
supply of petroleum.  
The 1973 energy crisis was a watershed moment as it marked the end of the USA’s energy 
affluence (Department of Energy, 1994:6). In the wake of the crisis, the energy situation was 
critical as it was not confined to regional shortages but instead was countrywide and impacted 
every economic sector (Department of Energy, 1994:6; Meyer, 1973:7; Kissinger, 2009:1).  
So critical was this situation that the Department of Energy described that, “Although 
presidential concern over petroleum supply and pricing extended back to the 1950s and 
earlier, Nixon’s executive order for the first time institutionalised the Federal Government’s 
response to post-World War II energy shortages.” (Department of Energy, 1994:7).  
In effect, the oil shocks of the 1970s destroyed the energy regime that emerged after the 
Second World War and which was based on the USA’s diplomatic and military power in 
conjunction with the major petroleum companies that benefited from these (Ikenberry, 
1986:105; Levy, 1974:690). An identified vulnerability was the political manipulations that 
were viewed as a major cause of the crisis and were related to the United States’ dependence 
on imported petroleum (Ikenberry, 1986:107). By contrast establishing an adequate response 
was less simple. Katz (1984:34) highlights that, “The characteristics of the energy crisis, 
simultaneously acute and diffuse, immediate and long-range, technically complex and 
painfully obvious, deeply interpenetrated with all other societal processes - typified the 
emerging problems resulting from fundamental shifts in the international and domestic 
socioeconomic structures…”  
3.4.1 Structural Influences  
A state’s response to challenges is influenced by their position within the distribution of 
power in an anarchic international system. The anarchic international system presents the 
incentives and constraints that states will respond to and states will have to carefully consider 
their means of self-help to deal with challenges while at the same time having to consider the 
positions of rivals and competitors alike as they compete for power and scarce resources. In 
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the aftermath of the energy crisis of 1973 the US economy
66
 would soon after slide into 
recession; a key characteristic of every major energy crisis was the economic recession that 
followed an upsurge in the price of petroleum over the last forty years which would 
undermine US power and security relative to other states in the anarchic system (Hamilton, 
1985:97; Singer, 2008:1). Since energy is an essential input into all economic activities, 
economic growth, and the associated domestic stability this depends on, is hampered with a 
decline in real Gross National Product (GNP), an increase in unemployment levels and 
inflation, thus creating a correlation between decreased economic performance and 
disruptions in petroleum supply, as well as increasing prices (Yergin, 1979:82; Hamilton, 
1983:228 – 229; Bohi and Toman, 1993:1093). As such, the combination of the oil shock and 
its associated price hikes and economic stagnation would serve to emphasize the link between 
cheap petroleum and economic growth, security and stability that the USA depended on to 
maintain a relative advantage over the USSR, as well as rivals and allies and the implications 
thereof for its position in the distribution of power relative to these states (Singer, 2008:1; 
Yergin, 1979:81; Hamilton, 1983:228; Greene, 1997:65). Because the oil shocks of the 1970s 
coincided with the Cold War, it raised further fears that the Soviet Union could further 
destabilise the region and its petroleum production “with its considerable military forces 
poised across the Caucasus from Middle East oil fields” (Deutch, 2004:2).  
The events of the 1970s, which included the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 as well as 
environmental constraints, proved to be a turning point for US energy policy and were 
characterised by the difficulty of reconciling the design of the pre-1973 US energy policy to 
the new context. As a global hegemon, the USA had to be strategically concerned with the 
impact of the energy crisis because of the impact thereof on the strength of the US economy 
and its trade deficit, an important quality of the USA’s hegemony (Aron, 1979:454; 
Sharbaugh, 1975: 88).  Within the bipolar distribution of power, and the competition with the 
Soviet Union, the implications of the crisis for US hegemonic stability and potential decline 
had to be important considerations (Gilpin, 1987:42, Hung, n.d.). The crisis would emphasise 
the need for the development of a coherent energy policy which could enhance the USA’s 
energy security (Department of Energy, 1994: 5).  Within such a policy framework, the goals 
of improving the USA’s energy security and reducing its dependence on foreign sources of 
petroleum became pivotal policy preoccupations of the Nixon and Ford administrations 
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 The upsurge in the global price of petroleum had a further negative effect of deteriorating the United States’ 
balance of trade (Tatom, 1979:21). 
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(Sharbaugh, 1975: 88).  Since the energy policies of US administrations in the 1970s were 
concerned with the policy goal of energy security, this required the federal government to 
have a more interventionist role in energy policy design (Yergin, 1988). Both the Nixon and 
Ford administrations emphasised the goal of improving the USA’s energy self-sufficiency 
and limiting the USA’s dependence on unstable regions (Department of Energy, 1994:6; 
Department of Energy, 1994:18). Yet, balancing between low energy prices for consumers 
with the enhancement of secure energy supplies proved difficult to attain, especially in the 
midst of an increasing need for environmental regulation (Department of Energy, 1994:20; 
Melosi, 1987:167). 
The 1973 oil embargo was a defining point for developed nations’ energy policies and the 
USA was no exception. Although the energy crisis was composed of many crises: economic, 
political, diplomatic, and geopolitical, all requiring a specific type of policy response, in the 
aftermath of the embargo, energy security became the most important goal of energy policy 
(Finon, 1994:3). Since US hegemony was based on cheap petroleum prices that enhanced the 
competitiveness of US industries and influenced its role, achieving energy security became a 
shorthand for achieving the economic growth and stability that US power  and security were 
based on. That is, US hegemony rested on its military capabilities which in turn rested on its 
latent power that in essence was its economic strength. All energy policies had to enhance US 
economic power so that it could compete against other states both economically and 
militarily thereby enhancing its self-help in an anarchic international system. 
At the start of the energy crisis, an important development in multilateral cooperation made 
possible by US hegemony was the establishment of the International Energy Agency (IEA). 
Before the embargo, the economic and diplomatic relationships between the region’s 
petroleum producers and the Soviet Union and Communist China have exerted a strong 
influence over Middle Eastern states’ strategic policies, especially within Syria and Iraq 
(Levy, 1974:692, 705). Western powers feared that the Soviet Union would use this 
opportunity to further undermine stability in petroleum producing countries and place further 
restraints on Western interests in the region thereby further destabilising the US and its allies 
(Levy, 1974:705). It is helpful to recall that the US objective in the post-World War Two era 
was to ensure the prosperity and stability of Western Europe and Japan, which was essential 
to the distribution of power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union (Nye, 1980:133). US policy-makers 
were concerned that in addition to the threat posed by the Soviet Union to Middle Eastern 
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stability, the challenge to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 
(OECD) energy security would fracture the Western alliance (Nye, 1980:133).  
While the USA’s hegemonic position was influential in the global petroleum system of the 
pre-1973 era which relied on the USA’s economic, military and diplomatic endeavours, the 
USA relied on its hegemonic position to bring order to the petroleum system in relation to 
both OPEC and the Soviet Union by band-wagoning with other industrialised countries. The 
United States, in cooperation with sixteen industrialised states, responded to the political and 
economic alterations spurred by the oil crisis of 1973 by establishing the International Energy 
Agency in November 1974 to serve as an independent intergovernmental agency within the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (IEA (a), 2014:13 - 14; 
Deutch, 2004:3; Keohane, 1978:933). The main purpose for the establishment of the IEA was 
to enhance global energy security for its members (IEA (a), 2014:3; Deutch, 2004:3). At its 
establishment, the focus was on the security of petroleum in particular as member states and 
their industries were so dependent on this resource (IEA (a), 2014:13). The IEA adopted a 
narrow and explicitly economic definition of energy security which was defined as “the 
uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price” (IEA (a), 2014:13). To 
enhance their collective security and reduce their vulnerability to any future embargoes and 
other interruptions to their energy access, these countries, under the leadership of US 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, worked within the structures of the IEA to coordinate 
emergency petroleum reserves and collectively reduce their demand for petroleum 
(Ikenberry, 1986:107). In reaction to these events, three strategies were promoted to enhance 
energy security: diversification from petroleum to other types of energy, greater emphasis on 
less energy-intensive technologies (demand-side management), and diversification away 
from Middle Eastern petroleum to other suppliers (Ikenberry, 1986:107). Ultimately, the 
main issue that had to be dealt with was the dependence displayed by Western economies on 
foreign sources of petroleum, particularly from the Middle East, thereby agreeing to broad 
principles for international cooperation which relied on a 90-day strategic petroleum stock 
requirement and response mechanism to minimise the effects of sudden supply disruptions 
and in case of a disruption to either increase supply, restrain demand, or release stocks or 
impose all three measures (Ikenberry, 1986:107; Kissinger, 2009, IEA(b), 2014:18).  
Yet, the challenges presented by the energy crisis proved to be particularly challenging for 
coordination efforts through US hegemony, since the oil crisis revealed caveats amongst the 
industrialised countries within the alliance structure of the bipolar distribution of power 
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regarding solutions to the crisis and the raising of energy to a security issue thereby 
accentuating tension between these countries showcasing that states will pursue their own 
self-interest in spite of a common threat (Yergin, 1979:82). Although the creation of the IEA 
helped to diminish these conflicts somewhat, there still remained a measure of conflict which 
revolved around the development of reprocessing and breeder technologies and nuclear 
proliferation (Yergin, 1979:82). Other industrialised countries were also weary of the 
increasing petroleum imports in the United States (Yergin, 1979:82 – 83). It was suspected 
that the United States was integrating with Saudi Arabia to “pre-empt the country’s 
production in a crisis” and also that the United States was increasing its petroleum imports in 
order to increase its own stockpile (Yergin, 1979:83). Thereby cooperation is hard to achieve 
in an anarchic system since self-interested states are concerned about cheating and that their 
competitors, even when that competitor is an ally, appears to attain relative gains. 
In additional to these multilateral efforts, the energy crises of the decade also had important 
implications for the USA’s military role that likewise was based on its hegemonic and 
historical role within the petroleum system. By 1979, President Carter hoped that the energy 
situation would have improved (Department of Energy, 1994:24). However, the Iranian 
Revolution which began in October 1978 once again caused petroleum shortages across the 
globe
67
 (Podobnik, 2006:127; Department of Energy, 1994:25; Bohi, 1987:23). When the 
Shah of Iran was overthrown, a new regime came to power that was openly hostile to 
Western interests and perceived interference in the Middle East (Gately, 1986: 242). This 
helped to augment a hostile international environment which was further characterised by the 
rise of European countries and Japan in the international system. By this point, between 1973 
and 1978, US petroleum consumption continued to grow by an approximate 11.8 percent and 
the USA became more vulnerable to OPEC supply disruptions (Lieber, 1980:154).
68
 This 
situation was further destabilised by petroleum exporters who used this situation to increase 
prices which was potentially going to once again induce an economic recession in the USA 
with implications for US security and hegemony (Department of Energy, 1994: 24, 26). 
While, energy security entered into public conscience in 1973, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 
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 This upsurge in the price of petroleum occurred in spite of continued refinery throughput since the decline of 
Iranian throughput was counteracted by increased production from Saudi Arabia in the remaining months of 
1978  (Bohi, 1987:22).    
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 By contrast, petroleum consumption declined in Western Europe and the OECD by 2.3 percent over the same 





 (Yergin, 1988:110). Industrialised countries reacted to this event 
by following the same protocol that they initially followed in 1974 (Ikenberry, 1986:107). 
These events led the Carter administration to once again reiterate the importance of energy 
security in the wake of the new energy crisis (Department of Energy, 1994:27).  
While a number of economic and technical strategies were employed to handle the energy 
crisis of the 1970s, military intervention and force were complementary strategies employed 
by succeeding administrations to maintain access to petroleum and energy resources. Due to 
its hegemonic position in the international system, the USA relied on the use of its military 
power to maintain access to and supply of Middle Eastern petroleum much like in previous 
decades, a role that was complementary to its position in the international system and driven 
by the threat posed by the Soviet Union within an anarchic international system. In January 
1980, President Jimmy Carter announced in his State of the Union Address that “an attempt 
by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault 
on the vital interests of the United States, and such an assault will be repelled by any means 
necessary, including military force” (Herman, 2014; Bacevich, 2010; Abrams, 2012). Such 
strategies had to be incorporated as part of its competitive strategy and foreign policy in 
relation to its rivalry with the Soviet Union in the bipolar order as a global hegemon that had 
to enhance its security after the effects of the oil shocks. 
The Carter Doctrine was a pivotal moment in US security policy and was to have a long-
lasting impact on the USA’s involvement in the Middle East (Bacevich, 2010). Within its 
historical context, the Carter Doctrine must be viewed as a continuation of the Truman 
Doctrine which articulated the USA’s role at the onset of the Cold War (Bacevich, 2010). In 
this context specifically, the Carter administration used this as a pre-emptive move to warn 
against Soviet involvement in Middle Eastern energy production (Bacevich, 2010). This also 
sustained the identification of the Middle East as a key national security interest which 
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 Other important changes that occurred relating to the structure of the petroleum market was the emergent use 
of futures and spot markets for petroleum products becoming prominent in the wake of the 1979 price shock 
(Bohi, 1987:25). The competition that emerged due to the use of spot markets has enabled the decoupling of 
petroleum companies’ integrated operations while also breaking down the traditional relationships between 
petroleum importers and exporters (Bohi, 1987:25). In total, “The spot market provides an alternative supply 
source during supply disruptions, while the futures market provides an alternative insurance source for more 
risk-averse individuals. Similarly, the futures market provides speculators with the opportunity to gamble on 
future price changes without making transactions in physical barrels of oil.”  (Bohi, 1987:25).  
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required hard power and the application of military force (Bacevich, 2010). In 1996, the 
Clinton administration further solidified the idea that the USA will use force if necessary to 
maintain access to the Middle East’s petroleum for the global market in his National Security 
Strategy (Singer, 2008:2).                            
As the USA was beginning to experience relative structural decline in the international 
system, this despite having the world’s largest economy, at the start of the 1970s, the 
distribution of power in the international system would influence the USA in two important 
ways as its hegemonic position became more vulnerable vis-à-vis its rivals and allies, while at 
the same time US hegemony was central to its occupying a leadership role and pursuing 
certain objectives internationally. Since US hegemony rested on its economic strength and 
military power, the impact of the energy crisis on its economy had a deleterious influence on 
one of the key sources of US power vis-à-vis rivals and allies alike, US economic strength 
which rested on cheap petroleum. This situation was made more acute as implementing a 
coherent energy policy in response to the crisis was a complex task due to the multi-
dimensional nature of the problem.  
The USA was forced not only to deal with the implications of the crisis for the USA’s 
economy, but likewise develop a policy based on multilateral cooperation and military 
intervention to deal with the crisis as its hegemonic position required it to maintain stability 
within the alliance structure in its rivalry with the Soviet Union within a bipolar distribution 
of power. This multi-pronged approach to deal with the crisis was driven by the USA’s 
hegemonic position and its need to secure order in the international system while likewise 
protecting its hegemonic position in the aftermath of the crisis through the protection of its 
economic and military interests. Energy security became a pivotal goal of US energy policy, 
a goal made more acute due to the vulnerability US hegemony experienced in the hierarchic 
distribution of power, especially as its allies’ economic strength was increasing. As a result, 
both economic and military considerations had to be prioritised which were facilitated by US 
hegemony. Since US competitiveness in the international distribution of power depended on 
inexpensive petroleum, efforts had to be secured to  mitigate this situation through diplomatic 
and military means, a situation compounded by the USA’s rivalry with the USSR in the 
bipolar international system to secure a relative advantage. Within this economic and political 
configuration within a bipolar distribution of power, the Middle East continued to be 
identified as a matter of national security, all the while US petroleum consumption increased, 
thereby increasing its vulnerability. While the USA relied on its position as a global hegemon 
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in the distribution of power to advance cooperation during this period of crisis, cooperation 
had been difficult to secure since its allies, as self-interested states, were worried about 
cheating and relative gains, showcasing that states will be worried about their own self-
interest despite the commonality of the risk. Yet, although policy-makers wished to wean US 
dependency off Middle Eastern petroleum, this proved to be a difficult goal to achieve due to 
the intertwinement between US economic strength and influence over the global petroleum 
system which were based on US hegemony in the international system. Energy security thus 
became the principal goal of energy policy, since US hegemony was based on cheap 
petroleum prices which enhanced its competitiveness in relation to other states; therefore the 
negative economic consequences of the oil crisis indicated the vulnerability of the US 
economy to supply shocks and the USA’s dependence on foreign petroleum. 
3.4.2 Domestic Influences 
Because of the extreme risks the crisis posed to US security, unlike earlier eras, the US 
government had to assume a more interventionist role in energy policy design. At the time, 
US energy policy focused on mitigating the consequences of these energy price increases on 
production and prices (Tatom, 1979:21). Because of the energy security vulnerability and 
belief that the world was running out of petroleum, the Nixon administration pushed through 
a number of bipartisan and extraordinary reforms at the federal level to meet the challenge of 
the USA’s energy insecurity (Ross, 2013). The Nixon administration’s main energy policy 
goal centred around increasing the production of domestic supplies which were to be based 
on conventional techniques mainly through price increases as well as nuclear energy (Yergin, 
1979:86).  
In response to the energy crisis, the beleaguered president launched Project Independence 
which aimed to transform the USA’s energy policy and guarantee its energy security by 
having the nation achieve national energy self-sufficiency by 1980
70
 (Department of Energy, 
1994:6; Yergin, 2011; Bremmer and Hawes, 2004:104; Yergin, 1979:86). While concern 
over petroleum imports extended to the 1950s, introducing the goal of energy independence, 
even though it was unrealistic, marked a particular set of ideas about the nature of the crisis 
and its solution. Although it cannot be separated from political rhetoric to convince 
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 One of the most prominent omissions in the energy independence debate is that petroleum prices are 
determined in a global petroleum market; even if a nation should achieve so-called energy independence, the 
price of petroleum will still be affected by the global price (Nivola, 2002:25).  
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consumers of the government’s uncompromising approach to the energy crisis, it is also 
indicative of the new teleological shift of the USA’s energy policy. While this goal never 
materialised, the idea of achieving independence from perceived foreign interference would 
become a highly emotive rallying call of every presidential run-up (Nivola, 2002:24; Terzic, 
2012:2). 
The Ford administration maintained these policy goals in its energy policy which promoted 
domestic supply-side strategies that would predominantly be based on fossil fuels and nuclear 
energy (Yergin, 1979:86). When the Ford administration came to power shortly after the 
Watergate Scandal, it made a declaration that such an energy crisis was not to re-occur and 
emphasised the need to pursue Project Independence (Department of Energy, 1994:18). With 
this aim in mind, the Ford administration continued with the federal role towards energy 
policy established under the Nixon administration (Department of Energy, 1994:18). 
In response to the crisis, there emerged two main pieces of legislation from these 
administrations which were the Energy Policy and Legislation Act of 1975 and the Energy 
Conservation and Production Act of 1976 after their Congressional approval at the federal 
level (Yergin, 1979:86; Department of Energy, 1994:19). However, in spite of these calls for 
energy independence, the USA’s petroleum imports continued to increase (Department of 
Energy, 1994:19). The difficulties involved in managing this situation were comprehended by 
the Ford administration, 
“On January 7, 1977, Ford presented his last energy message to 
Congress. Cautioning against the dangers of a greatly expanded 
federal role in energy, he also warned the Nation of the high cost of 
delay in solving the energy problem. Ford emphasized the 
complexity of the issue and the difficult and extensive choices that 
had to be made. Besides underlining the interdependence among 
the United States and other consuming nations, he outlined the 
conflicting objectives that had to be balanced to achieve long-term 
equilibrium between energy supply and demand. The most difficult 
problems were reconciling politically popular low consumer prices 
with adequate and secure energy supplies and balancing 
environmental objectives with energy production and use.” 
(Department of Energy, 1994:20). 
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Yet, in spite of the urgency and the necessity of designing a comprehensive energy policy to 
enhance US security and power, for a variety of political and technological reasons, the 
Nixon and Ford administrations’ policy goals never materialised (Yergin, 1979:86). 
Environmental concerns restricted coal and nuclear production and use; the decontrol of 
energy prices at the time was impractical, while sufficient quantities of domestic petroleum 
and natural gas could not be produced (Yergin, 1979:86). Moreover, a moratorium had been 
placed on nuclear energy use further limiting these policies’ options and results (Yergin, 
1979:86). While conservation had been a policy goal of both administrations’ energy policies, 
it was not really a priority, while solar energy did not even feature (Yergin, 1979:86). Thus, 
the anarchic structure of the international system, although it provides necessary and urgent 
incentives, is at most a permissive cause (Waltz, 2001:232 – 233), at the unit-level will be 
those factors that determine the practicality of policies, the contradictory consequences of 
their implementation, and the complicated task of meeting conflicting policy objectives.   
What further complicated this response was that the 1970s were a critical period since this 
was the era when environmental concerns and the energy crisis merged (Melosi, 1987:167). 
The debate centred around whether the goals related to environmental protection and 
economic growth were reconcilable impacting the perception
71
 amongst policy-makers of the 
compatibility of the two goals within the design of US energy policy (Melosi, 1987:167). 
Although environmental awareness had been increasing since the 1960s, most environmental 
problems were still mostly local and regional in nature (Melosi, 1987:170). The main 
concern, which also extended to the global level, related to natural resource exhaustion, a 
situation made acute by publications such as Meadows’ Limits to Growth in 1972 and the 
1973 publication of Small is Beautiful by E.F. Schumacher which painted doomsday 
scenarios related to dwindling supplies of natural resources and the need to reconsider the 
structure of economic systems. Nonetheless, in the 1970s, there were two major perceptions 
that began to emerge amongst policy-makers which prevailed and which influenced the 
USA’s energy policy: (i) there was an inherent contradiction between the goals related to 
energy production and environmental regulation and (ii) energy production and 
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as it is from this point onwards that it has greater relevance for the policy areas under analysis. Nevertheless, for 




environmental regulation goals were complementary (Melosi, 1987:174). Policy-makers in 
the federal government increasingly had to take into consideration environmental concerns 
related to energy production and use in the 1970s and find a policy compromise (Melosi, 
1987:176).  
In contrast to the Nixon and Ford administrations, the energy policy introduced by the Carter 
administration was based on a different approach in the aftermath of the energy crisis and 
thereby contained new policy goals. In spite of the Nixon and Ford administrations’ policy 
efforts, between 1975 and 1977, the USA’s petroleum imports continued to increase, even 
though petroleum prices had decreased and supplies became stable (Department of Energy, 
1994:19). While petroleum imports increased from 35.4% in 1974 to 35.8% of total 
petroleum supply in 1975, by 1976, imported petroleum accounted for 40.6%, and in 1977, 
46.5% of total petroleum supply (Department of Energy, 1994:19). During the same period, 
the domestic production of petroleum declined (Department of Energy, 1994:19). In 1977, a 
natural gas shortage also occurred which further constrained energy supply (Department of 
Energy, 1994:20 - 21).  
Although it was not wholly original, the Carter administration’s energy policy included new 
elements in contrast to the policies advanced by the two previous administrations (Yergin, 
1979:86 - 87). The National Energy Plan that was developed contained goals related to a new 
set of priorities, and opposed the “high-production strategies” of past energy policies, and 
was overwhelmingly impacted by the emergence of environmental concerns (Yergin, 
1979:87). In the midst of the concerns about the USA’s petroleum dependence, Carter’s 
energy policy placed as a first priority the conservation of energy as the most affordable 
method to meet the nation’s energy needs and to reduce petroleum imports (Yergin, 
1979:87). Secondly, the plan emphasised increased domestic coal production as a means to 
reduce the United States’ dependence on foreign petroleum (Yergin, 1979:87). Renewable 
energy, especially solar energy, was the third component of this plan (Yergin, 1979:87). 
Fourthly, the plan emphasised increasing the price of energy so that its price would reflect its 
true cost (Yergin, 1979:87).  
In relation to the two previous administrations’ energy policies, the Carter administration’s 
energy policy maintained the overall proposals that these energy policies promoted. What 
was different was that its energy policy was characterised by a different focus wherein 
conservation reached the top of the policy agenda while minimising the role of domestic 
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natural gas and petroleum production and strongly argued that it was necessary to transition 
away from both domestic and foreign petroleum and natural gas (Yergin, 1979:87 - 88). The 
administration set a precedent by describing solar energy as a feasible, short-term source of 
energy (Yergin, 1979:88). After the Ford administration, the Carter administration’s energy 
policy emphasized conservation, the innovation of alternative energy technologies and the 
reduction of energy consumption (Department of Energy, 1994:21). Unlike the Nixon 
administration, the Carter administration did not believe that the United States could 
realistically achieve energy independence; it did however hope that by 1985 the USA could 
reduce imports and demand, increase alternative energy technologies as well as coal 
production (Department of Energy, 1994:21).  
The Carter administration’s
72
 position towards federal energy policy was defined by its 
formulation of a more comprehensive policy instead of merely overseeing fuel management 
which had characterised previous administrations (Department of Energy, 1994:22). The 
Carter administration emphasised that energy was a particularly difficult challenge, second 
only perhaps to the prevention of war, and underscored the peculiar challenge that energy 
presented to the executive and Congress to govern at the federal level (Department of Energy, 
1994:21). Such measures were striking as it was only during times of war that the federal 
government undertook such a managerial role that was now been proposed by the Carter 
administration (Department of Energy, 1994:21).  
In spite of its stated objectives, for a number of reasons, Carter’s policy was unable to meet 
its goals and improve the era’s challenges. For instance, the conservation measures were 
similar to the ones proposed by the Ford administration and proposals to implement 
provisions for conservation and solar energy when compared to the emphasis placed on these 
in his speeches, were quite minimal (Yergin, 1979:88). Support for nuclear energy also 
remained present, in spite of the Carter administration’s statements to the contrary (Yergin, 
1979:88). The environmental movement that emerged in this decade placed constraints on 
uninhibited energy production and raised environmental conservation to the top of the policy 
agenda very quickly, thereby restricting certain policy options such as the wide-spread use of 
coal (Tarlock, 1985: 353, 360).    
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 The Department of Energy was created under the Carter administration after Congressional approval 
(Department of Energy, 1994:22). 
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Moreover, at the federal level, the Senate did not support Carter’s energy Bill, having it 
stalled in 1977 (Yergin, 1979:88 - 89). Since the Carter administration designed the energy 
policy in the absence of Congressional input, gaining support for it in the legislative branch 
proved difficult (Yergin, 1979:89). Opposition to Carter’s energy policy also emerged from a 
number of domestic groups as well. Producers criticised the plan for not encouraging 
production while being overburdened with price controls, few federal incentives and 
environmental regulations (Yergin, 1979:89). The interests of consumers who were defined 
by “Congressional representatives from the industrial Midwest and Northeast” alongside 
consumer lobbying groups criticised the minimisation of price controls and that the price and 
tax proposals would establish an inequitable redistribution of income (Yergin, 1979:89 - 90). 
Although the Carter administration was later able to enact an energy policy, it contained a 
number of alterations due to proposals made in Congress
73
 emphasising the constraints 
imposed by Congress in developing a coherent energy policy within the US federal system 
(Department of Energy, 1994:24). Nonetheless, the National Energy Act was a watershed 
moment since it voiced the end of the era of cheap and abundant energy and established 
conservation as an “indispensable ingredient in national energy policy” (Department of 
Energy, 1994:24).  
Regarding the policy’s outcomes, Yergin (1979:90) observes that, “With opinions so bitterly 
divided, and the perceptions of the distribution of benefits so sharp, it is not surprising that 
the efforts to advance towards a meaningful energy programme in the United States have 
been stalemated.” Thereby, after some alterations, Congress passed the policy on the fifteenth 
of October 1978 (Yergin, 1979:90). However, the policy that was passed would have little 
effect on curbing the USA’s increasing petroleum imports (Yergin, 1979:90). While the 
Carter administration attempted to institutionalise reform, there was limited consensus 
surrounding the problems or solutions and Congressional opposition have limited the 
necessary reforms (Yergin, 1979:91). Thus, “The real centrepiece of American energy policy 
continues to be stalemate…” (Yergin, 1979:91) within the US federal system, and the 
division therein as to how to adequately deal with complex problems, limiting the executive 
in its ability to develop a coherent energy policy. 
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 Congress rejected the crude oil equalisation tax (Department of Energy, 1994:24). 
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Before climate change became an issue of political significance, the widespread use of 
renewable energy was initially forecasted as a strategy of enhancing energy security
74
 after 
the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979 through the reduction of import dependence in developed 
nations (Sovacool, 2009; Podobnik, 1999:166). Hence, it appeared that from a security of 
supply perspective; renewable energy appeared to be a panacea to the challenges facing the 
world’s energy market. The federal nature of the US government meant that states were 
encouraged by the federal government to experiment with different policy designs 
(Williamson and Sayer, 2012:22). Therewith, a number of states began to adopt policies that 
incentivised renewable energy development in the wake of the oil embargo of 1973 
(Williamson and Sayer, 2012:19). This took on a number of different forms amongst 
individual states. For instance, Massachusetts became the first state in 1977 to use a sales tax 
policy in order to encourage the development of renewable energy (Williamson and Sayer, 
2012:19). North Carolina, on the other hand, enacted business as well as personal income 
energy tax credits in 1977 (Williamson and Sayer, 2012:19). “…Oregon declared a state 
policy to encourage development of renewable sources…Oregon provided personal income 
tax credits to offset the costs of installing residential renewable energy systems.” (Williamson 
and Sayer, 2012:19). Unfortunately, interest in renewable energy diminished in the 1980s and 
1990s, and resumed in the 2000s (Williamson and Sayer, 2012:19). 
In summary, although the Carter administration’s policy was not original and drew on the 
work of previous administrations as well as Democratic counter-proposals, the key difference 
in its policy was that it managed to put together disparate elements into a policy framework 
and place greater emphasis on conservation in contrast to the idea of an abundant and 
excessive use of energy and a correspondingly limited role for government that characterised 
earlier eras (Department of Energy, 1994:21). While both the Nixon and Ford administrations 
primarily focused on the amplification of domestic energy supplies, the Carter administration 
was more supportive of energy efficiency measures (Department of Energy, 1994:21). What 
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is remarkable about this era is that although all three administrations faced similar structural 
constraints which were the bipolar international system, the start of US hegemonic decline, 
and the rise of European and Japanese rivals, yet they showcased different responses. During 
the 1970s, it was also difficult for all three administrations to form coherent energy policies 
as the executive interacted with Congress over complex, multidimensional issues (Uslaner, 
1989:56; Miller, 1995).  It may be understood that when confronted with the opportunities 
and constraints presented by the international system, these administrations had to design 
policies that reflected and enhanced the USA’s hegemonic position while simultaneously 
been differentiated by their use of certain goals to meet the crisis within the limitations 
imposed by the US federal system. 
3.5 The Reagan Administration’s Energy Policy: 1981 – 1989  
In contrast to the 1970s, market conditions changed in the 1980s (Yergin, 1988:110). While 
the 1970s were marked by high energy prices and international instability, the pendulum 
swung once again and by the 1980s, three important trends characterised this era which 
would alter geopolitical and market dynamics: the petroleum price collapse of 1986 caused 
mainly by Saudi Arabia’s decision to increase its petroleum production; increased petroleum 
production from non-OPEC suppliers, and the emergence of a global, integrated petroleum 
market. By the 1980s, the likelihood of another politically induced energy shortage was 
significantly reduced because of the transition to a “globally integrated oil market” (Van der 
Graaf, 2012:234; Bohi, 1987:22).  
While OPEC still contained the world’s largest proven petroleum reserves; during this period 
its global petroleum production declined significantly which also weakened its geopolitical 
influence (Greene, 1997:65; Gately, 1986:242). OPEC’s role was further undermined by 
OECD countries’ concerted effort during this period to manoeuvre away from OPEC 
producers and diversify the world’s petroleum supply with increased production flooding the 
market from the United Kingdom, Mexico, Norway and the Soviet Union (Ross, 2013; 
Gately, 1986:242). The collective result was that petroleum prices
75
 fell by 70 percent 
between 1980 and 1986 (Ross, 2013). This helped to stall concerns over the security of 
petroleum as its production was no longer concentrated to a particular region (Yergin, 
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 Although petroleum prices declined by 70% between 1980 and 1986, the specific price collapse of 1986 was 
mainly caused by Saudi Arabia’s decision to increase its production although there is some speculation 
surrounding the precise causes of the 1986 oil price drop (see Bohi, 1987). 
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1988:111). Rather, there was a surplus of production in comparison to the shortages 
experienced in the previous decade (Yergin, 1988:111). In response to the previous decade’s 
oil shocks, the petroleum industry further altered with the creation of new market tools such 
as speculation and spot markets which dominated the petroleum industry in the 1980s (Ross, 
2013). Industrialised nations’ consumption also began to decline which reduced overall 
demand for Middle Eastern petroleum (Ross, 2013).  
In 1986, petroleum prices collapsed, falling by 50 percent (Gately, 1986:238, 260; 
Department of Energy, 1994:46). The 1986 price collapse was precipitated by Saudi 
Arabia’s
76
 decision to restrict its production and was driven by its strategy to secure future 
revenues and credibility as a producer (Gately, 1986:252). Since Saudi Arabia had the 
world’s largest proven petroleum reserves, it was concerned with the stability of the global 
petroleum market in contrast to other OPEC members whose reserves were less extensive 
(Gately, 1986:252 - 253). Gately describes the event as, 
“It seemed unlikely in 1985 that Saudi Arabia would break with the 
rest of OPEC and take the high profile, politically risky strategy of 
forcing a price collapse. The risks were not only political and 
economic. There were also external military risks: a hostile Iran 
might strike from across the Persian Gulf, widening its war with 
Iraq. Or, joining with Libya, Iran might foment destabilizing 
activity within Saudi Arabia.” (Gately, 1986: 260 - 261).   
However, the 1980s also presented a new set of challenges in addition to those experienced in 
the 1970s (Cavanagh et al., 1989:239). The 1980s were marked by the increased urgency for 
environmental protection in response to climate change and acid rain (Cavanagh et al., 
1989:239). In particular, the combustion of fossil fuels was responsible for the climate 
change phenomenon which was a significant challenge as the US energy system was highly 
dependent on fossil fuels (Cavanagh et al., 1989:239). While traditional problems such as 
dependence on foreign petroleum, and trade deficits arising from this dependence remained, 
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 Traditionally, Saudi Arabia has occupied a decisive role in OPEC in terms of the pricing and availability of 
petroleum due to its disproportionately higher reserves (Levy, 1974:691). This allowed Saudi Arabia to act as a 
swing-state in the energy market whereby it decreased its petroleum supply if prices are too low or increases 
them if the price is too high (Houser and Mohan, 2011:3) 
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these new environmental threats were added to this existing repertoire (Cavanagh et al., 
1989:240).   
3.5.1 Structural Influences 
States have to rely on self-help in the international system and must focus on ways to protect 
themselves against others to ensure their survival and Waltz reminds us that, “Whether firms 
survive and prosper depends on their own efforts.” (1979:104 - 105). States have to 
continuously be concerned about their ability to compete economically in the anarchic system 
if they are to survive since a state’s material capabilities depend on its economic strength 
(Waltz, 1993:59). When the Reagan administration came to power in 1981, it faced similar 
material constraints to the preceding Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations. At the start of 
the 1970s, the USA was beginning to experience relative structural decline in the 
international system due to the relative decline of the American economy even though its 
economy was still the largest in the world (Gilpin, 1987:42). By the 1980s, there were three 
major trends that further strained American economic power: its financing of the largest 
portion of the international alliance order under its control, its military competition and 
confrontation with the Soviet Union, as well as increased government expenditures towards 
domestic services which resulted in government expenditures increasing faster than the Gross 
National Product (GNP) (Gilpin, 1987:42). Within the bipolar order that characterised the 
distribution of power in the international system, the USA had to increasingly confront the 
ascent of Japan and European countries which posed as serious economic competitors within 
the international system (Mastanduno, 1991:75). As the distribution of power in the 
international system was altering, the Regan administration responded to these shifts and 
material constraints by developing an energy policy that could enhance US structural power 
through the re-invigoration of its economy. This would require that the federal role be limited 
and that energy policy be based on a pro-production strategy that was capable of delivering 
energy at reduced costs to consumers and industries. With changing market conditions by the 
mid-1980s, the Reagan administration could credit the stability of the USA’s domestic energy 
sector to its energy policy. While the change in the distribution of power in the international 
system compelled the Reagan administration to seek solutions to the country’s relative 
economic decline, the particular goals outlined in US energy policy would be influenced by 
the specific ideology that this administration had. Nevertheless, the distribution of power in 
the international system ultimately determined the direction of the Reagan administration’s 
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energy policy to enable it to secure a relative advantage vis-à-vis its competitors while 
enhancing US economic power, and thereby security.  
3.5.2 Domestic Influences 
“The National Energy Policy Plan that I am sending to you…represents a break from the 
format and philosophy of the two National Energy Plans that preceded it. Our national energy 
plan should not be a rigid set of production and conservation goals dictated by Government. 
Our primary objective is simply for our citizens to have enough energy, and it is up to them 
to decide how much energy that is, and in what form and manner it will reach them.” 
(Reagan, 1981). With the election of Ronald Reagan on the fourth of November 1980, this 
statement was to signify a departure with the energy policy framework that had been in place 
since the Carter administration (Department of Energy, 1994:33). Reagan’s electoral victory 
would mark a water-shed moment in US politics as the Reagan administration introduced 
large-scale transformation in all spheres of policy-making in the United States (Axelrod and 
Wilson, 1991:842). The neoliberal Republican administration of Ronald Reagan was highly 
sceptical of any form of government intervention, and instead emphasised the 
decentralisation of all government authority (Elliot, 2013). The Reagan administration thus 
introduced a “New Federalism
77
” to minimise federal regulation and devolve governance 
functions from the federal government to the states (Axelrod and Wilson, 1991:841). This 
“New Federalism” was a reaction to the growth of the regulatory
78
 role that the federal 
government undertook in the previous decade (Zimmerman, 1991:8). 
Although the international system provides incentives, ideology will influence an 
administration’s policy-makers’ perception regarding the course of action states’ will pursue 
in response to these (Waltz, 1979:107; Oskanian, 2016:628). The Reagan administration’s 
approach toward energy policy was influenced by two major propositions: (i) its need to 
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 Reagan’s federalism was defined as the devolution of political power to state and local governments 
(Zimmerman, 1991:7). In practice though, this federalism was never wholly institutionalised as Reagan “signed 
bills prohibiting state economic regulation of certain industries (Zimmerman, 1991:7). He did however minimise 
the federal government’s oversight of state regulatory activity and also reduced many federal regulatory 
standards such as the Environmental Protection Agency’s oversight of pollution levels (Zimmerman, 1991:10). 
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 Devolution was used as “a reaction to the growth of regulatory federalism during the 1970s. Candidate 
Reagan promised to devolve or delegate more authority to the states, and thus reduce the plethora of direct, 




bring the federal budget under control, and (ii) its ideological predisposition, in contrast to the 
administrations of the 1970s, which altered the federal government’s role in energy policy 
(Department of Energy, 1994:33). For the Reagan administration, energy was part of the 
solution to the country’s economic recovery while its ideological beliefs predisposed it to 
reduce the federal government’s role so that the free market and the private sector were able 
to set the priorities (Reagan, 1981; Department of Energy, 1994:3). When the Reagan 
administration came to office in 1981 concerns over energy supply continued amidst the 
threat that increasing petroleum imports presented to the USA’s energy security (Norman, 
1981:1481; Department of Energy, 1994:31).  
The Reagan administration’s energy policy was based on the assumption that increased 
production was the only appropriate means to deal with rising demand (Norman, 1981:1481). 
An important aspect of this strategy was to eliminate government price controls and 
regulations which this administration assumed led to a decline in domestic energy production 
(Department of Energy, 1994:33). Instead, the federal government was supposed to promote 
“long-term, high-risk energy research and development” which for various reasons the 
private sector would be unable to support (Department of Energy, 1994:33). However, in 
those areas where it could, private capital was meant to assess the “commercial viability of 
energy technologies” (Department of Energy, 1994:33). The Reagan administration’s 
ideological position also predisposed it to limit environmental regulation towards industry, 
however, it was more limited in this endeavour due to the steady increase in public support 
for the environment during the 1980s (Kelemen and Vogel, 2009:12; Norman, 1981:1481).  
In essence, the position adopted by the Reagan administration was that the energy crisis was 
induced by the federal government due to the effects that past policy measures had on energy 
markets - policies that were fostered to protect certain energy industries from competition and 
government intervention in energy markets first originated in the 1920s with the demand pro-
rationing system and the petroleum import quotas introduced in the 1950s on the grounds of 
national security (Department of Energy, 1994:34; Yang, 1977:2, 4). The prevailing mode of 
thought was that, “The more successful were those who sought relief from the rigours of 
competition through political means, the less robust became the adjustment capacity of the 
energy markets to unforeseen shocks.” (Yang, 1977:4). As such, the Reagan administration’s 
ideological beliefs influenced the administration to eliminate existing allocation and price 
controls on propane, petroleum and natural gas, allowing the prices of these fuels to be 
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determined by the free market
79
 as the best means of enhancing US energy security and 
economic power within the anarchic international system (Department of Energy, 1994:34).  
Thereby, in direct contrast to the previous administrations’ measures and approach which 
began in 1973, the Reagan administration released Securing America’s Future: The National 
Energy Policy Plan which focused on the economy’s recovery and free market fundamentals 
towards energy decisions and the country’s energy insecurity which originated in 1973 
(Department of Energy, 1994:34). Under this new policy framework, the role of the federal 
government was to encourage the production of energy resources “and bring these energy 
resources into the marketplace” (Department of Energy, 1994:34). Within this framework, it 
was made clear that government will not occupy an interventionist and regulatory role that 
could be performed by the private sector (Department of Energy, 1994:34). 
While the Reagan administration’s policy wanted to focus on three main concerns: energy 
prices, environmental impacts and national security; its election  was in essence a return to 
the limited role that federal government had in national energy management prior to the 
energy crisis of 1973 (Department of Energy, 1994:35). Moreover, by 1982, the United 
States’ energy situation altered which the Reagan administration credited to the free market 
(Department of Energy, 1994:35). Therewith, by 1983, the Reagan administration developed 
an energy policy that continued with the free market fundamentals by discouraging price 
controls and energy allocation (Department of Energy, 1994:37). In 1983, the National 
Energy Policy Plan abandoned the goal of energy independence that had been promoted by 
previous administrations (Melosi, 1987:181). The Reagan administration justified increased 
production in light of the country’s economic problems whereas previous administrations had 
focused on decreasing consumption to deal with the country’s economic challenge (Melosi, 
1987:181). Secretary of Energy, James Edwards was adamant that the solution to the nation’s 
energy dilemma was to “produce, produce, produce.” (Norman, 1981:4515).  
However, since energy became integral for national security, energy security continued to be 
the central goal of the Reagan administration (Department of Energy, 1994:37). This was not 
unjustified since by the mid-1980s, concerns about energy security once again resurfaced due 
to continued warfare in the Middle East and rising imports which created concern over the 
United States’ energy dependence within the Reagan administration (Department of Energy, 
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1994:46). The United States’ energy security thus appeared to be linked to the petroleum and 
gas industries for the foreseeable future (Department of Energy, 1994:47). Much of this was 
based on the historical development of US energy policy and the Reagan administration 
hearkened back to the ideas that surrounded US energy policy in the pre-1973 era. “The 
administration's faith in the private development of energy reaffirmed the historic role of 
government as promoter of economic growth and rejected its function as regulator and 
intervenor. Because the nation's economic interests were perceived to be linked to large, 
powerful energy industries, there was no attempt to tamper with the multinationals and large 
oil independents or to frustrate oil companies from diversifying into other energy sources. 
The administration's goal was to remove impediments to corporate action to stimulate 
economic growth.” (Melosi, 1987:181). 
Interestingly, while the Reagan administration’s ideological position was applied to energy 
policy, this same stance was not extended to the area of nuclear energy; that is in spite of its 
free-market rhetoric, the Reagan administration strongly supported nuclear energy
80
 and 
increased its funding (Axelrod and Wilson, 1991:841; Department of Energy, 1994:38; 
Joppke, 1992 – 1993:714; Norman, 1981:1481). Since the Reagan administration’s energy 
policy was based on a pro-production strategy as a means of solving the nation’s energy 
challenges, nuclear energy
81
, like coal, petroleum, and natural gas, was to be integral to this 
strategy (Melosi, 1987:182). Within the federal structure of the US political system, Congress 
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 Although Reagan supported nuclear energy, civic groups allied themselves alongside state and local 
authorities to oppose nuclear facilities (Joppke, 1992 – 1993:710). Civic and state concerns centred around 
perceived waste disposal, costs and utility rate regulation as well as emergency planning (Joppke, 1992 – 
1993:710). The Reagan administration pursued a major nuclear rearmament policy, with the Soviet Union’s 
decision to invade Afghanistan heightening public concern over the possibility of the outbreak of nuclear war 
(Joppke, 1992 – 1993:713). Nonetheless, in the early 1980s, financial difficulties necessitated nuclear utilities to 
cancel the completion of a number of plants that were being built (Joppke, 1992 – 1983:713). The Three Mile 
Island accident, financial difficulties and diminished support from civilian and certain political actors led to a 
further halt of nuclear energy in the United States (Joppke, 1992 – 1993:713). Although the federal government 
was responsible for the regulation of nuclear energy under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, in 1983 the Supreme 
Court passed a decision that gave states the right to reject the construction of nuclear plants in their territory as 
long as such a decision was grounded on economic concerns rather than nuclear hazards (Joppke, 1992 – 
1993:715). 
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however did not support funding for nuclear energy after 1983 (Department of Energy, 
1994:38). The Chernobyl nuclear accident of 1986 further reduced support for nuclear 
energy
82
 (Department of Energy, 1994:43).  
Due to America’s abundant coal reserves, the Reagan administration strongly supported coal 
development, especially clean coal technology
83
 as a means to increase its usage in light of 
environmental challenges (Department of Energy, 1994:42). The Reagan administration 
asserted that the USA’s energy strength was represented by its vast coal reserves which 
totalled 80% of all known fossil fuel resources (Department of Energy, 1994:42). However, 
in the 1980s, energy generation and use based on coal and nuclear energy, the two main 
substitutes to petroleum, diminished in the United States amid rising concerns over their 
environmental consequences which “put increasing pressure on the whole energy supply 
system” while government support for renewable energy technologies was also halted 
(Yergin, 1988:110 - 111; Elliot, 2013).  
Because of the high petroleum prices of the 1970s, a number of measures were enacted by 
Congress in the 1970s and early 1980s that aimed to increase energy supply from renewable 
energy technologies (Williams et al., 1990:65). Although there was an enthusiastic uptake of 
renewable energy technology in the mid-1980s, this began to decline with decreasing private-
sector investment, the plunge in petroleum prices, and limited support by the federal 
government (Williams et al., 1990:65).  Interestingly, it was during the 1980s that renewable 
energy technologies’ feasibility was demonstrated (Williams et al., 1990:65).  
3.6 An Explanation of US Energy Policy Using Neoclassical Realism: International 
Structure and Domestic Constraints 
Although this study indicates that anarchy and the distribution of power are important factors 
that influence states, unit-level variables are necessary intervening variables to the 
comprehension of state choices and actions (Lindemann, 2014:35). Within this framework, 
the international system remains constant and “imposes the same limitations on states” yet 
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 An additional crisis that was experienced shortly after the Iranian Revolution was the Three Mile Island 
Nuclear accident on the 28
th
 of March 1979 which only strengthened civic opposition to nuclear energy 
(Department of Energy, 1994:26; Joppke, 1979: 710 – 711). 
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 In 1986, the Clean Coal Technology Demonstration Programme (CCTDP) was launched in an effort to 
combat acid rain (DOE, s.a.). 
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states respond differently to its influence (Katzenstein (a), 1977:597; Zakaria, 1992:180). It is 
argued that states will alter their behaviour towards systemic constraints when unit-level 
variables intervene (Lindemann, 2014:37). The contradictions of conflicting policy objectives 
interact with the value assigned to these in terms of their costs by decision-makers which 
results in trade-offs and inconsistencies. 
At the start of the twentieth century, US economic growth and competitiveness developed 
because of cheap and abundant domestic energy reserves. The federal government’s role was 
limited to providing an enabling environment and protection for domestic industries, 
especially against foreign competitors. During this epoch, US energy policy rested on the 
following set of assumptions: (i) private industry, markets and capital are the basis for 
innovation and wealth, therefore competition rather than government regulation is required; 
(ii) there is a correlation between energy production and economic productivity therefore, the 
more energy is produced and consumed, the stronger the economy will be (Landsberg, 
1980:77); and (iii) the price of energy would decrease as refineries and utilities increased in 
size (Landsberg, 1980:77). These assumptions and context provided the rationale for US 
energy policy. And critically, within the distribution of power in the international system of 
the era, the low cost of energy gave the USA a competitive advantage in international 
markets against its rivals thereby facilitating the growth and maintenance of US hegemony.  
In this regard, US energy policy has shown a degree of remarkable continuity. With the 
exception of the two World Wars and the energy crises of the 1970s, when government 
undertook a regulatory role in the management of energy resources, and attempted to find a 
comprehensive solution to the country’s petroleum dependence, there remained a framework 
of ideas and ideology that has remained consistent. The contradictions of US energy policy 
cannot be understood apart from its hierarchic position in the international system as a global 
hegemon, a system which is also anarchic. This has operated on two levels. Firstly, the USA 
had to rely on its immense military capabilities and diplomatic endeavours to attain access to 
and supply Middle Eastern petroleum for itself and its allies. Secondly, in an anarchic 
competitive system dominated by a bipolar rivalry, the USA had to rely on cheap and 
abundant domestic energy to help it maintain its hegemonic position relative to its allies and 
rivals alike. The logic of the anarchic system compels states, even hegemons, to be 
continuously aware of their position relative to others, which forces them to undertake those 
actions that will enhance their material capabilities and security. Under such conditions, 
neither friend nor foe can be trusted, since today’s ally can be tomorrow’s competitor for 
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scarce resources and power. States thus continuously fear giving others a relative advantage 
over them. The USA is no exception. 
However, the incentives provided by the international system have to be interpreted and 
processed through unit-level variables, which often produces unintended consequences for 
decision-makers. Each administration faced a particular context and had to design a policy 
that was suitable in the US political system. Access to and supply of inexpensive petroleum 
has been integral to US energy policy because of its necessity for the security of the US 
economy and promotion of the alliance structure vis-à-vis the Soviet Union within a bipolar 
international system. Nevertheless, in an anarchic system decision-makers had to determine a 
course of action that would maximise access to energy at a low price to ensure the 
competitiveness of US industries in relation to other countries and therefore enhance its 
hegemonic position. 
Before 1973, decision-makers’ main concerns revolved around the cost and supply of 
petroleum, especially for military operations and economic activities and competitiveness as 
these were imperative for the enhancement of the USA’s hegemonic ascent and role in the 
international system. However, since the US had ample supplies of domestic resources, these 
remained minor concerns at the federal level. In an anarchic international system, states strive 
for security and power and compete for raw materials. Thereby, the USA’s abundant 
domestic petroleum reserves during a period of conflict oversaw its hegemonic rise as the 
international order of the nineteenth century was disintegrating. Petroleum attained a security 
status because of its centrality for all military and economic operations in the USA which 
influenced the imperative related to the necessity of access to and supply of cheap petroleum. 
It was during this period that the main contradictions faced by US policy-makers arose. 
Petroleum became a strategic component and allowed the US to wield influence over its allies 
and within the Middle East. In an anarchic system dominated by the rivalry between the USA 
and the USSR, US policy-makers had to restrict Soviet involvement in the Middle East and 
amongst its allies. However, they also had to protect domestic industries. To accomplish this, 
quotas, import restrictions as well as tax incentives were introduced. International petroleum 
companies received diplomatic and military assistance. This minimised support for other 
industries, coal and renewable energy in particular, while US production peaked in 1972 and 
economic growth depended on foreign petroleum, giving OPEC an opportunity to restrict the 
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supply of a resource that was central to US power in the distribution of power in the 
international system. 
The events of the 1970s, which included the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 as well as 
environmental constraints proved to be a turning point for US energy policy and were 
characterised by the difficulty of reconciling the design of the pre-1973 US energy policy to 
the new context. High energy prices and environmental constraints forced a reconsideration 
of decision-makers’ understanding for the appropriate role for government as well as a 
reformulation of energy policy’s goals, while maintaining the USA’s hegemonic position. In 
an anarchic international system characterised by a bipolar order where the USA and USSR 
competed for influence over other states and a zero-sum game competition for access to 
scarce resources, decision-makers had two major concerns: restore US influence over the 
global petroleum system, and restore US competitiveness and energy security in the midst of 
high energy prices, increasing petroleum imports, and resultant trade deficit. The focus of US 
energy policy shifted under the Nixon and Ford administrations to a pro-production strategy 
in light of the embargo. However, such policy measures had to be designed within certain 
parameters. Firstly, the link between cheap petroleum and its importance for the economy 
became vividly illustrated. Such a link became paramount for US security in an anarchic 
system. Secondly, since security is the most important goal of states in an anarchic 
international system, Congress passed extraordinary and bipartisan reforms within the USA’s 
federal system to protect US security. Thirdly, because of the nature of the problems faced by 
policy-makers, the contradictions of decisions arose because of the conflicting objectives of 
maintaining US hegemony thereby protecting petroleum supplies and allies, but at the same 
time meeting domestic challenges which included maintaining low prices for consumers, a 
policy goal which had to be balanced with the policy goal of security of supply while been 
cognisant of the emergence of environmental constraints. 
Through the use of neoclassical realism it is possible to highlight the contradictions that arose 
as a consequence of US energy policy at the time. The most serious challenges facing policy-
makers were increasing petroleum imports and energy security which were integral to US 
competitiveness in international markets and its strategic position amongst both allies and 
rivals. Such a preoccupation with competitiveness arises from states’ concern with the policy 
goals that are perceived to enhance their security and power in an anarchic international 
system. However, the ability of decision-makers to achieve these goals in an anarchic system 
depends on domestic politics and economics (Mastanduno et al., 1989:458).  
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To reflect on energy policy during this decade, both the Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford 
administrations based their energy policies on a conventional production strategy that is, 
increasing the domestic production of coal, petroleum, nuclear and natural gas (Yergin, 
1979:81). The Jimmy Carter administration promoted a different strategy, one that was based 
on transitioning away from natural gas and petroleum, and instead relying more on energy 
conservation and solar energy (Yergin, 1979:81). While the Carter administration made the 
most ambitious effort to design and implement a coherent energy policy, the federal structure 
of the US political system checked these executive efforts due to a combination of 
Congressional opposition and interest group criticism which resulted in a watered-down 
policy. The structure of the domestic system is imperative for the pursuit of power in the 
international system as it essentially determines what is permissible even when policy-makers 
within an administration have a particular perception of which policy goals are needed to 
attain power and security (Mastanduno et al., 1989:458). However, all three administrations 
when faced by a crisis were able to utilise their authority to invoke new measures in the 
USA’s energy policy design to deal therewith (Jones and Strahan, 1985:156). As a result, 
much of what the executive can achieve ultimately “depends not only on the external interests 
and actions of states, but on their ability to manage, channel, or circumvent domestic political 
pressures as well.” (Mastanduno et al., 1989:458). During the 1970s, energy security
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became the most important goal in the wake of the crisis. The above analysis indicates that 
policy-makers within these administrations’ differing perceptions compelled them to pursue 
certain policy goals to deal with the energy crisis. Moreover, the differing perception related 
to the cost of the goals to deal with the energy crisis combined with federal level constrains 
thereon resulted in not only differing policies as described above but also the inability to 
coherently deal with the crisis.     
The assumptions that US energy policy had been based on would be challenged by the events 
of the 1970s (Tomain, 2007). The resulting ambiguity surrounding the perception of the 
hierarchic ordering of policy goals and the resulting costs and benefits resulted in a 
splintering of the ideational framework surrounding US energy policy. Henceforth, two 
opposing viewpoints emerged regarding the goals that a comprehensive energy policy should 
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 The goal of energy security was complicated since the geopolitical calculations related to the Middle East and 
Europe had to be reconciled with alleviating the recession as well as enhancing economic growth and protecting 
the US economy from future shock. 
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consist of, one that believed that economic growth and environmental protection are 
compatible with one another and another that does not. While security and power may be the 
most important priorities for decision-makers at the structural-level, there is no formulae as to 
what this should entail nor as to how these should be achieved.  
Predominantly, the link between increased energy production and consumption and economic 
growth has been the dominant theme of US energy policy. Energy is an essential input into 
all economic activities in the United States and its cheap and abundant provision have 
historically led to an increase in the country’s economic productivity which altered its 
position in the international system (Congressional Budget Office, 2012:iv). Any perceived 
supply disruptions tend to increase the price of energy, and per consequence all other goods 
and services in the economy, thereby decreasing the USA’s economic output (Congressional 
Budget Office, 2012:iv). However, the importance of each fuel to the economy determines 
the vulnerability that the US economy will display to this disruption (Congressional Budget 
Office, 2012:iv). Fossil fuels, and petroleum in particular, represent a particular area of 
vulnerability since they account for 80% of US energy consumption (Congressional Budget 
Office, 2012:iv). Disruptions in petroleum markets represent the biggest area of vulnerability 
for the US economy because of the dependence exhibited by the electricity and transportation 
sectors thereon (Congressional Budget Office, 2012:iv). In particular, an increase in the price 
of petroleum caused by disruptions have had the starkest impact on the economy and 
therefore the USA’s hegemonic position and thereby security and power in the international 
system (Congressional Budget Office, 2012:iv).  
These administrations’ energy policies must be viewed in light of the USA’s particular 
political system, as well these administrations’ policy-makers’ perception therein, and its 
hegemonic position and role in the international system. The energy crisis of 1973 yielded a 
mixed political response across a spectrum of actors (Katz, 1984:33). Due to various 
circumstances, Congress was marked by inaction towards the energy crisis and energy policy 
in general (Katz, 1984:33 – 34). Numerous special interest groups attempted to turn this crisis 
to their own advantage and applied pressure on policy-makers to meet their needs which 
created a mixed response (Katz, 1984:33). As a consequence, in the area of energy policy, the 
Congressional-executive relationship had a mixed track-record. Moreover, the incremental 
and quick response to the crises limited the ability of the federal government and 
Congressional committees to have a coherent response to the crisis (Katz, 1984:33). 
However, a crucial impediment to these efforts was the dependency of the transportation 
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sector on petroleum. While efforts have been made to enhance innovation, there was simply 
no alternative to petroleum in the automobile sector (Yergin, 1988:126; Greene, 2010:1616). 
Additionally, environmental concerns, which were predominantly local in nature, could no 
longer be ignored and placed constraints on the domestic production of various fossil fuels.  
At the structural level, the consequences of economic and technological change mean that 
what makes a state strong in one era, cripples it in another – that is if the state is unable to 
utilise these changes to its advantage and adapt. The international system is highly 
competitive as nations continue to compete for ascendency therein. The anarchic nature of the 
system compels states to seek self-help therein by any means in order to ensure their security, 
as well as power. There is a link between national power and energy policy since a sound 
energy policy has implications for energy security, economic competitiveness and 
environmental protection. In his classic, Politics among Nations, Morgenthau (1968:106) 
asked, “What are the factors that make for the power of a nation vis-à-vis other nations?” 
Although he lists a number of elements, in a modern, industrialised state, an energy policy 
that ensures energy security and economic competitiveness no doubt remains embedded in 
the answer to this question. Energy’s essential input into all social and economic processes 
makes its disruption a challenge for state power. 
Although facing similar material constraints, a new approach to energy issues was developed 
in the 1980s under the Reagan administration with a return to the traditional limited role that 
the US government occupied in its energy policy that was to be based on deregulation (Behr 
and Berry, 1981). The Republican administration of Ronald Reagan came to power with a 
very specific set of ideas, and policymakers therein had a particular approach surrounding the 
role of government and economic functioning and based its energy policy on an ideology 
centred on a limited role for government in market intervention (Gershon, 2017; Weinberg, 
1988:1321-1322). The Reagan administration’s approach towards energy policy  was based 
on its free market ideology which allowed for a more congruent position to emerge between 
the executive and Congress - with the exception of nuclear energy and to a degree 
environmental regulation - since the Reagan administration did not challenge the basic 
structure of the USA’s energy and economic systems (Gershon, 2017). Concerned about US 
military competition with the Soviet Union, and economic competition with European allies 
and Japan, the Reagan administration had to determine a set of policy goals that could 
achieve energy security and economic competitiveness within the bipolar distribution of 
power (Gilpin, 1987; Milner and Snyder, 1988). The administration’s ideological 
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predisposition would incline it to pursue a pro-production strategy heavily reliant on fossil 
fuels and limited government intervention, at the expense of renewable energy and the 
protection of the environment (Weinberg, 1988:1323). Again, decision-making surrounding 
ambiguous goals within a competitive international system where states strive for security 
and power, often leads to a selection of those goals that are most optimal for their attainment, 
often at the expense of other policy goals such as the protection of the environment. Since 
energy policy is important for the international competitiveness of US industries and thereby 
US hegemony, an energy policy had to be designed that could ensure adequately low prices 
and secure supply. Although environmental concerns began to receive increased public 
attention, the Reagan administration’s free market ideology restrained its incorporation of 
these concerns into policy, especially if these were to challenge economic activities and 
growth and accrue unacceptable costs which were essential for the USA’s hegemonic 
position and role (Weinberg, 1988:1332). Thus, there was little incentive from international 
pressures and energy system vulnerability by the mid-1980s for the US executive and 
Congress to undertake a more interventionist role, nor limit the USA’s dependence on fossil 
fuels. During this era, the administration’s ideological stance was paramount in influencing 
energy policy outcomes in response to the distribution of power in the international system. 
Although it is not the central focus of the thesis, it may be useful to briefly discuss the 
reasons for Congressional inaction towards energy policy, in spite of its importance for the 
US economy and thereby hegemony. The United States Congress is characterised by the 
institutionalisation of highly intricate rules which restricts the design of a coherent energy 
policy (Uslaner, 1989:55). As a result, in Congress, a group can veto a proposal that is to 
their dislike, with coalitions often unable to strike a compromise especially when it comes to 
energy politics (Uslaner, 1989:74). Uslaner declares that, “…in the United States Congress, 
where complex rules often frustrate coherent policy formulation, strongly-held positions can 
prevail over obstructionist if they are determined enough.”  (Uslaner, 1989:55). All of the 
major primary energy sources, namely coal, natural gas, petroleum and uranium have 
drawbacks, and the choices and trade-offs between them tend to be highly technical and 
complex which results in technical factors not being determinate in energy policy decisions 
due to these complexities and trade-offs, thus policy decisions are often guided by ideology 
when considering their merits and drawbacks complicating Congressional deliberations on 
these issues and often leading to policy incoherence as the executive and Congress diverge 
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over the substance of energy policy (Orr, 1979:1026; Mitchell, 1978-979:605; Uslaner 
1989:74).  
One of the most important variables influencing the development of US energy policy has 
been ideology (Uslaner, 1989:59). While the separation of power embedded in the structure 
of American politics does play a role in influencing US energy policy particularly when one 
party controls the White House while the other controls Congress, it is ideological gridlock 
which has proven to be most decisive (Uslaner, 1989:56). “Under multidimensional 
preferences strongly held - as in energy – vote trading may be absolutely essential, but 
extremely difficult to obtain. The outcome is likely to be stalemate” (Uslaner, 1989:58). 
Scholars of energy politics in the United States Congress (that is voting on pertinent energy 
issues) have noted that while economic interests do play a role in determining outcomes 
(Mitchell, 1978 - 1979; Uslaner, 1989:59) more significant has been the role of ideology in 
determining outcomes in US Congressional politics in the 1970s and 1980s (Mitchell, 1978 - 
1979; Uslaner, 1989:59).  
From the analysis that has been developed, it is evident that all four administrations’ energy 
policies, whether in time of crisis or stability, were influenced by the structure of the 
international system and the concern for the maintenance of US hegemony in relation not 
only to the USSR, but also rising competitors. Yet, each administration showcased a different 
response to managing the crisis based on what policy-makers’ considered was required to 
alleviate the problem related to energy security and economic recession in the United States. 
Within the distribution of power in an anarchic international system, the USA would 
prioritise security and economic growth especially in relation to the military competition with 
the Soviet Union and the rivalry with European allies and Japan. 
 The federal structure of the US political system narrowed these options as Congress and the 
executive had to cooperate in the design of US energy policy. In response to the challenges 
faced by the USA, US energy policy reflected its hegemonic position. Since cheap petroleum 
facilitated US hegemony by enhancing its economic strength and competitiveness, the USA 
played an active diplomatic and military role in the global petroleum market both within its 
domestic energy policy and the establishment of the IEA. Within the distribution of power in 
the international system, the federal structure of the US political system, and differing 
administrations’ policy-makers’ perception of the costs related to policy goals, limited 
consensus on the substantive issues of energy policy and led to policy incoherence and 
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reflects the difficulties faced by the federal government to develop a coherent energy policy 
in response to the crisis (Department of Energy, 1994:5). The impact of the crisis would 
influence the government’s role to become more regulatory, while congressional and 
executive approach to energy policy would require that energy policy be based on consensus 
rather than pragmatism. Significantly, this chapter lays the foundation to understand the 
historical development of US energy policy related to the importance of petroleum and low 
cost fossil fuels and its implications for subsequent administrations. 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a historical overview of the evolution of energy policy in the 
United States of America since the period of its industrialisation during which time, the 
USA’s energy policy would centre around three economic assumptions: private industry, 
markets and capital are the basis for innovation and wealth, therefore competition rather than 
government regulation is required; (ii) there is a correlation between energy production and 
economic productivity therefore, the more energy is produced and consumed, the stronger the 
economy will be; and (iii) the price of energy would decrease as refineries and utilities 
increased in size. Although at the time, it lacked a coherent energy policy that could link 
various energy industries, the USA was still able to sustain strong economic growth at the 
start of the twentieth century. But the decision that was to have ripple effects throughout the 
rest of the twentieth century was the decision to shift the US navy from coal to petroleum 
during the First World War. Over the next three decades, petroleum would gain a 
disproportionally important influence within US energy policy as it became tied to US 
strategic interests in the Middle East and amongst its European and Japanese allies after the 
Second World War. Within this context, the USA, due to its hegemonic position, has 
occupied a central role in global energy supply and has concerned itself not only with its own 
energy security requirements but pivotally, also with that of its allies and has acted as a 
stabiliser in the global energy system since the 1940s. However, as the USA became 
increasingly dependent on foreign petroleum, decision-makers would become concerned 
about the implications thereof for US national security and introduced a quota system to 
protect US domestic interests and its national security, while the USA relied on its military 
and diplomatic power to protect the access to and supply of Middle Eastern petroleum. 
Ironically, US dependence on foreign petroleum would increase between the end of the 
Second World War, and the oil crisis of 1973, while its domestic production would decline 
and finally plateau in 1972. The US government’s support for the petroleum industry and 
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focus on petroleum in relation to other energy resources, notably coal
85
 and renewable 
energy, would only cause the crisis to deteriorate in the pre-1973 era. Before 1973, this 
emphasis on petroleum was based on the link between petroleum and national security in US 
national interests, while the government wished to restrict federal regulation of energy and 
the economy and rely on the private sector instead  while at the same time as the petroleum 
and natural gas industries lobbied the federal government to limit subsidies to the coal 
industry and restricted dialogue of the possibility of a non-petroleum based energy policy 
which was highly inclusive of coal. 
In October 1973, the Yom Kippur War was the turning point that would transform the USA’s 
energy context into a crisis. The successive Nixon and Ford administrations, while 
recognising the complexity of the situation, would issue the declaration for the USA’s Energy 
Independence from foreign petroleum in the next decade, an emotive rallying call that 
hearkens to the stark vulnerability that the USA’s dependence on foreign petroleum 
illustrated. Both administrations’ energy policies had a pro-production focus to restore US 
energy security. In addition, the creation of the IEA was an attempt to re-establish US 
hegemony in the energy sector vis-à-vis OPEC, and maintain the USA’s role therein in 
relation to Soviet involvement. Yet, the energy crisis would reveal important fractures 
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 Coal and petroleum play different roles in the US economy wherein the major contribution of coal is for the 
generation of electricity while petroleum is used across sectors (Ratner and Glover, 2014:7-8; Tomain, 
1990:365). In 1950, coal consumption was equivalent to “35% of total primary energy” which was reduced to 
approximately 20% by 1960 (Ratner and Glover, 2014:1, 4). Although petroleum is used across sectors; the 
transportation sector is almost entirely dependent on petroleum (Ratner and Glover, 2014:6, 7). While the US 
government subsidised both the coal and petroleum industries between the end of the Second World War and 
the energy crisis of 1973, by the mid-twentieth century, a strategic relationship existed between the petroleum 
industry and the US government as their interests converged (Tarlock, 1985:349-350; Tomain, 1990:360; 
Sovacool, 2017:156). Although coal is domestically produced, petroleum had geopolitical implications and 
would thereby occupy an important status in US foreign policy. Indeed, Priest (2012:236) asserts that, “The 
control of oil also helped elevate the United States as the supreme global power… In the postwar period, 
American-controlled oil underwrote European and Japanese reconstruction. Oil thus became a key component in 
the exercise of American hegemony over a relatively prosperous world order, after an era in which an unstable 
balance of power produced two world wars sandwiched around a global depression.” Petroleum thus became a 
significant component of US foreign policy and geopolitical calculations during this era (Priest, 2012:236). 
Moreover, due to the close link between the petroleum industry and the US government during this era, the 
petroleum industry pressurised the US government to give the coal industry more limited subsidies relative to 




between the USA and its allies towards the crisis and the difficulties involved in securing 
cooperation towards such an essential resource. Under the Carter administration, US energy 
policy would be redirected to focus on conservation as a means to meet the decade’s 
challenges while environmental regulation, unlike previous policies, would strongly feature. 
While displaying different ideational frameworks towards the oil crises and its multi-faced 
consequences, all three administrations would face some degree of Congressional opposition 
and dawdling response towards the development of a solution to these crises. However, the 
Reagan administration discontinued with the policy response developed by the previous 
administrations and redesigned US energy policy to its pre-1973 framework. With the 
increasing environmental awareness that began in the 1960s and intensified in the 1970s, 
Congressional opposition would limit its ability to hamper environmental regulation and 
increased nuclear energy production. Yet, the development of US energy policy from the 
1970s up to the Regan administration would illustrate the difficulties involved in the 
development of a coherent US energy policy and the entrenchment therein of the basic 
assumptions that developed in the first half of the century. 
The combination of the oil embargoes and its associated price hikes and economic stagnation 
would serve to emphasize the link between cheap petroleum and economic growth and 
stability (Singer, 2008:1). However, the ambiguous nature of how to attain policy objectives 
and decide on the energy mix and the distribution of costs and benefits, as well as their 
relation to other policy goals makes the formulation of a coherent energy policy problematic 
and per consequence successive administrations’ policy-makers’ perception regarding policy 
goals were inhibited by both internal and external constraints. Since the 1960s, environmental 
concerns have made this more problematic and have led to a tension between economic 
growth and environmental protection. Even though the oil shocks of the 1970s had a negative 
macroeconomic impact on and weakened the USA structurally in relation to other states, the 
USA’s hegemonic position would not allow it to relinquish a petroleum system that 
essentially developed under its control, especially with the threat stemming from the Soviet 
Union, and the ascent of European countries and Japan within the bipolar distribution of 
power. With the oil crises and environmental concerns of the 1970s, two divergent paradigms 
emerged in regards to the attainment of these economic assumptions, one that believed that 
environmental protection was compatible with economic growth and put forward a set of 
proposals to attain these, and the other which viewed environmental protection as essentially 
incompatible with economic growth. Within this context, climate change would emerge as a 
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further complicating factor that would add to the contradictions of US energy policy which 
will be further discussed and analysed in the following chapter. Yet, throughout the twentieth 
and into the twenty-first centuries, petroleum would occupy a strategic and central place in 
US energy policy. This historical chapter laid the foundation for understanding the 
development of US energy policy during most of the twentieth century and while perception 
plays a lesser analytical role in this chapter since environmental regulation only began to 
feature as a prominent policy-driver that had to be considered from the 1970s onwards, this 
becomes an important consideration for subsequent administrations as climate change and the 






The George H.W. Bush Administration 1989 – 1993: The End 
of the Cold War and the Greening of Energy Policy 
4.1 Introduction 
The Bush administration (1989 – 1993) continued with the energy policy framework 
developed by the Reagan administration but was less ideologically committed to the free-
market principles that characterised the former administration and was more supportive of 
environmental regulation, to an extent. Three important trends occurred during this period 
that would have implications for US energy policy: the end of the Cold War, the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait and the origins of the UNFCCC. Moreover, the international system 
changed from a bipolar to a unipolar
86
 system. The Bush administration was the first to 
attempt to integrate energy and climate change policies. Energy is an essential contributor to 
the climate change phenomenon principally through the combustion of fossil fuels. Yet, fossil 
fuel-based energy supply is essential for economic activities and growth, a historical trend 
which has resulted in the global energy mix to continue to be dependent predominantly on 
fossil fuels. This has created a link between economic growth and prosperity and by 
extension state power, and the combustion of fossil fuels. Over time, the lock-in effect of 
modern energy systems complicates the transition away from these fossil fuels without 
incurring serious economic repercussions.  
By 1988, climate change emerged on the policy agenda in the United States. It also turned out 
to be a divisive issue in US politics as it would place pressure on the traditional economic 
assumptions that its energy policy relied on. Due to the entrenchment of these assumptions, 
integrating the costs of mitigation into US energy policy would become extremely difficult. 
Nonetheless, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was 
established and ratified by the USA becoming an important policy driver. 
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 There are certain analysts who disagree with the notion that the international system changed to a unipolar 
order after the end of the bipolar order of the Cold War, rather arguing that the international system changed to a 
multipolar order instead (Gaiser and Kovacˇ, 2012:49 – 53). In the view of this thesis, the international system 





Since the establishment of the UNFCCC in 1992, the United States has been described as an 
essential leader whose participation is indispensable to generate an outcome
87
 that would 
decelerate environmental deterioration. Historically, it has contributed the largest percentage 
of total cumulative emissions. As a global hegemon it has also been integral for the design 
and success of the UNFCCC negotiations. From the outset, its role therein has been met with 
controversy. Since the Rio Earth Negotiations, the USA has adopted a position that 
contrasted with that of most developed as well as developing nations. This however, was not 
always the case. When environmental problems emerged at the fore of international attention 
in the 1960s and 1970s, US leadership was characterised as a creator and proponent of 
international environmental negotiations
88
, by the 1990s this radically changed and for the 
next two decades it was criticised for being an obstacle as well as laggard towards collective 
action towards environmental issues (Ivanova and Esty, 2008:57).  
In the midst of these constraints, analysts, politicians and the media lament the lack of a 
coherent federal energy policy in the USA. The continuous rise of US dependence on foreign 
petroleum, and its inability to integrate mitigation targets have been pointed out as deep-
seated flaws of its energy policy design. In the midst of these difficulties, the division of 
power between Congress and the executive have resulted in a stunted approach to energy 
policy. This emphasis on the cost and competitiveness of energy and its mitigation in relation 
to other countries is anticipated since this was viewed to structurally weaken the USA in 
relation to other countries. Therefore, the USA’s energy policy needs to be understood in 
light of its historical development and its objectives, while congressional politics remain 
characterised by stalemate. This would have consequences for the USA’s position in the 
negotiations in the lead up to the UNFCCC. As a result, the US position would be 
characterised by the contestation of the principle of Common but Differentiated 
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 Leadership is a highly contested concept in the climate change negotiations. Often, it is invoked with a state’s 
ambition to limit GHGs (Andresen and Agrawala, 2002:4). There does not exist a single type of leadership and 
there is no single means to exercise it (Andresen and Agrawala, 2002:41). There is further ambiguity 
surrounding who is recognised as a leader by other states and under what conditions (Parker et al., 2014:2). 
Thus far, the USA, China, the EU and the G77 have been identified as leaders at the multilateral negotiations 
(Parker et al., 2014:8). It is not clear what leadership can be used for. That is, leadership can just as easily be 
used for the purpose of obstructionism, as it can towards the abatement of GHGs. 
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 Some of these early efforts and leadership initiatives were instrumental in the creation of the United Nations 
Environment Programme (1972), Convention Concerning the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes and other Matter (Ocean Dumping Convention), and the Montreal Protocol (Ivanova and Esty, 2008:57). 
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Responsibilities (CBDR), and the use of legally-binding mitigation targets, while 
emphasising the use of nationally determined actions and its leadership in the negotiations. 
Such a two-level game further involves US domestic climate change politics which are 
complex and involve the coordination of a multitude of actors. In this chapter, a brief 
explanation of the main themes of the US position in the UNFCCC is provided as well as an 
overview of its political system. This chapter then provides an overview of the origins of 
anthropogenic climate change on the US political agenda. An overview of the development of 
US energy policy, followed by its position in the UNFCCC, and the interactions between 
these two policy areas is provided. 
4.2 A Brief Outline of the Main Controversial Issues Covered in the UNFCCC and 
the US Position  
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was established 
in 1992 at the Rio Earth Conference with the objective of the “… stabilization of greenhouse 
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system.  Such a level should be achieved within a time frame 
sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food 
production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable 
manner.” (UNFCCC, 1992:4). Although this goal is broadly agreed to in principle, it has 
drawn much criticism and controversy. The USA, as one of the central actors within the 
UNFCCC, has criticised a number of issues concerning the objective of the UNFCCC, 
especially focusing on the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), 
the architecture of the UNFCCC and US leadership therein. The issue of Common but 
Differentiated Responsibilities is one of the most controversial aspects of the UNFCCC 
negotiations. Most of this contention boils down to the issue of relative historical contribution 
towards aggregate emissions, rather than current emissions. Since 1992, the principle of 
CBDR was, and continues to be, intended to reveal the divergent economic, political, social, 
and historical contexts that characterise developed and developing nations (Kopela, 2014:71). 
The USA nonetheless points out that the principle is no longer consistent with recent 
economic developments that have occurred in the last twenty-five years that render the 
principle outdated (Kopela, 2014:71). As developing countries’ share of global emissions has 
grown and will exceed those of developed countries in the future, there is increasing pressure 
placed on them to accept mitigation obligations, something they oppose citing developed 
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countries’ responsibility for climate change and their own need to meet economic and 
developmental needs (Kopela, 2014:71; Leaf et al., 2003:304). Developing countries further 
point out that the phenomenon of climate change was caused by developed countries’ 
historical consumption patterns and that global environmental agreements would hinder 
developing countries from being able to access the goods and services that enabled developed 
countries to amass their wealth and standards of living (Leaf et al., 2003:304). While all 
states share in the responsibility for alleviating climate change, they are differentiated in their 
capabilities to mitigate it, and crucially in their responsibility regarding their contribution 
towards historical emissions (Kopela, 2014:88), a point that is continuously reinforced by 
developing countries but that the United States criticises because since climate change is a 
global problem and developing countries will be responsible for the greater share of future 
emissions, developing nations should not be exempt from accepting obligatory mitigation 
targets (Biermann, 2005:282). The principle nonetheless acknowledges developing countries’ 
special circumstances in that their emissions need to increase to alleviate poverty levels and 
enhance socio-economic development (Kopela, 2014:89). The USA has contested the 
principle of CBDR and instead suggested that the principle of equal allocation of emissions 
rights per unit of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) should rather guide mitigation actions 
(Biermann, 2005:281). 
For many years, there were two fundamental approaches to the architecture of the global 
climate change regime that have not been resolved. With the entry into force of the Kyoto 
Protocol in 2005, Parties faced the challenge of having to decide what to do once the Kyoto 
Protocol expired in 2012 (Bodansky, 2011:2). In terms of the abatement of total emissions, 
this has remained a problematic endeavour as only a quarter of those countries responsible for 
global emissions had quantified emission reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol, while 
other states such as Canada, Japan and Russia indicated increased reluctance to continue with 
the framework established under the Kyoto Protocol as the negotiations progressed 
(Bodansky, 2011:2). In relation to this framework, other countries, notably China, India and 
the United States have favoured a bottom-up approach which relies on nationally-determined 
policies (Bodansky, 2011: 2 - 3). In designing the architecture of the regime, the climate 
change negotiations have faced a choice between two main alternatives over the last few 
years: (i) accept the legally-binding, quantitative approach presented by the Kyoto Protocol, 
or (ii) rely on a bottom-up approach that utilised nationally-defined measures (Bodansky, 
2011:3). For years, the United States has supported the latter approach (Bodansky, 2011:3).   
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Irrespective of their position towards the UNFCCC, all US administrations have alluded to 
the importance of US leadership in the climate change regime. The USA has relied on its 
leadership position as a global hegemon to design the UNFCCC and the related Kyoto 
Protocol, but to also design a number of parallel bilateral and multilateral agreements in 
conjunction with other countries (Biermann, 2005:277). Whether multilateralism or 
unilateralism was adopted by different administrations, each administration sought to direct 
the UNFCCC negotiations on the USA’s terms (Biermann, 2005:284). Yet, whether they 
could accept the terms of the UNFCCC agreement depended on a number of unique features 
found within the USA’s political system. 
4.3 An Introduction to the US Federal Government: The Relationship between the 
US President and Congress and its Implications for International Treaties  
The US has a number of unique as well as intricate qualities characterising its legal, 
constitutional as well as political institutions that influence its domestic and international 
climate policies and the position that it has at international negotiations (Wirth, 2015:1). Over 
the years, domestic and international politics have become highly complex and further 
depend on the state of existing federal legislation towards a highly regulated issue such as the 
environment (Wirth, 2015:1 – 2). To understand the conditions under which the ratification 
of international treaties is undertaken by the US president, it is necessary to understand 
certain features of the American political system. To accomplish this, this section briefly 
describes the relationship between the US President and Congress in relation to international 
treaties before proceeding to expand on this interaction within the context of the study’s area 
of investigation.  
The United States of America is a federal political system. Its government is divided into 
three branches consisting of the executive, judicial and legislative branches creating a system 
of “checks and balances” (CAR, 2002:11 – 12; CAR, 2010:10). Unlike parliamentary 
systems, a separation of power distinguishes its tripartite system (CAR, 2002:12). Under its 
federal system state, local and federal governments share power towards energy and 
economic issues as well as natural resources amongst other things (CAR, 2010:10).  As such, 
a number of commissions, advisory offices and departments work together to develop, 
implement and coordinate the nation’s climate change policies (CAR, 2010:9). 
Therefore, policy-making in the United States occurs at different levels (Fisher, 2013:770). 
Thus, multiple actors are involved at a number of levels whose interactions intersect in highly 
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complex and nuanced ways. This distribution of various domestic coalitions, as well as the 
preferences of domestic actors, indicate the pressure exerted on the executive to achieve often 
conflicting national objectives within the UN climate change negotiations (Downie, 2013:24). 
Within this environment, bureaucracies negotiate amongst one another to formulate a policy 
position and establish coalitions with the preferences displayed by various government 
agencies and bureaucratic coalitions changing over time (Downie, 2013:24 - 25).  
The President’s power is circumscribed in relation to Congress under Article II, Section 2, 
Clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States of America which articulates that “No State 
shall, without the Consent of Congress…enter into any Agreement or Compact with another 
State, or with a foreign Power” (The Constitution of the United States, 2007:8; Skodvin and 
Andresen, 2009; Depledge, 2005:2). According to this clause, in order to make treaties, the 
president is required to have the support of two-thirds of the US Senate in order to ratify and 
put international treaties into effect (Hovi et al., 2010:4; Depledge, 2005:2; Bang et al., 
2012:756). The stipulations set out in the US Constitution influence its domestic as well as 
international climate policies (Skodvin and Andresen, 2009).  
While the US Constitution separates foreign policy-making between the President as well as 
Congress, this separation is not decisive (Grimmett, 1999). Grimmett explains that, “What the 
Constitution does, and all that it does, is to confer on the President certain powers capable of 
affecting our foreign relations, and certain other powers of the same general kind on the 
Senate, and still other such powers on Congress; but which of these organs shall have the 
decisive and final voice in determining the course of the American nation is left for events to 
resolve.” (Grimmett, 1999). The final foreign policy outcome is the result of the interplay 
between the President and Congress (Grimmett, 1999). Thereby, each tier has influence over 
the foreign policy making process although they have different roles therein (Grimmett, 
1999).  
Within this tug-of-war relationship between the executive and congressional branches of 
government, there are a number of ways in which Congress and the President have the 
authority to modify the US position and treaties vis-à-vis one another in international 
negotiations. The first and most obvious is that because of the restrictions of the Constitution, 
without Congressional support, the President will be unable to pass an international treaty 
that is binding on the United States (Skodvin and Andresen, 2009; Garcia, 2015).  
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The precise impact of international legal agreements on domestic US law once these are 
entered into law depend  on the nature of the agreement, that is whether it is self-executing or 
not self-executing (Garcia, 2015:12). When an international treaty or executive agreement is 
characterised by the force of law without requiring subsequent congressional action it is 
considered self-executing (Garcia, 2015:12). There are three reasons as to why a treaty may 
be considered non-self-executing: (i) the agreement will not become effective as domestic 
law unless there is an enactment of implementing legislation, (ii) Congress by resolution, or 
the Senate to give consent to the treaty, need implementing legislation, and (iii) implementing 
legislation is constitutionally required (Garcia, 2015:12).  
For the United States to become legally bound
89
 under an international agreement, a series of 
steps need to be completed (Barbour, 2010:5). If the United States pursues a treaty as a means 
of entering into an international agreement there are three steps that need to be undertaken 
before it can become federal law (Barbour, 2010:5). The first step involves the United States 
signing the treaty, the second is that the Senate needs to then review the submitted agreement 
for its review and consent, and in order for the agreement to be approved, two-thirds of the 
Senators need to indicate their approval; and lastly, the President is able to ratify the 
agreement accepting its terms for accession or ratification (Barbour, 2010:5).  
Hovi et al. (2010:4) explain that with regards to a treaty
90
, the Senate may either approve it 
with conditions, reject and give back the treaty, approve it as written, or prevent the 
participation of the United States by withholding its approval (Hovi et al., 2010:4). The 
Senate will oppose multilateral environmental agreements when they incur domestic changes 
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 In the US legal system, international legal commitments are binding upon it both domestically as well as 
internationally (Garcia, 2015:1).  
90
 The status that an international agreement is able to attain in the context of the US legal system will depend 
on a number of factors (Garcia, 2015). There are two ways in which the term treaty may be understood from a 
legal viewpoint (Garcia, 2015:2). A treaty, in the context of US law, refers to an agreement that is negotiated 
and signed by the executive, but it can only enter into force under the approval of two-thirds of the Senate after 
which it can be ratified by the President (Garcia, 2015:2; Barbour, 2010:5). Then there is treaty in terms of 
domestic US law wherein “treaty” is understood to be a subcategory of binding international agreements 
(Garcia, 2015:2; Barbour, 2010:5). Executive agreements, however, form the most common type of agreements 
that the United States enters into (Garcia, 2015:4). The executive enters these types of agreements which do not 
need to be submitted for the advice and consent of the Senate although Congress does need to be notified if the 




that will sustain a redistribution of costs and benefits amongst states and constituencies (Bang 
et al., 2012:757). As such, divergences in natural resource endowments as well as public 
opinion amongst states create a disagreement amongst law-makers and distributional politics 
plays out (Bang et al., 2012:757).  
Nonetheless, there is a category of agreements that follow a different path to becoming US 
law, namely executive agreements (Barbour, 2010:5). What distinguishes these agreements is 
that such agreements do not require either the Senate’s consent or advice (Barbour, 2010:5). 
Non-self-executing agreements depend on Congress for the enactment of implementing 
legislation that would change the agreement’s provisions into US law and give the necessary 
agencies and departments the authority to comply with and enforce this - even if it were an 
executive agreement (Barbour, 2010:5 – 6; Bang et al., 2012:756; Garcia, 2015:1). By being 
ratified by the Senate, these treaties attain the status of federal law and are therefore binding 
in terms of their implementation (Skodvin and Andresen, 2009). The consequence is that the 
Senate is weary of ratifying agreements which contain specific commitments unless these 
have already been contained within federal law (Skodvin and Andresen, 2009).  
The president’s jurisdiction within negotiations stem from his having executive powers to 
negotiate and conclude a particular international treaty – regardless of whether or not the 
Senate will approve its ratification (Hovi et al., 2010:4; Grimmett, 1999). He also has the 
final say regarding the finalisation of a treaty and has the authority to assemble the 
negotiating team and provide them with their negotiating mandate (Hovi et al., 2010:4). 
Although the president depends on the Senate for its advice and consent, he can nonetheless, 
pursue either a treaty or an executive agreement in order to enter into a legally-binding 
agreement (Barbour, 2010:5).  
Thus, the final decision to sign a treaty is ultimately his choice even if the Senate does not 
give its consent (Hovi et al., 2010:4 - 5). Nevertheless, the President is expected to inform the 
necessary leaders and committees within Congress regarding his desire to enter into 
negotiations for a new treaty, and to simultaneously hold Congress in consultation regarding 
the design of the agreement (Hovi et al., 2010:5). However, the US political system is 
influenced by legislative restrictions which has implications for domestic measures aimed at 
the mitigation of climate change, whereby Percival explains that, “…Even though the 
president has unsurpassed ability to persuade agency heads to adopt policies he favours, he 
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does not have legal authority to dictate the content of decisions entrusted by statute to agency 
heads.” (2014:136).     
This dichotomy regarding the legal status between the development of its domestic and 
foreign policy can be traced to the unique legal system that the United States inherited from 
the British: a dual system highlighting the supremacy of Parliament wherein “the 
international and domestic legal orders do not intersect except through the operation of some 
mechanism linking the two.” (Wirth, 2015:17). This separation creates a dichotomy between 
the international and domestic settings which are categorised as legally as well as 
conceptually distinctive: “meshing the two can under some circumstances be complex, a form 
of a two-level game.” (Wirth, 2015:17 - 18). 
The terms convention and protocol do not necessarily articulate whether these climate change 
agreements are legally-binding either under international or domestic law (Barbour, 2010). 
“Under international law, an agreement is considered binding only if it conveys the intention 
of its parties to create legally-binding relationships and has entered into force” (Barbour, 
2010:4). The term convention may indicate an area of international relations that is not of 
intrinsic importance to the relations amongst states (Barbour, 2010:3). Usually, conventions 
cover a narrow scope and focus on “a single clearly determined object” (Barbour, 2010). 
Under international environmental law, a framework convention typically refers to guidelines 
which parties utilise to target an issue and the related details surrounding implementation that 
can be developed by subsequent agreements (Barbour, 2010:3). Protocols, on the other hand, 
are not usually foundational agreements in inter-state relations (Barbour, 2010:3). Rather, the 
intention of the Protocol is to interpret, supplement, modify, or clarify the “provisions of a 
primary instrument” (Barbour, 2010:3). Therefore, the variety of terms used in international 
negotiations do not necessarily give an indication of its legal status (Barbour, 2010).  
To directly link this provision in the US Constitution to its position in the global climate 
change negotiations, this position is designed by the executive branch of government 
(Depledge, 2005:12). The executive branch consists of the President, and related 
departments, as well as agencies, such as the Department of Energy, Department of State and 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which create the USA’s position endorsed at 
international negotiations (Depledge, 2005:12). Depledge further points out that, “Any 
significant domestic action on climate change at the federal level in turn requires extensive 
coordination and a complex approval process, involving the executive and its many agencies, 
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the two houses of Congress” as well as the fifty states (2005:12). While US presidents do 
have considerable influence over foreign policy under the Constitution, the President is still 
obliged to “share his powers with Congress” as part of the separation of powers inherent in 
the US political system (Skodvin and Andresen, 2009; Depledge, 2005:12). 
The executive branch of government bears the responsibility concerning the implementation 
and enforcement of US laws (CAR, 2010:9). A number of offices which have essential roles 
in the formulation of US climate policy in the Executive Office of the President include the 
Office of Science and Technology Policy, the National Security Council, the Council on 
Environmental Quality and the Office of Climate Change and Energy (CAR, 2010:10). These 
departments assist the President to administer and enforce rules and regulations, to propose 
legislation, as well as to implement Executive Order (CAR, 2002:12). There does not exist a 
single department in the United States that has individual authority to deal with the multitude 
of issues surrounding climate change (CAR, 2002:12). “Within the executive branch alone, 
some two dozen federal agencies and executive offices work together to advise, develop, and 
implement policies that help the US government understand the workings of the Earth’s 
climate system, reduce GHG emissions and US dependence on oil, promote a clean energy 
economy, and assess and respond to the adverse effects of climate change.” (CAR, 2010:10).   
The legislative branch of the US government, that is the US Congress, comprises two bodies, 
these being the Senate and the US House of Representatives, each having equal jurisdiction 
over lawmaking. The bicameral structure of the US Congress was designed to divide power 
on the basis of representation based on statehood and representation based on population. The 
House consists of 435 members, each one drawn from a single congressional district 
containing on average 650 000 people (CAR, 2010:10). The Senate, conversely, consists of 
100 members which is an aggregate of two drawn from the fifty US states (CAR, 2010:10). 
Each house has the authority “to develop legislation” (CAR, 2010:10). There are two main 
ways in which Congress influences environmental policy: (i) oversight of the federal 
executive branch and (ii) the creation of laws (CAR, 2002:12).  
US foreign policy is not created in a vacuum (Grimmett, 1999). Rather, the process of 
formulating foreign policy involves multiple levels and numerous individuals, each vying for 
influence over the process (Grimmett, 1999). Concerning the relationship between Congress 
and the President in determining which aspect they will influence and the final foreign policy 
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outcome depends on numerous factors and each branch plays a crucial yet different role in 
this process. 
4.4 A History of the United States in the UNFCCC Negotiations 
The United States has occupied a unique, often controversial role, in the global climate 
change negotiations (Matthew and Paterson, 2005:71 – 72). At the same time, the United 
States is recognised as an indispensable actor within the highly fragmented global climate 
change regime
91
, and the necessity of its leadership and cooperation is unquestioned since it 
is responsible for the majority of total emissions and has considerable political as well as 
economic influence to provide the resources needed for the creation and establishment of 
such agreements and in determining whether or not these will be successful (Parker et al., 
2014:8, 15). At the start of the negotiations, the USA was the world’s biggest emitter of 
greenhouse gases (GHGs)
92
 on both a per capita as well as gross basis and according to 2008 
data it was responsible for approximately a fifth of global emissions (Selin and VanDeveer, 
2011:121; Agrawala and Andresen; 1999:457; EPA, s.a.). Not only is its leadership in the 
negotiations imperative to limit emissions but its cooperation is necessary to also assist other 
nations to transition away from fossil-fuel based energy systems (Parenteau, 2004:365). What 
complicates any analysis of the USA’s position is that the politics of climate change in the 
United States are highly contested and complex offering numerous examples as well as 
counter-examples of action and inaction. While federal level attempts to regulate climate 
change remain strained, at the state- and municipal-level, many progressive policies and 
initiatives have been implemented such as California’s Global Warming Solutions Act of 
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 According to Keohane and Victor (2010:2), there does not exist an overarching, comprehensive regime for the 
governance of climate change. Rather, attempts at this governance have established a number of regulatory 
regimes that focus on various aspects of the phenomenon which are at times complementary with one another 
and at other times conflictual (Keohane and Victor, 2010:2). This diverse set of regulatory regimes are described 
by Keohane and Victor as a regime complex for climate change, which falls “between comprehensive 
international regulatory institutions, which are usually focused on a single integrated legal instrument, at one 
end of a spectrum and highly fragmented arrangements at the other” (2010:2).  
92
 The trajectory of US emissions has changed over time. By 1999, the USA’s total GHG emissions were 
approximately 12% higher than what they were in 1990 (CAR, 2002:5). CO2, the greatest source of US 
emissions, represented 82% of total US emissions with fossil fuel combustion being responsible for the majority 
of these emissions (CAR, 2002:5). By 2011, the USA’s emissions were 6.5% below its 2005 levels (CAR, 
2014:8). This contrasts with previous trends where US emissions grew by 1% per annum between 1990 and 
2005 (CAR, 2014:9). 
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2006, the Massachusetts Regulation of Electric Utility Emissions of 2001 and state-level 
renewable portfolio standards (CAR, 2014:13; CAR, 2002:62). 
The relative power positions of states within the negotiations are not static but alter over time 
(Parker et al., 2014:9). The USA’s position in the climate change negotiations can be 
understood to be embedded along two dynamics, one domestic, and the other international. 
Due to this embeddedness, the United States’ foreign policy position in the global climate 
change negotiations has not remained static but instead; its position in the UNFCCC has 
varied over time throughout successive administrations (Downie, 2013:22). During the 
intervening two decades, the context of the negotiations has also altered with new actors 
gaining influence and adding their pressure to its outcomes (Parker et al., 2014:8). What this 
illustrates is that preferences, rather than being static, are fluid and are dependent on the state 
of the negotiations and domestic political incentives and constraints (Downie, 2013:23).  
The purpose of the following section is to create a chronological discussion of the history of 
the USA’s position in the global climate change regime and the development of its energy 
policy during this period and the areas of convergence and divergence between the two. 
Special attention will be paid to critical moments in the history of the UNFCCC and the 
position assumed by the USA therein. By analysing the history of the development of this 
regime, it is possible to gain better insight into how various key issues were framed therein 
(Wirth, 2015:3). 
 4.5 The Origins of Environmental Problems 
As an environmental predicament, climate change emerged in conjunction with other 
environmental issues in the mid-twentieth century. While some of the environmental issues 
that emerged in this period were domestic problems, others were global, or transnational, in 
nature. The growing awareness surrounding ecological degradation related to deforestation, 
desertification, biodiversity loss, population growth, acid rain, and pollution all pressured for 
the design of effective policies at the national and oftentimes regional level, to deal therewith 
(Momtaz, 1996:263; Mansfield, 2008: 235, 236). Due to the associated negative effects of 
these environmental problems on communities, wildlife, agricultural practices, and economic 
activities; in 1968, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOSC) became worried about the 
perceived threats of environmental degradation and requested that a world conference be 
organised on the issue of the environment at the United Nations General Assembly (Momtaz, 
1996:261). This resulted in the UN Conference on the Human Environment, which took place 
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in Stockholm, Sweden in 1972, otherwise known as the Stockholm Conference (Momtaz, 
1996:261).  
Beginning with the Stockholm Conference, since the 1970s a number of environmental 
regimes have been established to tackle regional and global environmental problems 
(Mansfield, 2008:236). These conferences mostly focused on local ecological problems 
whose effects were more manageable to reverse therefore posing no real threat to economic 
activities and productivity (Bodansky, 2001:23).  Yet, since the Stockholm Conference and 
through to the present, these regimes have continuously been the centre of controversy 
surrounding such contentious questions as to what qualifies as an environmental problem, 
who is responsible for these, what should their solution be, and who ought to pay for the 
damage and related solutions (Mansfield, 2008:236).  
In the Cold War context of the 1970s, and its ideological competition between the Soviet 
Union and the United States, these environmental negotiations were torn between the 
developmental needs of the South versus the ecological concerns of the North (Mansfield, 
2008:237). Northern concerns over population growth and resource depletion were 
compounded by the OPEC and Iranian oil crisis of the 1970s and the calls by the South for 
the establishment of a New World Economic Order, which heightened developed countries’ 
concerns over global stability in light of growing ecological hazards and associated resource 
depletion. The tension between economic growth and environmental protection which 
emerged as a forceful theme at the time would characterise all further negotiations.    
4.5.1 The Emergence of Climate Science and the UN Environmental Negotiations 
1950s – 1970s 
The advancement of scientific knowledge about climate change had been integral in making 
this a prominent issue in domestic and global politics. Because climate change presents a 
problem that is global in nature, its solution required nations to deliberate in international 
forums to find an all-encompassing solution. The emergence of climate change in the 
twentieth century must be understood in the nuanced context of emerging environmental 
problems ranging from resource depletion, pollution and acid rain, to shifts in the 
international system from the bipolar Cold War structure, as well as alterations in the 
relationship between the developed nations of the North and the developing nations of the 
South. Throughout this period, the USA’s hegemonic position was prominent in advancing 
scientific knowledge on climate change as well as establishing international regimes to deal 
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with climate change as well as other environmental problems. This position could be used to 
advance the USA’s national interests as well as give other states the incentive to join these 
regimes and accept their legitimacy.   
Since the late 1950s, the United States of America has provided the largest scientific 
contribution to the emergent study of the climate change phenomenon through such scientific 
discoveries as the creation of general circulation models which have been instrumental in 
establishing future climate scenarios (Sprintz and Weiß, 2001:77; Agrawala and Andresen, 
1999:457). At the time, the USA occupied a hegemonic position in the scientific arena giving 
it a niche therein. The advancement of such knowledge was essential in improving the 
understanding of climate change and its effects (Bodansky, 2001:24). By the 1960s, 
observatories on the island of Mauna in Hawaii were able to gather evidence through precise 
measurements that the level of CO2, the primary gas causing climate change, was increasing 
(Bodansky, 2001:24).   
At the outset, the emergence of this scientific knowledge compelled the federal government 
to action. Such was the haste that by 1970, the first report which contained two chapters on 
climate change as well as global warming was produced by the Council on Environmental 
Quality in The First Annual Report of the Council on Environmental Quality (Percival, 
2014:139). Since then however, a gulf has developed between the epistemic community that 
endorses climate science and has turned climate change into an issue of public as well as 
political concern, and the policy community which is concerned with the abatement costs 
associated therewith (Sprintz and Weiß, 2001:77; Agrawala and Andresen, 1999:457). This 
section outlines the emergence of the US position in the global climate change negotiations 
and its development in relation to US energy policy, as well as its international environmental 
policy in so far as it applies to the UNFCCC. Due to the environment’s intersection with and 
input into economic processes and development, it raises contrasting sets of issues for 
negotiating countries.  
As a hegemonic state, the USA played an active role in tackling environmental problems and 
creating multilateral environmental regimes in the 1970s and 1980s – regimes which in turn 
served its self-interest and gave it a relative advantage in relation to other nations (Falkner, 
2005:585; Kelemen and Vogel, 2009:1). In fact, at the time, the USA accused European 
countries of being laggards in enforcing stringent environmental treaties and controls 
(Falkner, 2005:585). Although European states ratified these treaties, US hegemonic 
148 
 
leadership was a critical element in ensuring the establishment and acceptance of these 
regimes, while many European countries were in many instances reluctant to do so (Kelemen 
and Vogel, 2009:1). In some cases, European countries attempted to weaken or impede these 
treaties, such as treaties related to depletion of the ozone and acid rain (Kelemen and Vogel, 
2009:6, 25). On the other hand, the United States was a key actor in the preparation for the 
historic United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, and by the mid-1980s, the 
United States was an essential actor in the negotiations that led to the establishment of the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Kelemen and Vogel, 
2009:2).   
With regards to international environmental negotiations, the USA was a leader in the 
advancement of the negotiation and ratification of Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
(MEAs) because its environmental laws were more progressive in relation to similar 
industrialised countries, while it had the resources and material power necessary to provide 
incentives and compel other states to join (Bang et al., 2012:756). Such environmental 
treaties and controls however, did not undermine its economic competitiveness and 
international position. Because of its prominent position, during these negotiations, the USA 
could pressurise other states to cooperate on the basis of its existing domestic legislation 
without the need for domestic support for such initiatives (Bang et al., 2012:756). In 
particular, the USA was instrumental in designing the architecture of early environmental 
regimes such as the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, as well as the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, and had been an early 
signatory and ratifier of these treaties under the Reagan presidency (Percival, 2014:139). 
These two environmental regimes have set the precedent as the “most successful multilateral 
environmental agreements in history” (Percival, 2014:139). In spite of the ideological 
differences between administrations, the USA has supported environmental protection, so 
long as this did not undermine its perceived national interests and position in the international 
system. 
4.5.2 Ronald Reagan, the Montreal Protocol, and the Emergence of Climate Change 
on the Political Agenda 
A number of important trends emerged in the 1980s which increased the importance of 
climate change on the US political agenda. In the specific context of the United States, in 
spite of earlier federal and scientific interest, climate change really emerged as an issue of 
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political interest in 1980 under the Carter administration (Agrawala and Andresen, 
1999:458). In fact, the President’s Council on Environmental Quality had reiterated that 
climate change was a problem that was the USA’s responsibility which required the USA’s 
action to find a solution (Agrawala and Andresen, 1999:459).  
This position was promptly reversed by his successor, Ronald Reagan, during his 
administration’s years in the White House between 1981 and 1989 (Agrawala and Andresen, 
1999:459). Yet, in spite of this executive inaction, between the early and mid-1980s, a few 
members of Congress were beginning to attend hearings on this new phenomenon with more 
urgency (Agrawala and Andresen, 1999:459). The increased attention that was beginning to 
emerge towards this new policy issue would pressure Reagan into signing the Global Climate 
Protection Act in 1988 which articulated that the President had to submit a plan for review to 
Congress in regards to the stabilisation of emissions (Agrawala and Andresen, 1999:459). 
In the midst of this political interest, the Montreal negotiations set an important precedent to 
the global climate change negotiations (Yergin, 2012:458). In 1985, scientists from the 
British Antarctic Survey discovered a “hole” in the ozone layer which was caused by a group 
of chemicals called chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) which had been developed in the 1920s 
(Yergin, 2012:459). The impact of this scientific discovery and potentially adverse 
environmental consequences were critical in increasing the necessity of negotiating a 
solution. Scientific evidence indicated that this would have serious consequences for human 
and ecological well-being which prompted a quick response to the threat such that by 1987, a 
mere two years after the discovery, the Montreal Protocol to restrict CFCs came into effect 
after it was endorsed by twenty four states (Yergin, 2012:459 - 460).  
The Montreal Protocol established an important precedent for climate change as it indicated 
the haste with which the global community could act towards a perceived environmental 
threat (Yergin, 2012:460). Within this context, the United States occupied an important 
leadership role in establishing the economic and scientific basis upon which to solve this 
issue (Hahn, 1994:307). However, there was a crucial difference between CFCs and GHGs, 
which Yergin (2012:460) points out, 
“The Montreal Protocol…acknowledged that increasing concentrations of 
greenhouse gases was dangerous. It dramatically underlined the acceptance 
of the notion that human activity imposes costs on the earth’s atmosphere. 
And it demonstrates that countries could come together quickly and agreed 
to eliminate a common environmental threat…There was one striking 
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difference, however. The relevant universe was so much smaller. Fewer 
than forty companies manufactured chlorofluorocarbons, and just two had 
half the market. But the whole world burned fossil fuels.”     
Theoretically, the Montreal Protocol raises some interesting issues for realism concerning 
cooperation, especially in international environmental relations, and the conditions that 
enable it. To a limited degree, countries are able to cooperate, especially when their interests 
are at stake. The type of problem that the Montreal Protocol addressed helps to illuminate its 
successful employment. The Montreal Protocol would not distribute unacceptable costs to 
states, nor give one set of nations a relative advantage over others, and unlike fossil fuels, 
CFCs are not critical for a nation’s (energy) security.  In the early years of the deliberations 
surrounding climate change, policy makers, impressed by the success of the Montreal 
Protocol, used many of its key features in the design of the later UNFCCC, some of the 
significant features that were implemented were its top-down approach, the distinction 
between developed and developing nations, the responsibility of developed countries 
regarding incremental costs accrued to developing countries for mitigation, as well as the 
quantitative limits on the production and consumption of CFCs (Bodansky, 2011:699 – 700). 
For a variety of reasons, climate change proved to be a far trickier problem. 
4.5.3 Congressional Concern and International Co-Ordination 
By the 1980s, compelling scientific evidence emerged which showed that the climate was 
indeed changing, that its cause was largely the result of human activities and, its affects 
would be detrimental to human well-being (Yergin, 2012:458). Scientific evidence 
surrounding the negative repercussions of this weather phenomenon drove public debate and 
media coverage for the issue (Yergin, 2012:458). Through the momentum that was generated 
due to this concern and increasing awareness about climate change, a process of interaction 
between the epistemic community and policy-makers emerged (Yergin, 2012:458). The 
particular urgency surrounding climate change in the 1980s was a reaction to a host of other 
environmental challenges that swept through the era such as deforestation, acid rain, and 
ozone depletion (Paterson, 1996:60).  
Climate change however would emerge on to the mainstream political agenda when the first 
hearings to be held on the climate change phenomenon by the United States’ Senate took 
place in July 1988 (Yergin, 2012:457; Paterson, 1996:60; Agrawala and Andresen, 
1999:459). This occurred in the midst of severe draught and heat waves experienced in North 
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America in the summer of 1988 (Agrawala and Andresen, 1999:459). These hearings were a 
turning point in the politics of climate change as it was at this point that climate change 
would emerge as an issue that required political attention in the United States (Yergin, 
2012:457). Because, an era of economic abundance was experienced during the 1980s, this 
limited the usual economic objections to environmental regulation and especially in 1988 
(which at the time was the hottest year yet recorded), contributed to the sense of urgency 
surrounding the claims of scientists in regards to climate change (Paterson, 1996:60; 
Agrawala and Andresen, 1999:459; Yergin, 2012). 
A week after the historic Senatorial hearings, the basis for a global climate change regime 
would begin to take form during a global conference, Changing Climate: Implications for 
International Security, which was sponsored by the Canadian government (Agrawala and 
Andresen, 1999:459). Pivotally, the conference reiterated the view that climate change was 
anthropogenically-induced  and that industrialised countries bore the primary responsibility 
for its creation and were urged to limit their emissions “by 20% from 1988 levels by 2005” 
(Agrawala and Andresen, 1999:459). These set of events would make climate change a 
significant issue in George H.W. Bush’s 1988 presidential campaign, a campaign in which he 
defended himself as an environmentalist, while contrasting himself to the anti-environmental 
stance often portrayed by president Reagan (Agrawala and Andresen, 1999:459; Kelemen 
and Vogel, 2009:12). 
By the late 1980s, in spite of these perceived challenges, spurred by growing alarm over the 
evidence produced by climate change science, as well as growing public concern, policy-
makers adopted three main mechanisms to deal with this challenge at the international level 
(Paterson, 1996:60; Wirth, 2015:3). The first mandate was the creation of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
93
 in 1988 which was tasked with 
creating an overview of the scientific consensus regarding climate change for policy-makers 
(Paterson, 1996:60; Wirth, 2015:3). The second was the organisation of a number of high-
level conferences in which politicians could work out their preferred policy options to deal 
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 The IPCC, which would exert influence over the negotiations throughout its history, was established under the 
mandate of the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) as well as the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) which authorized the IPCC to gather and synthesise all the available scientific evidence on 
climate change led by teams organised by scientists from around the globe (Wirth, 2015:3). Its reports were 
organised around three principal themes, “(1) the physical science basis of climate change; (2) impacts, 
adaptation and vulnerability; and (3) mitigation of climate change” (Wirth, 2015:4). 
152 
 
with this challenge (Paterson, 1996:60 - 61). Lastly, countries pledged unilateral targets 
aimed at limiting the emission of CO2 at 1990 levels by the year 2000 (Paterson, 1996:61). 
The accelerated pace developed by these three responses created the global negotiations to 
establish an international convention that could respond to climate change (Paterson, 
1996:61). 
4.6 US Energy Policy and Climate Change Mitigation 
Attempts to integrate GHG mitigation into US energy policy and economy have been a 
complex exercise, resulting in a dialectic approach towards the design of US energy policy 
(Parker et al., 2011:1). The phenomenon of anthropogenic climate change, and modern 
energy production and consumption, are linked since the latter is primarily responsible for the 
former. In addition, there is a strong relationship between GHG emissions and economic 
growth (Parker et al., 2011:1). Thereby, any action to mitigate climate change would have 
serious implications for the structure of the USA’s energy system and economic activities. It 
is important to emphasise that such actions would have consequences and costs not only for 
the vested interests involved in the fossil fuel and automobile industries, but also for the 
economic competitiveness and ranking of the United States in an anarchic and competitive 
international system. Historically, US competitiveness relied on the cheap supply of energy to 
replace more costly capital as well as labour costs (Parker et al., 2011:1). Its hegemonic 
position in the international system was further influenced and enhanced by its control of the 
global petroleum system in the post-Second World War context which allowed it to gain 
access to cheap petroleum supplies both for itself and its allies.  
Per consequence, one of the fundamental contradictions that US policy-makers had to solve 
was the tension between economic growth and the regulation of greenhouse gases (GHGs) 
(Legault, 2008/2009:146). In this regard, two issues were prominent in this concern: (i) the 
relationship between energy and the environment and, (ii) the relationship between energy 
and the economy (Department of Energy, 1994:74).  Since the separation of power has been 
the bedrock of American politics, reconciling opposing political viewpoints has been a 
prominent challenge for various administrations when attempting to formulate a coherent 
energy policy. Energy policy has thus been a prominent, yet controversial, theme for 




4.7 The Bush Administration’s Energy Policy 
Executive administrations are simultaneously constrained by both the international and 
domestic systems in their pursuit of policy objectives. While policy-makers within the 
Republican Bush administration developed particular policy goals based on the influence of 
systemic incentives, they had to be aware of domestic constraints on these. As such, the 
relative abundance of the 1980s would give way to two important policy issues, the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait, which would place renewed emphasis on energy security, and the 
UNFCCC. By 1989, the Bush administration was working towards creating a comprehensive 
National Energy Strategy, “We cannot and will not wait, for the next energy crisis to force us 
to respond.” (Department of Energy, 1994:61). Thereby, the National Energy Strategy of 
1991 and the Energy Policy Act of 1992 were designed to achieve “continued economic 
growth, increased energy efficiency, strong environmental protection, and then a reduced 
dependence on foreign oil” (Bush, 1991(b)). However, at the outset of the Bush 
administration, it appeared that there was no coherent manner to integrate the various 
elements and objectives that an energy policy should consist of (Department of Energy, 
1994:51, 61).  
4.7.1 Structural Influences 
            Historically, domestic energy resources have been relatively inexpensive and abundant within 
the USA, especially characterised by relatively low-cost petroleum prior to the energy crises 
of the 1970s, while the USA also had lower taxes on energy in comparison to other 
developed countries (Joskow, 2001:4). At the structural level, this permitted the USA to be 
more competitive relative to its economic rivals through lower energy prices in place of 
higher labour and capital costs (Parker et al., 2011:1), while simultaneously though its 
hegemonic position it wielded influence over the global supply of petroleum, a resource of 
both economic and geopolitical significance during its rivalry with the USSR within the 
bipolar structure of the international system. With the energy challenges of the era, it is not 
surprising that during the 1970s and 1980s, energy policy developed in response to “energy 
and economic security” as inexpensive energy was the source of US power and security 
within the anarchic international system (Joskow, 2001:13). By the start of the Bush 
administration, the USA’s dependence on imported petroleum was increasing (Joskow, 
2001:7). As the international distribution of power changed from a bipolar to a unitary system 
154 
 
at the start of the Bush administration, this would influence how self-interested states 
“provide for their security” (Waltz, 2000:5, 6).  
Under the Bush administration (1989 – 1993), three formidable events took place which 
would have important implications for US energy policy: the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the establishment of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992. The USA’s response to these events was 
influenced by the logic of anarchy and its position as hegemon whose influence was filtered 
through factors found at the unit-level. The international system is characterised by the 
continuous struggle for power therein. The demise and eventual breakdown of the Soviet 
Union in the late 1980s would leave the USA as the sole superpower in a unitary system. 
With the threat and rivalry between the USA and the Soviet Union no longer a factor in 
strategic calculations, policy-makers could pursue a new set of priorities and strategies. 
Nonetheless, with one threat diminishing a new set emerged. Although military calculations 
would somewhat decrease, economic competition would emerge as a central preoccupation as 
the United States would have to be concerned with the economic competition between itself, 
European countries, Japan and to a lesser degree China. The elegance of the bipolar system 
could permit policy-makers to pursue a set of well-defined military strategies to contain the 
Soviet threat. Economic challenges and strategies were less clear-cut. Therewith, the Bush 
administration came to power during a time of flux in international and energy
94
 systems.  
By the 1980s, although energy systems were characterised by ample and stable supplies, 
increased awareness of environmental degradation related to energy use required policy 
intervention and restricted certain policy options. Especially climate change and other 
environmental issues became more prominent in public and political spheres and applied 
                                                          
94 The end of the bipolar world order was succeeded by the emergence of globalisation as a prime feature of the 
global political economy (Gilpin, 2001:3). While globalisation has a number of features, a crucial aspect of this 
phenomenon is that states and their economies became increasingly integrated and interconnected (Yergin, 
2012:12). With this transformation set in place, the emphasis placed on military strength and traditional notions 
of armed security on the global agenda were relaxed somewhat, although this was regionally differentiated 
(Luttwak, 1990:16). Globalisation impacted energy markets with the deregulation and privatisation which 
commenced in the 1970s becoming entrenched in the 1990s (Yergin, 2006:34; Yergin, 2012:12). There had 
been three crucial implications of globalisation on the energy system which were the acceleration of demand, 
structural transformation of the petroleum industry, which increased the use of natural gas for electricity 
generation in many countries (Yergin, 2006).  
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pressure on energy policy design. Therewith, due to these structural changes and their 
security implications, the Bush administration promoted the National Energy Strategy of 
1991 and subsequently the National Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT92).  
In 1991
95
, the collapse of the Soviet Union transformed the international system from the 
bipolar system dominated by the competition between the United States and the USSR to a 
unipolar order dominated by the United States (Westphal, 2006; Van der Linde et al., 2004). 
The end of the Cold War was prematurely heralded as a new era of prosperity and peaceful 
relations among nation-states - the start of the so-called end of history (Fukuyama, 1992). 
This initial optimism would be very short-lived as conflict and the struggle for power 
characterise the international system because of anarchy. Thus, the first major petroleum 
crisis of the post-Cold War era was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
96
 in August 1990 by Saddam 
Hussein which disrupted the supply of petroleum to the world market, once again raising 
fears over energy security and thereby national security (Yergin, 2012:9 - 10; Hamilton, 
2009:220). At the time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, there was approximately 5.5 million 
barrels per day of spare capacity, which was sufficient to supply around 8% of global demand 
and ease the pressure of the petroleum lost from the warring countries (Brown et al., 2006:6). 
In spite of this, petroleum prices increased from $21.50 per barrel in January 1991 to $28.30 
in February in reaction to the lost petroleum supply (Brown et al., 2006:6). The Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait thus introduced an energy crisis by increasing the cost of petroleum and natural 
gas (Joskow, 2001:1). 
In response to the Kuwait crisis, the Bush administration led Operation Desert Shield in order 
to curb further Iraqi operations (Department of Energy, 1994:62). Under the auspices of the 
United Nations and the leadership of the United States, a coalition was quickly formed, which 
included Russia, to oust Saddam Hussein from Kuwait and provide stability to the world’s 
petroleum market (Yergin, 2012:11). With the absence of the Soviet threat, the United States’ 
pursued a role in maintaining control over the supply of petroleum that could depend on 
                                                          
95
 The end of the Cold War was formally announced by George H.W. Bush in November 1990; however the 
iron curtain collapsed in December 1991 (Department of Energy, 1994:68).    
96
 Saddam Hussein wished to gain control of Kuwait’s rich petroleum fields (Yergin, 1991:12). Had Saddam 
Hussein successfully annexed Kuwait, collectively Hussein’s petroleum reserves would equal that of Saudi 
Arabia’s and would allow him to dominate petroleum production in both Arab states as well as the Persian Gulf 
where world petroleum reserves are concentrated (Yergin, 2012:9; Yergin, 1991:12). This would have allowed 
Saddam Hussein to accrue tremendous power both regionally and globally (Yergin, 1991:12).   
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multilateral cooperation because of its hegemonic position in a unipolar system which 
allowed it to successfully balance with other states against Iraq, although this role was still 
influenced by the Truman and Carter Doctrines. In light of the security threats posed by 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, policy-makers once again had to consider whether security of 
supply should determine fuel choice with domestic energy sources, ranging from coal to 
nuclear dominating the energy mix (Cable, 1995:306).   
Thereby, due to the changing distribution of power in the international system and trends 
related to security in the international system, the administration promoted a policy 
framework, the National Energy Security Act of 1991 and its follow-up the National Energy 
Policy Act of 1992, which emphasised a number of objectives such as improving the 
international competitiveness of American industries, while petroleum was highlighted as a 
prime vulnerability for the United States (Department of Energy, 1994:66). Certain measures 
were considered by the administration that would reduce imported petroleum through 
government regulation and market mechanisms, however, in the end the administration did 
not support these because of the higher cost that this would incur to consumers and a 
corresponding decrease in the competitiveness of US industries (Department of Energy, 
1994:67). Likewise, certain measures aimed at increasing renewable energy production and 
efficiency were not accepted because of the economic costs that these would have incurred 
(Department of Energy, 1994:67). Such actions by the administration will correspond to the 
logic of anarchy wherein states will pursue those policy objectives that will increase their 
states’ material capabilities and latent power in relation to other states at the expense of other 
policy goals that are perceived to be of lesser importance in this regard. Power, however, is 
multi-dimensional, and the policy objectives that amplify it are not obvious, nor does their 
combination always lead to desired outcomes.  
In addition, as a result of the end of the Cold War, with the demise of the bipolar distribution 
of power, one of the major alterations was the decline in defense activities and its associated 
arms race which figured previously in energy policy which altered policy-makers’ priorities 
in the energy sector in this regard (Department of Energy, 1994: 72, 76). Instead, attention 
was starting to be directed towards waste management and environmental restoration making 
environmental issues more prominent in energy policy design (Department of Energy, 
1994:72). In the historical overview published by the Department of Energy, this was 
described as “defense activities were ‘giving way to green.’” (Department of Energy, 
1994:73). Clean coal became the most prominent energy initiative for the federal government 
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while renewable energy also received increasing attention (Department of Energy, 1994:71, 
73). Change at the global level within the distribution of power in the international system 
was thus instrumental in influencing the USA’s energy policy with greater emphasis being 
placed on economic competition between states (Department of Energy, 1994:76). Overall, 
the energy crisis of the early 1990s was less severe in magnitude than the energy crises of the 
1970s, and did not have a severe economic impact (Joskow, 2001:1, 57), nevertheless, the 
National Energy Policy Act of 1992 was more focused on energy security and environmental 
regulation while the Bush administration emphasised a reliance on the market for the 
effective allocation of energy resources (Joskow, 2001:13). 
The end of the Cold War, and the demise of the bipolar order, changed the structure of the 
international system. While the USA was still a hegemonic state, it found itself in a context 
characterised not only by a new set of challenges but also within a dramatically altered 
distribution of power. In this altered distribution of power at the structural level, economic 
strength became paramount in maintaining and enhancing US hegemony vis-à-vis the ascent 
of European countries and China that threatened the US position within the anarchic 
international system since economic competition, rather than military competition, 
characterised the new distribution of power (Waltz, 1993: 59 -60). The USA’s survival would 
depend on a new approach to maintaining its economic strength. Although the demise of the 
Soviet Union reduced a prime threat that characterised the bipolar distribution of power, the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait would increase petroleum prices thereby posing a threat to US 
economic growth and thereby latent power (Joskow, 2001:13). With the demise of the Soviet 
Union, the USA relied on its hegemonic position to regain stability in global petroleum 
markets in cooperation with other states. However since its allies were no longer concerned 
about the military threat posed by the Soviet Union within an anarchic international system, 
there was a decreased reliance by these states on US protection. With economic competition 
being more pronounced and energy prices increasing, the Bush administration had to 
carefully consider balancing competing goals within its energy policy (Department of Energy 
1994:53).  Although states are always concerned with military threats because of the anarchic 
structure of the international system and the need to secure survival therein, the threat posed 
by economic competition is an important element of this consideration. Per consequence, the 
primary concern in the design of energy policy’s goals still remained maintaining the 
competitiveness of the US economy since US hegemony depended on its economic strength.  
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It may thus be surmised that the emphasis on economic competitiveness was an imperative 
that increased in light of the ascent of competitors in the international system with the 
resultant change in the distribution of power, and the implications thereof for US power and 
security. As a result, while energy security and dependence on foreign petroleum were 
important policy goals, the primary motivation that facilitated or limited support for certain 
policy goals was the impact thereof on the cost of energy as this bore direct consequences for 
the ability of the USA to maintain its hegemonic position vis-à-vis its rivals. Within this 
altered distribution of power, the Bush administration supported the goals of energy security, 
efficiency and environmental protection within its energy policy (Bush, 1991). Due to the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, energy security, with an emphasis on petroleum, became the 
primary goal of energy policy because of the need to reduce US vulnerability, especially the 
USA’s reliance on unstable suppliers (Bush 1991). However, this goal had to be balanced 
with environmental protection in order to maintain low energy costs (Bush, 1991).  
While environmental protection may have gained greater support by the Bush administration 
due to the demise of the Soviet Union, economic competition with other states along with the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, would compel the Bush administration to place greater emphasis on 
reducing energy costs and securing a greater supply of petroleum. George H.W. Bush (1991) 
indicated that “…we are, I will be the first to concede, a long way from total energy 
independence. Our imports of foreign oil have been climbing steadily since 1985 and now 
stand at 42 percent of our total consumption. Too many of those oil imports come from 
sources in troubled parts of the world… We know that for domestic oil production, certain 
areas are offlimits, and justifiably so, for sound environmental reasons. But developing new, 
alternative energy sources takes time. Some sources of power face political problems. So, 
America will have to continue to import energy for years to come. We also know that unwise 
and extreme measures to reduce oil imports would seriously hurt the consumer in this country 
and will adversely affect the working man and woman in this country, American jobs, and 
American industries. In the face of these realities, we must act with care, but we must act 
comprehensively.” While the Bush administration may have sought a balanced, 
comprehensive energy policy this was difficult to achieve in practice, due to the tension 
between these competing goals and the implications thereof for the cost of energy and 
therefore the USA’s material capabilities and latent power. In addition, although the change 
in the distribution of power would give policy-makers the incentives to pursue certain broad 
goals related to US security and power by emphasising energy security and competitiveness, 
the substantive content of the policy and its overall coherence and efficacy would be 
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determined at the unit-level. The ability to compete economically in the international system 
would nonetheless compel the Bush administration to prioritise low cost energy and energy 
security at the expense of environmental regulation. 
4.7.2 Domestic Influences 
The Republican Bush administration responded to the changing incentives of the structure of 
the international system, yet the compatibility between policy goals and the way in which this 
administration determined to pursue these, and their efficacy, was determined at the unit-level 
through the particular perception of policy-makers within this administration as well as the 
federal structure of the US political system. Even though the Bush administration continued 
to rely on market operations, policy-makers within this administration were less 
ideologically-driven in comparison to the previous Reagan administration (Miller, 1995:720).  
Although the Bush administration initially gave reassurance that there was sufficient and 
adequate supply to meet demand, world petroleum prices rose quickly after the Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait with implications for US energy security and per consequence economic power 
(Department of Energy, 1994:64). The energy crisis would influence the Bush administration 
to design a national energy strategy and “to convince Congress to enact comprehensive 
energy legislation” (Joskow, 2001:1). Within this context, on the 20
th
 of February 1991, the 
National Energy Strategy was presented to Congress by the Bush administration (Department 
of Energy, 1994:66). The Strategy hinged on free market operations, a reliance on the private 
sector and competition, as well as innovation, and limited government intervention as a 
means to secure these policy-makers’ perceived goals of “an energy future that was ‘secure, 
efficient, and environmentally sound’” (Department of Energy, 1994:66; Helm, 1991:1; 
Tomain, 2007:1203). While the energy policies of the 1970s were characterised by a 
prominent role for the federal government in designing and implementing these policies, the 
Bush administration continued with the limited role for government that was reinstated by the 
Reagan administration and that was reminiscent of the energy policies preceding the 1973 oil 
crisis. Within this context, according to the administration, the policy framework was 
committed to the goals of energy security as well as environmental protection (Department of 
Energy, 1994:66). According to Watkins, the National Energy Strategy “was the first such 
effort designed to provide energy security, environmental quality, and affordable energy 
through ‘free market incentives, reduced regulation, and increased federal investment in 
research and development.’…Past attempts at charting an energy policy… ‘have relied on 
controls, taxes, subsidies and regulation. Government alone cannot be the answer.’” 
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(Department of Energy, 1994:66). Yet, because of the federal structure of the USA, the Bush 
administration could not pursue their goals in a coherent manner because of Congressional 
input (NRRI, 1993:1). 
A unique feature of policy-makers within the George H.W. Bush administration was their 
perception that the goal of environmental protection was not inconsistent with either energy 
security nor national security (Department of Energy, 1994:53; Waldman and Hulac, 2018; 
Schneider, 1991; Wampler, 2018) to the extent that it did not increase the cost of energy to 
consumers and industries and thereby not undermine US competitiveness nor allow its rivals 
to attain relative gains within international environmental negotiations (Waldman and Hulac, 
2018). Thus, the goal of environmental regulation was promoted to the extent that it did not 
undermine US power and security relative to its rivals within the international distribution of 
power. Nevertheless, at the rhetorical level, the Bush administration stated that it wished to 
design an energy policy that could balance between the goals of environmental protection, 
energy security and low cost energy (Bush, 1991; Schneider, 1991). While energy security, 
economic growth and low cost energy would remain critical policy objectives, the continuous 
divide between Congress and the administration would stall the design of a coherent energy 
policy as there was divergence over the content of the policy (Department of Energy, 
1994:61; Miller, 1995). Overall, while there was a perception amongst policy-makers within 
this administration that the goal of environmental protection was not incongruent with energy 
security and economic growth, the two latter goals would continue to be emphasised, while 
enhancing the competitiveness of US industries (Department of Energy, 1994:66; Wampler, 
2018; Schneider, 1991). Thereby any measures that could increase the price energy were 
rejected often leading to an incoherent energy policy (Department of Energy, 1994:67): 
“Implementing these measures could reduce oil imports substantially, 
but the administration rejected them ‘because the cost would very high 
– in higher prices to American consumers, lost jobs, and less 
competitive US industries.’ Indeed, certain measures promoting 
energy efficiency and renewable energy production for which the 
Department had pushed hard were stricken from the National Energy 
Strategy because they would have cost the federal treasury too much 
money.” (Department of Energy, 1994:67) 
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Within the federal structure of the USA, the National Energy Strategy received opposition 
from Congress which required compromise therein and would become the foundation for the 
subsequent Energy Policy Act of 1992
97
 after a process of deliberation in Congress 
(Department of Energy, 1994: 68 – 70; 76; Miller, 1995). The Energy Policy Act of 1992 was 
thus very different to the strategy that was proposed by the Bush administration in 1991 
(Joskow, 2001:14; Miller, 1995). While the 1991 strategy promoted by the Bush 
administration was based on supply-side initiatives to meet the policy’s goals, after 
Congressional debate, the policy that would be enacted in 1992 was based on “creating tax 
and direct subsidies for energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies and on 
encouraging all states to develop and implement “integrated resource planning” (Joskow, 
2003:13 – 14). While policy-makers within the Bush administration reacted to the incentives 
produced by the international system by developing a set of policy goals, the US federal 
system which was characterised by a division of power, would stymie the administration’s 
ability to produce a comprehensive energy policy and react to these incentives. In its attempt 
to manipulate policy outcomes to meet certain objectives, the administration had to respond 
to internal constraints (Mastanduno et al., 1989:459). The Congressional gridlock around the 
policy was viewed by the administration as the consequence of the intrusion of parochial 
interests rather than support for what Watkins termed “the national good” (Department of 
Energy, 1994:70). In spite of the deliberations and initial gridlock, an energy policy 
framework was adopted that was bipartisan and at the rhetorical level argued to be “pro-
energy, pro-environment, and pro-growth”, but nonetheless characterised by inconsistencies 
(Department of Energy, 1994:71; NRRI, 1993:1; Miller, 1995).  
As such, the National Energy Strategy and the EPACT of 1992 received mixed reviews. One 
of the main criticisms aimed at the Strategy was that it would maintain US dependence on 
foreign petroleum such that 2001 import levels would be on par with those of 1991 
(Department of Energy, 1994:67; see also Joskow, 2003:21 - 22). While it was hoped that 
there would be a reduction of imported petroleum, the two measures necessary to accomplish 
this, these being increased petroleum exploration in Alaska as well as increased auto 
efficiency standards were not accepted (Miller, 1995:720). Likewise, the Energy Policy Act 
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of 1992 was criticised for containing a number of inconsistencies since it was based on 
political compromise in order to accommodate competing views from different interest 
groups within the US federal structure (Costello et al., 1993:1; Miller, 1995; Joskow, 
2003:13; Rossi, 1995:196). 
In spite of these criticisms, unlike its predecessor, the Bush administration attempted to place 
greater emphasis on environmental protection. At the start of the Bush administration, it was 
perceived by its policy-makers that environmental protection was not inconsistent with 
energy security and national security (Department of Energy, 1994:53; Schneider, 1991; Van 
Orman, 1992: 253). Secretary of Energy, James D. Watkins expressed that, “I am 
confident…I can help find that desired and balanced formula wherein safety is never 
subverted, the environment is adequately protected, and national security and other energy 
objectives are achieved in harmony.” (Department of Energy, 1994:53). In addition, the 
EPACT of 1992 was the first attempt to combine energy and climate change policy and relied 
on a least-cost strategy to stabilise and reduce US GHG emissions (Parker et al., 2011:1; 
Schneider, 1991; Ellerman, 2012:16). Thereby, the mitigation of climate change became a 
policy goal when the United States ratified the UNFCCC in 1992 (Parker and Blodgett, 
2008:1; Ellerman, 2012:16). In this regard, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT92), 
which was principally designed in reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, was also as a 
secondary response, designed in reaction to the UNFCCC (Parker and Blodgett, 2008:1). The 
Bush administration articulated eleven areas of EPACT92 that could assist the United States 
to reduce its emissions in its 1992 submission to the UNFCCC such as establishing energy 
efficiency standards and to also include climate change concerns into “energy policy 
planning” (Parker and Blodgett, 2008:1). At the time, such an approach was based on the 
perception that reducing US emissions could be achieved at little cost (Parker and Blodgett, 
2008:3). It was further hoped that achieving the goal of reducing emissions could be a by-
product of meeting other policy goals referred to as a “no-regrets” policy towards climate 
change (Parker and Blodgett, 2008:3, 7). The Bush administration promoted the use of 
voluntary reductions by industry which could allow the administration to pursue its policy 
objectives without requiring Congressional input at the federal level (Parker and Blodgett, 
2008:7). Such emphasis on nationally determined and voluntary actions were endorsed since 
climate change mitigation would need to be integrated into US energy policy (Department of 
Energy, 1994:73). This would have important implications for the US position in the 
UNFCCC and its ability to cooperate therein. 
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4.8 The Rio Earth Conference, the Establishment of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the North-South Divide 
While the Cold War was marked by the ideological competition between the Soviet Union 
and the United States within the bipolar structure of the international system, when 
multilateral environmental negotiations emerged in the early 1970s, these negotiations were 
torn between the ecological concerns of the North and the developmental needs of the South 
(Mansfield, 2008:237). By the end of the Cold War, the context of multilateral environmental 
negotiations altered between the Stockholm Conference of 1972 and the Rio Conference of 
1992 such that there were marked differences between the issues and context
98
. With the 
changing structure of the international system to a unipolar one, the traditional security 
concerns of the Cold War diminished, public concern regarding the environment increased, 
and energy was considered a security issue in the post 1973/1979 context (Najam and 
Cleveland, 2003:128). A key concern amongst developed and developing nations that would 
influence the negotiations was the convergence between energy and climate policy 
concerning different countries’ responsibilities and abilities to alter their energy production 
and consumption patterns, “These debates during and after Rio have been defined principally 
by compulsions that lie at two distinct corners of the sustainable development triangle: the 
environmental compulsion emanating from the ecological stresses associated with specific 
energy production and consumption choices, and the economic compulsion derived from the 
central role of energy in economic growth.” (Najam and Cleveland, 2003:128). 
By the time of the Rio Earth Conference of 1992, the North-South divide between developed 
and developing nations strained cooperation in the UNFCCC from the outset (Heller and 
Shukla, 2003:135). During the negotiations, developing countries were clear that they would 
not accept an agreement that would impede their development while developed countries had 
nearly two centuries of economic development based on fossil fuel energy and emissions 
(Parks and Roberts, 2008:621). In the lead up to the Rio Earth Conference, developing 
countries continuously expressed concerns that their ability and right to economic growth and 
development would be curtailed, while developed nations would not curb their emissions 
unless developing nations did likewise showcasing a continuous concern amongst both 
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developing and developed countries about the implications for relative gains as a 
consequence of the outcome of the negotiations (Parks and Roberts, 2008:622).  
The tension between economic growth and environmental protection which emerged as a 
forceful theme at the time would characterise all further negotiations - a prisoners’ dilemma 
fraught with questions over natural resource use. While this tension between economic 
development on the one hand and environmental protection on the other were prominent 
themes in the Cold War era, the difference now was that  security concerns gave way to 
economic concerns due to the altered structure of the international system, and in addition 
alliance formation changed since the East bloc could not act as an alternative that developing 
nations could rely on to the developed North that had characterised the bipolar anarchic 
international system. 
4.8.1 The Creation of the UNFCCC 
The Rio Earth Conference of 1992 thus took place amidst the shifting structure of the 
international system. The end of the Cold War alongside its East-West impasse spurred a 
sense of optimism that a new era of cooperation in international relations was emerging. In 
this exuberance, the Rio Earth Conference was believed to be a symbolic achievement of this 
new era. Within this context, the final outcome of the Rio Earth Conference hinged on US 
leadership. While the USA was a key player in the design of the UNFCCC, its role therein 
was starting to become increasingly controversial while domestic politics towards the climate 
change regime, while initially supportive, were beginning to become resistant. The US 
position needs to be understood within the contours of the changing international system.  
The events of the 1980s combined to advance momentum to find a global solution to climate 
change. The joint effects of the discovery of the hole in the ozone layer and the publication of 
Our Common Future by the Bruntland Commission would firmly place climate change as 
well as other environmental issues at the top of the political agenda (Bodansky, 2001:23). 
Such was the momentum that by 1989, a series of negotiations were organised which would 
pave the way for the second UN conference on the environment to establish a regime to cope 
with climate change under the auspices of the General Assembly (Momtaz, 1996:262; 
Bodansky, 2001:23; Leggett, 2011:2). Between February 1991 and May 1992, the 
architecture for a global regime was negotiated under the Intergovernmental Negotiating 
Committee (INC) (Agrawala and Andresen, 1999:460).  
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Between the third and fourteenth of June 1992, the historic United Nations Conference on the 
Environment and Development (UNCED) took place in Rio de Janeiro (Momtaz, 1996:262). 
The conference specifically addressed questions surrounding the tension between protecting 
the environment, while simultaneously endorsing economic development within the political 
goal of sustainable development (Momtaz, 1996:262). The negotiations were complicated in 
the context of an international system made up of states that were legally equal under the 
ideal of sovereignty but economically were starkly inequitable resulting in unequal hierarchic 
positions and power relations. Under these circumstances, the related outcome of the Rio 
Earth Conference was that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) was adopted and opened for signature on the ninth of May 1992 (Wirth, 2015:4; 
Momtaz, 1996:269). 
The UNFCCC came into force on the twenty first of March 1994 (Barbour, 2010:1). Under 
this framework, countries are grouped into Annex I parties, that is developed countries who 
are historically responsible for the greatest contribution towards accumulated emissions, and 
non-Annex I parties, traditionally low-income, developing countries (Barbour, 2010:1). At 
this point, the UNFCCC did not mandate binding, quantified emission reduction targets
99
 
(Barbour, 2010:1). The UNFCCC as a multilateral climate regime is made up of a number of 
nested instruments (Wirth, 2015:3). The UNFCCC is a  
“procedurally-oriented instrument containing obligations for 
sharing and articulating certain broad substantive principles, but 
with few if any binding commitments to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. The word ‘framework’ in the title is a term of art, 
referring to an international regime established by a freestanding 
‘umbrella’ multilateral convention to which are appended 
substantive protocols.” (Wirth, 2015:4).  
The “artefacts” mentioned in the final agreement included legally non-binding decisions, 
declarations, procedural formats, as well as amendments (Wirth, 2015:5). Article 3 of the 
UNFCCC mentions principles consisting of common but differentiated responsibilities, 
sustainable development, equity as well as precaution which guide the outcomes at the 
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 The UNFCCC endorses an “absolute” target to limit emissions which essentially mandates that emissions 
should be minimised by a certain amount – this however is not legally binding (Centre for Climate and Energy 
Solutions, 2002).  
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negotiations (Wirth, 2015:5). In principal, these are highly abstract concepts whose precise 
meaning is open to negotiation. Nonetheless, these concepts set the bar for what a successful 
outcome should look like and thus, actions that appear to deviate away from these principles 
are quickly labelled as stalling the negotiating process. One such instance is the Convention’s 
goal of stabilising and reducing the emission and concentration of greenhouse gases to “a 
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” 
(Wirth, 2015:5; UNFCCC, 1992; Momtaz, 1996:269). However, countries continue to 
dispute not only what these concepts mean, but also precisely what is meant by “dangerous 
interference”. It is thus often alluded that this objective “should be achieved within a time-
frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food 
production is not threatened, and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable 
manner” (Wirth, 2015:5; UNFCCC, 1992). In summary, the UNFCCC did not contain 
legally-binding targets for greenhouse gas reductions but it did lay down a framework that 
enabled a negotiating process that could establish such targets and it required developed 
countries to set mechanisms to reduce their emissions (Percival, 2014:139).  
The treaty thus puts in place a structure to enhance collaboration amongst countries in an 
initial step towards finding a global solution to climate change, it does not however contain 
“measurable and enforceable objectives and commitments” (Leggett, 2011:2). While the 
Convention recognises the responsibility of all parties, it nonetheless differentiates between 
their responsibilities and stipulates that Annex I countries should be committed to reducing 
their GHG emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000 (Wirth, 2015:5 - 6; UNFCCC, 1992). 
With regard to these stipulations, two major controversies emerged within the negotiations 
(Wirth, 2015:6). Firstly, the insistence on the control of emissions within a procedurally-
orientated instrument was viewed as inappropriate (Wirth, 2015:6). Secondly, the insistence 
on dividing countries into developed and developing nations with divergent responsibilities 
towards the mitigation of GHGs was similarly controversial (Wirth, 2015:6). 
4.8.2 A Description of the United States’ Position in the Early UNFCCC Negotiations 
and its Energy Policy: 1989 – 1992 
The USA’s energy policy has rested on a number of economic assumptions that guided policy 
decisions, and historically the US government had a limited role therein. Although its energy 
policy lacked coherence, nonetheless, the USA was able to attain a competitive advantage 
internationally by having access to a cheap supply of energy in lieu of higher capital and 
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labour costs (Parker et al., 2011:1). Thereby, an international agreement that was to rely on 
enforceable emission targets would be incompatible with an energy policy that had 
historically relied on cheap fossil fuels (Brown, 2002:10742). Should such an agreement be 
binding on the United States it would have had severe impacts on its economy (Brown, 
2002:10742). US leadership was instrumental in designing a treaty that would not undermine 
its relative gains by mandatory restrictions of fossil fuel consumption thereby raising the cost 
of energy, an important factor of its international competitiveness, and thereby power. Its 
position was articulated by President George H.W. Bush who claimed that, “Sometimes 
leadership is not going along with everybody else.” (Bush (a), 1992). This quote in many 
ways captures the essence of the US approach towards global leadership which would be 
reflected by its position in the UNFCCC. 
4.8.3 Structural Influences 
In international negotiations, the relative gains problem is extensively acknowledged as a 
formidable obstruction to cooperation (Snidal, 1991:701). Because of the security 
implications of international anarchy, states have to be concerned with their relative gains 
since this has implications for the goals that individual states wish to attain as well as their 
security (Snidal, 1991:703). By the end of the Cold War, although it was still hegemonic in a 
unipolar distribution of power, the relative decline of the United States, and the ascent of 
competitors in the international system, made the USA more concerned with its relative gains 
(Mastanduno, 1993:252). With the potential implications of the negotiations for its economic 
competitiveness and thereby hegemony and security, the United States displayed a cautious 
position towards global climate change governance (Agrawala and Andresen, 1999:459). 
Although, at the outset of the Bush presidency, a no-regrets policy was endorsed, however by 
the time of the Noordwijk Ministerial Conference in November 1989, a rift became evident 
amongst developed countries, where the USA, alongside Japan and the Soviet Union, 
strongly opposed a European-inspired initiative for the establishment of quantified targets 
and timetables, a position which the USA would continuously endorse by articulating that 
rather than setting binding commitments, countries should rather put forward non-obligatory 
national strategies
100
 to cope with domestic policies related to climate change (Agrawala and 
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through an emphasis on targets and timetables (Bodansky, 2001:29). The USA, USSR and Japan argued that 
such use of timetables and targets was too rigid  and did not reflect individual national circumstances and that 
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Andresen, 1999:460; Bodansky, 2001:28; Bodansky, 2011:700). The rift between the United 
States and other industrialised countries would only deepen with the subsequent Bergen 
Conference in 1990 and the Second World Climate Conference (SWCC) wherein the United 
States obstructed the adoption of targets and timetables and continued to promote the use of 
national strategies (Bodansky, 2001:29). At the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee 
(INC) negotiations that took place in Chantilly, USA in February 1991, the USA would not 
accept a quantified target over concerns over the economic costs associated with such an 
approach and the associated implications for its hegemonic position in an anarchic system, 
much to the chagrin of Japan and European countries (Paterson, 1996:61).  
An agreement that would be based on quantitative targets and timetables would disadvantage 
the USA internationally and provide its competitors with relative gains in an anarchic 
international system where states have to rely on self-help in order to survive. Such an 
agreement would have undermined the US hierarchic position and security in the 
international distribution of power.  By emphasising the use of nationally determined and 
voluntary actions, the USA, through its position as a global hegemon, would have the means 
to pursue policies that would enhance its strategic latent power internationally and maintain 
its competitive advantage vis-à-vis its rivals, and thereby maintain its hegemony. Such 
emphasis on nationally determined and voluntary actions were endorsed since climate change 
mitigation would need to be integrated into US energy policy (Department of Energy, 
1994:73). This was particularly challenging as in 1990, the United States’ GHG emissions 
were 1618 metric tons carbon equivalent of which 83% emerged from the combustion of 
energy fuels (EIA, 1998:xii). Taking a cautious approach, initially, the Bush administration 
emphasised research for the phenomenon (Department of Energy, 1994:73). Even though the 
potential hazards of climate change were considered and preliminary action as part of federal 
activities was started, the Bush administration, much like its predecessor, cautioned against 
taking drastic action until there was more scientific evidence regarding the relationship 
between global warming and greenhouse gases (Department of Energy, 1994:73). The Bush 
administration argued that predictions of catastrophic climate change were drawn from 
limited data and did not warrant drastic policy action, particularly as a binding protocol 
would have major consequences for US energy policy which could lead to US hierarchic 
decline with consequences for US power and security in the international distribution of 
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well as the promotion of scientific research (Bodansky, 2001:29). 
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power and its hegemonic position therein (Lantis, 2005:399). Instead, emphasis was placed 
on least-cost policy measures that were implemented on a voluntary basis, and could be 
pursued for additional benefits, such as energy efficiency and pollution reduction, with the 
mitigation of climate change been a bonus thereof and with the competitiveness of the USA 
relative to its rivals not being undermined (Parker and Blodgett, 2008:7 – 9). Such activities 
could allow the United States to mitigate climate change without incurring serious harm to its 
economy, nor drastically altering its energy policy that was based on fossil fuels and least-
cost policy options, and thereby maintain its hegemony and not giving its rivals a competitive 
advantage. 
The goals of energy policy and climate change policy became increasingly incongruous as 
the tenure of the Bush administration progressed in spite of evidence that indicated that 
climate change mitigation could be achieved at little cost (Parker and Blodgett, 2008:1). 
While a number of important environmental acts
101
 were endorsed during the first two years 
of the Bush administration in such key issues as reforestation, the advancement on the 
restrictions of gas and oil exploration off the US coast, the phase out of chlorofluorocarbons, 
and advancement of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 yet, by the early 1990s, the 
Bush administration halted many of the earlier international environmental policies that they 
advocated, a trend which was evident in their position at the climate change negotiations as 
well as the Bush administration’s decision to not sign the Convention on Biological Diversity 
at the Rio Earth Conference (Hahn, 1994:336; Thompson, 2005:308; Agrawala and 
Andresen, 1999:460). While Japan and European countries threatened to go ahead with the 
negotiations without US participation, in the end they managed to reach a consensus that 
allowed the treaty to mention dates while remaining ambiguous to not withstand claims of it 
being a binding commitment (Paterson, 1996:61). Because of its hegemonic position in the 
international distribution of power, the USA was able to secure its main goals within the 
UNFCCC, in spite of the opposition of other countries (Parker et al., 2011:3). 
Because of its hierarchic position in the international system being that of a hegemon, the 
United States played an instrumental role in the design of the architecture
102
 of the UNFCCC 
and became a party to and adopted it in 1992 while the Senate ratified the Convention in 
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 George Bush Senior ran his 1988 presidential campaign to be the ‘environmental President” (Bush (a), 
1992). 
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 A number of US proposals made it into the final text such as the centrality of free markets and economic 
instruments that were included in the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 (Bush (a), 1992).  
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October 1992 (Wirth, 2015:4; Percival, 2014:139; Selin and VanDeveer, 2011:121; Agrawala 
and Andresen, 1999:460). Nonetheless, within the Rio negotiations, the United States was 
criticised for its position and found itself isolated by developed and developing
103
 nations 
(Bush (a), 1992). However, the USA was adamant that it was to assume a leadership role
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in the negotiations, “In terms of Rio, as I said yesterday, we are the leaders; we’re not the 
followers. And the fact that we don’t go along with every single covenant, I don’t think that 
means a relinquishment of leadership. I think we are, and I think the record shows we are, the 
leading environmental nation in the world. So I would just reject the premise or say, no, this 
doesn’t concern me.” (Bush (a), 1992). The USA therefore used its hegemony within the 
negotiations to reach an agreement that was not detrimental to its position in the distribution 
of power in the international system, nor give its competitors a relative advantage vis-à-vis 
itself. This re-iterates Grunding’s (2006:798) study which indicated that there is less 
cooperation in the UNFCCC negotiations because of the consequences thereof for relative 
gains because the economic impact would have implications for the USA’s security.  
This is not surprising as at the structural level, with the Soviet Union no longer posing as a 
military threat, the focus became concentrated on a country’s ability to compete 
economically, and thus due to the minimisation of military threats, policy-makers will focus 
increasingly on their states’ economic and technological competence relative to other nations  
(Waltz, 1993:59 - 60). Such motivations are compelled as states are more concerned about 
relative gains in an anarchic and competitive system (Waltz, 1993:60). This would be 
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countries of not only aspirational declarations but also legal obligations” (Hurrell and Sengupta, 2012:467). 
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apparent in the United States’ position in the UNFCCC under the Bush administration and 
their ability to cooperate therein. 
While the USA was still hegemonic, the relative decline of the United States, alongside the 
rise of competitors in the international system, made the USA more worried about its relative 
gains as economic competition became more pronounced with the demise of the military 
threat posed by the Soviet Union. In order to maintain the competitiveness of the US 
economy, the use of non-obligatory national strategies instead of binding commitments were 
emphasised as these did not undermine the goals that historically characterised US energy 
policy nor increased the cost of energy to the US economy through mitigation action, 
especially in the context of the scientific uncertainty surrounding the issue at the time that the 
Bush administration alluded to; whereas the use of binding commitments, especially when 
developing countries were precluded from having such commitments, would have reduced 
the competitiveness of US industries vis-à-vis these developing countries (Parker et al., 
2011:1, 3; Royden, 2002:419; Anderson, 1998:5; Senate Report 105-54 Appendix, 1997:10 - 
11). As such, the USA could rely on its hegemonic position to oppose an agreement that 
would be based on quantitative targets and timetables which was perceived to weaken the 
USA internationally and provide its competitors with relative gains thereby undermining both 
US power and security.  
The risk posed by the relative gains that would be gained by countries that do not have 
similar policies aimed at reducing GHG emissions, and that do not have legally binding 
mitigation targets, and the implications thereof for US competitiveness, has been central to 
the US debate on enacting policies related to climate change mitigation from the outset of the 
negotiations (Senate Report 105-54 Appendix, 1997:10; Leggett, 2011:1; Hovi, Sprintz and 
Bang, 2010:130), especially as “in a global context where currently some countries have 
legally binding policies to reduce greenhouse gas emission and other countries do not - i.e., 
differentiated global carbon policies - the potential exists that countries imposing carbon 
control policies will find themselves at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis countries without 
comparable policies. The risks accompanying establishment of carbon control policies, in the 
absence of similar policies among competing nations, have been central to debates on 
whether the United States should enact greenhouse gas legislation (Leggett, 2011:1). 
Specifically, concerns have been raised that if the United States adopts a carbon control 
policy, industries that must control their emissions or that find their feedstock or energy bills 
rising because of costs passed-through by suppliers may be less competitive and may lose 
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global market share (and jobs) to competitors in countries lacking comparable carbon 
policies.” (Parker and Blodgett, 2008; Arnold, 2013:1). Through its hegemonic position the 
USA was able to support least-cost policy measures that were implemented on a voluntary 
basis thereby maintaining its power in the anarchic international system – a system which 
was characterised by the continuous competition between states for power and survival. 
4.8.4 Domestic Influences 
System-level incentives need to be interpreted through unit-level variables in order to make 
sense of foreign policy outcomes. Incidentally, the USA’s ability to cooperate in and ratify 
the UNFCCC emerged from a bargaining process between the executive and legislative 
branches within the US federal system (Ikenberry et al., 1988:6). Thereby, the Congressional 
input into the policy-making process forms an important internal constraint on the ability of 
the executive administration to respond to structural incentives and attain their goals 
(Mastanduno et al., 1989:458 – 459).  From the outset, the Senate gave its consent to the 
Convention’s ratification and supported the Bush administration’s endorsement of the 
UNFCCC due to the particular structure of the agreement at the time (Wirth, 2015:7). The 
United States was thus one of the earliest ratifiers of the UNFCCC in 1992 when it entered 
into force (Wirth, 2015:7). During the negotiations, the Republican Bush administration was 
against a binding convention to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Lantis, 2005:399). The US 
Senate was particularly adamant that a climate change treaty would have negative 
consequences for the US economy and negatively affect economic sectors such as the energy 
sector, agriculture and manufacturing, setting the stage for subsequent senatorial opposition 
(Lantis, 2005:400). The obligation placed on developed countries to cover the costs related to 
mitigation in developing countries in various proposals was a particularly contentious issue 
(Lantis, 2005:399). At the unit-level, due to the structure of the US political system, taking 
drastic policy action to solve a potentially non-existent problem through the adoption of a 
binding agreement by Parties would have had serious consequences for US energy policy and 
as a result the Bush administration was pressed by various domestic coalitions from 
petroleum companies and utilities and Congressional dissent to either block, or dilute, an 
international agreement that could have such wide-ranging consequences for US energy 
policy (Lantis, 2005:399). Per consequence, the Bush administration would not support an 
agreement that would have drastic measures to mitigate carbon dioxide thereby weakening 




In relation to US energy policy, there are a number of ways to understand this outcome at the 
unit-level. Initially, in an influential study carried out by the National Academy of Sciences 
(NAS), titled Policy Implications of Greenhouse Warming, indicated that climate change 
could be reduced by least-cost measures (Parker and Blodgett, 2008:1). Since the cost of 
energy was an important consideration in the policy design process, in spite of estimates that 
US GHG emissions could be reduced at low cost, concerns for the competitiveness and 
strength of the US economy, compelled Congress to oppose any form of binding targets. The 
Bush administration’s inability to design effective mitigation measures can also be 
understood from the incoherent structure of US energy policy. The EPACT of 1992 was 
designed in reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, thereby placing emphasis on energy 
security, and as a secondary response to the UNFCCC. At the time there was an incongruence 
between policy goals leading to trade-offs. Since the necessity of Congressional input was 
necessary due to the federal structure of the US system, this policy had to rely on a least-cost 
strategy to minimise US emissions, the Bush administration had to endorse voluntary actions 
so that it could pursue its objectives without Congressional input (Parker and Blodgett, 
2008:3). Thus, the policy endorsed least-cost options which principally consisted of fossil 
fuels, petroleum in particular, and by the same logic minimised the emphasis on renewable 
energy. While a least-cost strategy was endorsed, the Bush administration was urged by 
Congress to water-down the agreement to ascertain that it would not have negative 
consequences for the US economy and the competitiveness of its industries. Thus, although 
policy-makers within the Bush administration had the perception that economic growth and 
environmental protection were compatible to an extent, due to the particular implications of 
mitigation for the cost of US energy at the time, these consequences for the cost of energy 
and by extent the US economy would undermine these early attempts by the USA to support 
the UNFCCC and accept its obligations. Instead, research and a least-cost energy policy were 
endorsed in the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to reduce US emissions (Parker et al., 2011:1, 4). 
Subsequently, President Bush expressed during ratification hearings that should there be an 
amendment or protocol to the UNFCCC which would stipulate binding GHG emission targets 
these would be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent (Barbour, 2010). Thereby, 
in spite of the ratification of the UNFCCC by the Senate, the USA remained the only 
industrialised nation not to offer quantified targets for the mitigation of its GHGs in the 1992 
UNFCCC treaty consistent with its hegemonic position which allowed it more latitude to 
enforce a position that would not undermine its relative gains nor hierarchic position. Within 
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the structure of the USA’s domestic system Congressional fear that environmental regulation, 
and climate change mitigation in particular, would have negative consequences for the US 
economy and its international competitiveness, limited the ability of the executive to 
cooperate and ratify a particular kind of agreement (Depledge, 2005:14). Instead, the USA 
adopted a “non‐binding target of containing emission levels at 1990 rates by the year 2000” 
under the UNFCCC (Senate Report 105‐54, 1997:1). Nevertheless, by ratifying the 
Convention, the United States accepted certain obligations to meet the goal of mitigating 
global climate change (Leggett, 2011: 2). 
4.9 Linking the USA’s Energy Policy and Position within the UNFCCC 
Mastanduno et al., (1989:459) indicate that “...international anarchy and the pursuit of power 
are central to understanding both domestic and international politics.” During the Republican 
Bush administration, (1989 – 1993) three important events occurred which would impact its 
domestic and foreign policies, the end of the Cold War, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the 
establishment of the UNFCCC whose objective is the “… stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system.” (UNFCCC, 1992:4). Importantly, the international 
system changed from a bipolar to a unipolar
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 distribution of power during the George H.W. 
Bush administration. As the sole superpower in a unipolar system after the end of the Cold 
War, the preponderance of the Eisenhower, Truman, and Carter Doctrines would allow the 
Bush administration to lead a multilateral coalition, which included the Soviet Union, to 
restore access to Middle Eastern petroleum after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Although the 
USA was a hegemonic power in a unipolar system, the emergence of new transnational 
problems after the Cold War required more complex solutions
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 and trade-offs which could 
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 The reader should be aware of the debate amongst scholars as to whether the international system changed to 
a unipolar or a multipolar system after the end of the Cold War (Gaiser and Kovacˇ, 2012:49 – 53). This thesis 
however adopts the view that the international system changed to a unipolar system after the end of the Cold 
War (see Brooks and Wohlforth, 2015/16). 
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 It is ironic that while there has been growth in the policy instruments and databases available to policy-
makers that assist in streamlining the decision-making process, climate change presents a super wicked problem 
that poses unique challenges to policy-makers whose moral, political, ecological and economic consequences 
present trade-offs which evade simplistic solutions and processes in spite of the corresponding growth in 
knowledge (Rabe, 2010: 3 – 4; OECD, 2017: 10; Lazarus, 2009). As such, the contradictions and uncertainties 
surrounding policy goals and instruments that policy-makers are required to make sense of can be assisted only 
to a degree by cost-benefit analysis and other policy analysis tools (Bollen et al, 2009:6). 
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not be solved by military means. Even though it was non-mandatory, the UNFCCC did 
emerge as an important driver for US energy policy as US policy-makers began grappling 
with the potential implications and synthesis between these divergent policy areas and related 
goals in the post-Cold War context. Yet, energy security continued to be emphasised in spite 
of Soviet decline and the successful operation against Iraq because of its centrality for the US 
economy, the basis for its power and security, in an anarchic international system and its 
hegemonic position therein. Policy-makers within this administration were broadly 
supportive of the assumptions that guided US energy policy for over a century by 
emphasising a restricted role for federal government and market operations. Concern for the 
US hierarchic position in the international system continued the concern with energy security 
and international competitiveness, and thereby not raising the costs of energy in the USA as 
this would undermine its hegemonic position. Petroleum continued to be of significance for 
US energy policy and its role within the international system which were vital aspects of its 
hegemonic position and role. These formed important domestic and international constraints 
towards the USA’s ability to cooperate in the UNFCCC and design an energy policy that was 
simultaneously compatible with the goal of the UNFCCC and its international and domestic 
objectives.  
At the structural level, the change from a bipolar to a unipolar distribution of power altered 
the ways in which states provided for their security.  US energy policy, which was principally 
designed in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and as a secondary response to the 
UNFCCC, would reflect this alteration as there was a minimisation of military activities 
while providing greater allowance for environmental regulation. However, US energy policy 
still reflected the tension between environmental regulation and economic growth as the USA 
responded to the necessity of enhancing its security through self-help as well as the need to 
maintain its hegemonic position in the international distribution of power. With the demise of 
the bipolar order and its military competition, economic competition became an essential 
component of interstate competition within the unipolar distribution of power. However, US 
dependence on foreign petroleum continued to increase, which would have implications for 
US energy security and power in the international distribution of power, especially in the 
aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait which had consequences for the price of energy. 
Within this new context, to meet its objectives, the Bush administration supported a reliance 
on market mechanisms for the effective allocation of resources to enhance economic growth, 
and developed the National Energy Strategy of 1991 to ensure US energy security in the 
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midst of the USA’s dependence on petroleum imports and the potential consequences for the 
US economy within the anarchic international system (Joskow, 2001:8). This dual approach 
must be understood within the historical development of the USA’s energy policy which had 
a reliance on the free market (Boskin, 1993:27) while at the same time adhering to the 
necessity of enhancing the USA’s economic growth and strength which were crucial aspects 
of the USA’s security and hegemonic position within an international context where 
economic competition had become prime. However, increased environmental awareness 
restricted certain policy options and had to be carefully assessed against increasing costs to 
US energy so as not to undermine US competitiveness relative to its rivals, and thereby its 
hegemonic position. 
At the unit-level, US energy policy reflected the bargaining process between the executive 
and Congress with significant alterations been evident between the Energy Strategy of 1991 
and the final Energy Policy Act of 1992, with the latter energy policy, written in a time of 
crisis, being based on political compromise due to the incursion of vested interests; and due 
to the necessity of Congressional input a number of environmental and energy issues were 
left out of the subsequent energy policy that was developed (Rossi, 1995:196 – 197). The 
result of this bargaining process was that the Energy Policy Act of 1992 would also be 
characterised by incoherence since policy-makers were unable to reach consensus on a 
number of policy issues (Rossi, 1995:197). Moreover, any policy measures that were 
considered to increase the price of energy were rejected which contributed to the incoherence 
of the policy. Thereby, Congressional input limited the Bush administration’s ability to 
pursue a comprehensive policy. While the perception of policy-makers within the Bush 
administration emphasised the compatibility between the policy goals of energy security, low 
cost energy and environmental regulation, these were pursued through a limited role for 
government and free market operations and competition, unlike the energy policies of the 
1970s. Although the Bush administration was less ideologically predisposed in comparison to 
the Reagan administration and attempted to synthesise economic growth with environmental 
protection since policy-makers within this administration had the perception that these two 
goals could be compatible, environmental regulation was endorsed to the extent that it did not 
raises the costs of US energy. At the federal level, the division between the Bush 
administration and Congress related to the design of US energy policy and the potential costs 
thereof led to inconsistencies in US energy policy with the incomprehensive policy design 
having implications for its position in the UNFCCC. 
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From a structural perspective, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United 
States occupied the position of a global hegemon in a unipolar international system (Falkner, 
2005:585). The USA’s position in the negotiations that led up to and established the 
UNFCCC under the Republican Bush administration during the 1989 to 1993 period reflected 
both executive and Congressional concerns surrounding cheating and the relative gains that 
would be gained by US competitors in the international system. With the decline of the 
bipolar order dominated by a forty year concern over security competition with the Soviet 
Union, there were increased concerns about the USA’s ability to compete economically in the 
international system in relation to Europe, Japan and increasingly, emerging economies, as 
these were the main rivals to its hegemonic position, and thereby power and security. 
Because of the security implications of the anarchic structure of the international system, 
states have to be aware of relative gains because of the consequences thereof for the pursuit 
of their goals and security. The administration’s reluctance to adopt mandatory actions to 
reduce the USA’s emissions reflected its concerns over the costs of such measures to the US 
economy in relation to these countries. Even though certain studies indicated that the costs of 
mitigation could potentially be low, the agreement would still need to be watered-down in 
order for it to be accepted in the US federal political context. Hence, while the USA 
emphasised its leadership within the UNFCCC and relied on its hegemonic position for the 
UNFCCC’s design, such a design would reflect the need to maintain US power and security 
in the international system while minimising relative gains for its competitors.  
Since US energy policy had been based on low energy costs and the minimisation of 
environmental standards which gave the USA a competitive advantage in the international 
system, policy-makers were reluctant to re-design an energy policy that was seen as integral 
to US power and security in the international system. This must be understood within the 
context of the USA’s hegemonic position and its relative decline in the midst of the ascent of 
competitors in the international system which would compel the USA to have a cautious 
approach towards the UNFCCC and emphasising that non-obligatory national strategies 
rather than legally-binding commitments be endorsed therein since there were fears that US 
industries would be disadvantaged by the adoption of legally-binding mitigation targets, 
especially if developing countries did not have similar obligations (Senate Report 105-54 
Appendix, 1997:10 - 11).  With the demise of the Soviet Union, economic competition 
between states would be emphasised, policy-makers had to focus predominantly on economic 
growth in relation to other countries. Therewith, the USA would not accept legally-binding 
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quantified targets because of the economic costs associated therewith, while developing 
countries were exempt from these targets, which would have disadvantaged the USA in the 
anarchic international system while providing its competitors with relative gains (Senate 
Report 105-54 Appendix, 1997:10 - 11). The resultant UNFCCC agreement was supported by 
the Bush administration and Congress since: 
“First, the ratification of the UNFCCC was based at least partially on 
the premise that significant reductions could be achieved at little or 
no cost. This assumption helped to reduce concern some had that the 
treaty could have deleterious effects on U.S. competitiveness. 
Further ameliorating this concern, compliance with the treaty was 
voluntary. But the assumption has never lacked critics; and their 
views - and to some extent, experience based on alternative energy 
costs - have rendered the “low cost” assumption tenuous in the eyes 
of many.” (Parker et al., 2011).  
With the demise of the bipolar distribution of power and its military competition, the 
perception of policy-makers within the Bush administration would enable greater support for 
environmental regulation, in the midst of the continuing emphasis on the goals of energy 
security and low cost energy, however this environmental regulation would be promoted only 
to an extent. In this particular historical context, the Bush administration is an interesting 
example since as a Republican administration, it was more supportive of environmental 
regulation unlike its predecessor, yet the emphasis on low cost energy impeded this policy 
goal in particular in regards to the UNFCCC.  
Moreover, at the federal level, due to Congressional input, US energy policy had to be altered 
leading to policy incoherence since it excluded two measures that were necessary for the 
reduction of petroleum imports, these being greater auto efficiency standards and enhanced 
petroleum exploration in Alaska (Miller 1995). Therefore, the two levels of analysis 
interacted in a complex manner during this era. On the one hand, the change to a unipolar 
distribution of power led to less emphasis on military activities, thus allowing the Bush 
administration to support environmental regulation by prioritising it as a policy goal 
(Department of Energy, 1994:66), yet, on the other hand economic competition would be 
more prominent within this new distribution of power. At the unit level, federal level politics 
impeded the design of a coherent energy policy capable of placing emphasis on 
environmental regulation. Since energy policy creates an enabling environment, the costs that 
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would be distributed to consumers and industries was the main concern. In this regard, since 
the UNFCCC would raise the costs of US energy it would structurally disadvantage the 
USA’s hegemonic position. At the time, the EPACT of 1992 could consist of a number of 
policy goals, a “no regrets policy” that could meet the objective of the UNFCCC at little cost 
to the USA. Nonetheless, in this era, there began to emerge disagreement over policy goals 
and the resulting costs to US industries and its economy. Fundamentally, no real alterations 
were developed and US energy policy largely reflected the framework developed by the 
Reagan and pre-1973 administrations. 
Thereby, within the federal structure of the US political system, under pressure from 
Congress, the Bush administration watered-down the design of the UNFCCC due to the 
unacceptable costs it would distribute both within the USA’s domestic context but also 
internationally. Since the USA was the world’s most powerful state it could achieve this 
because of its relative power position and thus design the UNFCCC on the basis of its 
national interests.  Such measures were meant to enhance US power and security, while 
giving it a relative advantage and minimising the propensity to cheat by other countries.  
At the federal level, Congress stipulated that no international agreement should increase the 
cost of energy to US consumers and industries. In the US domestic context, the USA’s ability 
to ratify the UNFCCC was based on a bargaining process between the executive and 
Congress. Congressional input thus formed an important internal constraint on the USA’s 
ability to cooperate in the UNFCCC. The federal structure of the US political system, along 
with Congressional concern over the costs that could be incurred to US energy prices, 
facilitated Congressional ability to limit US cooperation in an agreement that could 
significantly re-design US energy policy. Therefore, at the federal level, the broad contours of 
energy policy were developed alongside the development of an agreement based on voluntary 
measures which would not undermine the competitiveness of US industries (Parker et al., 
2011:3). This can be further linked to the distribution of power in the international system as 
this was ultimately instrumental in limiting US cooperation in the UNFCCC due to the threats 
that the outcome could pose to the US hegemonic position therein by increasing the costs of 
US energy, thereby undermining the USA relative to its competitors. Per consequence, no 
agreement could be enacted that significantly re-designed US energy policy and raised the 
costs to US consumers and industries, which are instrumental for US economic strength and 
thereby hegemony.  
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The UNFCCC and US energy policy during the Bush administration reflected an interesting 
interaction between the structural- and unit-levels. The costs related to US energy were 
important considerations at both the unit- and structural-levels since this was imperative for 
the competitiveness of US industries internationally. Any enhancement of energy costs would 
have serious implications for the USA’s hegemonic position and security within the 
distribution of power. Thus, maintaining the USA’s hegemonic position relative to its rivals 
was essential, while not providing its competitors with relative gains which influenced the 
debate surrounding US energy policy and its position in the UNFCCC. However, at the 
federal level the interplay between the executive and Congress towards US energy policy 
resulted in an incoherent approach towards the design of US energy policy in an attempt to 
maintain these low costs and minimised support for the UNFCCC and environmental 
regulation. While the Bush administration may have been less ideologically driven in 
comparison to its predecessor, it could only support environmental regulation in US energy 
policy and the UNFCCC to the extent that costs to US energy did not increase. The federal 
structure of the US political system influenced its cooperation in the UNFCCC at the unit-
level since the resultant treaty could be accepted in the US domestic setting under the 
conditions that the treaty would not increase US energy costs and that the treaty was 
voluntary and legally non-binding (Parker et al., 2011). Nevertheless, there was a continued 
criticism that costs to US energy could increase under the treaty, a theme that would be 
evident for subsequent administrations (Parker et al., 2011). 
4.10 Conclusion   
This chapter has discussed the development of US energy policy and the role the USA played 
in the establishment of the UNFCCC at the 1992 Rio Earth Conference under the Bush 
administration. Crucially, the development of US energy policy cannot be understood in 
isolation from its hegemonic position in the anarchic international system and the influence 
of the policies of previous administrations that incurred a range of conflicting objectives that 
would need to be resolved. It has shown how in spite of claims that the USA could achieve 
low-cost mitigation targets, integrating mitigation measures into US energy policy was a 
controversial option receiving opposition from Congress at the unit-level. The Bush 
administration thus had to rely on low-cost and voluntary actions where climate change 
mitigation could be achieved as a by-product of achieving other policy goals in order to by-
pass Senatorial opposition while maintaining the USA’s hegemonic position and not giving 
other states’ relative gains. Per consequence, attempts to integrate US energy and climate 
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change policies became an incoherent approach. Since the late 1980s, climate change and the 
UNFCCC would emerge as a new set of challenges that would have to be reconciled with 
conflicting policy objectives such as energy security and economic growth within the USA’s 
energy policy. With the structural decline of the Soviet Union changing the international 
system from a bipolar to a unipolar system, traditional security concerns would give centre 
stage to economic concerns in order to maintain the USA’s hegemonic position as it 
competed with its rivals in the anarchic international system.  Within the US domestic 
configuration, Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution leads to a power play 
between Congress and the executive. With multiple actors and agencies involved at multiple 
levels, it is the constitutional separation of powers between these branches of government that 
have had a prominent influence on what can be pragmatically achieved. The historical record 
indicates that US hegemony was essential in the creation of the UNFCCC, and likewise the 
USA used its hegemony to undermine the UNFCCC when it did not suit its national interests. 
However, with the introduction of a new administration, a more ambitious approach towards 
climate change was pursued but more opposition was also incurred. Designing a policy that 
could respond to conflicting pressures and consisted of conflicting objectives at both the 









The Clinton Administration 1993 – 2001:  
The Achilles Heel of the Economy 
5.1 Introduction 
The Clinton administration was marked by its attempt to link energy, climate change and 
economic issues within its energy policy. Therewith, the energy policy that this 
administration attempted to introduce was meant to merge a number of goals that historically 
were perceived to be in conflict with one another, namely economic growth and 
environmental protection. Hence, this administration introduced the Climate Change Action 
Plan (CCAP) in 1993, and a British Thermal Unit (BTU) tax on the heat content of the fuel to 
meet the goal of economic growth, but also to meet the objective of reducing US emissions 
by the year 2000 at 1990 levels. Although philosophically, the Clinton administration did not 
distinguish itself tremendously from the previous Bush administration, it was the emphasis on 
reconciling economic growth with environmental protection, while cooperating within the 
UNFCCC and its allies, that set it apart. 
Such attempts would soon be quenched when Congressional opposition would limit the 
Clinton administration’s ability to reach their goals. The exuberant effect produced by the end 
of the Cold War soon subsided with the emergence of a set of multi-faceted issues in an era 
when economic competition would become integral for power and security in the 
international system. Nonetheless, the Clinton administration pursued a set of quantified, 
legally-binding mitigation targets in the UNFCCC. It was thus an integral player in the 
negotiations that led to the establishment of the Kyoto Protocol. However, the passing of the 
Byrd-Hagel Resolution in 1997 effectively limited this administration’s ability to cooperate 
in the UNFCCC. Congressional reasons for the opposition to the Kyoto Protocol was its 
exemption of developing countries from accepting mandatory mitigation targets, and the 
harm that such an agreement would inflict on the US economy. The concerns about the costs 
to US energy policy influenced the US position towards policy goals, and ultimately, 
cooperation within the UNFCCC.  
This chapter outlines the development of US energy policy under the Clinton administration, 
followed by a discussion of how this development would interact with executive and 
Congressional politics towards the UNFCCC and cooperation therein. Specific attention will 
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be paid to the negotiations that led to the establishment of the Kyoto Protocol, and domestic 
and international constraints that resulted in the eventual inability of the Clinton 
administration to cooperate therein.  
5.2 The Clinton Administration’s Energy Policy  
The Democratic Clinton administration (1993 – 2001) would attempt to distinguish itself 
from the previous Bush administration in regards to both its foreign and energy policy. It 
focused on multilateralism to achieve its international goals and adopted a hard law approach 
towards the climate change regime, while it attempted to link energy policy to other policy 
issues in order to strengthen the US economy – the engine of US power in the international 
system. Since great power status depends on economic capability, states need to consider 
which policy options will help them design a policy that can meet such a goal and how to 
manage the trade-offs and contradictions involved in such a design (Waltz, 1993:50). In an 
interstate system, economic competition can be just as intense as military competition (Waltz, 
1993:59). With altering circumstances, policy-makers have to reconsider their options for 
self-help and there is no one formula regarding the composition of this self-help, nor how to 
attain power and security (Waltz, 1993:63). The end of the bipolar order served to introduce 
important new alterations in the international distribution of power. The accelerated 
economic growth of China and India, as well as other developing countries, increased their 
political influence. Structurally, these countries began to emerge as important players vis-à-
vis the USA and placed pressure on the USA’s role in the international system. To deal with 
the new trends in both international and energy systems, the Clinton administration relied on 
The Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP) released in 1993, and a new policy tool, a BTU tax 
on the heat content of the fuel. 
By the 1990s, many of the policies that were enacted in the 1970s and early 1980s began to 
reap dividends and the 1990s were thus a period of limited policy activities (Joskow, 2001:3; 
Minsk, 2017:4). This era was characterised by stable energy markets with stable and 
decreasing energy prices, as well as abundant supplies (Joskow, 2001:1; Minsk, 2017:4). Per 
consequence, there was little investment in new production sites and energy infrastructure 
(Westphal, 2006). In spite of market stability, at this point, the USA’s energy dependence 
was higher compared to 1974 (Department of Energy, 1994:79; Miller, 1995). Despite the 
relative stability, a number of important transformations began to occur in energy systems 
which were to have important implications for later administrations and their energy policies.  
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Concern over the adverse effects of climate change increased in the early 1990s which 
required international coordination to mitigate it. The reports released by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) since 1990 provided strong evidence for 
the phenomenon of global climate change which was linked to human induced activities of 
which energy is one of the most prominent (Kanellakis et al. 2013:1020). Climate change 
was thus seen as a constraining factor on energy use. Increasingly, the UNFCCC negotiations 
had to be considered when designing energy policies because of the implications that energy 
production and use had for the mitigation of climate change. 
The oil crisis of the 1970s occurred in conjunction with increasing concern over 
environmental problems which led to the promotion of renewable energy to address these 
challenges (Yergin, 2012:13). Although there was much support for these technologies 
during the 1970s, during the 1980s, the decreasing price of petroleum and challenges related 
to the economic deployment of renewables decreased their political and economic support 
(Yergin, 2012:13). With stable energy prices and secure supplies in the 1990s, renewable 
energy technologies were further marginalised (Yergin, 2012:13). These trends in both 
international and energy systems created the context in which the Clinton administration 
found itself, and would impact the administration’s choice of policy goals and instruments. 
While this administration reacted to the perceived incentives of the international system, and 
attempted to implement a novel approach to energy, climate change and economic issues, 
Congressional politics would undermine these policy attempts, resulting in an incoherent 
policy approach. 
5.2.1 Structural Influences 
The policy goals of the Clinton administration can be traced to the exuberance of the end of 
the Cold War, wherein the United States was the sole superpower in a unipolar system, and 
“economically, the United States is the world’s most important country, militarily it is the 
decisive one.” (Waltz, 2000:53). Such conditions were further augmented as the USA 
experienced enhanced economic well-being and security in the aftermath of the Cold War 
(White House, s.a.; Waltz, 2000; Waltz, 1999:699). Unlike the previous Reagan and Bush 
administrations, the Clinton administration was characterised by a different approach towards 
energy policy and environmental regulation therein. Policy-makers within this administration 
would attempt to advance policy goals and instruments within its energy policy based on the 
assumption that these could achieve the goals of economic growth, environmental protection 
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and energy independence simultaneously and at a reduced cost of such abatement actions. 
Nonetheless, because of the effects of anarchy, decision-makers must continuously be 
concerned with their state’s security in a self-help system, and thereby energy would become 
a crucial aspect of economic policy under the Clinton administration since energy is a 
security issue in an anarchic international system (Williamson, 1994:115). Moreover, since 
inexpensive energy was a core component of US competitiveness and the augmentation of its 
hegemony in the distribution of power, emphasis had to be placed on the link between US 
energy policy and its economic well-being, especially in relation to its competitors. Per 
consequence, the Clinton administration attempted to link energy policy to other issues which 
included economic growth and the environment (Miller, 1995:721, 722; Williamson, 
1994:115). Under these circumstances, President Clinton, in the first press conference that he 
held after been elected president, asserted that energy would play an instrumental role in 
stimulating the economy and job creation (Department of Energy, 1994:77; Williamson, 
1994:115). With the demise of the Cold War and its bipolar structure, economic competition, 
rather than military competition, would become a pivotal strategy for US security and power 
for the enhancement of its hegemony even though the international system was unipolar. 
Thereby, under the Clinton administration, the economy was a top policy priority and energy 
was viewed as a vital input therein to enhance its hegemonic position within the distribution 
of power in relation to its competitors (Department of Energy, 1994:77; Williamson, 
1994:115). To enhance its hegemonic position, the country’s energy policy was therefore 
required to attain three objectives: strategic security, economic vitality and environmental 
quality (Department of Energy, 1994:77; Joskow, 2003:52). The Clinton administration was 
compelled to pursue these policy goals within its energy policy of linking economic 
competitiveness and environmental protection as German and Japanese manufacturers had 
greater energy efficiency which allowed them to have lower production costs thus giving 
them an advantage within the distribution of power over the United States of America and 
thereby threatening its hegemonic position (Schneider, 1992).   
In this regard, the United States’ energy dependence and its trade deficit caused by payments 
towards energy imports as well as the role that its energy policy played in deteriorating this 
situation, and thereby its position in relation to its competitors, was a concern for the Clinton 
administration since it undermined its power and security and caused it to be dependent on 
states’ that were hostile to its interests (Department of Energy, 1994:78; Schneider, 1992; 
Joskow, 2002:521). To improve this situation, the Clinton administration emphasised energy 
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efficiency, increased production and consumption of natural gas, the development of 
alternative energy sources, and “making good energy policy and good environmental policy 
good economic policy for America” (Department of Energy, 1994:78; Miller, 1995; Joskow, 
2002:521). As such, it was emphasised that economic recovery, environmental protection and 
job creation depended on the type of energy policy that was to be designed (Department of 
Energy, 1994:79; Schneider, 1992; Miller, 1995). Since power and wealth are inextricable, 
they were necessary for the survival of the USA in the anarchic international system and the 
enhancement of its hegemonic position in relation to its rivals (Mastanduno et al., 1989:462), 
and the Clinton administration had to try to find ways to merge economic and environmental 
goals in US energy policy under new circumstances, two goals that were historically 
perceived to be in conflict with one another. As part of this administration’s economic 
recovery plan, energy would be central for the economic stimulus package, deficit reduction 
programme, and long-term investment projects (Department of Energy, 1994:80; Graetz, 
1993:567-568). However, since energy industries and the fossil fuels they supply were 
viewed as the long-term foundation of US power and economic prosperity and thereby 
maintained the USA’s hegemonic position, any attempts to  steer away from these would be 
undermined since “Power, as Realists remind us, is a currency with which to purchase 
security and other valued political goods. Wealth…is a necessary means to power and the 
two are in long-term harmony.” (Mastanduno et al., 1989:462). Thus, while the United States 
maintained its hegemonic position in the international system, the Clinton administration was 
concerned with the promotion of an energy policy that could be congruent with both 
economic and environmental goals in order to gain a competitive advantage in relation to its 
competitors thereby enhancing US power and security and not succumb to further hierarchic 
decline due to the increased costs of US energy. This led to this administration attempting to 
achieve congruence between economic growth and environmental protection within its 
energy policy so as to enhance US hegemony as well as security by enhancing its economic 
strength since the enhancement of power within the international system during this era 
depended on enhanced economic strength. 
5.2.2 Domestic Influences  
The Democratic Clinton administration released the Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP) in 
1993 as part of its strategies to meet the objectives of the UNFCCC which relied on fifty two 
voluntary measures to reach this administration’s emission goal and was intended to reduce 
the USA’s GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2000 (Miller, 1995:722; Cavanagh et al., 
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2001:29; Leaf et al., 2003:305). Curiously, these initiatives bore great resemblance to those 
that the Bush administration would have implemented and articulated preference for 
government-industry co-operation, a reliance on market incentives, limited government 
intervention and voluntary programmes (Cavanagh et al., 2001:29). Even though the Clinton 
administration highlighted climate change as a key policy priority, substantively there was 
little departure from the Bush administration’s policy framework (Cavanagh et al., 2001:29). 
Although the CCAP did not include new measures and instead promoted voluntary 
programmes, under the Clinton administration, the environment was directly mainstreamed 
into energy policy decisions due to this administration’s policy-makers’ perception that the 
goals of environmental regulation and economic growth were compatible and could be used 
to enhance the US economy (Miller, 1995:723; Department of Energy, 1994:84). Thus, 
climate change became a major issue and policy priority for the Clinton administration which 
affected its energy policy goals (Department of Energy, 1994:84; Minsk, 2017:4). However, 
as a continuation of the policy framework started by previous administrations, the Clinton 
administration, while accommodating environmental goals, supported the free market and 
“viewed the proper role of energy policy to respond to market imperfections, especially as 
they related to the environmental impacts of energy production and consumption” (Joskow, 
2001:4).  
At the federal level, in spite of the USA’s hegemonic position and favourable economic 
conditions, implementing the administration’s preferred policies would meet strong resistance 
in the US Congress because of the potential negative consequences that environmental 
regulation could bear for the US economy. To accomplish the administration’s goals of 
combined economic recovery and environmental protection, which were perceived to be 
compatible by policy-makers within this administration, on the seventeenth of February 1993, 
a BTU tax on the heat content of the fuel was supported as the main policy tool to increase 
revenue, but also in order to reduce pollution and the trade deficit, and enhance energy 
independence and efficiency which would reflect an attempt to integrate Clinton’s campaign 
mandate to reduce the deficit alongside vice-President Al Gore’s environmental priorities 
(Department of Energy, 1994:80; Agrawala and Andresen, 1999:461; Downie, 2013:27; 
Skodvin and Andresen, 2009; Royden, 2002:419). It was hoped that the BTU tax would help 
the USA to achieve its commitments under the 1992 Rio Earth Summit as well as generate 
$72 billion in revenue over the span of the subsequent five years and reduce the federal 
deficit (Department of Energy, 1994:81). However, vested interests as well as Democrats and 
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Republicans in Congress strongly opposed the tool even though it did contain adjustments 
that would have protected energy-intensive industries - which at that point served as a turning 
point in the domestic politics of climate change (Department of Energy, 1994:82; Miller, 
1995:721; Downie, 2013:27 – 28; Brown, 2002:10753). In 1993, Congress made it very 
evident that it would not support any programme that aimed to limit the USA’s GHG 
emissions (Brown, 2002: 10749; Hilzenrath, 1993; Royden, 2002:420). Such measures to 
reduce emissions were viewed as being harmful to the Democratic Party’s supporters in the 
labour sector while the Republican Party was antagonistic because of the opposition 
stemming from the corporate sector (Brown, 2002: 10753).  
At the federal level, after Congress did not enact this legislation, the Clinton administration 
assumed a more modest position towards energy policy and complied with existing budgetary 
and regulatory constraints because of the structure of the US political system which 
effectively diffused executive power in relation to Congress (Joskow, 2001:2). Congress, 
which was dominated by the Republican Party, opposed the Clinton administration’s attempt 
to increase fuel efficiency standards for vehicles and appliances and to implement tax 
incentives for renewable energy (Joskow, 2001:2). Nonetheless, in spite of this opposition, 
under the Clinton administration, the environment would attain mainstream status and 
environmentalists were a part of the executive branch under Clinton’s presidency 
(Department of Energy, 1994:82). With well-functioning energy markets during the 1990s, 
energy policy became less urgent as there was less concern over the cost of energy (Joskow, 
2001:4). Yet, in spite of these efforts, between 1990 and 1999, US GHG emissions would 
increase substantially because of economic growth, increased electricity consumption, and 
increased activities in the transportation sector which was responsible for 39% of total 
emissions – the largest of any sector - during this period (Brown, 2002:10750).  
5.3 The Clinton Administration, the US Position in the UNFCCC Negotiations and 
US Energy Policy  
Shortly after the historic Earth Summit of 1992, the Clinton administration came to power 
with a new set of ideas to deal with climate change and sought to distinguish itself from the 
previous Bush administration on this issue, as well as the restoration of the United States’ 
international reputation through its engagement in multilateralism (Brown, 2002:10753; 
Downie, 2013:27). Thereby, the United States took a different foreign policy position 
towards the UNFCCC under the Clinton administration (Depledge, 2005:14; Downie, 
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2013:27). While the inclusion of quantified, legally-binding emission targets were a stalling 
point for the USA under the Bush administration, President Clinton declared in April 1994 
that the USA would voluntarily reduce its emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000 which 
was the goal set out by the UNFCCC and had federal agencies seek a plan to have this 
attained (Cavanagh et al., 2001:29; Downie, 2013:27; Skodvin and Andresen, 2009). In a 
self-help system, how policy-makers implement policies and organise policy goals to attain 
power and security are ultimately at their discretion and depend on their assessment of the 
national interest and their country’s particular circumstances and position internationally.  
5.3.1 Structural Influences 
The Clinton administration was willing to pursue cooperation within the UNFCCC, and 
placed emphasis on the importance of environmental regulation as a vital goal of its energy 
policy (Miller, 1995). However, there are two major issues that limit a state’s ability to 
cooperate in international negotiations: the propensity to cheat and concerns about relative 
gains. The Clinton administration had to be aware of these issues in the negotiations that led 
to the establishment of the UNFCCC. An additional complicating factor was the exemption 
of developing countries from accepting legally-binding mitigation targets thereby giving 
them an advantage in the international system. This emerged as a major concern for the 
administration as they had to design an agreement that would not structurally disadvantage 
the United States in relation to its rivals in the international system (Berke, 1993). However, a 
dichotomy emerged in the Clinton administration’s position towards climate change at this 
point. While, the President’s main policy tool of a BTU tax on the heat content of the fuel 
was no longer an option, the goal of reducing emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000 
remained (Downie, 2013:28; Williamson, 1994:115; Agrawala and Adresen, 1999:461). At 
the domestic level, non-mandatory measures were promoted to achieve the goal of emissions 
stabilisation; however, at the international level, the Clinton administration continued to 
pursue a hard-law position towards the climate change regime unlike its predecessor, most 
notably through its endorsement of the Kyoto Protocol (Skodvin and Andresen, 2009; 
Agrawala and Adresen, 1999:462; 464). 
The negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol
107
 began in March 1995 at the first Conference of the 
Parties (COP 1) which was held in Berlin (Downie, 2013:26). The goal of the negotiations 
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countries. However, due to the historical responsibility and the objectives set by the UNFCCC, Parties 
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was to determine the commitments developed nations (Annex I Parties) were to adopt and 
how to determine their adequacy in terms of the objectives set out by the UNFCCC (Downie, 
2013:26). Parties decided at the meeting to set quantified limitation targets, which would be 
the responsibility of developed countries to undertake due to their historical responsibility, 
which was justified by the notion of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ (Hovi et al., 
2010:5). At this point, Parties agreed that it was not expected of developing countries to cut 
their emissions (Hovi et al., 2010:5). 
The difficulty of pursuing cooperation towards the UNFCCC under the Clinton 
administration  needs to be assessed within the constraints of the effects that mitigation 
actions would have on US energy markets, and by extension its economy and thereby 
hegemonic position, relative to other states.  In 1996, US GHG emissions increased to 1 753 
million metric tons carbon equivalent, most of which were from the combustion of fossil 
fuels, thus any attempted climate policy would have negative consequences for its energy 
sector and thereby hegemonic position relative to other states (EIA, 1998:xii; Miller, 
1995:722 – 723). Since GHG emissions originating from energy-related activities were such 
a large percentage of the USA’s total emissions, any policy measures and activities to reduce 
these emissions will have consequences for energy markets in the United States ranging from 
energy use and prices to the economy (EIA, 1998:xii). An increase in energy prices in the 
economy would result in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), output and employment losses 
(EIA, 1998:xxiv). The Climate Action Report of 1997 (CAR, 1997) articulated that,  
“The increasing role of international trade in the US economy has 
heightened concerns about the effects of emission-reduction policies 
on competitiveness. While most US trade is with other OECD 
countries, trade with the rapidly developing countries in Asia and 
Latin America is increasingly important. Thus, there is a concern that 
mandates to restrict greenhouse gas emissions in the United States 
could result in higher energy and other production costs, particularly 
relative to those of US trading partners in the developing world 
without similar mandates. Higher costs, to the extent not offset by 
efficiency gains, could cause some US industries to lose market share 
or to relocate production to those countries. Conversely, trade enables 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
recognised that it was necessary to set legally-binding, ambitious targets and that developed countries had to 
bear the responsibility for these targets.  
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the United States to expand production for export in those high-
productivity sectors in which the nation has comparative advantage.”  
Under such circumstances, what compelled the Clinton administration to pursue cooperation 
within the UNFCCC? Generally, there are two ways to understand the Clinton 
administration’s supportive stance, and likewise, why such an approach could not be 
sufficient to achieve the necessary cooperation that was required for the USA to accept 
legally-binding mitigation targets. Broadly, the goals that this administration wished to 
pursue can be understood as an outcome of the end of the Cold War and its bipolar structure. 
With the US emerging as a hegemonic state in a unipolar system, the generated optimism 
limited the traditional objections to the pursuit of non-security goals. But, the anarchic 
structure of the international system cannot be ignored for long, and ultimately, the main 
goals that any state, including the USA, can pursue is that of security and power. 
Additionally, economic competition became an important aspect of international relations 
after the end of the Cold War (Waltz, 1993:59). As a means to maintain US power and 
security in the international system, the Clinton administration emphasised the goals of a 
reduced trade deficit, reduced pollution, as well as enhanced energy independence and 
efficiency, thereby attempting to merge energy, climate change and economic goals as a 
means to both enhance US power and security in the international system, while also meeting 
the goals of the UNFCCC by enhancing the competitiveness of US industries relative to its 
rivals (Hilzenrath, 1993; Miller, 1995; Minsk, 2017:4). However, attempts to synthesise these 
goals with others, while not improbable, is nonetheless a challenging task (Miller, 1995). 
Again, any increase to the cost of US energy would undermine the competitiveness of US 
industries and economy, with resultant negative consequences for its hegemonic position 
(Parker et al., 2011:7; Lippman, 1993; Hilzenrath, 1993). Due to the close association between 
US economic strength and hegemony, there would be opposition to any agreement that 
increased the costs of US energy and thereby impeded the USA’s hegemony while 
strengthening its rivals vis-à-vis itself (Parker et al., 2011:7; Lippman, 1993; Hilzenrath, 
1993). 
Moreover, although the USA was a hegemonic state, it was also not the hyper-power of the 
immediate post-World War Two era, instead, structurally it was weaker, while other states, 
both developed, but increasingly developing states as well, were becoming stronger relative 
to itself (Milner and Snyder, 1988:749 - 750). Since inexpensive energy was a source of 
comparative advantage for the USA, mandatory policies that would increase its price were 
viewed as threatening the structural position of the USA, and its security (Parker et al., 
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2011:7; Lippman, 1993; Hilzenrath, 1993). Such restrictions were further opposed by the 
propensity to cheat by developing states because of asymmetrical climate policies, and 
carbon leakage (Parker et al., 2011:7; Lippman, 1993; Hilzenrath, 1993). The structure of the 
international system thus largely accounted for the broad goals adopted by the Clinton 
administration, but likewise why it was difficult to ultimately achieve cooperation. While the 
structure of the international system played the dominant role in restricting US cooperation 
within the UNFCCC, the goals that were supported and the inability to cooperate, however, 
can further be traced to the structure of the US domestic system. 
5.3.2 Domestic Influences  
While the international system provides a set of incentives and constraints that decision-
makers need to respond to, there is no standard approach as to how these will be interpreted; 
nor in how this response will be shaped. While Democratic the Clinton administration was 
willing to cooperate in the UNFCCC based on the distribution of power in the international 
system and its perception of the compatibility between economic growth and environmental 
regulation as a means to augment US power and security therein, Congress was not. After the 
1994 elections, the emergence of a Republican dominated Congress led to a rift between the 
Senate and the executive in the US federal system towards the climate change regime away 
from the more progressive stance displayed by the Clinton administration (Depledge, 
2005:15). The pressure placed on the Clinton administration by their domestic constituents, 
was used as a justification to interpret the UNFCCC from an agreement to reduce GHGs to a 
treaty that merely encourages advanced industrialised countries to freeze their emissions 
(Sprintz and Weiß, 2001:68). 
The COP 1 negotiations proved to be a decisive milestone for the USA’s domestic politics 
and its associated diplomatic effort (Depledge, 2005:15). During the 1995 negotiations, the 
Clinton administration adamantly supported converting the UNFCCC into a binding set of 
protocols (Lantis, 2005:399). During these negotiations, the US negotiating team came under 
pressure from industry lobby groups not to preclude developing countries from an agreement 
centred on legally-binding mitigation targets (Depledge, 2005:15).  In spite of these lobbying 
efforts, the US delegation instead chose to support the position adopted amongst its allies 
towards the substantive nature of the agreement, and thus indicated its support for quantified 
mitigation targets and multilateralism (Depledge, 2005:15). This position was reiterated 





 legally-binding emission reduction targets in spite of lobbying 
efforts otherwise (Depledge, 2005:15; Cavanagh et al., 2001:29 - 30). This last point drew 
considerable ire from lawmakers who argued that the USA, and their constituents 
specifically, were to experience severe negative economic effects if the USA was to cut its 
emissions while strong developing economies did not face similar requirements thereby 
causing structural decline relative to its competitors and negating relative gains for the USA 
within the negotiations which was based on the potential increased costs being accrued to the 
US economy should such environmental measures be endorsed (Hovi et al., 2010:5). 
Unsurprisingly then, the Clinton administration’s position in favour of accepting legally-
binding mitigation targets at the Berlin Mandate stirred a great deal of ire within the Senate at 
the federal level (Hovi et al., 2010:5). By circumventing dissent from domestic actors that 
opposed a quantified, legally-binding deal through its support for the Berlin Mandate, a 
coalition was able to be formed in Congress between Republicans and Democrats which later 
would stop the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol (Lantis, 2005:399).  
In December 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted at the Third Conference of the Parties 
(COP 3) (Downie, 2013:26). To achieve the objectives set out under the UNFCCC, the Kyoto 
Protocol established binding emission targets for all developed nations and formulated 
flexibility mechanisms, such as the trading of emissions, to enable countries to meet their 
targets (Downie, 2013:26). While the Kyoto Protocol articulates quantitative emission 
reduction targets for industrialised countries, it exempts developing countries from legally-
binding and quantified emission targets (Wirth, 2015:7). Substantively, six greenhouse gases 
are mentioned in the Protocol, which are weighted in accordance to their “relative 
contributions to climate disruption as measured by ‘carbon equivalents’ based on global 
warming potentials established by the IPCC” (Wirth, 2015:7).  
Under the Kyoto Protocol, Parties decided that the commitment period to have this achieved 
was to begin in 2008 and finish in 2012 (Wirth, 2015:7). Under the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I 
Parties were called to reduce their overall emissions by 6 to 8 percent by 2012 with 1990 as a 
baseline (Lantis, 2005:398). Under the Kyoto Protocol, the USA outlined that it would reduce 
its emissions by 7% below 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012, a position that provoked 
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interagency tensions with regards to its practical achievement (Percival, 2014:140; Parenteau, 
2004:368; Downie, 2013:31). The Kyoto Protocol has some unique features such as its use of 
flexibility mechanisms which included its cap-and-trade system to meet these targets (Wirth, 
2015:7). This was created to minimise the costs of implementation by providing more 
flexible measures to countries to meet their obligations under the Protocol (Wirth, 2015:7). 
Within this historical context, two interrelated pieces of legislation would also influence US 
climate and energy policy, these being the Clean Air Act (CAA) and the SO2 cap-and-trade 
system
109
, and it is worthwhile to briefly allude to their history to understand this policy 
context in the United States. With the increase in environmental activism of the preceding 
decade, the Clean Air Act, and the EPA, were established in 1970 by President Richard 
Nixon with bipartisan support and would become an important influence on environmental 
law in the USA (Schmalensee and Stavins, 2018: 1 - 2). The origins of the SO2 cap-and-trade 
system can be traced to 1990 when the administration of George H.W. Bush introduced 
amendments to the CAA as a regulatory effort that was designed to reduce the emissions of 
sulphur dioxide (SO2), mainly from electric power plants, in order to deal with acid rain 
which became a prominent environmental concern in the 1980s (Chan et al, 2012:1, 3). The 
SO2 allowance-trading programme set a precedent as an extensive pollutant cap-and-trade 
system and was intended to minimise US SO2 emissions by ten million tons per annum 
against a 1980 baseline (Chan et al, 2012: 3). In contrast to earlier, inflexible “command-and-
control” pollution programmes, the SO2 allowance-trading programme was flexible such that, 
“If annual emissions at a regulated facility exceeded the allowances allocated to that facility, 
the facility owner could either buy allowances or reduce emissions, whether by installing 
pollution controls, changing the mix of fuels used to operate the facility, or by scaling back 
operations. If emissions at a regulated facility were reduced below its allowance allocation, 
the facility owner could sell the extra allowances or bank them for future use; these 
opportunities created incentives to find ways to reduce emissions at the lowest cost” thereby 
providing companies with different methods with which to reduce their SO2 emissions while 
also allowing those companies that had costly abatement expenditures to trade with those that 
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had low abatement expenditures (Chan et al, 2012:4, 10). This was an effective programme 
that resulted in SO2 emissions from electric power plants been reduced by 36 percent in the 
period between 1990 and 2004 (Chan et al, 2012:4). Moreover, the Clean Air Act of 1970 as 
well as the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 placed emphasis on the use of scrubbers to 
reduce SO2 emissions from coal-fired power stations which was to have important 
implications for the coal industry and electric power plants (Chan et al, 2012:24; Williams, 
1993).  
Since the cap and trade system is theorised to be beneficial for dealing with climate change 
and as such has important implications for climate policy given that “The Programme's 
emissions cap and allowance trading approach has achieved a strict environmental goal at 
dramatically lower costs than traditional forms of regulation” in the United States, it has 
therefore being the centre of much political debate (Chan et al, 2012: 1 – 2; Tietenberg et al., 
n,d: 27).  
The Clinton administration, and especially vice-president Al Gore, played a pivotal role in 
the design of the Kyoto Protocol and its flexibility mechanisms, and the administration 
pushed for the inclusion of the flexibility mechanisms in the final agreement (Wirth, 2015:8; 
Percival, 2014:140). The US delegation promoted the use of the flexibility mechanisms in an 
attempt to reconcile the Clinton administration’s progressive position with the more 
antagonistic position adopted by Congress (Depledge, 2005:16 – 17). The USA’s preference 
for market-based mechanisms was met with some resistance from other states, particularly 
developing nations and the EU (Depledge, 2005:17). Yet in spite of opposition from other 
nations, the USA’s preferences for flexible financial mechanisms was extensive in the final 
negotiating text of the Kyoto Protocol, and surpassed inputs from other countries which did 
not endorse the inclusion of flexibility mechanisms to the same degree as the United States 
(Depledge, 2005: 17; Rowlands, 2001:47). 
The flexibility mechanisms consisted of a number of measures which have been designed to 
minimise the costs of implementation under the cap-and-trade system (Wirth, 2015:7). These 
mechanisms have been designed to increase the means available to states to meet their 
obligations under the Kyoto Protocol (Wirth, 2015:7). Under the protocol, states that have 
quantified emission reduction targets may trade the rights to emit amongst parties (Wirth, 
2015:7). Under the Protocol, Annex I states are also able to partake in cooperative projects 
that limit emissions in other Annex I parties thus attaining credits for such endeavours, these 
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mechanisms are called the Joint Implementation (JI) (Wirth, 2015:7 - 8). Annex I Parties are 
also able to implement their emissions reduction obligations through the establishment of 
emission reduction projects in developing countries through the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) (Wirth, 2015:7 - 8). In addition to the flexibility mechanisms, the United 
States also endorsed the six gases that the Convention and Protocol attempt to reduce, namely 
methane, hydroflourocarbons, carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, sulphur hexafluoride and 
perlourocarbons (Rowlands, 2001:47). The European Union, in contrast, promoted the 
reduction of only three gases namely methane, nitrous oxide and carbon dioxide; however, it 
was the USA’s selection which made it into the final text of the negotiating agreement 
(Rowlands, 2001:47). Such incidents assert the hegemonic status of the United States within 
the negotiations (Rowlands, 2001:47).    
Within the federal structure of the US political system, in order to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, 
the President required a two-thirds majority in the US Senate, an attempt that was highly 
problematic since a rift was starting to form between the executive and legislative branches of 
government in reaction to system level constraints and incentives (Sprintz and Weiß, 
2001:68; Downie, 2013:31). In the lead up to the COP 3 negotiations, the Republican-
dominated US Senate strongly disapproved of the negotiating position adopted and made it 
clear that they were not being consulted during the progress of the negotiations (Depledge, 
2005:15; Hovi et al., 2010:5). This congressional resistance was driven by members of 
Congress and certain business interests who opposed the USA’s acceptance of a legally-
binding agreement, and attempted to quench the presidential ambition in Congress due to the 
heightened costs that would be incurred to the US economy and the benefits that would have 
been gained by rivals to the United States should the Kyoto Protocol have been adopted 
(Downie, 2013:30).  
This opposition would increase and eventually, four months before negotiations for the Kyoto 
Protocol began, the passing of the Byrd-Hagel Resolution 95-0 in the US Senate signalled a 
shift in the US position on climate change (Downie, 2013:30; Agawala and Adresen, 
1999:467).  In essence, this Resolution stipulated that the USA should not be signatory to a 
protocol that would inflict harm to the US economy, and that would not include commitments 
for developing countries indicating that Congress was concerned about the harm such an 
agreement would have for the USA’s relative gains, and potential for cheating in an anarchic 
system where developing countries’ power was starting to increase (Downie, 2013:30; 
Agawala and Adresen, 1999:469). The passing of the Byrd-Hagel Resolution influenced the 
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USA’s emissions’ targets which now had to be reconciled to the stipulations laid out by the 
Berlin Mandate and the Byrd-Hagel Resolution (Downie, 2013:31). The Senate thus opposed 
any international ratification that would undermine US competitiveness and economic growth 
and that would impose emission restrictions on developed nations but exempt developing 
countries (Skodvin and Andresen, 2009; Lantis, 2005:400).  
At the federal level, such opposition arose because of worries related to the wide-ranging 
distributional effects for the US economy had the USA ratified the Kyoto Protocol (Lantis, 
2005:399). By having negative consequences for the US economy while creating a double-
standard that would allow developing countries to continue emitting, critics gained a firm 
foot-hold in the Senate (Lantis, 2005:399). Congressional fears for the competitiveness of US 
industries and its economy were thus compounded by the asymmetrical design of the Kyoto 
Protocol which could undermine the relative position of the USA - potentially inducing 
structural decline - while augmenting strong developing countries’ ability to cheat and attain 
relative gains that could further undermine the security of the USA. Although the voices of 
opposition were prolific, those who did support the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol pointed 
out that a transition to environmental modes of production would have benefits for the US 
economy over a long-time horizon (Lantis, 2005:399). In addition, the Clinton administration 
faced certain restrictions in terms of the policy actions that it could purse to attain their goals 
within the context of the US political system. Such actions had to operate on a voluntary 
basis as outlined in the CCAP, and in many ways did not depart from the type of policy 
instruments that would have been pursued by the Bush administration, while its pursuit of a 
BTU tax on the heat content of the fuel was opposed by Congress. Since the concern about 
the implications of policy actions for the cost of energy in the USA was paramount, 
attempting to design and implement effective policies is highly complex and difficult, often 
resulting in stalemate due to the differences regarding whether environmental protection and 
economic growth are compatible. Thereby, designing an energy policy that could be 
responsive to multiple and conflicting objectives has reduced the USA’s ability to pursue a 
policy that could meet the objective of the UNFCCC, while the limited role for the US 
government, while arising from the historical development of its energy policy, and 
Congressional input, has further limited the effectiveness of the USA been able to have a 
coherent approach towards climate change mitigation, energy security and economic growth. 
Because of this Congressional opposition, the Clinton administration was unable to neither 
reach its goals nor implement a coherent energy policy. 
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Thus, even though policy-makers within the Clinton administration promoted a particular 
perception of the compatibility of the goals between US energy policy and the UNFCCC and 
its Kyoto Protocol in reaction to structural changes, it was circumscribed by domestic 
coalitions in terms of what the administration could achieve at the negotiations (Downie, 
2013:27). The Clinton administration knew that it was unable to gain the support of the 
Senate since the latter required a two-thirds majority in order to ratify international treaties 
according to Article II, Section 2 of the United States’ Constitution (Wirth, 2015:8). 
Notwithstanding the administration’s negotiating efforts, domestic ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol was unattainable since developing nations were precluded from having controls 
placed on their emission levels and the potential harm to the US economy (Percival, 
2014:140). Because of the Senate’s verbalised hostility, the Clinton administration did not 
even present the Kyoto Protocol to the Senate for ratification (Percival, 2014:140).  
Although Congress was able to restrict the Clinton’s administrations support of the UNFCCC 
and Kyoto Protocol within the federal structure of the US political system, the Clinton 
administration continued to show support for the climate change regime until the end of his 
presidency in spite of Congressional opposition and his administration contributed the most 
financial support during the negotiating process in Kyoto and also made great financial 
contributions towards the Second Assessment Report (AR2) as well as related scientific 
research into climate change (Depledge, 2005:18). However, the USA’s inability to ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol essentially limited the Protocol’s effectiveness and stalled the global climate 
change negotiations for years (Bang et al., 2012:755). The negotiating process
110
 that ensued 
after the finalisation of the Kyoto Protocol which sought to establish the Protocol’s rules was 
problematic and collapsed at the sixth Conference of the Parties (COP 6) in The Hague, after 
an intense disagreement between the USA and the EU towards flexibility mechanisms and 
specifically disagreements regarding the role of sinks in mitigation (Downie, 2013:26 – 27; 
Justus and Fletcher, 2001:1).  
5.4 Linking the USA’s Energy Policy and Position within the UNFCCC 
By the 1990s, US energy policy would have to incorporate a multi-faceted set of issues. The 
Democratic Clinton administration would have to deal with an important implication of the 
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end of the Cold War, wherein, in spite of the USA’s hegemonic position in the anarchic 
system, economic interests would prevail over traditional security concerns within a unipolar 
distribution of power. This is not to negate the assumptions of realism, the international 
system is still a competitive one, and states compete not only for security but also for power. 
In light of this, since ignoring environmental externalities was becoming increasingly 
difficult, the Clinton administration made a concerted effort to integrate the goal of climate 
change mitigation into US energy policy as reflected in the administration’s promotion of The 
Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP) and the implementation of a BTU tax on the heat 
content of the fuel as a policy tool due to policy-makers’ perception of the compatibility 
between environmental regulation and economic growth. It was hoped that this would be able 
to simultaneously enhance economic growth while reducing pollution. Historically, the 
prevailing view was that the goals of environmental protection and energy production were 
irreconcilable since increased environmental protection would increase the costs of energy to 
US consumers and industries, and in the specific context of the USA, environmental 
externalities were not factored into the price of energy which allowed the cost of energy to 
remain artificially low giving it a source of comparative advantage in international markets 
(Tomain, 2007:1203). For decades, efforts to link the two policy goals have been resisted 
since it would disadvantage the USA’s global competitiveness by increasing the cost of 
energy. Therewith, since power and security remain the most important state objectives in the 
international system, attempts by the Clinton administration to redress the issue of 
environmental protection was resisted at the federal level by Congress leading to a hierarchy 
and incongruence of policy goals with security and power ultimately trumping others and 
leading to the inability to integrate climate change mitigation into US energy policy because 
of the concerns for the increase in the cost of US energy and resultant hegemonic decline 
relative to other states.  
This must ultimately be understood in accordance with the changing incentives of the 
structure of the international system. With the end of the Cold War, two structural changes 
occurred. While still hegemonic, the USA was no longer the hyper-power of the post-World 
War Two era and had to carry out its role in a weaker position. Although the bipolar system 
came to an end and the Soviet Union was no longer a threat to US interests and the 
international system became a unipolar structure, emerging economies, alongside European 
countries and Japan, presented significant rivals to the USA, one that decision-makers could 
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not ignore as economic competition became paramount and would have implications for the 
USA’s power and security (Levinson, 1996; Stoga, 1993; Waltz, 1993: 59 - 60). 
At the structural-level, the end of the bipolar distribution of power emphasised economic 
competition, while presenting policy-makers with a set of multi-dimensional and conflicting 
policy objectives (Waltz, 1993: 59 - 60). While the international system was characterised by 
a unipolar distribution of power and the exuberance of the end of the Cold War, the USA’s 
energy dependence was nevertheless higher compared to 1974 whereby the dependence on 
oil exports, which in 1973 represented 35% of consumption, by 1994 represented 50% 
(Miller, 1995). Within this complex structural context, the Clinton administration attempted 
to link energy, climate change and economic issues in its energy policy to strengthen the US 
economy, thereby enhancing its hegemonic position and security in the anarchic international 
system (Miller, 1995; Williamson, 1994:115). The administration was concerned about 
resolving the USA’s trade deficit and energy dependence through the combination of 
previously incongruent goals in its energy policy (Levinson, 1996; Miller, 1995). Moreover, 
at the structural level, the Clinton administration was influenced in its energy policy goals 
because of competition with Germany and Japan whose manufacturers attained greater 
energy efficiency which allowed them to have lower production costs giving them an 
advantage internationally (Levinson, 1996). The Clinton administration thus responded to the 
complex incentives provided by the international system in its attempt to enhance the 
competitiveness of the US economy relative to its competitors. 
At the federal level, Congressional politics impeded the Clinton administration’s preferred 
energy policy and thus limited the Clinton administration’s approach towards synthesising 
environmental regulation and economic goals in its energy policy (Agrawala and Andresen, 
1999:469). The Clinton administration faced opposition from both Congress and vested 
interests in its pursuit of its energy policy goals with Congressional opposition stemming 
from heightened worries as to whether environmental regulation would undermine US 
economic growth policy (Agrawala and Andresen, 1999:469; Hilzenrath, 1993). Due to 
Congressional opposition, the Clinton administration would be limited in its approach 
towards its hard law stance towards the UNFCCC (Agrawala and Andresen, 1999:469; 
Parker et al., 2011:7).  
The structural level would likewise have important implications for the US position within 
the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol. Structurally, the US position in the UNFCCC was more 
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complex during this era. The international system provides incentives which policy-makers 
need to respond to. As such, the UNFCCC was an opportunity for the USA to influence the 
UNFCCC to meet the USA’s interests, and likewise enhance the Clinton administration’s 
attempt to merge energy, climate change and economic goals in its energy policy to enhance 
US power and security (Williamson, 1994:115; Miller, 1995). However, although the USA 
was a hegemonic state in a unipolar distribution of power, the increasing influence of 
emerging economies such as China and India who would be exempted from accepting legally 
binding mitigation targets was a strong structural level limitation on the Clinton 
administration’s ability to cooperate towards the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol (Parker et al., 
1993:7; Agrawala and Adresen, 1999:467). Since these countries were exempted from 
accepting legally binding mitigation targets this increased concerns over relative gains and 
cheating. This must also be understood along with the negative consequences that the cost of 
mitigation could have had for US energy markets and its economy (Parker et al., 1993:1; 
Hilzenrath, 1993). Thus, the structural system presented a contradictory set of opportunities 
but also constraints that would result in the difficulties experienced by the Clinton 
administration in its pursuit of cooperation with the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol.   
Under such conditions, at the federal level, Congress was unwilling to support measures that 
would raise the cost of energy to US industries and consumers, since it would lead to US 
structural decline, undermining its security and leaving it vulnerable in the face of rising 
challengers Parker et al., 1993:7; Agrawala and Adresen, 1999:467. Per consequence, in light 
of these alterations, and concerns for US power and security, the rift between Congress and 
the executive led to policy impasse. Moreover, since energy markets were stable throughout 
this period, there was little incentive to review US energy policy and make the necessary 
adjustments to its policy goals (Joskow, 2003). Therewith, US energy policy would slip on 
the policy agenda (Joskow, 2003). 
Since the CCAP and the BTU tax on the heat content of the fuel could not be part of the 
Clinton administration’s strategies to meet its objectives in the UNFCCC, it had to rely on 
other means to pursue its goals within the federal structure of the US political system 
(Hilzenrath, 1993; Agrawala and Andresen, 1993:467). Moreover, such strategies had to 
compatible with the US political context and the historical development of its energy policy 
and thus had to be based on government-industry cooperation, reliance on market incentives, 
limited government intervention and voluntary programmes (Department of Energy, 1994:66; 
Tomain, 2007:1203).  
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The US position in the UNFCCC is influenced by its energy policy principally through the 
influence of the anarchic structure of the international system and the distribution of power 
therein where states compete for scarce resources, and where there is no guarantee of 
security, thus when choosing between contradictory policy goals, states will choose those 
goals that will increase their power and ability to operate in a self-help system and which are 
most cost-effective (Waltz, 1993:50). Decision-makers however are simultaneously 
constrained by domestic politics and international negotiations, a two-level game to make use 
of Putnam’s famous analogy (Moravscik, 1993:4). Moravscik (1993:4) argues that, “the 
statesmen involved simultaneously calculated the domestic and international implications of 
their actions.”  
Although decision-makers may want to increase the power and security of their state within 
an anarchic international system by advancing those goals which can help them to achieve 
both power and security, there is no guarantee that they can reach such goals (Waltz, 1993). 
At the structural level, within the distribution of power in the international system, since the 
USA is a hegemonic state, it is able to create and abandon international agreements and 
institutions on the basis of its national interests, which are influenced domestically in reaction 
to shifts in domestic and international politics based on the perception of the costs of policy 
goals and their perceived implications for US security and hegemonic position (Jervis, 
1978:167 – 168; Mearsheimer, 1994-1995:7).  
At the unit-level, policy-makers within the Democratic Clinton administration did not 
perceive the conflict between the goals of energy security, economic growth and climate 
change mitigation to be irreconcilable (Williamson, 1994:115; Miller, 1995). The 
administration thus believed that mitigation costs could be reduced with the right policy 
instruments, which were the BTU tax and other market instruments (Hilzenrath, 1993; 
Andresen and Agrawala, 1999:469; Parker et al., 2011:5). Congress however was concerned 
about the change in the distribution of power in the international system with the rise of 
developing countries, especially China (Parker et al., 2011:6-7), which led to concerns about 
asymmetrical climate policies and the resulting relative gains and propensity to cheat that 
would be gained by rivals which would disadvantage the USA while allowing other states to 
prosper. In the specific context of the US federal political system, the executive has to share 
power with Congress, and with the exception of a few instances, is not able to act unilaterally 
to pursue international agreements as per the requirements of the US Constitution (Andresen 
and Agrawala, 1999:467). In a Republican-dominated Congress, both Republicans and 
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Democrats indicated their opposition to the Kyoto Protocol and with Congress unwilling to 
support the Kyoto Protocol, the Byrd-Hagel Resolution solidified this opposition because of 
the potential negative consequences for the US economy and exemption of developing 
nations (Andresen and Agrawala, 1999:467; Parker et al., 2011:7). Due to this Congressional 
opposition, the Clinton administration was unable to pursue cooperation towards the 
UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol. 
At the structural level, the USA was thus threatened by its relative decline and the changing 
distribution of power in the international system, but likewise the challenge of designing 
comprehensive policies to meet the new challenges and trends in the post-Soviet era while 
still maintaining US power through its economic strength in relation to its rivals (Levinson, 
1996; Stoga, 1993). Such decisions were undertaken since economic competition was more 
pronounced after the end of the Cold War (Waltz, 1993:50 - 51). Per consequence, Congress 
would not support any agreement that would weaken the US economy since the fossil fuel 
industry was viewed to be important for its long-term economic prosperity and security 
(Parker et al., 2011:7; Agrawala and Andresen, 1999:467). In this context, the trade-offs 
between the UNFCCC and US energy policy were thought to be too high because of this 
dependence on cheap and abundant fossil fuel energy for long-term economic growth 
(Hilzenrath, 1993).  
At the structural level, it was the concern with maintaining the US hegemonic position 
relative to its competitors through a reduction of the costs of energy prices to US consumers 
and industries which determined the scope of US energy policy and its inability to cooperate 
within the UNFCCC. The Clinton administration attempted to redesign US energy policy to 
be inclusive of the goal of environmental regulation and economic growth in response to 
enhancing US hegemonic power in relation to its rivals (Lippman, 1993). However, 
Congressional opposition would restrict the design of US energy policy to have greater 
emphasis on environmental regulation (Parker et al., 2011:7; Agrawala and Andresen, 
1999:467). The unipolar distribution of power, characterised by economic competition, 
would be instrumental in restricting the design of US energy policy as US economic growth 
based on fossil fuels remained paramount for its power and security (Waltz, 1993:50; 
Agrawala and Andresen, 1999:469). At the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, Congressional 
opposition would continue to be based on the potentially high costs this would incur to the 
US economy (Parker et al., 2011:7; Agrawala and Andresen, 1999:467). The structure of the 
international system would further emphasise concerns over asymmetrical costs and cheating 
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by other states (Parker et al., 2011:7; Agrawala and Andresen, 1999:467). The incongruence 
between US energy policy and the goal of the UNFCCC would be emphasised by Congress 
due to the threat it posed to the USA relative to its rivals within the anarchic international 
system (Parker et al., 2011:7; Agrawala and Andresen, 1999:467).  
The interaction between the two levels thus reflected the complex and contradictory goals 
facing policy-makers at the time. While the international system presented the incentives that 
policy-makers had to respond to, there were no definitive means available as to how these 
ought to be interpreted nor how to enhance US power and security in the midst of the ascent 
of emerging economies and the need to enhance the USA’s economic strength. At the federal 
level, the division between Congress and the Clinton administration towards the UNFCCC 
and its Kyoto Protocol, as well as US energy policy, would not permit the Clinton 
administration to pursue either its preferred foreign or energy policies due to the structure of 
the US federal system and the power in Congress to limit the executive’s policies therein 
(Parker et al., 2011:7; Agrawala and Andresen, 1999:467).  
5.5 Conclusion 
The end of the Cold War was an important factor that contributed to the design of US energy 
policy. Instead of the overt concern on security, US energy policy increasingly focused on 
environmental regulation and economic competitiveness which also had implications for the 
US position in the UNFCCC. The Clinton administration was instrumental in the design of 
the Kyoto Protocol and wished to enhance US cooperation within the UNFCCC. While 
president George H.W. Bush did not legally commit the United States to reduce its emissions 
to 1990 levels by the year 2000, president Clinton went ahead and committed the United 
States to this target and had federal agencies seek a plan to have this attained (Cavanagh et 
al., 2001:29). To simultaneously meet the goals of the UNFCCC while augmenting US power 
and security internationally, the Climate Change Action Plan of 1993, and a BTU tax on the 
heat content of the fuel, were relied on by the administration as a means to enhance the 
USA’s economic growth by linking energy and climate policies. 
Yet, Congressional opposition to both the tax and the US position limited the coherence of 
both domestic and foreign policies. While the Clinton administration played a central role in 
the design of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the Byrd-Hagel Resolution halted the US 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol on the grounds that it exempted developing nations and 
would incur negative consequences for the US economy. In spite of the Clinton 
205 
 
administration’s concerted efforts to support the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, an 
appreciation for the difficulty in designing and implementing coherent policies within the 
context of US domestic politics should be maintained. Due to Congressional opposition, the 
Clinton administration was unable to attain their goals, nor design a coherent energy policy 
and cooperate within the UNFCCC. What mitigation actions could be pursued could only be 
enacted on a voluntary basis. Concerns for the costs that US energy policy would incur, and 
the implementation of asymmetrical climate policies, would drive Congressional opposition. 
With stable energy markets in the 1990s, energy policy would decrease on the political 
agenda while still centring on the economic assumptions that guided US energy policy 
throughout the twentieth century. The subsequent Bush administration would pursue a 





The George W. Bush Administration (2001 – 2009): Risks to 
Continuous Supply in the 2000s 
6.1 Introduction 
There are two major issues that would distinguish the George W. Bush administration (2001 - 
2009), these being the renewed concern for energy security, and the decision to repudiate the 
Kyoto Protocol. After the relatively stable energy markets of the 1990s, energy security 
would become a policy preoccupation due to the rise in the price of petroleum; the 
breakdown of California’s competitive, deregulated electricity markets, energy shortages in 
the western United States and an increase in the price of natural gas. The increased energy 
demand from China and India would further contribute to the instability of global energy 
markets. 
The administration’s decision to repudiate the Kyoto Protocol was a major foreign policy 
alteration in contrast to the Clinton administration. Given the USA’s central role in designing 
the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, the USA’s reluctance to follow through in implementing 
action towards these regimes threatened the efficacy of the Kyoto Protocol. Instead, the Bush 
administration promoted the use of voluntary and market-based actions to mitigate climate 
change rather than a set of quantified, legally-binding mitigation targets. Such insistence is 
further influenced by the type of energy policy that the Bush administration wished to pursue. 
Under the George W. Bush administration, the two central concerns to emerge that would 
drive US energy policy were the country’s increased dependence on foreign petroleum and 
energy security (Klare(a), 2004:57). To meet these challenges, the Report of the National 
Energy Policy Development Group in 2001 and the Energy Policy Act of 2005 
(EPACT2005) would centre on the increased production of fossil fuels at the expense of 
environmental regulation. Reconciling a domestic energy policy that augmented fossil fuel 
production with a foreign policy geared towards mandatory mitigation actions was simply not 
possible. The development of this energy policy occurred in the context of strenuous 
circumstances for the USA’s energy security, as well as an ideological inclination and the 
influence of vested interests towards a focus on fossil fuel production as the panacea to the 
nation’s energy dilemma. This chapter outlines the context that the Bush administration 
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emerged in, followed by a discussion of the related factors that would play a role in 
influencing this administration’s energy policy and stance towards the UNFCCC and Kyoto 
Protocol.   
6.2 The Bush Administration’s Energy Policy  
Policies are designed not only within a historical context, but also within a framework of 
ideas and goals that form the guidelines for the policy-makers involved (Hall, 1993:279). 
When historical circumstances alter to such a degree that reconciling the ideational 
framework that informed policy design to the new context is increasingly impractical, policy-
makers need to re-asses the design of their energy policies (Helm, 2005:1). Although such a 
notion is accurate to a degree, what is striking about the USA is that, with the exception of 
war and politically-motivated petroleum embargoes, there has been a remarkable degree of 
continuity to US energy policy as a set of economic assumptions guided the design of US 
energy policy. Therewith, in light of these circumstances, the George W. Bush administration 
would establish the Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group in 2001 and 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT2005).  
The George W. Bush administration (2001 – 2009) would need to design its energy policy 
within a new set of conditions that were markedly different from the previous fifteen years. A 
new energy crisis occurred in the USA at the end of the 1990s that resulted from increasing 
natural gas prices and the tripling of the price of petroleum in 1999, electricity shortages in 
the western United States and the breakdown of California’s competitive, deregulated  
electricity markets when the wholesale electricity price increased more than ten times the 
previous year to $317 per megawatt hour and the price of natural gas, which supplied half of 
the state’s electricity, increased four times to that of the previous year in December 2000 with 
the state experiencing blackouts throughout the summer of 2001 and its two major utilities 
experienced serious financial problems (Joskow, 2001:1; Helm, 2002:173; Timney, 2002:109 
- 110). Critically, the United States began to import half of the petroleum that it consumed by 
April 1998, deteriorating the dependency that the country had on foreign producers (Klare(a), 
2004:56) Overall, after the relatively stable energy markets of the 1990s, energy security 
would emerge firmly on decision-makers’ agenda in the 2000s as a result of a combination of 
high petroleum prices and a tight petroleum market (Yergin, 2006:69; Helm, 2002:173; 
Hamilton, 2011:20).  
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Rising demand predominantly from the developing world
111
 - significantly China and India - 
over what appeared to be increasingly dwindling supplies further constrained the market and 
contributed to the price increase raising further alarm in industrialised countries (Yergin, 
2006:72; Westphal, 2006; Correljé and Van der Linde, 2006). In this context, 2004
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represented a turning point because a sense prevailed that an era of inexhaustible and 
inexpensive energy was over (Deutch, 2004:1; Dorian et al., 2006:1984) since: 
“Asia’s growing impact became widely apparent in 2004, when the 
best global economic performance in a generation translated into a 
“demand shock” – that is, unexpected worldwide growth in petroleum 
consumption that represented rate of growth that was more than 
double the annual average growth rates of preceding decade.” (Yergin, 
2006:72). 
While there were similarities between the energy security concerns of the 2000s; these were 
also qualitatively different from the security concerns of the 1970s (Deutch, 2004:1). Energy 
supply systems have become more complex than in the 1970s which posed a new set of 
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 China was self-sufficient in its petroleum production until 1993 (Yergin, 2006:71). However, between 1993 
and 2006, China’s GDP would triple while its demand for petroleum would double during the same period 
(Yergin, 2006:71). India’s accelerated economic growth was partially the outcome of the high petroleum prices 
emerging from the onset of the first Gulf War which created for the country a balance of payments shock in 
1993 (Yergin, 2006:72). Manmohan Singh, its then finance minister, began a number of far reaching reforms 
because the country had virtually no foreign currency reserves at its disposal which provided the leverage for its 
economic growth (Yergin, 2006:72). Even though India’s petroleum consumption was forty percent less than 
China’s in the previous decade, its demand for petroleum was projected to increase in tandem with its economic 
growth (Yergin, 2006:72). The economic growth of China and India led to the two countries’ petroleum 
consumption to exceed that of North America’s by 2005 (Yergin, 2006:72).    
The process of globalisation had also been responsible for the unprecedented demand in energy as a result of 
China’s and India’s integration into the global economy, and the tight balance in the energy market, a result of 
the “demand shock” causing an upward spiral in the price of petroleum (Yergin, 2006:34). By 2004, China’s 
petroleum demand had increased by seventeen percent which is an unparalleled rise in energy demand from a 
historical point of view and drove petroleum prices even higher (Yergin, 2006:34).  
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 After 2005, production did not continue to increase, even though in contrast to similar events, there was no 
geopolitical event that appeared to be responsible for this, or in spite of the “absence of a significant physical 
disruption in the supply of oil” (Hamilton, 2011:21; Hamilton, 2012:18).  
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challenges to energy security
113
 (Chester, 2010:889). While strategic transportation channels 
and cross-border pipelines continued to remain a source of insecurity, to this has been added 
the liberalisation of energy markets as part of government energy policy, energy markets and 
financial markets have become increasingly related, new sources of demand have emerged 
mainly in developing countries, the number of supply nations has been concentrated to a few 
countries in a highly volatile region, and fossil fuel dependence characterised most countries’ 
energy mix while energy production and consumption is responsible for 80% of global GHG 
emissions; and interdependencies had been established between petroleum refining, natural 
gas processing and electricity (Chester, 2009:160; Yergin, 2006:69; Westphal, 2006; 
Bamberger, 2006:5). In the midst of these trends, rising consumption from new players meant 
that demand for energy in the United States was forecasted to increase alongside other major 
developing countries (Deutch, 2004:1; 9).  
This period also witnessed the increased uptake of new energy technologies which included 
hardware and software able to utilise previously “non-utilisable” reserves, as well as 
developments in alternative and renewable energy technologies (Stanislaw, 2012:1). In the 
early 2000s, renewable energy investment, capacity and integration throughout all sectors 
began to significantly increase (REN21, 2014:5). There were a number of reasons for this 
expansion: the effects of the energy crisis which started in the 1970s, with accompanying 
economic recessions, illuminated the importance of energy for economic and national 
security, secondly, a number of countries established markets for renewable energy and 
helped to advance technological progress as well as economies of scale, and thirdly, the need 
to mitigate and adapt to climate change has increased the expansion of renewable energy 
(REN21, 2014:5). During this period, US states began to increase renewable energy 
procurement in the wake of the federal government’s inaction in this policy area. These 
technological innovations have facilitated geopolitical, environmental and economic 
transformations and have also increased competition amongst nations to gain control over the 
technological hardware as well as software (Stanislaw, 2012: 2 - 3).  
6.2.1 Structural Influences 
Waltz reminds us that “Structural change begins in a system's unit, and then unit-level and 
structural causes interact. We know from structural theory that states strive to maintain their 
                                                          
113
 Up to 2008, the price of energy was increasing while demand for energy, especially natural gas, has been 
growing globally (De Jong et al., 2010: 222).  
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positions in the system. Thus…great powers try to arrest or reverse their decline (Waltz, 
1993: 49-50). Under the Bush administration, the USA had to respond to the challenges to its 
energy policy and energy security within a distribution of power that was altering with the 
introduction of developing countries as important players therein and constraints on the USA. 
As such, it is important to recognise that under these new circumstances and their 
implications for energy security, US policy-makers had to reconsider federal energy policy 
when the abundance of the 1990s gave way to the precariousness of the 2000s (Helm, 2005). 
In 2001, the USA experienced its most serious energy shortages since the crises of the 1970s, 
with this shortage reflected in increased energy prices
114
 (Report of the National Energy 
Policy Development Group, 2001:viii). Demand for energy was projected to outstrip 
production levels if these were to increase at the same rate as 1990 levels (Report of the 
National Energy Policy Development Group, 2001:viii; Klare and Volman, 2006:612). 
Because of the continuation of the recognition between energy use and security and power in 
an anarchic international system, due to these trends, the administration was concerned about 
the implications this would have for the strength of the economy and national security citing 
that “America’s energy challenge begins with our expanding economy, growing population, 
and rising standard of living. Our prosperity and way of life are sustained by energy use.” 
(Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, 2001:viii; ix). Moreover, in 
2001, the USA was producing 39% less petroleum than it did in 1970 (Report of the National 
Energy Policy Development Group, 2001:x). In the midst of these trends, the USA’s 
dependence on foreign sources of petroleum, and the implications thereof for national 
security and the economy was a key concern (Report of the National Energy Policy 
Development Group, 2001:viii).  
The Bush administration’s response to these trends would be influenced by the USA’s 
relative position within the distribution of power, and the implications for the USA’s security 
and power in an anarchic system arising from these trends, with the USA’s power and 
security increasingly threatened because while it was still hegemonic, the USA had been 
experiencing structural decline in an international system that increasingly had a multipolar 
distribution of power (Wohlforth, 1999:6). That is, by the early 2000s, the distribution of 
power in the international system altered, with traditional powers such as the European Union 
and Japan still challenging the USA, but increasingly alongside emerging economies, such as 
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 In the preceding years, the United States had become increasingly dependent on foreign sources of petroleum 
(The White House, 2005(b)). 
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China, India and Brazil, for scarce resources and power. The principal challenge was thus 
how to maintain and protect the US hegemonic position in the anarchic system in the face of 
such challenges.  
Since low cost fossil fuels were an integral aspect of US hegemonic power, the severity of 
these issues could potentially have severe implications for the security and power of the USA 
in an anarchic international system in the midst of the ascent of rivals to the USA (Klare and 
Volman, 2006:612; Chanlett-Avery, 2005:1, 11). Recognising the seriousness of the matter, 
President George W. Bush assembled the National Energy Policy Development Group in his 
second week in office to develop an overview of the nation’s energy policy in the recognition 
that more than a superficial solution was required for these issues (Report of the National 
Energy Policy Development Group, 2001:viii; Klare(a), 2004:56). In order to meet these 
challenges, the National Energy Policy Development Group, which was chaired by vice-
president Richard Cheney, produced a report
115
 in May 2001 that emphasised the increased 
supply of domestic fossil fuel energy from coal, petroleum, and natural gas as well as 
increased usage of nuclear power and hydropower while reducing government regulation 
(Reardon, 2004:452; Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, 2001:xiii; 
xii). Under the auspices of the report, the United States had to foster a strategy that could 
assure that supply can meet growing demand in order to protect US national security as well 
as economic well-being (Volman, 2003:573; Klare and Volman, 2006:612). Since the most 
critical goals of US energy policy were economic growth and energy security as the vehicles 
of US power and security in a competitive system, the dependence on the supply of cheap 
fossil fuels at the expense of other policy goals such as environmental regulation was the 
main trade-off in order to protect the USA’s hegemonic position within the distribution of 
power vis-à-vis its rivals while enhancing its security by enhancing low cost fossil fuel 
production. While the Report asserts that the trade-off between environmental protection and 
energy production is no longer as stark due to advances in technology (Report of the National 
Energy Policy Development Group, 2001:xiv), the Report’s overt commitment to fossil fuel 
production and consumption would undermine its commitment to environmental protection, 
and climate change mitigation in particular.  
The strategy’s insistence on a fossil-fuel based energy strategy to meet these challenges can 
be traced to the historical development of petroleum being the bedrock of US power in the 
anarchic system because of its importance for the US economy and seeming low cost relative 
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 This publication became known as the Cheney Report (Volman, 2003:573). 
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to other energy sources, thereby in so far as the challenge of increasing the supply of energy 
was concerned, petroleum in particular was a major policy driver at the time in order to 
enhance US security and power within the distribution of power vis-à-vis its rivals due to its 
importance for US economic stability and growth (Klare and Volman, 2006:612). A number 
of regions were highlighted by the report as stable suppliers such as Africa
116
, Latin America 
and the Caspian Sea region as well as a controversial proposal to produce domestic reserves 
found in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) in order to meet the nation’s energy 
challenge, a proposal that raised the ire of environmentalists (Volman, 2003:574; Klare and 
Volman, 2006:612; Cleveland and Kaufman, 2003:486 - 487). However, given the 
circumstances faced by the Bush administration and its goals, it is ironic that less emphasis 
was placed on renewable energy and mitigation within the UNFCCC which could decrease 
US dependence on petroleum imports and enhance its energy security. In spite of the 
synergies between climate change mitigation and the reduction of US dependence on 
petroleum through increased renewable energy use and efficiency measures, a key concern of 
the Bush administration was the potential impact of climate change mitigation on economic 
growth (Reardon, 2004). Such a policy concern needs to be situated in the administration’s 
concern for the USA’s position in a competitive global economy, where strong emerging 
economies, particularly China, were posing as considerable challengers (Klare and Volman, 
2006:612; Chanlett-Avery, 2005:1, 11). Therefore, the Bush administration responded to the 
incentives provided by the international system which was influenced by the increasing 
competition between the USA and emerging economies within the changing distribution of 
power by emphasising the goals of economic growth and energy security within its energy 
policy at the expense of environmental protection as this would enhance its comparative 
advantage by maintaining low cost energy (Klare and Volman, 2006:612; Chanlett-Avery, 
2005:1, 11).  
Since 2001, when the George W. Bush administration first assembled the National Energy 
Policy Development Group, the USA’s increased dependence on foreign petroleum, as well 
as increased energy prices drove the need for a new energy policy; and in the prior months of 
2005, President Bush outlined a plan to attain the nation’s energy independence (Holt and 
Glover, 2006:1; IEA, 2007:9; The White House, 2005(b)). While energy policy has a number 
of goals, it is often the case that it is an upsurge in the price of petroleum that pressurises 
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 It was thus in 2002 that American national security and Africa were for the first time used concurrently by 
official Pentagon documents (Volman, 2003:573). 
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policy-makers to re-assess US energy policy as this impacts US economic growth and per 
consequence power and thereby its position within the distribution of power (Bamberger and 
Behrens, 2005:2). Therewith, on the 8
th
 of August 2005, President Bush signed into law the 
first energy plan since 1992 (The White House, 2005(a); IEA, 2007:9). The Energy Policy 
Act (EPACT2005) reflected many of the recommendations of the Report of the National 
Energy Policy Development Group.  
To varying degrees, three issues were addressed by the EPACT2005: US energy security, 
energy dependence and climate change. In contrast to the EPACT1992 which was designed 
with a consideration for efforts to mitigate climate change under the UNFCCC, climate 
change mitigation proved to be a peripheral issue in the design process of the EPACT2005 
(Parker and Blodgett, 2008:16). Instead the main focus was on energy security and energy 
supply with little mention of the potential implications for climate change mitigation (Parker 
and Blodgett, 2008:16). Rather, the debate in the USA over future energy supply revolved 
around how to improve energy security by reducing US dependence on foreign petroleum 
imports (IEA, 2007:9). The USA was thus the only IEA country where energy consumption 
was forecasted to increase and which also lacked a policy designed to internalise the external 
cost of GHG emissions (IEA, 2007:9). In the midst of these issues and goals, clean energy 
technology was anticipated to be a solution to both these challenges (IEA, 2007:9). Although 
the Bush administration was hesitant to address climate change, the Energy Policy Act 
(EPACT 2005) did put in place new standards in clean energy use driven by increased public 
awareness and concern over anthropogenic climate change (IEA, 2007:9). However, the 
administration and Congress lacked co-operation in this area (IEA, 2007:10). 
In addition, the Bush administration emphasised the national goal of reducing the US 
dependency on foreign petroleum due to concern over rising demand from India and China, 
with the implications that this had for price increases and the availability of petroleum and 
corresponding implications for US power and security in relation to these rising rivals in the 
international system which must be understood in the context of US consumption growing 
faster than its domestic production (Bush, 2005; Chanlett-Avery, 2005). The link between 
changing economic circumstances, and economic security and energy policy was thereby 
highlighted. It was therefore the Bush administration’s preoccupation with unhindered 
economic growth in an anarchic and competitive system and preventing other countries from 
gaining an unfair advantage that focused its attention on those policy options that could 
reduce Carbon Dioxide (CO2) emissions without hurting economic growth (Reardon, 2004).  
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The Bush administration emphasised the link between fossil fuel production and power in the 
international system as a means of enhancing US self-help and power in an anarchic system 
increasingly dominated by competition with emerging economies while the US hegemonic 
position was experiencing structural decline (Report of the National Energy Policy 
Development Group, 2001:viii; ix; Klare(a), 2004:56; Klare and Volman, 2006:612; 
Chanlett-Avery, 2005:1, 11). With the new challenges that emerged in the early 2000s 
especially related to increasing energy prices alongside accelerated demand from India and 
China, as well as increasing US consumption, the changing distribution of power in the 
international system, with the influence of strong emerging economies such as China and 
India, alongside European countries and Japan being a consideration, renewed the 
administration’s concern with the energy policy goals of energy security and fossil fuel 
production as a necessity for US economic well-being as well as national security (Klare and 
Volman, 2006:612; Chanlett-Avery, 2005:1, 11). With the relative decline of the US 
hegemonic position within an increasingly multipolar distribution of power, the Bush 
administration was driven to maintain and enhance the US hegemonic position therein 
through the emphasis on maintaining low fossil fuel prices but in the context of increasing 
competition for scarce resources from China and India, as well as developed nations (Klare 
and Volman, 2006:612; Chanlett-Avery, 2005:1, 11). Because the competitiveness of US 
industries depended on low cost fossil fuels, and per consequence economic growth for US 
power and thereby hegemony, within these dynamics renewed focus had to be placed in the 
Bush administration’s energy policy on ensuring that supply can meet increasing demand, at 
the expense of other goals such as environmental protection and climate change mitigation, 
which could potentially harm US economic growth and thereby weaken its position relative 
to its competitors within the anarchic international system (Volman, 2003:573; Cleveland and 
Kaufman, 2003:486 – 487; Eckersley, 2007:317). Such developments would be influenced by 
the unit-level which would impact the USA’s energy policy within the above-mentioned 
dynamics. 
6.2.2 Domestic Influences 
While the energy policy designed under the Bush administration had as its main goals of 
security and economic growth influenced by the structure of the international system, the 
content of the policy in terms of its goals can be traced to the unit-level. Due to the particular 
challenges faced by the USA at the start of the 2000s characterised by energy security 
challenges of precariousness rather than the abundance of the 1990s, the Report of the 
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National Energy Policy Development Group and the EPACT2005 were chiefly concerned 
with US dependence on foreign petroleum and energy security (Klare and Volman, 2006:612; 
Chanlett-Avery, 2005:1, 11; Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, 
2001:viii, xii). As will be highlighted in this section, in order to understand these policies’ 
approach to these issues and the era’s challenges, three factors would influence these policies 
at the unit-level: the ideological predisposition of the Bush administration, the influence of 
vested interests, and Congressional stalemate at the federal level.   
The California energy crisis, the unprecedented rise of US dependence on foreign petroleum 
to over fifty percent of consumption in 1998, and rising energy prices provoked a 
reconsideration of US energy policy in the wake of these challenges. However, there was no 
single solution to the energy crisis that decision-makers faced at the time. In reaction to these 
events, many environmentally-sensitive politicians would argue that US energy policy should 
be drastically altered to focus on renewable energy sources, hydrogen power, as well as 
conservation (Klare(b), 2004:396). In the midst of these trends, the Republican Bush 
administration emphasised the national goal of reducing the US dependency on foreign 
petroleum by increasing domestic petroleum production which formed the basis of its energy 
policy (Jacobs, 2010:147). There thus emerged a tension between two approaches to the 
energy crisis faced by the USA at the time, one that emphasised conservation while the other 
approach emphasised production (Jacobs, 2010:146). Often, support for one or the other 
measure could be traced to a partisan divide between Democrats and Republicans (Jacobs, 
2010:141, 144). 
The ideology of the Republican Party would play a role in influencing the Bush 
administration’s policy-makers by advocating decreased environmental regulation, and 
instead, rather focus on the private sector’s increased domestic production due to policy-
makers’ perception that economic growth and environmental protection are incompatible due 
to the costs associated therewith (Jacobs, 2010:141, 144). This nevertheless presented a 
dilemma since US domestic production was forecasted to decrease which meant that US 
dependence on foreign petroleum would increase (Klare(b), 2004:396). This focus on 
increasing supply would appear stark in contrast to the mandates advocated by the Carter 
administration in the 1970s which focused on conservation efforts (Jacobs, 2010:148 - 149). 
However, although ideology presented a critical factor that shaped US energy policy at the 
time, this must be balanced with the incursion of vested interests. The Report of the National 
Energy Policy Development Group had a strong input from the fossil fuel industry as both 
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George W. Bush and Dick Cheney had in the past headed companies in the energy sector, and 
likewise the report was sent for recommendation and advice to a number of major fossil fuel 
corporations, which included Enron (Jacobs, 2010:152, 157). Subsequently, the EPACT2005 
would likewise provide tax incentives in favour of companies in the fossil fuel industry to 
increase domestic production (Jacobs, 2010:162). This incursion by vested interests was thus 
combined with an ideological predisposition to reduce the role of the federal government and 
enhance domestic production in US energy policy (Jacobs, 2010:168).  
Yet, the Bush administration’s attempt to reformulate US energy policy did meet resistance 
from Congress at the federal level, especially in the area of the goal of the reduction of 
environmental regulation by the federal government within the report of the National Energy 
Policy Development Group and EPACT2005 related to drilling in the ANWR (Jacobs, 
2010:159 - 160, 162). Within this altering context, in contrast to the relative stability of the 
1990s, the continued Congressional inaction over US energy policy characterised by 
continuous debate and political divisiveness was viewed as a strong restriction on the design 
and passage of a comprehensive policy that could mitigate these challenges (Bush, 2005). 
Yet, in the wake of the September eleventh tragedy, the use of executive privileges was used 
extensively by the Bush administration to reduce environmental regulation, especially those 
restrictions related to the coal industry indicating a complex relationship between the 
executive and Congress at the federal level (Jacobs, 2010:153 – 154,156). 
Since the goal of climate change mitigation was perceived as undermining the goal of 
increased fossil fuel production and thereby increasing costs to the US economy by policy-
makers within this administration, in 2001, the Bush administration announced that it would 
not cap global CO2 emissions, citing negative consequences for economic growth as 
justification (Reardon, 2004:452). The coal industry, which supported Bush during his 
electoral campaign, strongly opposed attempts to mitigate climate change (Reardon, 
2004:452). Coal made up 36% of CO2 emissions from energy consumption and with the 
technology available at the time, there would have been few means available to reduce 
emissions except by substituting coal and an emphasis on voluntarily actions that do not 
interfere with economic growth (Reardon, 2004:452). In this context, a market-based 
approach was promoted to mitigate climate change (Jacobs, 2010:160). The preoccupation 
with the petroleum, natural gas, and coal industries drew on the importance these industries 
played in supplying cheap and abundant energy to consumers which gave US industries a 
competitive advantage in the global economy and thereby enhancing its hegemonic position 
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and influence, especially as low cost energy was historically an important component of US 
hegemony and security. 
Nonetheless, in the vacuum created at the federal level, sub-national actors have filled the 
void in an attempt to tackle the climate change challenge with states and municipalities 
having thus far implemented their own policies to deal with climate change that are on par 
with their European counterparts (Fisher, 2013:770 - 771). To enhance their ability to do so 
and to counter-act some of the existing measures, during George W. Bush’s presidency, a 
number of states attempted to take legal action to invoke the regulation of carbon emissions 
and took legal action against the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to have it curb 
GHG emissions or allow states to do so themselves (Fisher, 2013:770). An important 
watershed moment in US domestic politics occurred in 2007 when the Supreme Court, in the 
landmark Massachusetts v. EPA, ruled that GHGs are “‘air pollutants’ subject to regulation 
under the Clean Air Act” (Percival, 2014:134). This ruling provided the legislative 
foundation that enabled the EPA to regulate the emission of greenhouse gases which allowed 
the US legal system to adapt to changing conditions (Percival, 2014:134 - 135). As a result, 
numerous local level policies have been implemented from the bottom-up that have 
encouraged greater action towards climate change (Lutsey and Sperling, 2008:673).  
6.3 The Bush Administration, the US Position in the UNFCCC Negotiations and US 
Energy Policy  
A commonly held notion is that the Bush administration had a dismal approach towards 
climate change both at home and abroad since the United States was viewed as having 
retreated from global environmental leadership through its obstructionist position in the 
UNFCCC (Pugh, 2015; Ivanova and Esty, 2008:57). Moreover, under the Bush 
administration, the United States retracted from the Kyoto Protocol as well as many other 
environmental policies that were adopted by the Clinton administration (Selin and 
VanDeveer, 2011:121; Selin and VanDeveer, 2009:3; Depledge, 2005:11; Parenteau, 
2004:363). While Al Gore signed the Kyoto Protocol in November 1998 in the hope that the 
composition of the Senate would alter in the future to be more receptive towards it, George 
W. Bush made it clear that his administration would not ratify the Protocol soon after he 
came to office; a position which he reaffirmed in March 2001 wherein he stated in a letter to 
Republican senators that he would not support the Kyoto Protocol (Wirth, 2015:8; Depledge, 
2005:19). Having being involved in the architecture of the global climate change regime, the 
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USA’s repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol presented a major foreign policy shift – a stance 
which caused severe criticism from the international community (Lisowski, 2002:101; Justus 
and Fletcher, 2006:9).  
The decision to not ratify the Kyoto Protocol because it did not stipulate mandatory emission 
reduction targets for developing countries alienated many developed and developing nations 
in relation to the USA in the negotiations for the next decade (Selin and VanDeveer, 
2011:121). Not only did the Bush administration’s repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol impact 
the USA’s legal stance at the UNFCCC, but this decision could have also prohibited the 
Protocol being enforced by any other state (Wirth, 2015:8). In order for the Protocol to enter 
into force it had to be ratified by those states which accounted for 55% of total emissions at 
1990 levels of which the USA accounted for approximately 35% (Wirth, 2015:9). It was only 
once the Russian Federation ratified the Protocol that it was able “to enter into force in 
February 2005” (Wirth, 2015:9). In spite of the USA’s rejection of the climate change 
regime, it did not attempt to prevent other states from partaking in the negotiating process 
under the UNFCCC, while the Bush administration continued with negotiations under the 
UNFCCC stream in order to endorse their own objectives, but did not partake in the Kyoto 
Protocol negotiations
117
 (Depledge, 2005:21, Justus and Fletcher, 2006:10). Although 
controversial, this administration had a far more complex and nuanced position towards both 
climate change and the UNFCCC wherein the USA promoted the use of voluntary measures 
and a technology-centric approach domestically and designed multilateral agreements to 
mitigate climate change that were not legally-binding (Pugh, 2015). Thereby, to commence 
this discussion, it may be useful to begin with the highlight of the Bush presidency: this 
administration’s decision to repudiate the Kyoto Protocol.  
6.3.1 Structural Influences 
While the structure of the international system is a permissive rather than a necessary cause 
(Waltz, 2001:232 – 233), it does emphasise certain options while limiting others within the 
distribution of power in the international system since states have to rely on self-help in order 
to attain their security within this anarchic system. Although the USA achieved their 
objectives in the Kyoto negotiations, namely the inclusion of the flexibility mechanisms, 
during the Bush administration, the USA was the only major industrialised country to not be 
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a party to the Kyoto Protocol (Parenteau, 2004:366; Selin and VanDeveer, 2011:121; Legget, 
2011). At the start of its term in office in 2001, the Bush administration officially justified 
their opposition to the Kyoto Protocol for the following set of reasons in a report released on 
the eleventh of June 2001: the Kyoto Protocol was ineffective since it exempted developing 
countries, it will have negative consequences for the USA’s economy, and the USA’s 
dependence on other states will increase due to the need to acquire emission reduction credits 
from other states (Lisowski, 2002:107). The Bush administration further justified his 
repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol by referring to the Byrd-Hagel Resolution and California’s 
energy crisis (Lisowski, 2002:101). Overall, the two primary reasons justified by the Bush 
administration for this policy reversal was the Kyoto Protocol’s inclusion of “the use of 
excessively strong targets” and the exemption of developing nations from adopting 
mandatory mitigation commitments (Depledge, 2005:19).  
There were important structural-level impediments that influenced the Bush administration’s 
stance towards cooperation within the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol. Because of the anarchic 
structure of the international system, states tend to be limited in their ability to cooperate due 
to concerns that the relative gains from such interactions will advantage other states (Grieco, 
1988:600). In addition, interstate cooperation is further limited when there are security 
implications involved due to the distribution of costs both across and within the states 
involved. Due to these concerns for both relative gains, and US security, the Bush 
administration and Senate justified the repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol by underscoring the 
level of uncertainty and the high costs involved surrounding the mitigation of climate change 
for the US economy (Lisowski, 2002:109; Parker et al. 2011:7). These concerns for the 
USA’s relative gains and security have to be placed within the constraints of the changing 
distribution of power within the anarchic system marked by the relative decline of the USA 
and the rise of emerging economies. The asymmetrical design of the Kyoto Protocol that 
would exempt developing states from legally binding mitigation targets would thereby have 
advantaged strong emerging economies in global trade, while there would have been 
repercussions for US competitiveness and a strong possibility of carbon leakage because of 
the increased costs of energy prices with consequences for both the distribution of power in 
the international system and US security as the USA’s hegemonic position would be 
undermined due to the economic costs it would have incurred while its rivals would have 
been advantaged (Parker et al., 2011:7; Roberts and Downey, 2016; Bohan, 2007). To further 
emphasise this point the afore-mentioned report, “observes a two percent reduction in GDP 
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would be equivalent to the 1970s oil shock, and a four per cent reduction would transform the 
US economy ‘from one of strong growth to recession, with potentially significant 
repercussions for the global economy’” (Lisowski, 2002:109). The Bush administration thus 
underscored that the Kyoto Protocol breached the Byrd-Hagel Resolution as it undermined 
the US economy and US structural power in the international system (Lisowski, 2002:109; 
Eckersley, 2007:317).  
Since US power in the international system was augmented through cheap fossil fuel prices 
by enhancing the competitive advantage of US industries in global trade, the need to maintain 
this fossil fuel dependence was reiterated when situated in relation to US structural decline in 
the international system (Parker et al, 2011; Tomain, 2007:1203). Moreover, with the rise of 
rivals that would attain relative gains because of the Kyoto Protocol’s emphasis that 
developed nations undertake mandatory mitigation action, the Bush administration would 
choose the opposite strategy that would place further emphasis on fossil fuels, and petroleum, 
to maintain the US hegemonic position in relation to their rivals (Lisowski, 2002:101, 107, 
109; Eckersley, 2007:317; Parker et al., 2007:7). Given the recommendations of the Report 
of the National Energy Policy Development Group and the design of the EPACT2005, due to 
the challenges faced by this administration, energy security and the USA’s dependence on 
foreign sources of petroleum were the main concerns of US energy policy at the time (Minsk, 
2017:5; Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, 2001:viii; Klare and 
Volman, 2006:612). As a repetition of past concerns, the costs of mitigation reduced the 
administration’s support for such measures over fears of the potential structural decline of the 
USA in the international system relative to its rivals (Lisowski, 2002:108; Parker et al.,:7). 
This was in spite of the fact that there was potential that the goal of climate change mitigation 
could simultaneously enhance the policy goals of both US energy security and reduce its 
dependence on foreign sources of petroleum (Toke and Vezirgiannidou, 2013:538; Kim, 
2014). Hence, the trade-offs between these policy goals and the means to attain them limited 
the Bush administration’s support for mitigation. Thus, the negative consequences for the 
USA’s economy, an important aspect of its hegemony, was a formidable structural level 
impediment to the Bush administration’s participation in the Kyoto Protocol, especially given 
the exemption of developing countries from having to undertake mitigation action (Lisowski, 
2007:107) which could have consequences for the distribution of power in the international 
system and the position and security of the USA relative to its rivals.  
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Since international regimes reflect the interests of powerful states, due to the USA’s 
hegemonic position, the Bush administration could repudiate the Kyoto Protocol when it did 
not serve its interests. Waltz (1993:18) reminds us that, “The nature and purposes of 
institutions change as structures vary.” Likewise, US foreign policy under the Bush 
administration was marked by a turn from multilateralism to unilateralism (Skidmore, 
2005:207). State behaviour can be traced to the structure of the international system, that is 
whether the structure is defined by a unipolar, bipolar or multipolar order and their position 
within this order. As the historical record indicates, the US coordination of multilateralism 
amongst states and international institutions has been a complex exercise (Skidmore, 2005). 
That is, while it was highly engaged in creating and coordinating multilateral institutions in 
the post-War era, as a hegemonic state, it was less likely to comply with the norms and 
principles of these institutions when these did not serve its interests (Skidmore, 2005). 
Rather, these institutions served as an expression of US power and hegemony, not its 
constraint (Skidmore, 2005). In the absence of the Cold War structure and the Soviet threat, a 
significant constraint on US power dissolved while its allies were less dependent on the US 
for security provision (Skidmore, 2005:224). The end of the Cold War and its bipolar order 
served as an important source of influence on US behaviour and its relations with its allies by 
making it “less willing to provide collective goods through strong international institutions” 
(Skidmore, 2005). Thereby, tension between the US and its allies increased since the US was 
less invested in multilateral institutions while its allies were more vocal in insisting that the 
US be bound to the same rules and norms that other states had to comply with (Skidmore, 
2005). In this context, vested interests became more forceful in opposing multilateral 
agreements that undermined their interests, placing pressure on the executive not to ratify 
some of these agreements (Skidmore, 2005:224). The collective result was that under the 
Bush administration, US foreign policy was characterised more by hard power and less on the 
willingness of other states to comply with US leadership (Skidmore, 2005).   
Within the above-mentioned context, the changing distribution of power in the international 
system reflected by the structural decline of the USA and the rise of developing countries 
within an increasingly multipolar
118
 order during this era, influenced the Bush administration 
to repudiate the Kyoto Protocol since its asymmetrical design related to the exemption of 
developing nations and potentially negative consequences for the US economy, would 
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undermine US power and security and thereby hegemonic position while advantaging and 
increasing the power of its rivals.  Since US power in the international system was augmented 
through cheap fossil fuel prices by enhancing the competitive advantage of US industries in 
global trade, the negative implications for US competitiveness, a key component of US 
hegemony, meant that this fossil fuel dependence and low energy prices were advanced 
within the context of US structural decline in the international system and the need to 
maintain its hegemonic position (Tomain, 2007: 1203; Parker et al, 2011). Thereby, the Bush 
administration would favour an energy policy that centred around fossil fuels, and petroleum, 
to maintain the US position in relation to its rivals through cheap energy prices, the 
traditional concern of US energy policy (Klare and Volman, 2006:612; Minsk, 2017:5). 
Because of the trade-offs between these policy goals and the design of the Kyoto Protocol, 
the Bush administration would not support the Kyoto Protocol and as such the USA could 
rely on its hegemonic position to repudiate the Kyoto Protocol as it did not serve its interests 
within the era’s particular configuration of power at both the domestic and structural levels 
(Mearsheimer, 1994-1995:7). There is link between economic strength and security in the 
international system. With the increased competition between the USA and developing 
nations within the distribution of power, the USA would not support the Kyoto Protocol as it 
undermined US power in the system. Since states have to rely on self-help in an anarchic 
international system, the USA had to advance those policies that were to enhance its security 
vis-à-vis its rivals in the international system while limiting its support for policies that did 
not serve its interests domestically or internationally. 
6.3.2 Domestic Influences 
In contrast to the international community, the Bush administration differed in two important 
respects in its stance towards the climate change regime. Firstly, the administration was 
sceptical towards the scientific consensus surrounding climate change and, secondly the 
administration questioned the use of multilateralism as a means of dealing with threats of a 
transnational nature (Depledge, 2005:11). George W. Bush did not always convey this 
antagonistic impression. During his 2000 campaign trail, Bush asserted that all power plants 
were to reduce their emissions under his presidency (Percival, 2014:140; Parenteau, 
2004:366). It was thus anticipated that the Bush administration would make a concerted effort 
to reduce the USA’s emissions (Percival, 2014:141). However, once in office, Bush distanced 
himself from this assertion seemingly due to antagonism from the conservative stream within 
the Republican Party (Percival, 2014:141). It further appears that US vice-president Dick 
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Cheney had great input into this policy reversal; and limited greatly the scope of involvement 
by both the EPA and State Department within the Bush administration’s decision (Percival, 
2014:141). 
At the unit-level, the Bush administration’s ideological predisposition alongside the influence 
of vested interests, were relevant factors that determined the Bush administration’s position 
towards the climate change regime in an attempt to curb US structural decline and not give its 
competitors relative gains. In this regard, it does appear that the perception of policy-makers 
within this administration regarding the costs related to environmental regulation and its 
compatibility with economic growth, which were influenced by its ideological beliefs, appear 
to be instrumental in influencing policy outcomes towards climate change amid the particular 
domestic and international context present at the time (Lisowski, 2002:102; Depledge, 
2005:19; Fisher, 2006:471). In particular, the fall back on ideology as a guiding principal 
proved to be an important factor for this repudiation rather than a well-considered policy 
design and consideration for the position of its allies (Depledge, 2005:19). Moreover, the 
Bush administration’s close association with the fossil fuel industry is quite apparent and 
well-documented. This association is an important factor that influenced the Bush 
administration’s position towards the Kyoto Protocol because it also influenced its ambition 
to enact a particular energy policy, one that was not compatible with the goals of the 
UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol (Lisowski, 2002:112). Moreover, the Bush administration gave 
no indication within its energy policy that the USA would achieve the UNFCCC goal of 
reducing emission levels to 1990 levels (Parker et al. 2011:8).  
The Bush administration favoured a domestic energy policy which endorsed the objective of 
an expansion of fossil fuel supply since it was considered important for economic growth - a 
dichotomy which could not be reconciled to a foreign policy which necessarily required a 
reduction in greenhouse gases emitted by the production and use of fossil fuels (Lisowski, 
2002:112). This was already evident in 2001, when the Bush administration assembled an 
energy task force to oversee the establishment of an energy policy; however, from the very 
beginning the task force was biased towards fossil fuels (Lisowski, 2002:112). This is not 
surprising since George W. Bush and many members of his cabinet, including Vice-President 





. Hence, many of these individuals were connected to companies that 
would be negatively impacted by efforts to mitigate GHGs (Lisowski, 2002:106). 
These material interests were also connected to this administration’s particular position 
towards foreign policy (Lisowski, 2002:106). Unlike its predecessor, the Republican mandate 
of the “America First” approach to foreign policy was supported which was used to review 
existing treaties (Lisowski, 2002:106). Thus, anything that appeared to threaten the USA’s 
hegemonic position in the global economy had to be forcefully handled (Lisowski, 2002:106 
- 107). Depledge proposes that, 
“The extent to which the US administration misjudged the global mood over 
the Kyoto Protocol and placed itself in such isolation is very revealing of its 
overall attitude to international affairs. The US administration had truly 
assumed that, once the US withdrew, the Kyoto Process would collapse, 
either because action on climate change without US participation was 
unthinkable, or because countries that had been publicly supporting the 
Kyoto Protocol were doing so disingenuously, and would be gratefully 
relieved at the opportunity to reveal their true opposition to the treaty and 
follow the US lead in rejecting it.” (Depledge, 2005:20).   
The Bush administrations’ decision
120
 to repudiate the Kyoto Protocol appears to have been 
based on the domestic and international political constraints that were present at the time 
(Lisowski, 2002:102). At the federal level, domestic politics, that is the Senate’s opposition 
to the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, seems to have justified the Bush administration’s 
antagonistic approach towards the negotiations (Lisowski, 2002:108). While the USA was 
not a party to the Kyoto Protocol, the Bush administration did implement a number of “new 
international technology cooperation agreements” that were more feasible in the domestic 
context of US politics (Pugh, 2015; Parker et al., 2011:7 - 8). Based on the administration’s 
particular beliefs regarding both domestic and international constraints, the result of this is 
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 Other explanations for this repudiation refer to the outcome of the breakdown of negotiations at COP 6 in 
The Hague which further underscored the idea that the Senate would not ratify any agreement, the Kyoto 
Protocol would prevent Bush from pursuing his energy policy domestically, and lastly Bush was personally 
antagonistic towards the Kyoto Protocol (Lisowski, 2002:101).  
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that under the Bush administration “three technologies were chosen for elevation to a 
political level” which allowed for the establishment of a new foundation for a technology-
centric approach to deal with climate change, these being carbon-capture, hydrogen and 
nuclear technologies (Pugh, 2015).  
Thereby, while the Bush administration repudiated the Kyoto Protocol, the administration 
nonetheless implemented certain measures to deal with climate change that were in line with 
their position that such actions need to be nationally determined. In a policy statement issued 
in June 2001, Bush articulated that the US approach to the climate change dilemma would be 
based on heightened scientific research, market mechanisms and voluntary actions (Justus 
and Fletcher, 2006:9). Although the Bush administration did not support a comprehensive 
climate change agreement and mandatory emission reduction standards; it did establish a 
number of partnerships regarding the implementation of a climate change strategy (Pugh, 
2015). The Bush administration presented its alternative to the Kyoto Protocol, the Climate 
Change Initiative, in 2002 (Skodvin and Andresen, 2009; Centre for Climate and Energy 
Solutions, 2002). The Climate Change Initiative had as its objective an 18% reduction of the 
emissions intensity of the US economy by 2012 and consisted of four main programmes that 
were meant to achieve this (Skodvin and Andresen, 2009). Under this alternative programme, 
a voluntary greenhouse gas intensity
121
 goal was put in place that elaborated existing 
voluntary programmes by “encouraging companies to voluntarily report and reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions, and proposes increased federal funding for climate change science 
and technology development” (Centre for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2002).  Essentially, 
this Initiative was based on a voluntary basis whereby technological development
122
 was 
endorsed (Skodvin and Andresen, 2009). This programme expanded the Department of 
Energy’s (DoE) existing voluntary reporting programme under which companies voluntarily 
submit data on their GHG reduction efforts (Centre for Climate and Energy Solutions, 
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 Another notable initiative endorsed by the administration was the National Climate 
Change Technology Initiative (NCCTI) and the Climate Change Research Initiative (CCRI) 
(Justus and Fletcher, 2006:9). Both these policies focused on short-term
124
 policy goals 
related towards technology and scientific solutions towards climate change (Justus and 
Fletcher, 2006:9).  
6.4 The USA’s Position in the UNFCCC after 2005 
Subsequent to its decision to repudiate the Kyoto Protocol, the Bush administration continued 
to hold a cautious position within the UNFCCC negotiations wherein after 2005, the 
negotiations concerning the mitigation of climate change were organised to determine the 
succeeding actions to be taken once the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period expired in 
2012 (Wirth, 2015:9; Dernbach and Altenburg, 2014:102). It was anticipated that such an 
agreement would be finalised at the Copenhagen climate summit in December 2009 (Wirth, 
2015:9). In December 2005 at  the eleventh Meeting of the COP of the UNFCCC  (COP 11) 
and the first Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (MOP 1), developing countries as 
well as the United States opposed the idea of negotiating “new legally-binding commitments 
for the post-Kyoto (post-2012) period”, while countries were hesitant to analyse new 
commitments for the post-Kyoto period if it did not include all major emitters such as India, 
China and also the United States (Fletcher and Parker, 2008: 7 – 8).  
By 2007, climate change emerged as a critical issue on the international stage which required 
urgent attention and action from all nations. To reflect this urgency, the United Nations 
Security Council held its first debate regarding the potential relationship between climate 
change, security, energy and peace (Fletcher and Parker, 2008:20). In this context, 
negotiations got underway to determine the most appropriate approach to advance in order to 
mitigate climate change at the negotiations in Bali, Indonesia from the third to the fourteenth 
of December 2007 (Fletcher and Parker, 2008:20). In 2007, the USA’s emissions peaked and 
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Programme (CCTP) which likewise endorses climate change technology and Research and Development (R&D) 
(Justus and Fletcher, 2006:9). 
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in the same year China surpassed the United States as the biggest existing emitter of GHGs 
(Legget, 2014:2; Legget, 2011:1). The COP 13 and third meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol held in Bali, Indonesia adopted the Bali Action Plan which was “intended to launch 
intensive multilateral consultations scheduled to conclude with a comprehensive agreement at 
COP-15 in Copenhagen, Denmark, at the end of 2009” (Wirth, 2015:9).  At the end of the 
negotiations, Parties were able to reach some sort of a compromise and produced the Bali 
Action Plan, under which two negotiating tracks were established (Wirth, 2015:9; Fletcher 
and Parker, 2008:8). 
The negotiating track of the Ad Hoc Group on Further Commitments under the Kyoto 
Protocol (AWG-KP) aimed to adopt new binding mitigation commitments for Annex I, or 
developed, countries for the post-2012 period (Wirth, 2015:9; Leggett, 2010). The Ad-Hoc 
Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) 
focused on negotiations under the Framework Convention which included all Parties to the 
Convention (Wirth, 2015:9). This second negotiation track proceeds in tandem with the 
AWG-KP (Leggett, 2010).  The Bali Action Plan consisted of four main elements: (i) 
mitigation of climate change; (ii) adaptation to the impacts of climate change; (iii) financial 
assistance; and (iv) technology development and transfer (Fletcher and Parker, 2008:9). 
Under the circumstances, it was understood that both developed as well as developing nations 
would need to accept measures to mitigate climate change after 2012 (Fletcher and Parker, 
2008:9).  
The United States was once again viewed as having an obstructionist position during the Bali 
negotiations
125
 (Ivanova and Esty, 2008:58). At the negotiations, the United States position 
was characterised by its refusal to accept binding emission reduction targets and under these 
circumstances the progress needed to advance mandatory emission reductions would be 
stalled until a more progressive administration would be willing to enter into negotiations in 
2009 (Fletcher and Parker, 2008:20). The Bush administration has been characterised by a 
pursuit of unilateralism towards security issues, a position that has likewise been evident in 
its position towards environmental issues (Ivanova and Esty, 2008:58). The real question is 
has the United States lost its influence in the UNFCCC? This was a major issue since other 
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 As a diplomatic first, the US delegation was actually booed when it obstructed the emerging Bali consensus 
(Ivanova and Esty, 2008:58). 
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nations were willing to proceed with the negotiations in spite of the absence of the United 
States therein (Ivanova and Esty, 2008:58). 
6.5 Linking the USA’s Energy Policy and Position within the UNFCCC 
The presidency of the George W. Bush administration occurred during a period of instability 
in energy markets with the California energy crisis, increased demand from developing 
countries, steep increases in energy prices and the USA’s dependence on petroleum imports 
surpassing fifty percent of consumption in 1998. Within this context, certain policy goals 
were promoted in reaction to the constraints and incentives presented by the international and 
domestic systems in an attempt to maintain low energy prices for US economic well-being. In 
response to these challenges, the Bush administration would issue the report of the National 
Energy Policy Development Group in 2001 and the Energy Policy Act of 2005 
(EPACT2005) which were primarily focused on the USA’s energy security and dependence 
on foreign petroleum. These policies placed an emphasis on increasing fossil fuel production 
to meet these challenges (Lisowski, 2002:112).  
At the structural level, since the Bush administration was concerned about US structural 
decline and the rise of rivals that challenged US hegemony in an anarchic international 
system, the policy goal of climate change mitigation would become a peripheral issue due to 
policy-makers’ concerns over the perceived costs of such actions and the perceived trade-offs 
with the afore-mentioned goals. This would further influence the administration to emphasise 
low cost fossil fuel energy to enhance the USA’s economy, and thereby hegemony, in 
relation to the ascent of emerging economies in the international system. Given the 
challenges faced by this administration, these goals were perceived by policy-makers within 
this administration as incompatible with one another in the attempt to augment US power and 
security, as well as maintain its hegemonic position relative to its rivals. Since the cheap 
supply of fossil fuels was a source of comparative advantage for the USA, the risks to its 
energy security and the perceived costs of mitigation increased the administration’s resistance 
towards environmental regulation and climate change mitigation.  
The Bush administration’s energy policy would be impacted at the structural level by the 
increasingly multipolar distribution of power in the international system and the USA’s 
relative hegemonic decline therein (Eichengreen, 2011; Cox, 2012:369; Gaiser and Kovacˇ, 
2012:59). Thus while the unipolar distribution of power and stable energy markets in the 
1990s proved favourable to US interests during this era, this multipolar distribution of power 
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was made more challenging within the context of the energy challenges facing the USA at the 
time, which made energy security and economic growth key policy goals (Klare and Volman, 
2006:612; Chanlett-Avery, 2005:1, 11; Gaiser and Kovacˇ, 2012:52, 59). With the rise of 
emerging economies in the distribution of power, interstate competition increased and the 
USA strove to maintain and enhance its hegemonic position within the anarchic international 
system. To enhance US power, domestic production of low cost fossil fuels was promoted as 
historically this was an important aspect of the USA’s hegemony through the enhancement of 
its economic growth and strength (Eckersley, 2007:317; Parker et al., 2011:7). Since 
economic growth and energy security were integral for US power and security in a 
competitive, anarchic system, the reliance on the production of cheap fossil fuels at the 
expense of other policy goals such as environmental regulation were promoted to enhance the 
USA’s hegemonic position, thus emphasising the link between fossil fuel production and 
power in the international system as a means of promoting US self-help (Eckersley, 
2007:317; Lisowski, 2002:109). 
At the federal level, the Bush administration’s energy policy can be linked to other crucial 
influences these being ideology, vested interests, and the structure of the US political system. 
The Republican Bush administration’s ideological position predisposed it to limit federal 
involvement in energy markets and environmental regulation (Percival, 2014:141; Pugh, 
2015). Rather, market mechanisms and voluntary actions were promoted to meet the 
challenge of climate change (Pugh, 2015; Parker et al., 2011:7). Under such circumstances, 
the Bush administration chose to pursue a more aggressive energy policy grounded in its 
ideological predisposition that was centred on a pro-production focus based on fossil fuels 
(Percival, 2014:141; Lisowski, 2002:102). Thus, US energy policy would reflect an emphasis 
on energy security and the production of fossil fuels, while environmental regulation proved 
to be a peripheral goal since policy-makers in this administration perceived economic growth 
and environmental regulation as incompatible because of the perceived costs that would be 
accrued to US energy prices and the negative consequences for the US economy (Volman, 
2003:573; Klare and Volman, 2006:612; IEA, 2007:9; Klare(b), 2004:396). The incursion of 
vested interests both within and outside the administration would further predispose the 
administration to place emphasis on a strategy that hinged on increased fossil fuel production 
(Percival, 2014:141). In the US federal system, Congressional opposition would limit the 
administration’s ability to pursue all of its policy goals, especially in so far as decreased 
environmental regulation was concerned as the restrictions on petroleum exploration in the 
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ANWR would demonstrate (Gerth, 2005; Rinfret and Pautz, 2019:300). Yet, in the 
September eleventh context, the Bush administration could make use of a number of 
executive actions to push through their policy goals reflecting a complex relationship 
between Congress and the executive during this era at the federal level (Rinfret and Pautz, 
2019:300). Moreover, Congressional inaction and continuous debate as well as division 
prevented the design of a comprehensive energy policy (Bush, 2005).  
This would have implications for the USA’s position in the UNFCCC. The Republican 
administration of George W. Bush had a cautious approach to both the UNFCCC and the 
Kyoto Protocol (Depledge, 2005:11; Parenteau, 2004:363). The historical context during 
which this occurred was an important attribute to this position. With the changing distribution 
of power, the Bush administration indicated its opposition to the Kyoto Protocol on the basis 
that it would have negative consequences for the US economy and because it exempted 
developing nations (Lisowski, 2002: 101, 107; Eckersley, 2007:311, 315). Thus, the 
implications for the USA’s hierarchic position and the relative gains attained by developing 
nations were important structural considerations, especially when considered alongside the 
mandate of the Byrd-Hagel Resolution. Therefore, at the structural level, US cooperation was 
limited because of the consideration of relative gains to developing nations alongside the 
distribution of costs across and within states. 
At the structural level, the Bush administration pursued such a foreign policy since it was 
threatened by US structural decline and the rise of China and other emerging economies, and 
the USA’s increasing energy insecurity after the abundance of the 1990s (Lisowski, 
2002:109; Eckersley, 2007:317). This can be traced to the altering distribution of power in 
the international system in respect to the 1990s. By the early 2000s, a shift was discernible in 
the international system with a devolution of power from the West to the East thus altering 
the distribution of power in the international system (Eichengreen, 2011; Cox, 2012:369). 
Rather than the unipolar world order of the early 1990s, the 2000s were characterised by a 
multipolar international system (Eichengreen, 2011). Since fossil fuels, especially petroleum, 
were an important building block of US power and hegemony, the Bush administration 
wanted US energy policy to focus on increased production of fossil fuels to maintain US 
security and power in an anarchic international system – a stance that was incompatible with 
the design of the Kyoto Protocol (Eckersley, 2007:117; Lisowski, 2002:107). Moreover, this 
occurred with the threat of increased demand for energy from China and other developing 
countries which further threatened the USA’s hegemonic position (Klare and Volman, 
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2006:612; Chanlett-Avery, 2005:1, 11). As has been highlighted in this chapter, to enhance 
US power, policy-makers within the Bush administration thus chose a policy design 
consisting of increased fossil fuel production, the free market and a reliance on technology to 
mitigate climate change in order to minimise the perceived costs to the US economy, and 
thereby not threaten the USA’s hegemonic position, policy goals which were incompatible 
with the demands of the Kyoto Protocol and the UNFCCC. Since the Kyoto Protocol did not 
serve the interests of the USA, the USA could rely on its hegemonic position to repudiate the 
Kyoto Protocol. Multilateral institutions will reflect the interests of powerful states. 
At the federal level, Congressional opposition in the Byrd-Hagel Resolution of 1997 made it 
evident that it will not support the Kyoto Protocol on the grounds that it would harm the US 
economy, and its exemption of developing nations which the Bush administration used as a 
pretext to not support the Kyoto Protocol (Lisowski, 2002:107). Within this domestic context, 
this was combined with the Bush administration’s ideological predisposition along with the 
intrusion of vested interests which influenced the Bush administration’s stance towards US 
energy policy, the mitigation of climate change and the Kyoto Protocol in the midst of 
concerns over the costs to US energy (Parker et al., 2011:13; Leggett, 2011:3). Moreover, the 
Bush administration’s foreign policy position was influenced by the Republican party’s 
“America First” mandate along with the perception that economic growth and environmental 
regulation were incompatible (Lisowski, 2002:106; Parker et al., 2011). To deal with climate 
change, the Bush administration implemented technology cooperation agreements along with 
voluntary and nationally determined actions which were more feasible in the domestic 
context of US politics (Pugh, 2015; Lisowski, 2002:102; Parker et al., 2011:7 - 8). 
The impact of the international system was filtered through the influence of ideology and 
vested interests within the US federal system during the Bush administration. The Bush 
administration thus favoured pro-production and energy security goals within its energy 
policy as these goals were perceived by this administration to be central to maintaining low 
energy prices, which were central to US competitiveness and hegemony, within the 
challenges presented by this particular era to US power and security relative to its rivals 
(Parker et al., 2011:7 - 8; Eckersley, 2007:317). The federal structure of the US political 
system would influence the maintenance of low energy prices and limit support, to a degree, 
for environmental protection, but especially climate change mitigation. Within the changing 
distribution of power, the USA would not support the Kyoto Protocol as its goals were 
incompatible with the goals of the Bush administration’s favoured energy policy, a situation 
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made more acute by the changing distribution of power, and the concern for US power 
relative to its rivals therein in the midst of growing competition for scarce resources 
(Lisowski, 2002:109; Chanlett-Avery, 2005:1, 11). The USA could thus rely on its 
hegemonic position to maintain the central goals of its energy policy while choosing to not 
support the Kyoto Protocol. Ideological predisposition and the influence of vested interests 
resulted in a particular energy policy that was incompatible with the Kyoto Protocol 
(Lisowski, 2002:102; Depledge, 2005:19; Fisher, 2006:471; Parker et al., 2011:13; Leggett, 
2011:3). With the increased competition of developing nations, in an increasingly multipolar 
distribution of power, these influences were augmented to permit the Bush administration to 
pursue its preferred energy policy while not supporting a regime that did not serve US 
interests. This was augmented by the notion that this would maintain low energy costs which 
was embedded within the federal structure of the US political system. Within this context, 
Congress did not support the Kyoto Protocol as it was deemed to give developing countries 
an unfair advantage while undermining the US economy by raising the costs of energy 
(Lisowski, 2002:107; Depledge, 2005:19; Parker et al., 2011:7).  
6.6 Conclusion 
After the relative market stability of the 1990s, the 2000s would present a set of multi-faceted 
issues to decision-makers that shirked a straightforward solution as US dependency on 
foreign petroleum reached unprecedented levels and its energy security was undermined by 
increased demand from developing countries and rising energy prices, while there was 
international and domestic pressure to mitigate climate change. The Bush administration 
would attempt to meet these challenges by developing an energy policy that centred on 
increased production of fossil fuels, a decision that would prove imprudent since it would 
make the USA even more dependent on foreign petroleum suppliers. Ideology and the 
intrusion of vested interests would play a part in influencing this policy design while negating 
support for environmental regulation since the costs of such actions would have negative 
consequences for the US economy. Due to the threat of rivals in the international system 
alongside these influences, the Bush administration would choose to not support the Kyoto 
Protocol since it negated its main energy strategy and imposed unacceptable costs to the US 
economy while providing its rivals with relative gains.  
The George W. Bush administration was characterised by a shift in US foreign policy. Its 
reliance on unilateralism rather than multilateralism towards various issues arose out of the 
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confluence of a multifaceted set of issues present at the time. It is perhaps unfair to judge this 
administration as the sole product of ideological malpractice and the incursion of vested 
interests. Given the strenuous set of circumstances facing decision-makers at the time both at 
the international and domestic levels, the attempt to design a pragmatic energy and foreign 






The Obama Administration (2009 - 2015): Energy Policy, 
Climate Change and the UNFCCC 
7.1 Introduction 
In some respects, the Obama administration’s energy policy entailed a continuity of previous 
administrations’ energy policies with a focus on a pro-production strategy and the promotion 
of private sector initiatives in the energy sector. His administration was marked by two major 
differences: its efforts to integrate environmental protection, especially that of a low carbon 
future, into energy policy, and its use of executive actions to achieve its particular goals. 
Obama’s presidency can be further distinguished into two periods. During the first 
presidential term, the focus was on the global financial crisis (GFC), climate change, and 
finding a nexus between the two for their resolution. Although Congress supported the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 which included measures for renewable 
energy deployment, it showed less support for cap-and-trade legislation citing concern 
regarding asymmetrical climate policies in China. Since Congress did not pass this 
legislation, it limited what the Obama administration could feasibly accomplish to reduce 
emissions and take a strong position at the UNFCCC negotiations during the Copenhagen 
negotiations in 2009.  These interactions must also be situated within an evolving historical 
context. While the EU and USA have traditionally been viewed as the dominant players in 
the global climate change negotiations; with the presidency of Barack Obama, this period saw 
the ascent of emerging economies such as China, India and Brazil who began to exert 
influence over the scope of the negotiations (Parker et al., 2014:8). 
During the Obama administration’s second term in office, the transformation in the US 
energy sector had important implications for US energy policy and its position in the 
UNFCCC. Because of the USA’s increased production of shale gas, the increased energy 
security and the creation of new economic opportunities helped decrease the costs to the US 
economy of mitigating climate change thereby changing the hierarchy of policy goals and the 
costs of different policy designs after forty years (CAR, 2016:7). Per consequence, the 
Obama administration could rely on executive orders, the Climate Action Plan (CAP) and 
Clean Power Plan (CPP), which were paramount in meeting its domestic and international 
goals. With these changes set in place, the Obama administration was instrumental in 
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securing the Paris Agreement, representing an important turning point in the history of the 
UNFCCC. This chapter traces on overview of the Obama administration’s energy policy and 
its interactions with its position in the UNFCCC and specifically focuses on analysing the 
Copenhagen Accord (2009), and the Paris Agreement (2015).  
7.2 The Obama Administration’s Energy Policy 2009 – 2013 
An energy policy emerges in reaction to and as a reflection of a particular set of 
circumstances (Helm, 2005:1). In 2008, energy-related activities accounted for 86% of US 
GHG emissions, 18% higher than when climate change first reached the political agenda 
during Congressional hearings in 1988 (Parker et al., 2011:1). Analysts also assumed that US 
dependence on petroleum imports would persist for decades, while the USA experienced its 
worst recession in years which caused the price of energy to decrease (De Jong et al., 2010: 
221). In 2008, a report published by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory for the US 
Department of Energy cautioned that, 
“Scientific evidence indicates that major decarbonisation of the 
world’s energy system is necessary to avoid irreversible climate 
change…This outcome must be achieved in the face of a vast carbon-
based infrastructure in the developed world that cannot be constrained 
overnight compounded by continued unprecedented growth of carbon-
based energy in the developing world. Crafting climate legislation is 
perhaps one of the most difficult challenges facing Congress. 
Effective policy must balance the drive for action on carbon dioxide 
emissions with measures to minimise the cost that is inherent in 
moving the energy foundation of the US economy away from free 
venting of carbon emissions. Economically transitioning from a fossil-
based economy to an energy economy where non-emitting sources 
provide significant portions of energy demand will take decades.”  
While the USA’s energy policy rests on a number of assumptions, this policy framework has 
for decades centred around the tension between economic growth and environmental 
protection. Briefly, up to the 1970s, US energy policy rested on three economic assumptions: 
competition rather than government regulation promotes the efficient working of energy 
markets; there is a correlation between energy production and economic productivity, 
therefore the more energy is produced and consumed, the stronger the economy will be; and, 
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economies of scale are needed to produce the largest quantity of energy at the lowest cost to 
ensure economic strength. Since the 1970s, these assumptions have been contested by the 
energy crises and environmental degradation related to energy production and use. This 
created two opposing ideational frameworks related to the assumptions on which energy 
policy should be based: one that assumes that economic growth and environmental regulation 
can be compatible given the right policy instruments; and one that views these two goals as 
incompatible due to the perception of the higher costs that environmental regulation will 
incur (Jaffe et al., 1995:133). Controversy further surrounded the role of government and 
regulation, the redistribution of income and costs, and the attainment and mix of energy 
sources.  
Before their election to office, candidates Obama and Biden put forward a New Energy for 
America plan which intended to establish an economy-wide cap-and-trade programme to 
reduce emissions by 80% by 2050 as well as set up a National Low Carbon Fuel Standard in 
order to accelerate the use of low carbon non-petroleum fuels (Parker et al., 2011:10). A re-
engagement with the UNFCCC was also a strong aspect of their agenda as candidates (Parker 
et al., 2011:10). However, in 2009, the United States experienced the worst economic 
crisis
126
 since the Great Depression of the 1930s (Collina and Poff, 2009:1; Council of 
Economic Advisers, 2014:i). While the two issues that Obama addressed during his election 
campaign were the United States’ petroleum dependence, and climate change; in the 
aftermath of the recession, it seemed unlikely that Obama would push for a progressive 
energy and climate policy that could achieve these goals (Collina and Poff, 2009:1; Holden, 
2009:410).  
In spite of these misgivings, on the 17
th
 of February 2009, the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (otherwise known as the Recovery Act) was signed into law by 
President Obama to link energy and economic recovery but in the midst of new trends and 
policy goals (Council of Economic Advisers, 2014:2; Collina and Poff, 2009:2). The Obama 
administration proposed the Recovery Act as a means to manage the economic crisis, energy, 
and climate change simultaneously - a clean energy economy framework that would 
simultaneously enhance economic recovery while mitigating climate change, thus attempting 
to combine two goals that historically were viewed as incompatible (Stanislaw, 2009; 
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 Economic output that is measured by gross domestic product (GDP) was at its worst decline since the end of 
the Second World War (Council of Economic Advisers, 2014:2).    
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Holden, 2009:414). Such a deal essentially consisted of three goals: improve the country’s 
national security, “build the foundation for a twenty first-century economy”, and advance 
America’s global leadership all of which are essential for its hegemony (Stanislaw, 2009). 
The key difference within this framework was that support for renewable energy was seen as 
a means to generate jobs and establish the foundation for a low carbon economy to alleviate 
the effects of the crisis (Collina and Poff, 2009:1; Selin and VanDeveer, 2011:121; Parker et 
al., 2014:8).  
The Stimulus - the largest in US history - provided $787 billion towards economic revival 
“through federal spending and investment in everything from education and welfare to 
infrastructure to unemployment benefits.” (Collina and Poff, 2009:2). Unlike previous 
policies, the stimulus was framed as specifically green with $120 billion of the $787 billion 
designed as a strategic stimulus investment in clean energy “in the form of direct spending 
and tax credits” set aside for projects that would focus on environmental initiatives such as 
energy efficiency, environmental improvement, clean and renewable energy and green 
transportation to promote Obama’s particular energy and climate objectives (Collina and 
Poff, 2009:2; Aldy, 2012:2). The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act’s Clean Energy 
Package was based on “short-term supply-side support for clean energy technologies” which 
was intended to reduce GHG emissions and the dependence on petroleum (Aldy, 2012:2). 
This was intended to increase support for the recommended economy-wide cap-and-trade 
regime to reduce GHG emissions by more than 80% by 2050 (Aldy, 2012:2).  
Aside from these legislative efforts, at the start of the decade, there have been a number of 
factors to negatively influence global energy markets. On the geopolitical front, one of the 
most prominent disturbances for the energy market had been the Arab Spring uprisings which 
began in December 2010 and spread across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
region raising fears over the reliability of petroleum supplies from the region (El-Katiri et al., 
2014:1; Calabrese, 2014:1). While petroleum prices initially decreased in the wake of the 
global financial crisis of 2008, the effects of the Arab Spring  and the accelerated demand 
from developing countries once again caused instability in the global energy market and thus 
raised concerns about energy security (Houser and Mohan, 2011:1; El-Katiri et al., 2014:1). 
Because the petroleum market is global in nature, disruptions in the Middle East have ripple 
effects throughout the rest of the world and had profound implications for global petroleum 
prices (Calabrese, 2014:1).  
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Although the United States began to experience some economic recovery at the end of 2010, 
political unrest in Libya caused an interruption of petroleum exports to Europe causing 
petroleum prices to spike again (Ratner and Glover, 2014:16). There was a brief respite while 
prices stabilised, however they soon increased again because of an Iranian supply disruption 
due to international tension regarding its nuclear programme provoking American and 
European sanctions against its petroleum exports (Ratner and Glover, 2014:16; El-Katiri et 
al., 2014:8). Although dependence on Middle Eastern petroleum was initially reduced in the 
wake of the global financial crisis, by 2011 it was forecasted that this dependence was once 
again set to increase (Yergin, 2011). This realisation ensured that energy security once again 
became a top policy priority amid concerns over the impact that rising petroleum prices 
would have on the fragile global economic recovery (Houser and Mohan, 2011:1; El-Katiri et 
al., 2014:2).  
7.2.1 Structural Influences 
The Obama administration’s energy policy consisted of a continuation of many of the 
previous administrations’ policy goals, but these were framed differently in light of the new 
challenges facing this administration. To situate this structurally, in an international system 
that is competitive and anarchic but uncertain, states compete against one another but still 
have to design policies that suit their  particular economic and political context. States will 
also respond to the changing distribution of power in the anarchic international system which 
influences their policies. Since the 1970s, US administrations drew a link between energy and 
economic recovery and strength in their policies in order to attain power and maintain the 
USA’s hegemonic position in relation to other states.  
Consequently, the Obama administration’s energy policy, much like any US energy policy, 
cannot be understood apart from the USA’s hegemonic position within the international 
distribution of power. Per consequence, these developments need to be situated within 
evolving trends at the international level. As such, the Obama administration’s energy policy 
was characterised by two aspects at the structural level: competition with China in regards to 
the manufacture of and inclusion of targets related to renewable energy, and the enhancement 
of the USA’s hegemonic position after the economic recession of 2008.  
At the start of 2009, energy policy received resurged interest under the new administration as 
a means to meet the challenge of increased competition from East Asia as a number of these 
countries were manufacturing renewable energy technologies including energy research and 
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technology development, as well as the inclusion of ambitious targets (Stanislaw, 2009). This 
trend became a source of concern, as the United States was seen to be outmoded in its lack of 
support for these industries
127
 in the midst of altering trends at the international level and the 
USA’s dwindling position therein (Stanislaw, 2009). Certain analysts argued that “The first 
country to mass-produce cost-competitive wind turbines, solar panels and electric vehicles 
will dominate the market for those technologies and reap the job creation benefits.” (Collina 
and Poff, 2009:2). To attain this niche, an important aspect of the Stimulus Plan
128
 had been 
its emphasis on renewable energy with the Plan accelerating funding toward solar, 
geothermal and wind energy (Holden, 2009:405; Council of Economic Advisers, 2014:iv). 
Obama has firmly stated that, “We all know that the country that harnesses this energy will 
lead the 21
st
 century. Yet we have allowed other countries to outpace us in this race to the 
future…I do not accept a future where the jobs and industries of tomorrow take root beyond 
our borders. It is time for America to lead again…That’s how we can grow this economy, 
enhance our security, and protect our planet at the same time.” (Holden, 2009:406; Obama, 
2009). This also became a Congressional concern, and on the 10
th 
of June, the majority of 
Senators voted against a climate change treaty that could potentially undermine “the 
intellectual property rights of American green technology” (Stanislaw, 2009). Within the 
evolving trends at the international level driven by economic and technological change, the 
Obama administration sought to maintain the USA’s hegemonic position and enhance US 
leadership in the international system through its support of these technologies. Support for 
these technologies was further based on the need to compete against its rivals and in order to 
not undermine the USA’s latent power nor to allow the USA to lag behind its rivals. 
Moreover, in an anarchic international system where states have to rely on self-help, 
enhancing the USA’s support for these technologies in response to its rivals was intended to 
not undermine the USA’s security relative to its rivals. 
Hence, in an anarchic international system, technological change intensifies international 
competition. To quote Obama from Stanislaw (2009:3), “It is China that has launched the 
largest effort in history to make its economy energy efficient…In the years to come, I hope 
that America will be selling clean technology to China and India and not the other way 
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 For instance, at the time, only a quarter of renewable energy companies were American in origin (Ladislaw, 
2009:3). Compare this to the seven sisters which dominated the petroleum market until the 1970s. 
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 Obama stipulated that, “the investments we made in the Recovery Act will double the nation’s supply of 
renewable energy in the next three years.” (Holden, 2009:406).   
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around.” Therewith, the US focus on renewable energy production and export has an 
additional aim of improving its latent power in the international system. Per consequence, the 
strengthening political clout of the emerging economies, alongside their bigger R&D budgets 
and centralised economies had influenced the Obama administration at the start of 2009 to 
pursue a more environmentally-sensitive energy policy (Stanislaw, 2009:3; Murray et al., 
2011:6). 
The international system is characterised by increasing competition between the United 
States and China for influence therein as the distribution of power has been shifted to reflect 
China’s growing power and influence vis-à-vis the USA. The nature of this competition is 
however complex. China and the United States are the world’s two largest emitters 
(Seligsohn et al., 2009:2). While its emissions have increased, China has introduced a 
number of policy goals in light of the climate change challenge (Seligsohn et al., 2009:2). Its 
energy mix has increased the number of non-fossil fuel energy sources and greater energy 
efficiency measures have also been introduced. For instance China
129
, currently the world’s 
second largest economy, has issued ambitious targets toward the development of renewable 
energy sources encompassed in policies and legislation to have been issued (Campbell, 2014; 
Murray et al., 2011:5). There are thus two elements to this competition, on the one hand 
China poses an economic challenge to the United States as the USA’s competitiveness is 
potentially weakened in relation to China, and secondly, China’s changing energy profile 
introduces pressure on the USA to do likewise. With the changing distribution of power due 
to the ascent of China, the Obama administration has responded by recognising the trends 
pursued by its rival and ensuring that the USA does not lag behind. As the distribution of 
power is changing, the USA will be increasingly concerned with its security and power in an 
anarchic international system and thus emphasising those technologies that will allow it to 
compete and increase its power and security in relation to other states. 
The international system was changing in terms of its structure and trends making it 
increasingly difficult to reconcile the ideas associated with energy policy with the historical 
context (Helm, 2005:1). This catalysed the administration to seek new measures to address 
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 Since the 1980s, the Chinese economy has grown rapidly with its gross domestic product (GDP) having 
grown by approximately 9.8 % annually (Campbell, 2014). Its economic growth has seen increased demand for 
energy with Chinese electric power generation capacity increasing from 66 Gigawatts (GW) in 1980 to 2011’s 
1100 GW – at the time coal fuelled approximately 66% of this generation (Campbell, 2014). A key policy driver 
has been the abatement of air pollution caused by coal-based electric power generation (Campbell, 2014). 
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the economic downturn as well as increased competition from other countries while 
repositioning US leadership in the international system. It is thus optimal to consider the 
drivers of US energy policy as a combination of external and internal pressures which have 
led to the adoption of such goals (Waltz, 1993:50). 
The international system is marked by the rise and fall of great powers. Technological and 
economic alterations produce new areas of wealth and power accumulation leading to 
competition amongst great powers for ascent in the anarchic international system since 
“great-power status cannot be maintained without a certain economic capability” (Moe, 
2009:204 - 205; Waltz, 1993:45, 50). Countries thus need to keep pace with technological 
and economic trends if they are to retain their power and security (Waltz, 1993:50 - 51). Moe 
(2007:3) asserts that, “…industrial leadership is inextricably linked to technological 
leadership. Countries that have mastered the core technologies of a particular historical era, 
and have been successful in setting up industries based on these technologies, are the ones 
that have forged ahead, grown in power and stature.” From a historical perspective, each 
industrial era has corresponded to the exploitation of a new energy resource leading to 
structural economic change and the creation of new industries (Moe, 2010:1730).  
As part of its strategy to attain these objectives, the Obama administration outlined in the 
Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future released in 2011 that it intends to lead the world in 
clean energy as a means to strengthen the US economy (Blueprint for a Secure Energy 
Future, 2011:3 – 4; Murray et al., 2011:4). Using Imperial language resonant of the Great 
Game of the nineteenth century, the Blueprint states that, “A global race is underway to 
develop and manufacture clean energy technologies, and China and other countries are 
playing to win.” (Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future, 2011:6). By developing and 
manufacturing “cutting-edge clean energy technologies” the USA will position itself as a 
global leader in the sector (Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future, 2011:7). That is the stark 
scenario that the Blueprint alludes to “Less than thirty years ago, the United States boasted 
more than 80 percent of the world’s wind capacity, and 90 percent of its solar capacity. We 
invented the photovoltaic solar panel, built the first megawatt-sized solar power station, and 
installed the first megawatt-sized wind turbine. Yet today, China has moved past us in wind 




In a number of ways, the Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future is very similar to the energy 
policies of previous administrations. It has a pro-production focus and alludes to energy 
efficiency, alternative fuels and market instruments. Climate change is alluded to as one of 
the challenges that US policy must address yet the main focus of the plan is on the cost and 
security of energy, and climate change as a means to meet these two challenges. Yet, it is also 
different. In contrast to previous administrations, this policy specifically focuses on a clean 
energy economy and its future importance. Therewith, the Obama administration focused on 
clean energy technology as a means to position the USA in this new economic framework 
and the threat posed by China to the USA’s position therein.  The USA played a key role in 
the petroleum system of the twentieth century and the Obama administration is re-positioning 
US hegemony to play this part in the twenty-first century renewable energy technology and 
economy. Nevertheless, Congressional opposition would continue to dominate the direction 
of US energy policy with consequences for a number of policy areas and the position of the 
USA in the climate change negotiations. Although the Obama administration began to re-
frame US energy policy, a number of impediments still remained.  
Moreover, in the wake of the recession US energy policy had to reinvigorate and maintain the 
USA’s hegemonic position by strengthening its economy. Although it appeared unlikely that 
the Obama administration would be able to pursue a progressive energy policy, it nonetheless 
was able to articulate a link between energy and economic recovery to enhance the USA’s 
hegemonic position to overcome the effects of the recession however within a new context 
(Collina and Poff, 2009:1; Holden, 2009:410; Council of Economic Advisers, 2014:2; Collina 
and Poff, 2009: 2). Since there is a link between the cost of energy and economic strength 
within the historical development of US energy policy, such a policy framework was 
necessary to enhance the USA’s power and security within an anarchic international system, 
however the necessity of enhancing the USA’s economy was developed by linking the 
economic crisis, energy, and climate change concurrently within new economic and 
technological trends especially related to the mitigation of climate change and the 
enhancement of the USA’s leadership in this area. 
The Obama administration’s energy policy needs to be situated historically with the goals 
developed by this administration being based upon the need to secure energy and economic 
recovery and strength, thus reflecting a historical continuity with previous administrations. 
Within this context, the USA’s energy policy must ultimately be seen as a reflection of its 
hegemonic position within the distribution of power within the international system. The 
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need to compete with its rivals, especially in East Asia, increased the focus on the goal of 
producing renewable energy technologies (Murray et al., 2011:1- 2, 5; Heussner, 2010). 
These competitive dynamics were reflecting the changing distribution of power as the USA 
increasingly sought to secure a relative advantage in relation to its competitors and enhance 
its power. Linking these goals to the strengthening of its hegemonic position especially after 
the recession influenced the emphasis on clean energy as a means to strengthen the US 
economy within the international system and to prevent China from gaining a comparative 
advantage over the USA within the distribution of power (Minsk, 2017:5; Heussner, 2010). 
While the goals of US energy policy remain focussed on the cost and security of energy as 
these have historically been integral to the competitiveness of the USA and thereby its 
hegemony, climate change mitigation was introduced as a means to meet these two 
challenges (Minsk, 2017:5; Tomain, 2007:1203). To maintain the US hegemonic position, 
there was an emphasis placed on renewable energy technology and the economy, which 
would also permit the USA’s hegemonic position to influence trends in these areas, much like 
in previous eras (Minsk, 2017:5; Heussner, 2010; Collina and Poff, 2009:2). 
Therefore, with the distribution of power in the international system reflecting the increasing 
competition between the United States and China for influence therein, the administration 
was driven to seek new goals to address the economic downturn as well as increased 
competition from other countries while repositioning US leadership in the international 
system (Minsk, 2017:5; Heussner, 2010; Stanislaw, 2009). This was intended to enhance US 
hegemony, especially as there was renewed pressure on the USA to keep up with 
technological and economic trends if it were to enhance its power and security, and thereby 
its hegemonic position within the distribution of power (Stanislaw, 2009; Heussner, 2010). 
Since US hegemony depends in many respects on its economic strength, the policy goals 
introduced by the Obama administration were meant to strengthen the US economy and 
thereby power and security within the altered distribution of power. 
7.2.2 Domestic Influences 
The international system presents policy-makers with a set of opportunities and threats while 
simultaneously, within this uncertain context, policy-makers must also develop policies to 
suit their domestic context requiring that these actors have to navigate between a complex 
two-level game (Taliaferro et al., 2009:7). The Democratic Obama administration made the 
focus on renewable energy and the mitigation of climate change key aspects of its energy 
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policy at the start of this administration due to these policy-makers’ perception that the policy 
goals of environmental regulation and economic growth were compatible, wherein managing 
the economic crisis, energy and climate change as a means to enhance economic recovery 
while simultaneously mitigating climate change were advanced (White House, s.a.:1; Obama 
White House, 2016:11; Office of the President, 2016:3; Minsk, 2017:5; Silverstein, 2016). At 
the federal level, at the outset of the Obama administration’s first presidential term, both 
houses had a Democratic majority, during his “first address of a joint session of Congress”, 
Obama “called for enactment of legislation creating a comprehensive national programme to 
control emissions of GHGs.” (Percival, 2014:143). During the first session of the 111
th
 
Congress, the Democratic-controlled House passed H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy 
and Security Act (ACES, otherwise known as the Waxman-Markey Bill) in June 2009 which 
was a bill set to take into account a number of climate change as well as energy related issues 
(Parker et al., 2011:10; Dernbach and Altenburg, 2014:103; Freed and Fitzpatrick, 2012:3). It 
was hoped that the bill
130
 would have altered the Clean Air Act to create a cap-and-trade 
system that would have in theory limited emissions “by 19 percent below 2005 levels by 
2020 and 83 percent below 2005 levels by 2050” which was set to start in 2012  (Parker et 
al., 2011:10; Dernbach and Altenburg, 2014:103). The bill was also meant to promote energy 
efficiency as well as renewable energy requirements, create a national carbon sequestration 
strategy, and “required EPA to set GHG emissions standards for various sources” (Dernbach 
and Altenburg, 2014:104; Parker et al., 2011:10). To quote Dernbach and Altenburg, “The 
bill, in short, would have employed a wide-variety of approaches to climate change; it was 
not simply cap-and-trade legislation.” (2014:104).  
However, while the Obama administration had a particular policy framework that it 
attempted to enact, the Congressional input therein play a key role in the kind of policy that 
was developed and the extent to which the Obama administration could meet its goals. 
Hence, in the midst of this initial enthusiasm, these efforts that were promoted at the start of 
2009 were soon to meet serious opposition at the federal level in Congress (Goldenberg, 
2012; (Reardon, 2016:387). Numerous opponents to climate change-related legislation and 
“climate change control programs” emphasised arguments related to the high costs associated 
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 Besides this bill, another considerable effort was the American Clean Energy Leadership Act which was 
intended to become a comprehensive bill that would have included “renewable energy requirements for electric 
utilities” although it still precluded “a mandatory GHG control program” (Parker et al., 2011:11). 
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with such programmes and measures, which was made more challenging by the difficulty to 
determine the potential costs associated with the programme, the threats and disadvantages 
that this posed to the competitiveness of US industries, the alleged complex nature of the 
legislation, as well as the growing emissions of developing countries, notably China (which 
surpassed the United States as the world’s biggest emitter of GHGs in about 2005), 
opposition from vested interests, Republican accusations that it was a regulatory system akin 
to a tax that would undermine efforts to ameliorate the recession, the influence of the Tea 
Party movement, a weak economic environment, and disbelief in the basic assumptions of 
climate science diminished support for this legislation at the federal level (Parker et al., 
2011:11, 12; Dernbach and Altenburg, 2014:104; Freed and Fitzpatrick, 2012:3; Osofsky, 
2011:244; Sussman, 2015). These opponents likewise pointed out that due to the accelerated 
rise in emissions originating in developing nations, unless a global climate change policy is 
sufficiently comprehensive, it will unlikely curb anthropogenic climate change (Parker et al., 
2011:11).  
At the federal level, Congressional debates were fuelled by questions surrounding China’s 
international and domestic commitments towards climate change and its reluctance to enforce 
stringent emission controls revealing worries related to the threat of enacting domestic 
legislation in the face of China’s accumulating emissions (Seligsohn et al., 2009:2). 
Congressional unease surrounding efforts to abate emissions in the United States in light of 
China’s ascendance became more acute as these incorporate concerns regarding the impact 
that policies will have on US trade competitiveness and industry by increasing the cost of 
energy since the USA will be at a competitive disadvantage in relation to China which did not 
have similar obligations and policies to accept mitigation targets (Seligsohn et al., 2009:2; 
Parker and Blodgett, 2008:1). Enacting policies to mitigate climate change when there are no 
similar policies in developing countries, have been a central feature of these Congressional 
debates concerning whether or not the USA should adopt policies to mitigate climate change 
(Parker and Blodgett, 2008:1). From a structural perspective, even if growth rates between 
countries are differentiated by insignificant differences, over a greater time span this can 
significantly alter their hierarchic position in the international system and the distribution of 
power between them (Moe, 2007:1). Moreover, ideology further influenced Congressional 





 regarding the Bill and “voting on this controversial bill largely followed party 
lines” making the legislation ideologically contested regarding the costs that would result 
from climate-related legislation (Bang et al., 2016:215).  
At the federal level, the concern in the United States regarding the creation of comprehensive 
climate change legislation is the potential transfer of carbon-intensive jobs from the United 
States to China (Seligsohn et al., 2009:11; Yudken and Bassi, 2009). Principally, if costs are 
not distributed equally amongst all countries, and should the United States pursue an 
ambitious climate policy, there is concern that jobs and manufacturing could be relocated to 
those countries with minimal environmental standards and emission targets which create 
lower production costs (Seligsohn et al., 2009:11; Yudken and Bassi, 2009).  In the United 
States, concerns over carbon leakage are concentrated in those industries whose cost 
structures include a large percentage of fossil fuel energy as well as those industries that are 
participants in global markets pressuring these industries to relocate to countries with more 
relaxed climate policies (Seligsohn et al., 2009:12). This would also have implications for the 
USA’s position at the UNFCCC since the threat of emerging economies who were not 
obliged to mitigate climate change, and thus be at an economic advantage in relation to the 
USA, proved a formidable impediment to the USA adopting a strong climate change treaty 
that would exempt these countries since these countries would be able to attain relative gains 
at the expense of the USA. 
Therewith, in the US federal system, the inability to pass the economy-wide cap-and-trade 
legislation since it could not be passed in Congress due to the costs associated therewith and 
the threat posed by China would transfer the administration’s focus to broader energy 
legislation (Osofsky, 2011:261; Bang et al., 2016:215). It thus appeared that the Obama 
administration would be constrained in its energy and climate policies much like the Clinton 
administration fifteen years earlier. Per consequence, within the structure of the USA’s 
federal system, one of the major challenges that the Obama administration faced was how to 
determine a course of action that would be permissible in the US political context after 
                                                          
131 More acutely, in the 2010 midterm elections, Republicans regained control of the House (Percival, 
2014:144). Throughout 2010, the Republican coalition in Congress was particularly ambivalent and attempted to 
obstruct the EPA in its emissions reduction mandate as well as other pollution hazards, and limit funding for 
climate change initiatives (Goldenberg, 2010). Congressional inaction thus complicated the EPA’s effort to 




Congressional inability to reach agreement (Hunter, 2009:256). In spite of Congressional 
opposition, the Obama administration would make a pledge to reduce US emissions by 17% 
below 2005 levels by 2020 at the UNFCCC negotiations in Copenhagen in 2009
132
 (The 
White House (b), 2014:1; Robinson, 2013:2; Percival, 2014:148). 
Shortly thereafter, the volatility in the Middle East due to the Arab Spring uprisings, 
increasing petroleum prices and the nuclear reactor accident in Japan were reasons for a 
review of the USA’s energy policy which enhanced the need for an energy policy that would 
make the United States more secure by utilising all their resources and diversifying their 
energy portfolio (Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future, 2011:3). Within the Blueprint for a 
Secure Energy Future, released on the thirtieth of March 2011, a major concern related to 
energy supply had been its cost and security which required a reduction in the nation’s 
dependence on petroleum (Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future, 2011:3). The Blueprint 
highlighted the importance of energy independence; a goal which every president since 
Richard Nixon attempted to attain, and political gridlock within the US federal system was an 
impediment to achieving this goal (Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future, 2011:3). Nuclear 
energy was supported as a means to mitigate climate change in spite of the events that 
occurred in Japan (Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future, 2011:3, 32). However, support for 
renewables was an essential component of this Blueprint, and Obama was unequivocal when 
he argued that, “Other countries are now exporting technology we pioneered and they’re 
going with the jobs that come with it because they know that the countries that lead the 21
st
 
century clean energy economy will be the countries that lead the 21
st
 century global 
economy. I want America to be that nation. I want America to win the future…Unfortunately 
some folks want to cut critical investments in clean energy. They want to cut out research and 
development into new technologies. They’re short-changing the resources necessary even to 
promptly issue new permits for offshore drilling.” (Obama, 2011). Congressional obstruction 
at the federal level towards many of the Obama administration’s proposed policy goals 
proved to be a formidable unit-level impediment, which would also have implications for its 
position in the UNFCCC negotiations in Copenhagen. 
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 There will be an in-depth discussion of this in the rest of the chapter. 
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7.3 The Obama Administration, the US Position in the UNFCCC Negotiations and US 
Energy Policy  
After a decade of controversial foreign as well as domestic policies that tarnished its 
international reputation, Obama’s electoral victory was lauded as a new era in American 
politics by his proponents. Since 1992, however, developing countries assumed far greater 
influence in determining outcomes in the UNFCCC negotiations (Selin and VanDeveer, 
2011:121; Parker et al., 2014:8). Within this altering context, the Obama administration had 
indicated its willingness to be a leader in the global climate change negotiations and to 
cooperate with other states in the climate change regime (Parker et al., 2014:8; Wirth, 
2015:9). However, in spite of his support, once in office, the Obama administration had to 
contend with the reality of Congressional opposition as well as sub-national politics that 
opposed reform in these sectors. The United States has made it clear from the outset that it 
will not accept a legally-binding agreement that will have negative consequences for its 
economy, and that will not include developing countries. The UNFCCC negotiations had the 
potential to undermine the economic competitiveness of the USA by making certain forms of 
energy more expensive while mitigation policies would lead to changes in the USA’s energy 
policy which depended on cheap and abundant fossil fuels.  
The ultimate goal of the UNFCCC negotiations was always to create a set of long-term and 
ambitious mitigation targets of which the Kyoto Protocol was intended to merely be a 
stepping stone in this achievement (Leggett, 2010). After 2005, the negotiations concerning 
the mitigation of climate change were organised to determine the subsequent actions to be 
taken once the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period expired in 2012 (Wirth, 2015:9; 
Dernbach and Altenburg, 2014:102). It was anticipated that such an agreement would be 
finalised at the Copenhagen climate summit in December 2009 (Wirth, 2015:9). At the Bali 
negotiations held in 2007, Parties agreed to create the Ad Hoc Group on Further 
Commitments under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP), a workstream which was intended to 
determine GHG reductions for the post-2012 period (Leggett, 2010). The Parties also agreed 
on the Bali Action Plan which was intended to set negotiations that would figure out future 
commitments “for the long term, climate change mitigation, adaptation, technology and 
financing” and is part of the Ad Hoc Group on Long Term Cooperation (AWG-LCA) 
(Leggett, 2010). This second negotiation track proceeds in tandem with the AWG-KP 
(Leggett, 2010).  
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It was hoped that the Fifteenth Conference of the Parties (COP 15) climate summit held in 
Copenhagen would provide the means to connect the two negotiating streams and work out 
the difficulties and incongruence between the two (Leggett, 2010). Accordingly, there was 
great expectation placed on the Copenhagen Conference as it was meant to produce a new 
legally-binding agreement for when the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period came to an 
end in 2012
133
 (Bodansky, 2011:10). It was anticipated that the Copenhagen summit would 
be a turning point in the history of the negotiations and per consequence attracted leaders at 
the highest political level.  Such was the anticipation, that more than a hundred world leaders 
attended the summit, including Barack Obama as well as the leaders of Brazil, Japan, China, 
Germany, India, South Africa, France and the United Kingdom (Bodansky, 2011:10). Indeed, 
since the 1992 Rio Earth Conference, President Obama had been the first US President to 
attend a high level climate summit at the Copenhagen climate conference in 2009 (Selin and 
VanDeveer, 2011:121). The COP 15 negotiations were for a variety of reasons a historical 
turning point in the negotiations (IISD, 2009:27). The negotiations represented the 
finalisation of two years of intensive negotiations under the Bali Road Map which 
commenced in December 2007 (IISD, 2009:27). Therewith, during the fifteenth Conference 
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 Although Bill Clinton did sign the Kyoto Protocol, the United States is not bound to its terms since Congress 
did not consent to its ratification (Barbour, 2010:11).  Nevertheless, by signing an international agreement, it 
does create a set of obligations and “presents a ‘moral obligation’ by the United States to pursue accession to the 
Protocol (Barbour, 2010:11). Because an institutional mechanism does not exist which is able to enforce 
obligations on the United States, it is up to the USA to decide if under its customary law it is a signatory to the 
Kyoto Protocol and which actions would undermine such obligations (Barbour, 2010:12).   
By the Copenhagen negotiations, the future of the Kyoto Protocol formed a major area of visibility and 
contention. During the Copenhagen negotiations, developed and developing nations disagreed over the future of 
the Kyoto Protocol (Harvey, 2011). In the lead up to the Copenhagen negotiations, the USA did not partake in 
the negotiations regarding the future second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, a position that has been 
maintained by the Obama administration due to a lack of domestic support (Harvey, 2011). Indeed, Todd Stern 
commented that, “The Kyoto Protocol is one of the toughest if not the toughest part of the negotiations…The 
US is not part (of those discussions) but what happens to the Protocol is relevant to whether there will be 
understandings on future regimes (and these) are still controversial and difficult subjects.” (Harvey, 2011). The 
USA remained interested however in negotiations centering around the design of either a single regulatory 
regime to curb emissions or to create a regime that could work in parallel to the Kyoto Protocol (Harvey, 2011). 
For the US a key area of controversy concerned developing countries’ acceptance of emission targets (Harvey, 
2011). The USA made it clear that relying on an archaic distinction as contained in the UNFCCC treaty of 1992 
did not reflect current circumstances and could not be used as a guide to any future treaty or regime, and 
whether such a regime would be legally-binding (Harvey, 2011).     
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of the Parties, climate change became one of the most striking features on the international 
agenda (IISD, 2009:27).  
In spite of the hype, the Copenhagen summit was dismissed as a disappointment that resulted 
in an inconclusive agreement that the Parties merely took note of (Wirth, 2015:9). Although 
the Accord was negotiated by and accepted by the world’s leading economies giving the 
agreement political clout, it was “noted” by the Parties, rather than adopted, “due to 
objections” from certain countries such as Bolivia, Venezuela and Sudan (Bodansky, 
2011:12). Per consequence, the status of the Accord was inconclusive and was unable to 
produce a “new, comprehensive agreement” since the negotiations were unable to extend or 
replace the Kyoto Protocol, or to determine a new legally-binding agreement (Wirth, 
2015:10; Bodansky, 2010). This outcome, as will be indicated, is not formally recognised 
within the UN process, and the COP had merely taken note of it (Wirth, 2015:11). To further 
add to the confusion surrounding the design of the Accord, the legality of the Accord is 
murky and lacks a set of coherent mitigation targets unlike the Kyoto Protocol (Wirth, 
2015:12; Dernbach and Altenburg, 2014:102). Instead, these pledges are merely public 
promises which are believed to provide the incentives to motivate further action (Dernbach 
and Altenburg, 2014:102). 
Nevertheless, the Accord includes elements pertaining to limiting global temperature rise to 
2
o
 Centigrade and created a process for recording targets and actions related to mitigation for 
both developed and developing nations alike (Bodansky, 2010). With the limit placed on a 
two degrees Celsius rise, the Accord further indicated that this may be further reduced to a 
1.5 degrees Centigrade rise based on the Accord’s effectiveness (Wirth, 2015:12). However, 
in contrast to the Kyoto Protocol, the Copenhagen Accord is characterised by vagueness 
concerning “the level of emission cuts and the date for achieving them” (Wirth, 2015:9). It 
also does not contain “any global numerical targets nor does it allude to either a second 
commitment period, a new agreement, or any successor instrument, either binding or 
nonbinding” (Wirth, 2015:12). The substantive elements of the Copenhagen Accord may be 
interpreted as a reflection of changing international politics and the effects thereof on 
multilateralism.  
Crucially, the Copenhagen Accord differs in three important ways in relation to the Kyoto 
Protocol (Dernbach and Altenburg, 2014:102; Bodansky, 2011:11). Firstly, it emphasises the 
use of a pledge and review system instead of targets and timetables (Dernbach and 
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Altenburg, 2014:102). Secondly, the Copenhagen Accord is not legally-binding (Dernbach 
and Altenburg, 2014:102). And thirdly, in contrast to the previous era in the UNFCCC 
negotiations, the Accord managed to dispense obligations to both developed as well as 
developing nations for the mitigation of climate change (Dernbach and Altenburg, 2014:102).  
Under the Accord, developed countries are encouraged to “submit ‘quantified economy-wide 
emission targets for 2020”, while developing countries need to submit nationally appropriate 
mitigation actions (NAMAs) (Dernbach and Altenburg, 2014:102). Thus, unlike the Kyoto 
Protocol, the Copenhagen Accord promotes an approach wherein each state can establish its 
own actions and commitments unilaterally (Bodansky, 2011:11). 
In contrast to the negotiations which took place during the creation of the UNFCCC and 
Kyoto Protocol, one of the key principal points of contention at the Copenhagen negotiations 
had been the issue of mitigation actions to be taken on by developing countries (Wirth, 
2015:10). Unlike earlier eras under the UNFCCC, the debate turned to an articulation of 
nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) for the attainment of these objectives 
(Wirth, 2015:10). By the time of the Copenhagen summit, trends relating to GHG emissions 
began to alter with some developing nations’ emissions had overtaken the emissions of 
developed nations
134
 which rendered any global agreement to limit climate change ineffective 
if it did not include developing nations’ efforts (Wirth, 2015:10).  
The Copenhagen political agreement includes emission pledges for all major economies 
(Diringer et al., 2009). Although China as well as other major developing countries are 
included in these mitigation pledges, there was no indication at the time of progression 
toward “a treaty with binding commitments” (Diringer et al., 2009). As part of the agreement, 
developed countries committed to implementing quantified economy-wide emission targets 
for 2020 while developing countries would implement mitigation actions
135
 that, at the time, 
were not defined, except that they should be in “the context of sustainable development” 
(Diringer et al., 2009). 
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 By this point, China’s GHG emissions had overtaken that of the USA’s (Wirth, 2015:10). 
135
 In contrast to the decisions and positions taken in previous years is that for the first time developing nations 
agreed to submit their greenhouse gas inventories every two consecutive years in reports (Hunter, 2010:7). 
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7.3.1 Structural Influences 
By 2009, the structure of the international system in terms of the relative power positions of 
states within the UNFCCC negotiations was distinctly different (Christoff, 2010:638). The 
active participation of the USA and China, two rivals in the international system in the midst 
of the changing distribution of power, in designing the architecture of a future legal regime, 
signalled a turning point in the UNFCCC’s development (Christoff, 2010:638; Bodansky, 
2011:11). Such a critical moment is necessary to consider in terms of what this meant for the 
evolution of US cooperation and the politics of the negotiations.  
For the sake of comprehension, a brief allusion to the history of the negotiations must be 
made
136
. During the first period of the climate change regime from 1991 to 2001, emission 
reduction targets for developed countries were the main issue that had to be resolved, while 
developing nations were precluded from having to accept emission targets (Bodansky, 2010).  
The most important rift during this period was between the European Union (EU) and the 
United States (Bodansky, 2010). To meet the objectives of the UNFCCC, the European 
Union promoted the use of ambitious, legally-binding, domestic targets that were to be 
domestically implemented while the United States, and the Umbrella Group consisting of 
allies such as Japan and Australia, opposed the use of targets-based emission quotas
137
 and 
instead continually supported market-based mechanisms, especially emissions trading, to 
mitigate climate change (Bodansky, 2010). Although the United States supported emission 
reduction targets for developing nations, the consensus around this issue was that at this point 
the responsibility for emission reductions was for developed countries (Bodansky, 2010). 
The negotiating dynamics between developed and developing nations, and amongst 
developed nations, would alter after the 2001 Marrakesh Accords and their related 
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 There are three ways in which allocation of emissions is determined: (i) an allocation corresponding to 
emissions in a specific base year or future emissions projected based on a business-as-usual trajectory 
(grandfathering); (ii) an allocation determined by equal per capita basis with a disregard for historical 
responsibility and, (iii) allocation is determined by an equal per capita basis but contingent nonetheless on 
historical responsibility (Neumayer, 2000:186). However, the normative principles that are used to determine 
both the responsibility and allocation of emission reductions in the UNFCCC may be grouped according to (i) 
responsibility corresponding to a state’s contribution to the problem, (ii) capability to abate emissions which in 
turn depends on technology, income, natural resources and institutions, and (iii) need referring to the right for 
countries to develop (Metz et al., 2002: 212).   
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implementation decisions for the Kyoto Protocol wherein the emphasis was still placed on 
mitigation targets for developed countries, however there began to emerge increased pressure 
that developing countries need to accept some mitigation targets as well reflecting a concern 
for the distribution of relative gains amongst developed and developing countries, but also 
amongst developed countries (Bodansky, 2010).  
The Copenhagen negotiations would be strongly influenced by these tensions and the 
disjuncture between developed and developing nations which would pressure the regime 
established under the Kyoto Protocol and its dynamics. The United States played an 
instrumental role within the final outcome of the negotiations; however in coordination with 
strong emerging economies as a reflection of the changing distribution of power (Dernbach 
and Altenburg, 2014:102; White House, 2009). In the lead up to the negotiations, the United 
States, as a hegemonic state, and China, its closest rival, interacted over many elements that 
would feature in the negotiations (IISD, 2009:27). Thereby, “Instead, the agreement suggests 
a bottom-up approach whereby developed and developing countries submit their pledges for 
information purposes to the Convention, a method advocated most prominently by the 
US…The Accord, however, does contain some language, reportedly a compromise between 
the US and China, stating that there will be some provisions for ‘international consultations 
and analysis,’ a concept yet to be defined. Those actions supported by international finance, 
technology transfer and capacity building will, however, be subject to international MRV.” 
(IISD, 2009:29). The prominence of the Brazil, South Africa, India, China (BASIC) group of 
strong emerging economies and the USA in the development of the final outcome at 
Copenhagen reflects important changes in the structure of the international system and the 
USA’s hegemonic role therein relative to other nations. Traditionally, the USA had to 
contend with the EU in negotiating a climate agreement (Paterson, 2009:140). While 
developing countries have been important actors in environmental negotiations, this new 
assertiveness on the part of emerging economies reflects a new position in the international 
system which would have consequences as the Copenhagen Accord would show.  
Although it has an unofficial status under the UNFCCC, the Copenhagen Accord is a 
reflection of altering circumstances in the midst of the changing distribution of power in 
world affairs and the changing economic circumstances of developing countries resulting in 
increased latent power, and the intensified competition that technological and economic 
change brings about (Bodansky, 2011:11; Waltz, 1993:51). The Copenhagen negotiations 
thus proved to be a decisive moment in the evolution of the UNFCCC. Thereby, the 
inconclusive outcome in the Copenhagen negotiations indicated two important trends to have 
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emerged at this point in the negotiations (Bodansky, 2010). The first is that Copenhagen 
represented a fundamental shift in the climate change negotiations as it was the first time that 
both developed and developing nations’ emissions were addressed (Bodansky, 2010). 
Secondly, the most crucial actors therein, namely the United States and China, had 
fundamental differences regarding “the architecture of a future legal regime” (Bodansky, 
2010). As international regimes reflect the interests of powerful states, at this point in the 
negotiations, the agreement was influenced by the changing position of the United States and 
China and the divergent interests that these countries had which would be influenced by their 
hierarchic power positions within the distribution of power and their need to secure relative 
gains. Since institutions are a reflection of the changing distribution of power and “are based 
on the self-interested calculations of the great powers”, within this dynamic states are capable 
of cooperation; however such cooperation is limited because of “the dominating logic of 
security competition, which no amount of cooperation can eliminate” (Mearsheimer 1994-
1995: 7 -9).  
With the distribution of power in the international system becoming increasingly multipolar, 
by this point in the negotiations, the once unified stance displayed by developing nations as a 
negotiating bloc began to disintegrate as the ecological, political and economic differences 
amongst them became more acute (Christoff, 2010:643). This disintegration of their unified 
position would have important consequences for the final outcome in the Copenhagen 
negotiations as these nations split into smaller alliance blocs as the rivalry between China and 
the United States would alter the dynamics of the negotiations (Christoff, 2010:643 - 644). 
Although the Copenhagen outcome depended on cooperation between China and the United 
States, their interaction was complicated due to the competitive nature of their relationship 
and divergent interests along with the focus on relative gains (Christoff, 2010: 644, 653). The 
interaction between the United States and China reflected their broader concerns over their 
energy security, political and economic leadership, as well as economic growth and 
development and the implications thereof for their power and security in an anarchic 
international system (Christoff, 2010:644). Nonetheless, it was in China’s and the USA’s 
interest that the conference produce a bottom-up framework that included individual 
voluntary targets and actions thereby being more accommodating of domestic political and 
economic contexts as opposed to a top-down target-setting framework (Christoff, 2010:653; 
Parker and Blodgett, 2008). 
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In Copenhagen, China was widely credited with stalling the negotiating process emerging as 
a central actor with an assertive role as its hierarchic position within the distribution of power 
was changing (Christoff, 2010:640). This assertive position was motivated by its economic, 
political, ecological and energy needs as well as its importance for the global economy 
(Christoff, 2010:644). It would not promote any agreement that would interfere with its 
autonomy concerning its economic and developmental needs since this would undermine the 
economic growth required for its political and economic stability leading to a power play 
between the two countries for relative gains in the negotiations (Christoff, 2010:648). 
Furthermore, tensions between the two countries increased over the meaning and application 
of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) (Christoff, 2010:643). 
The USA continued to contest the principle of CBDR while emphasising that strong 
emerging economies adopt binding emission targets as well (Christoff, 2010:643). At the 
global level, although the United States adopted a cooperative approach towards 
multilateralism under the Obama administration, this is still infused with an emphasis on 
retaining the USA’s military and economic supremacy due to its hegemonic position 
(Christoff, 2010:644). 
Historically, as illustrated throughout the thesis, the development of US energy policy was 
linked to its hegemonic position in the anarchic international system. The design of US 
energy policy was thus integral for its self-help and the enhancement of its material 
capabilities and latent power. Yet, changing circumstances would make it increasingly 
difficult to design a comprehensive energy policy that could reconcile a variety of, and often 
conflicting, policy goals. Since a state’s main goals in an anarchic international system are 
achieving power and security, states will pursue those goals that enhance these, while 
displaying a more cautious approach towards those policy goals that appear to detract from 
these – even if in the long-term these goals are of necessity for a state’s survival. However, 
this endeavour is complex because of the uncertainty that is involved in the identification and 
establishment of goals related to a comprehensive energy policy that can enhance a state’s 
security and power within an anarchic international system, and the trade-offs involved in the 
establishment of these goals. At the start of the Obama administration, there was an attempt 
to augment US power and security by reconciling economic growth with climate change 
mitigation (Minsk, 2017:5). At this point, the USA’s dependence on petroleum imports was 
projected to increase, while the energy sector was responsible for 86% of US emissions 
(Parker et al., 2011:1). The global financial crisis of 2008 had profound implications not only 
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for the USA’s domestic economy but also bore an impact on international relations with the 
emergence of the G20, questions surrounding US power and the increased role of other states 
internationally (Drezner and McNamara, 2013:155). As such the Global Financial Crisis 
further weakened the USA. US energy policy, under the ACES, and in the Blueprint for a 
Secure Energy Future, focused on enhancing US security and power as indicated by the 
continued emphasis on economic growth and energy security, but in addition, increased 
competition with China, which unlike earlier energy  policies, placed emphasis on renewable 
energy technology to compete within this rivalry (Stanislaw, 2009; Blueprint for a Secure 
Energy Future, 2011:6). Yet, as the Copenhagen Agreement would display, the USA was 
unable to play a more pronounced role within the negotiations, since its energy policy could 
not enhance its leadership role vis-à-vis China given the constraints faced by this 
administration (Goldenberg, 2012; Reardon, 2016:387; Seligsohn et al., 2009:2; Christoff, 
2010:638; Bodansky, 2011:11). Although the Obama administration approached the 
UNFCCC with a more cooperative agenda, since states are primarily concerned with power 
and security, the costs of such actions would have structurally disadvantaged the USA. 
Achieving congruence between the policy goals of energy security, economic growth and 
competitiveness, as well as climate change mitigation was unachievable, especially since at 
the unit-level Congress would not support the cap-and-trade regime which was intended to 
achieve these goals because of the USA’s rivalry with China and concern over asymmetric 
climate policies in relation to its competitor and the implications thereof for US power and 
security within the distribution of power in the international system. Since cooperation is 
inhibited by considerations related to relative gains and cheating, the USA would have to 
carefully consider how the distribution of costs and benefits to different states would be 
affected by this cooperation, and how it would be impacted by this distribution in relation to 
other states (Mearsheimer, 1994-1995:12). Since considerations related to interstate 
cooperation take place within a competitive, anarchic international system (Mearsheimer, 
1994-1995:12), the USA’s cooperation with China was limited by the impact of the 
agreement on the USA’s relative gains considerations within the context of the design of the 
USA’s energy policy at the time. 
The Copenhagen Accord was therefore a reflection of the changing distribution of power in 
the international system since the involvement of the USA and China, and their rivalry and 
self-interest, impacted the dynamics of the UNFCCC and the design of the Accord with the 
precedent inclusion of both developed and developing nations’ emissions being addressed 
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therein. Yet, the agreement also reflected the differences between the two countries regarding 
the design of a future legal regime. Mearsheimer (1994/95:82) reminds us that, “For realists, 
institutions reflect state calculations of self-interest based primarily on concerns about 
relative power; as a result, institutional outcomes invariably reflect the balance of power... 
However, realists recognize that great powers sometimes find institutions - especially 
alliances - useful for maintaining or even increasing their share of world power.” Thus, while 
the hegemonic position of the United States was instrumental in the design of the 
Copenhagen Accord and the attempt to secure relative gains for itself, it was a constrained 
hegemony reflecting the increasing power of China within the international system and 
therefore reflected their divergent interests and rivalry.  
7.3.2 Domestic Influences 
Copenhagen revealed a number of things about the position of the new Obama administration 
at the domestic and global levels. At the Copenhagen climate change negotiations, the Obama 
administration articulated that the United States would reduce its emissions by 17% below 
2005 levels by 2020 (The White House (a), 2014). While the Obama administration indicated 
its willingness to engage with the multilateral process due to its goal of enhancing the USA’s 
global leadership, the USA participated in the negotiations in a weak position (Wirth, 
2015:9). This weak position arose due to the feebleness of its domestic legislation at the time 
since the Clean Air Act (CAA) was unable to lay the basis “for a comprehensive, nationwide 
cap-and-trade scheme” (Wirth, 2015:9). While the USA agreed to limit global warming to 2 
Centigrade under the Copenhagen Accord, its position in the negotiations continued to be 
influenced by the Byrd-Hagel Resolution (Selin and VanDeveer, 2011:121; Dernbach and 
Altenburg, 2014:103). Since the United States was not a party to the Kyoto Protocol it made 
it clear that it will not sign on to anything that resembles it since there was little support for 
such a treaty in the Senate at the federal level (Hunter, 2010:6).  
The provisional target articulated by the USA to reduce its emissions by 17% below a 2005 
baseline by 2020 in line with expected climate and energy legislation
138
 rather than a position 
in which it accepted a binding target can be traced to Congressional refusal at the federal 
                                                          
138
 Under this umbrella of legislation was included the American Clean Energy and Security Act which was 
passed by the House of Representatives in June 2009, however a proposed cap-and-trade legislation was stalled 
in the US Senate because of the urgency surrounding the debate on the healthcare system reform, confusion over 
the substance of the legislation and concerns over its economic implications (The White House, 2009) 
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level to enact comprehensive climate legislation  (Wirth, 2015:12; Claussen, 2009, Stern, 
2010). This is reflected in the terminology used to state this position, “implementing 
agreement”, which suggested that “the outcome might be adopted as an executive agreement 
not requiring Senate advice and consent to ratification” (Wirth, 2015:10). Since the Obama 
administration adopted a different approach towards energy policy and the UNFCCC to 
strengthen the USA relative to its rivals and make it more secure because of this 
administration’s policy-makers’ perception that there were fewer trade-offs between 
environmental regulation and economic growth, an attempt was therefore made to bypass 
Congressional opposition at the federal level which had characterised earlier climate change 
negotiations. Specifically, concerns about US competitiveness and the need to include 
developing countries have remained prominent themes throughout this period and stem with 
the passing of the Resolution in 1997 reflecting a preoccupation with the costs of such 
policies and their consequences for the US economy and hierarchic position within an 
anarchic and competitive international system where the focus on relative gains and cheating 
remain prominent (Dernbach and Altenburg, 2014:103). Although the USA was unable to 
make a more ambitious commitment or produce a more comprehensive agreement, the 
significance of Copenhagen is that the USA pledged targets (IISD, 2014:43). Later, the 
Obama administration would design and implement policies to achieve this.  
Nonetheless, at the unit-level, what impeded the Obama administration in the negotiations 
was its inability to accept a strong mitigation target nor could it ratify an agreement that was 
negotiated as exclusively part of the Kyoto Protocol negotiating track (Christoff, 2010:653). 
The Obama administration was thus constrained by domestic institutions at the federal level 
which were opposed to an agreement that was viewed as undermining the USA’s global 
economic position by increasing costs to US energy while giving its rivals relative gains 
during a period of heightened economic uncertainty and weakness (Christoff, 2010:649; 
Goldenberg, 2010; Seligsohn et al., 2009:2). At the time, the Obama administration was 
further restricted in its position by other pressing domestic issues such as healthcare reform, 
as well as the recession which  contributed to the modest emission reduction targets put 
forward by the USA in Copenhagen (Christoff, 2010:650). Further complicating the USA’s 
position in Copenhagen had been the USA’s stagnant climate policy over a period of twenty 
years which had undermined the decarbonisation of the US economy (Christoff, 2010:643). 
However, the acceptance by China and other developing countries to submit their emission 
actions for MRV was an unprecedented decision that helped to decrease the resistance of US 
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domestic politics by alleviating fears in the USA that the US would weaken itself in relation 
to its economic and political rivals (Christoff, 2010:651). The Copenhagen Accord proved to 
be advantageous for the Obama administration since the Accord was non-legally binding, the 
USA could present its emission reduction target without having to fight over its legal scope 
within a legally-binding international agreement in Congress while a further benefit was that 
the Obama administration was not required to either support nor discard the Kyoto Protocol 
(Christoff, 2010:651). 
The Obama administration had to pursue a particular position within the UNFCCC because 
of continuous Congressional opposition at the federal level which was based on concerns 
regarding asymmetric climate policies and the increased costs to US energy and therefore 
negative consequences for its economy. Since the USA has a federal political structure, the 
executive is hindered in terms of the kinds of domestic energy policies and foreign climate 
policies that it can pursue in regards to the perceived incentives and constraints of the 
international anarchic system (The Constitution of the United States, 2007:8; Skodvin and 
Andresen, 2009; Depledge, 2005:2). At the unit-level, the USA’s position within the 
negotiations was limited by the Obama administration’s inability to pass the cap-and-trade 
regime in Congress since the costs of such actions combined with the trade-offs between the 
policy goals of economic competitiveness and climate change mitigation had Congress 
uneasy with pursuing such policy actions. Moreover, Congress opposed such measures 
because of the exemption of developing countries and the benefits that such states would gain 
if the USA pursued such actions. The distinction between developed and developing 
countries under the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol has being an important source of 
contention for the US position in the UNFCCC negotiations and its environmental policy 
(Parker and Blodgett, 2008). The main criticism stemming from US policy-makers is that 
such a distinction ignores some of the era’s biggest emitters, many of whom are developing 
countries (Parker and Blodgett, 2008). Thereby, the emphasis that the outcome must also 
include developing country emissions was a major turning point in the history of the climate 
change negotiations up to this point (Bodansky, 2010). 
For the remainder of the negotiations during the Obama administration’s first presidential 
term, at the Cancun Summit in 2010, the Parties recalled decision 1/CP.15 relating to the 
Copenhagen Accord and decision 1/CP.13 relating to the Bali Action Plan
139
 bringing some 
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 See Decision 1/CP.16 - The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention. 
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of these elements into the UNFCCC process through the Cancun Agreements (Bodansky (a), 
2012; Bodansky, 2011; Decision 1/CP.16, 2011). The Cancun Agreements further elaborated 
on the Copenhagen Accord’s sparse, three-page text into a thirty-page formulation of 
formalised, decision-making (Bodansky, 2011). At the Cancun Climate Summit, the USA 
had a more aggressive position and made it clear that developing nations, especially strong 
developing countries, had to accept emission reduction targets with emphasis that these 
reductions had to be accounted for in a verifiable system to decrease these states’ relative 
gains and ability to cheat (Goldenberg, 2010). In terms of the architecture of the climate 
regime, both the Copenhagen Accord and the Cancun Agreements support a bottom-up 
approach towards the mitigation of climate change through nationally-determined pledges 
which reflected the position of the United States (Bodansky, 2011). 
The UNFCCC negotiations held in Durban, South Africa between November and December 
2011 established plans for the end of the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period and the 
steps needed to be taken subsequently (Wirth, 2015:14). A non-binding decision was 
undertaken during COP 17 which allowed the Kyoto Protocol to be “extended for a second 
commitment period, beginning on January 1, 2013, the day after the expiration of the first 
commitment period, through the end of 2017 or 2020” (Wirth, 2015:14).
140
 At COP 17, the 
Parties further agreed to eliminate the negotiating tracks established under the Bali Action 
Plan in 2012 and in its place implement a new negotiating process (Hurrell and Sengupta, 
2012:472). With this aim in mind, the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for 
Enhanced Action (ADP) was adopted which was meant to “develop a protocol, another legal 
instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all 
Parties” and was intended by the Parties “for strengthening the multilateral, rules-based 
regime under the Convention” (Wirth, 2015:15; Bodansky (a), 2012). This final outcome, in 
which ever form it took, was scheduled to be adopted at the twenty-first Conference of the 
Parties (COP 21) which was scheduled to be held in Paris in 2015 and which was to “take 
effect in 2020” (Wirth, 2015:15; Bodansky (a), 2012; Bodansky (b), 2012). While it still 
offered only general guidelines, the significance of the Durban Platform is that the conclusion 
of these negotiations had the potential to establish a new era in the UNFCCC negotiations 
(Bodansky (a), 2012). Questions surrounding the future architecture of the climate regime 
would continue to be worked out over the next four years. 
                                                          
140
During COP 18 in Doha, Qatar in 2012, this amendment was formally adopted and it was decided that the 
Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period would be “extended until 2020” (Wirth, 2015:14).        
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Of significance to the concepts of CBDR and equity in the negotiations, in contrast to its 
predecessors, the Durban Platform for Enhanced Actions does not include the stringent 
division between developed and developing countries (Hurrell and Sengupta, 2012:472). This 
is a critical inclusion which has implications for the concept of CBDR and equity because 
this is more reflective of the USA’s position which stipulated that developing nations be 
included in the responsibilities for climate change mitigation. Such an omission indicates the 
shift that occurred over the last twenty years regarding the particular place and role of 
developing nations within the negotiations (Hurrell and Sengupta, 2012:472). Instead, the 
ADP undertook initiatives to narrow the ambition gap by encouraging Parties to initiate 
“more ambitious reduction targets” (Wirth, 2015:15).   
While the Obama administration has stated its support for various climate-related initiatives 
from the outset of his presidency based on this administration’s policy-makers’ perception of 
the congruence between environmental regulation and economic growth for the enhancement 
of the US economy, especially after the recession, at the federal level opposition from the 
Senate continued and by 2011 Congress had not signed the limitation of GHG emissions into 
legislation fearing the consequences of asymmetric climate policies for the USA’s 
competitiveness in relation to other countries (Selin and VanDeveer, 2011:121). Because of 
Congressional opposition at the federal level, the Obama administration was unable to adopt 
legally-binding emission reduction targets at the global climate change negotiations during its 
first few years in office (Selin and VanDeveer, 2011:121 - 122). This would change in 2013, 
with the introduction of the CAP executive action. 
7.4 The Interaction between the Obama Administration’s Energy Policy and its 
Position in the UNFCCC 
In contrast to the Republican George W. Bush administration which had a cautious approach 
towards the UNFCCC, the Democratic Obama administration adopted a cooperative 
approach towards the global climate change negotiations. Crucially, the international system 
reflected the rivalry between the USA and China which had important consequences for US 
energy policy and its position in the UNFCCC under the Obama administration. In this 
altered distribution of power, the Obama administration attempted to meet the challenge of 
climate change while still protecting the US position in an anarchic international system and 
thereby maintain the hegemonic position of the USA therein. Thus, the pursuit of this 
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cooperation reflected its self-interest (Mearsheimer, 1994-1995:7). It therefore designed those 
policies that were considered to give it a relative advantage in relation to its competitors.  
In regards to the Obama administration’s energy policy, at the structural-level, US energy 
policy is the result of the need to enhance the USA’s hegemonic position after the recession 
of 2008 and competition with China, and concerns that China could increase its material 
capabilities and latent power vis-à-vis the USA, with the distribution of power being altered 
to reflect the increasing power of China therein, and therefore the need for the USA to 
influence economic and technological dynamics to continue to reflect and maintain US 
hegemony. The Obama administration’s energy policy was also intended to enhance 
economic growth after the recession of 2008 in order to enhance US hegemony by linking 
energy, climate change and economic recovery but in the midst of new trends through a 
synthesis of climate change and energy goals. To enhance US hegemony at the structural 
level, the Obama administration attempted to manage the economic crisis, energy and climate 
change simultaneously in order to attain three goals: national security, economic 
enhancement and advance the USA’s global leadership. In light of the changing distribution 
of power with the increased emphasis on China, interstate competition between China and the 
USA increased which compelled the Obama administration to focus on renewable energy 
technology and set ambitious targets because of this rivalry and in order to enhance US 
leadership and hegemony. With the changing distribution of power and trends therein, a low 
carbon future became an important aspect of US energy policy for the Obama administration.    
However, while a low carbon future and renewable energy deployment became a central 
focus within this policy in order to enhance US security and power in an anarchic 
international system due to the assumptions that a low carbon future and renewable energy 
deployment would decrease energy costs, enhance the recovery of the US economy and give 
the USA a comparative advantage, as there was the perception by policy-makers within this 
administration that the policy goals of environmental regulation and economic growth were 
compatible, at the unit-level, Congressional concerns for asymmetric policies which would 
have allowed developing countries to attain relative gains combined with the threat posed by 
China and other emerging economies, led to Congressional opposition towards the cap-and-
trade legislation that would have allowed the Obama administration to have a strong position 
at the UNFCCC negotiations because of worries related to the high costs that could be borne 
to the US economy (Minsk, 2017:5; Parker et al., 2011:11, 12; Dernbach and Altenburg, 
2014:104; Freed and Fitzpatrick, 2012:3; Osofsky, 2011:244; Sussman, 2015. Congressional 
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opposition at the federal level was driven by the potential higher costs resulting from climate 
change legislation and the potential for carbon leakage from the USA to China and other 
emerging economies as a result (Parker et al., 2011:11, 12; Dernbach and Altenburg, 
2014:104; Freed and Fitzpatrick, 2012:3; Osofsky, 2011:244; Sussman, 2015). Importantly, 
the Obama administration was unable to enact the economy-wide cap-and-trade legislation at 
the federal level due to Congressional opposition which would have implications for the US 
position in the UNFCCC (Goldenberg, 2012; Reardon, 2016:387). At the federal level, the 
continued effect of the Byrd-Hagel Resolution further limited the Obama administration in 
terms of what they could achieve in the negotiations with the historical continuity 
accentuated in the midst of Congressional opposition. The division between Congress and the 
Obama administration toward both the UNFCCC and US energy policy would influence the 
Obama administration’s weak position in the UNFCCC relative to strong emerging 
economies, China in particular.  
As a reflection of its hegemonic position at the structural level, the Obama administration 
sought to restore US leadership in the UNFCCC, especially because of the importance of 
emerging economies within the negotiations which increased interstate competition. This 
occurred in a context wherein the dynamics of the negotiations began to alter given the 
increased emissions from developing nations; especially China’s, whose emissions had 
already surpassed that of the USA. With the relative power positions in the UNFCCC altered, 
the dynamics that resulted in the Copenhagen Accord indicated the changing and differing 
interests of powerful states therein, particularly China. The Copenhagen Accord reflects the 
complex position of the USA’s hierarchic position wherein in spite of its cooperative 
approach, its position reflected its self-interest and concern over the relative gains that could 
be accrued to developing nations, while it was structurally weaker with the effects of the 
global recession of 2008, and the inability to pass the economy-wide cap-and-trade 
legislation further limited its position. Increasingly, the United States was constrained by 
China at the system-level (Minsk, 2017:5; Goldenberg, 2012). 
At the structural level, China’s increased power in the international distribution of power 
played a dominant role in influencing US energy policy and climate change legislation and its 
position in the UNFCCC. Both the Obama administration and Congress reacted to China’s 
increasing role and its implications for the USA’s hegemonic position, especially within the 
context of altered economic and technological trends. With the influence of China increasing 
internationally, federal politics at the unit-level would be important limitations on the Obama 
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administration’s ability to attain its goals toward both its energy policy and UNFCCC. The 
unacceptably high costs alluded to by Congress in relation to US energy policy and the 
UNFCCC would influence federal politics in response to the changing distribution of power 
and the USA’s weakened hegemonic position therein as a result of the recession and the high 
costs that could be borne to the US economy. The US rivalry with China within the 
international system influenced both the Obama administration and Congress, but in different 
ways, as the means to deal with the crisis and China were starkly different.  
7.5 The Obama Administration’s Energy Policy 2013 – 2015 
By 2012, the context in which US energy policies have been designed over the last forty 
years has been transformed because of three related trends: the US economy has grown 
although its emissions in the transportation sector continue to decrease and perhaps the most 
significant is that overall US petroleum imports have decreased (Mitchell, 2013; White 
House, 2013). In the mid-2000s, analysts assumed that the United States’ dependence on 
imported petroleum and natural gas was a set long-term trend (Levi, 2012). The increased 
production of shale gas would abruptly change this scenario within a few short years. By 
2012, American production of petroleum dramatically increased for the first time in twenty-
five years causing imports to decrease to the two decade low of 42 percent while US 
petroleum consumption has decreased by 5.5% since its peak in 2007 (Levi, 2012; Freed and 
Fitzpatrick, 2012:2; Ratner and Glover, 2014:7; Mitchell, 2013; Gossett, 2013: 1). Thereby 
the US dependence on imported petroleum has decreased in contrast to the intervening 
decades since 1971 (All of the Above, 2014:2). This trend has helped the United States come 
close to achieving the elusive policy goal of energy self-sufficiency that has been the 
hallmark of energy policy goals
141
 for nearly forty years (Freed and Fitzpatrick, 2012:3). In 
addition, coal consumption has decreased; petroleum consumption remained flat, while the 
consumption of renewables and natural gas
142
 has been increasing (QER Report, 2015:1). 
This would have important implications for US energy policy as well as its ability to mitigate 
climate change, and per consequence, Secretary of State, John Kerry stated that,  
                                                          
141
 Due to the combined effects of the financial crisis, and policy measures, US petroleum consumption is 
significantly lower in comparison to the peak of 2005 (Mitchell, 2013).  
142
 Since 2005, the consumption of natural gas has risen by eighteen percent (All of the Above, 2014:2). 
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“…unlike some challenges that we face – I can readily attest to this – this 
one has a ready-made solution. The solution is not a mystery. It’s staring us 
in the face. It’s called energy policy. Energy policy. That’s the solution to 
climate change. And with the right choices, at the right speed, you can 
actually prevent the worst effects of climate change from crippling us 
forever. If we make the switch to a global, clean-energy economy a priority, 
if we think more creatively about how we power our cars, heat our homes, 
operate our businesses, then we still have time to prevent the worst 
consequences of climate change. It really is as simple as that.  But getting 
there is proving not to be as simple…We’re targeting emissions from 
transportation and power sources, which account for about 60 percent of the 
dangerous greenhouse gases that we release. And we’re also targeting 
smaller opportunities in every sector of the economy in order to be able to 
address every greenhouse gas” - Secretary of State, John Kerry (Kerry, 
2015).    
Thus far, these trends have contributed towards improved energy security and economic 
growth while reducing emissions thereby helping to mitigate climate change (All of the 
Above, 2014:2). Although, the Obama administration has made a low carbon future a central 
feature of his climate and energy policies because of competition with China, one of the 
primary difficulties for the Obama administration has been finding the linkage and trade-offs 
between the “benefits of low-cost energy, the social and environmental costs associated with 
energy production” within the US political system (All of the Above, 2014:31). The 
Quadrennial Energy Review (QER)
143
 which is published by the Department of Energy under 
the mandate of the Obama administration goes on to explain that (QER Report, 2015:1), 
“The focus of US energy policy discussions has shifted from 
worries about rising oil imports and high gasoline prices to debates 
about how much and what kinds of US energy should be exported, 
concerns about the safety of transporting large quantities of 
domestic crude oil by rail, and the overriding question of what 
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 The Quadrennial Energy Review (QER) was a strategy initiated by the Climate Action Plan in order to make 
certain federal energy policy resonates with the changes in the USA’s changing energy landscape by matching 
its security, climate and economic goals (QER Report, 2015:2).   
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changes in patterns of US energy supply and demand will be 
needed – and how they can be achieved – for the United States to 
do its part in meeting the global climate change challenge.” 
This resurgence in domestic petroleum and natural gas production was attributed as a reaction 
to higher petroleum prices as well as developments in the breakthrough of “computer-aided 
horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing” of tight oil (Levi, 2012; Manning, 2014:1). 
Because of this revolution in hydraulic production, analysts projected that the United States 
would become the world’s largest petroleum producer by 2017, thereby displacing Saudi 
Arabia (Manning, 2014:2). During the last ten to fifteen years, wide-spread transformation 
has been evident in the petroleum market arising from this technologically-induced change 
(Dale, 2015:2). Even though it accounts for only five percent of the global petroleum market, 
because of increased US production, petroleum prices collapsed in 2014 (Dale, 2015:3). Not 
only is the USA’s increased production of shale gas having important consequences for the 
US economy, it will also have far-reaching consequences globally due to altering patterns of 
exports and trade as well as alterations in the structure of natural gas markets (Gossett, 2013: 
1).  
Energy has been one of the main factors that assisted the economic recovery after the Great 
Recession, once again asserting the correlation between energy and economic strength and its 
relevance for US security and power in an anarchic system (All of the Above, 2014:3). The 
increase in the USA’s domestic energy production has significantly contributed to job 
creation and GDP growth while the United States’ trade deficit has been at its lowest since 
the 1990s even as “The resilience of the economy to international supply shocks – 
macroeconomic energy security
144
 – is enhanced by reducing spending in net imports and by 
reducing oil dependence.” (All of the Above, 2014:2 - 3).  
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 The Strategy highlights that the concept of energy security has a number of definitions within different 
contexts which range from reliability, geopolitical considerations, affordability, and availability (All of the 
Above, 2014:20). In spite of citing the various aspects of the definition of energy security, the Strategy adopts 
an explicitly macroeconomic definition of the concept (All of the Above, 2014:20). The Strategy defines 
macroeconomic energy security as, “…the extent to which a country’s economic welfare is exposed to energy 
supply risks, specifically, international energy supply disruptions that lead to product unavailability or price 
shocks or both.” (All of the Above, 2014:20).     
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These changes in domestic and global energy systems have changed the constraints and 
opportunities for the Obama administration’s energy and foreign policies with the 
convergence of the policy goals of minimising US petroleum dependence and the market 
forces related to the increased production of shale gas (Mitchell, 2013; Gossett, 2013:5). The 
tangible effects of the increased production of shale gas are the procurement of new 
technologies that have drastically altered the US energy position and its energy security 
(Manning, 2014:1, 4; IEA (C), 2014:1). There are four economic sectors that have been 
influenced by the increased production of shale gas, these being transportation, power 
generation, industrial, and the commercial/residential sectors (Gossett, 2013:1). Due to the 
low price of natural gas, electricity generation has switched from coal to natural gas while the 
domestic manufacturing sector has experienced a revival (Freed and Fitzpatrick, 2012:3). By 
decreasing gas prices, the US economy has been strengthened leading to “a resurgence in US 
manufacturing” which led to employment growth within the energy as well as other 
industries through decreased energy and related costs in the industrial sector (Manning, 2014: 
1; IEA (C), 2014:1).  
The perceived vulnerability that the United States has experienced since the 1970s oil 
embargo has appeared to wane (Rampton, 2012). Although this may seem to insulate 
America and make the long-awaited goal of petroleum self-sufficiency finally attainable, it 
must be understood that the United States continues to be integrated into the global petroleum 
market and as a result domestic petroleum prices will increase and decrease relative to 
developments in the global petroleum market (Levi, 2012). Therefore, these developments 
are not the panacea to the nation’s energy security challenges - its ability to become energy 
independent is unlikely and while it remains integrated into the global petroleum market it 
remains susceptible to price fluctuations (Levi, 2012; Mitchell, 2013). Although energy 
independence remains a powerful rhetorical tool in the United States, its position in the 
global energy market continues to be characterised by interdependence rather than 
independence for the foreseeable future (Mitchell, 2013).   
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By the end of 2014, the USA’s emissions
145
 were 9% below its 2005 levels (Vine, 2016). 
Both policy as well as market-induced factors influenced the USA’s emissions’ reduction 
(Vine, 2016:1). Due to the substitution of coal for natural gas, emissions from the electric 
power sector decreased by 15%, a trend that was augmented by decreasing electricity demand 
and increased renewable energy supply (Vine, 2016:1). Moreover, the move to a service-
oriented economy has further helped to reduce industrial emissions by 5% while associated 
emissions from the transportation sector decreased by 10% due to an improvement in vehicle 
efficiency (Vine, 2016:1). 
The Obama administration’s American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) has 
helped to increase clean energy technology utilisation (Freed and Fitzpatrick, 2012:3). The 
ARRA
146
, as well as state-level requirements for renewable energy utilisation, have seen 
wind generation grow by 116% and solar generation grow by 110% between 2008 and 2011 
(Freed and Fitzpatrick, 2012:3). In spite of this progress, these efforts to secure greater 
attention to renewable energy and the mitigation of climate change within energy policy 
should be situated within a complex array of deeply entrenched consumption and supply 
patterns that characterise the US energy system (Behrens, 2013:1). By decreasing the price of 
petroleum, the price of renewables and other “clean fuels” has increased “slowing the 
deployment” of solar, nuclear and wind energy (Manning, 2014:1). Similarly, concerns have 
been raised about the environmental impacts of the increased production of shale gas thus 
further undermining ecological well-being (Manning, 2014:1).  
7.5.1 Structural Influences 
States respond to altering trends and challenges in technological and economic developments 
in order to maintain and enhance their hierarchic position in the international system while 
competing with other states for power (Moe, 2009:204 – 205; Moe, 2007:3). After a first 
presidential term wherein the Obama administration had limited success in reaching its policy 
goals, its second presidential term would prove to be far more innovative in terms of its 
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 While this obviously represents an important new trend in the trajectory of US emissions, in the long-term, 
US emissions are projected to increase (Vine, 2016:1).  Since 2012, the price of natural gas has increased, which 
has led electricity generators to increasingly rely on coal (Vine, 2016:1). Overall, US emissions are projected to 
merely be “4.7% below 2005 levels in 2025” (Vine, 2016:1).  
146
 By 2013, ARRA funding was no longer available and the Republican Party continued to voice its opposition 
to the “continuation of tax incentives for renewables” (Freed and Fitzpatrick, 2012:2).   
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ability to pursue its objectives. Ultimately, at the structural level, states are primarily 
concerned with attaining power and security, and are either more or less optimal in attaining 
these. Since a change in the distribution of power alters a state’s calculations in the 
international system, the ascent of China would drive the administration’s attempts to attain 
those goals that would enhance its material capabilities and latent power in relation to its 
main rival (Johnson, Cha and Searight, 2016). Thereby, changing material circumstances can 
either impede or enhance an administration’s ability to pursue its policy goals by changing 
the costs associated with pursuing such actions. Due to the increased production of shale gas 
and its effects on the US energy sector, the Obama administration could pursue a number of 
its policy goals contained in the Climate Action Plan (CAP) (2013), the All-of-the-Above 
Energy Strategy as a Path to Sustainable Economic Growth (2014), and the Clean Power Plan 
(CPP) (2015). Due to the reduction in the costs of policy action as a result of the increased 
production of shale gas, there were fewer trade-offs between the goals of economic growth 
and environmental regulation thereby altering trends that would have implications for the 
USA’s hierarchic position relative to other states.  
The USA’s increased production of natural gas played a role in facilitating a transition away 
from coal and towards the use of natural gas to meet its national interests of enhancing its 
competitiveness relative to other nations in the clean energy economy since natural gas is 
perceived to assist countries to make the transition (Percival, 2014:149). The USA is not only 
changing its domestic sphere vis-à-vis energy and climate change but it is also changing 
trends at the international level to suit its objectives though its hegemonic position, a 
characteristic which much of the historical record attests to. While the distribution of power 
is a strategic calculation that states must constantly be aware of, the introduction of new 
technological and economic trends has ripple effects that will determine the ability of 
countries to ascend and descend in the international system since structural change occurs at 
the unit-level with unit- and structural-levels influencing one another (Waltz, 1993). 
Countries are thus required to keep up with new trends in energy technology in order to 
enhance their material capabilities, latent power and security. The USA’s isolated position in 
the UNFCCC meant that the Obama administration has been seeking an increasingly 
influential US role that can be linked to its domestic political economy while at the same time 
enhancing its hegemonic position. At the system-level, the Obama administration is 
concerned about alterations in the distribution of power with the rise of emerging economies, 
especially China, and the consequences this may have for economic and technological trends 
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which has the potential to undermine the position of the United States in the international 
system by undermining its latent power.  
The increasing rivalry with China due to the changing distribution of power influenced the 
policy developments of this administration within a context wherein the costs related to the 
mitigation of climate change and economic growth and energy security have altered which 
have enhanced the USA’s ability to influence trends at the structural-level (Hirschfield and 
Davenport, 2015). The Obama administration thus placed keeping-up with trends at the 
international level as an important policy priority not only to enhance the USA’s hegemonic 
position vis-à-vis this rivalry in the international system, but to also influence the 
international system through US hegemony, with Obama further emphasising that, “It’s up to 
us, the United States of America, to help remake that system” (Obama, 2016:9). Since lower 
cost energy prices have increased the competitiveness of US industries as well as energy 
security, the USA’s power and security have increased within the anarchic international 
system giving it greater leverage and enhancing its self-help relative to other nations (Fielden, 
s.a.). At the structural-level, the Obama administration sought to influence trends related to 
the global clean energy economy to compete against China (The Economist, 2014). By 
influencing the international system, the Obama administration would be able to enhance the 
USA’s hegemony and security relative to China.  
Since international institutions have as their most important function meeting the national 
interests of powerful states (Waltz, 2000:21), the Obama administration is aware of 
international trends that are beginning to transition towards a low carbon future and that 
increasingly powerful states are influencing the UNFCCC at the expense of the United States 
thereby pressurising the Obama administration to develop an energy policy that could 
enhance the USA’s mitigation of greenhouse gases while simultaneously increasing the 
USA’s economic growth and energy security. Under such tricky circumstances, the USA’s 
energy policy reflects changes at the international level and also domestic level. The 
traditional areas of contestation within the USA’s energy policy have been the attainment and 
mix of energy sources, and the costs related to this, and the trade-off between environmental 
protection and economic growth that arise from this. With the changes that have occurred in 
the energy sector because of increased US production of natural gas and petroleum, increased 
generation of electricity from renewable sources, and decreased petroleum consumption, have 
minimised the costs to the US economy, its carbon emissions have been reduced, and its 
energy security is improved through the reduction of the dependence of the US economy on 
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petroleum and petroleum imports (All of the Above, 2014:2). This has changed the context in 
which US energy policy has been designed over the last four decades. This has important 
implications for the USA’s hegemonic position and security through the enhancement of its 
latent power and by broadening the scope for US action both internationally and 
domestically.  
These policies have been developed in a context wherein, “America is producing more oil, 
gas, and renewable energy, and the U.S. is becoming more energy efficient overall. These 
trends are increasing our energy security, cutting our carbon pollution, and enhancing our 
economic growth.” (Obama White House, s.a.). With the trade-offs between these policy 
goals been reduced, this new policy framework has grappled with the manner in which these 
alterations in trends related to energy supply and demand can be used for the USA to be able 
to mitigate climate change as part of the UNFCCC framework because of a change in its 
material capabilities and latent power through a reduction of the costs to the US economy to 
mitigate climate change which would allow the USA to influence the UNFCCC to meet its 
objectives in relation to China (UNFCCC, 2015). The change in the USA’s political economy 
facilitated the Obama administration’s ability to pursue its preferred energy policy. However, 
issues related to climate change mitigation and the energy mix continue to be politicised since 
environmental protection is promoted to the extent that it does not undermine economic 
growth – a key aspect of US power in the international system (All of the Above, 2014:20; 
Lin, 2014:20).  
While the USA has responded to the changing distribution of power in the international 
system, and the increased power and influence of China therein (Johnson, Cha and Searight, 
2016), the material change brought about through the increased production of shale gas and 
its impact on the US energy sector, which have characterised the Obama administration’s 
second term in office, has facilitated the design of an energy policy more congruent to the 
synthesis between economic growth and environmental regulation by minimising the costs 
associated therewith and thus permitted the Obama administration to pursue its goals with 
more ease. Such goals are nevertheless still a reflection of its hegemonic position and are 
aimed to secure US self-interest internationally in the midst of altering economic and 
technological trends. In particular, the USA’s rivalry with China has influenced the Obama 
administration to pursue goals that would improve its material capabilities and latent power 
in the midst of the changing distribution of power.  
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7.5.2 Domestic Influences 
A considerable amount of policy change occurred during the Democratic Obama 
administration’s second term in office. In his 2013 State of the Union Address, following 
shortly after his re-election for his second presidential term, Obama forcefully declared that, 
“If Congress won’t act soon to protect future generations, I will. I will direct my cabinet to 
come up with executive actions we can take, now and in the future, to reduce pollution, 
prepare our communities for the consequences of climate change, and speed the transition to 
more sustainable sources of energy.” (Quoted in Robinson, 2013:1). During his 2013 State of 
the Union Address, President Obama pressed Congress to be willing to act on climate change 
that would involve a market-based and bipartisan solution (Percival, 2014:147). However, the 
Obama administration made it clear that should Congress hesitate to act
147
, it would use 
executive actions that could enhance the transition to renewable sources of energy and protect 
communities from climate change (Percival, 2014:147). Establishing such comprehensive 
federal legislation would facilitate the US to become a signatory to a global climate 
agreement that would be based on domestic support and would enable such an international 
outcome to be legally-binding in the United States (Robinson, 2013:2). However, since the 
Republican Party dominated both the Senate and the House after the 2012 election, the 
Obama administration had to rely on executive actions “to circumvent Congressional 
gridlock” thereby not requiring Congressional approval at the federal level (Bang et al., 
2016:215; Leggett, 2014:1). 





 of June 2013 as part of executive actions which sought to reduce US greenhouse gas 
emissions and whose measures do not require Congressional approval (Robinson, 2013:2; 
Leggett, 2014:1; Percival, 2014:148; CAR, 2014:8). The act consists of three main policy 
goals: reduce US carbon emissions, enhance the USA’s adaptation measures; and promote 
the USA’s global leadership which would have a positive impact on the US economy while 
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 There have been other global environmental treaties where Obama relied on his presidential powers and 
bypassed Congressional support such as the Minimata Convention on Mercury “when he determined that the US 
could deposit its instruments of acceptance. On November 6, 2013, the US became the first country formally to 
accept the Convention after the Obama administration determined that existing US law already provided 
sufficient authority for the US to implement it.” (Percival, 2014:153 - 154). 
148
 The CAP alludes to adaptation measures however, since the focus of this thesis is on mitigation, the Plan’s 
adaptation objectives shall not be the focus of analysis. 
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meeting the USA’s international objectives as the goals of economic growth and 
environmental regulation were perceived by policy-makers within this administration to be 
compatible in the midst of the emphasis placed by these policy-makers on a low carbon 
future and its enhancement of the US economy (Robinson, 2013:2; Percival, 2014:148; All of 
the Above, 2014:3). The CAP is intended to target all key economic sectors, consisting of 
buildings, transportation, as well as power, and focuses on reaching the pledged goals that the 
USA made in Copenhagen: namely decreasing emissions by 17 percent below 2005 levels by 
2020 and further decreasing these emissions 26 to 28 percent from 2005 levels by 2025 
(Tubman, 2015:1; The White House (b), 2014:1; Robinson, 2013:2; Percival, 2014:148). The 
most prominent aspect of the CAP is its objective of reducing emissions
149
 from power plants 
which are responsible for approximately thirty percent of total US greenhouse gas emissions 
(Tubman, 2015:1). Simultaneously, the Obama administration also issued a Presidential 
Memorandum which encouraged the EPA to “further regulate greenhouse gas emissions from 
new power plants, as well as modified reconstructed and existing facilities, under the Clean 
Air Act.” (Wirth, 2015:24). 
The Plan can be interpreted as a reflection of the Obama administration’s attempts to 
influence the USA’s domestic energy mix to better suit the international objectives that it is 
attempting to reach in the UNFCCC to enhance US leadership therein in relation to its rivalry 
with China (UNFCCC, 2015). The CAP’s international objectives which focus on various 
strands at the global level consist of: increasing clean energy use by enhancing fuel 
switching, nuclear energy, clean coal technologies and the development of natural gas; the 
advancement of negotiations within the WTO that would focus on “trade in environmental 
goods, including clean coal technologies”, to diminish the use of fuel tax subsidies both 
domestically and internationally,  to stop federal support for “public financing of new coal-
fired power plants overseas, except the most efficient coal technology available in the world’s 
poorest countries, or facilitates deploying carbon sequestration technologies”; and finally, the 
plan aims to address global leadership on climate change by designing an agreement that is 
inclusive, flexible, and ambitious (IEA, 2014:42; Climate Action Plan, 2013:5; Waskow, 
2013). Although the USA stipulated that achieving their international targets depends on the 
condition that other major economies also undertook emissions reduction actions, change in 
the US energy system has meant that achieving the Obama administration’s Copenhagen 
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 The Plan also aims to enhance renewable energy generation by 2020 by fifty percent (Robinson, 2013:2).  
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commitment of a 17% reduction of emissions by 2020 compared to 2005 levels
150
 is 
obtainable even in the absence of legislation indicating altered material constraints and the 
implications thereof for the Obama administration to pursue its goals based on this 
administration’s perception of the compatibility between environmental regulation and 
economic growth and the reduced costs for the US economy (Robinson, 2013:2; Leggett, 
2014:1). 
At the unit-level, because of the continued Congressional stalemate, the Obama 
administration has attempted to use existing “executive branch authority” to deal with climate 
change as well as energy related issues (Leggett, 2014:1). In spite of actions taken by states 
and other non-governmental organisations to advance progressive legislation on the issue of 
climate change, Congress is stalled by a division on “whether climate change risks merit 
raising current costs to the economy in exchange for benefits that would mostly accrue to 
future generations, people in other countries, and stability of Earth systems.” (Leggett, 
2014:1). To conclude, while the CAP remains an important attempt to tackle climate change 
in the US political system, it also illustrates the hurdles involved in passing federal climate 
change legislation, as well as the increasing costs involved in mitigation as it regulates 
specific plants and technologies, and the EPA will incur significant political and legal 
challenges in regulating GHG emissions for current coal-fired power plants (Robinson, 
2014:1). Additionally, while the plan mentions commitments to international efforts to deal 
with climate change, these commitments are vague (Wirth, 2015:25). 
Already a number of these initiatives have incurred opposition from certain states and 
Congress (Tubman, 2015:1). Ultimately, there remain opposing views of the costs to the US 
economy arising from energy policy goals. Those who oppose the CAP point out that it will 
curtail job creation and also increase the price of energy (Percival, 2014:149). They further 
highlight that as Congress has not enacted “new legislation addressing climate change, the 
president has overstepped the bounds of his constitutional authority.” (Percival, 2014:149).  
Although this is a point raised by critics, it should be appreciated that in this particular 
instance, the law is quite unclear over the extent of executive power (Percival, 2014:149). At 
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 The USA’s gross emissions were 10% below that of 2005 levels in 2012, otherwise 5% higher than its 1990 
levels; while in 2007, its emissions had peaked (Leggett, 2014:1). Between 1990 and 2012 its population grew 
by 2% while its economy (measured by Gross Domestic Products [GDP]) increased by 73% (Leggett, 2014:1). 
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the unit-level, the Obama administration maintains that congressional gridlock has 
necessitated that it use its “executive power expansively” (Percival, 2014:153). 
To further comment on these changes in the US energy sector and the administration’s policy 
goals, in May 2014, the Obama administration released their All-of-the-Above Energy 
Strategy as a Path to Sustainable Economic Growth which developed out of the 2005 Energy 
Policy Act which was the last time Congress enacted comprehensive energy legislation (Lin, 
2014:17). The Strategy hinges on the transformation of the US energy sector and thus sets out 
to advance energy sources that are characterised by zero or low emissions such as renewable 
energy technologies and nuclear (All of the Above, 2014:2). It likewise supports energy 
efficiency, carbon capture and storage and what it terms “environmentally responsible 
production of oil and natural gas” (All of the Above, 2014:2). The Strategy consists of three 
goals: supporting job creation and economic growth, deploying low-carbon technologies, and 
laying the foundation for a clean energy future; and enhancing energy security (All of the 
Above, 2014:2). Critically, the Strategy relies on natural gas to facilitate the transition 
towards the low carbon future (All of the Above, 2014:4).  
Unlike the Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future of 2011, the Strategy cites the United States’ 
Copenhagen pledges as an important driver of this policy change and finding these linkages 
(All of the Above, 2014:31). Thereby, the Strategy cites Obama’s 2013 State of the Union 
Address and his call on Congress to pass adequate legislation (All of the Above, 2014:20). 
Since Congress did not pass such legislation, the administration had to make use of other 
tools “with which to deploy low carbon technologies” at the federal level (All of the Above, 
2014:31). Critics however, point out that the plan appears to promote environmental 
regulation to the degree that it will not hurt fossil fuel production (Lin, 2014:20).  In spite of 
its rhetoric, the Plan had only an incremental effect on the USA’s energy mix and maintains 
the overall structure of the US energy system (Lin, 2014:19). 
Because of the interrelated challenges of climate change and the deployment of renewable 
energy, on the third of August 2015, the Obama administration released the Clean Power Plan 
(CPP), designed in light of the Paris negotiations which were set to take place in December 
2015, which has widely been applauded as the strongest action taken towards climate change 
by any administration by that point (Vaughan, 2015; EPA, 2015; White House (b), 2015; 
Department of State, 2015; White House Briefing Room, 2015). The administration argues 
that the CPP will “…ensure the US will stay on a path of long-term clean energy investments 
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that will maintain the reliability of our electric grid, promote affordable and clean 
energy…and continue the United States leadership on climate action.” (White House (b), 
2015). In particular, to transition to clean energy sources, while growing the economy, the 
plan supports solar as well as wind deployment and has measures such as increasing 
renewable energy generation by 30% by 2030 as well as reducing carbon pollution from 
power plants by 32% by 2030 in relation to a 2008 baseline (White House Briefing Room, 
2015; BBC, 2015; Vaughan, 2015; Department of State, 2015). Moreover, the CPP, sets the 
“first-ever carbon pollution standards for power plants” which are the biggest source of 
emissions in the United States (White House Briefing Room, 2015; Department of State, 
2015). The EPA (2015) has described the CPP as, “…the final Clean Power Plan is fair, 
flexible and designed to strengthen the fast-growing trend toward cleaner and lower-polluting 
American energy.” 
Thus far, the plan has been met with controversy at both the federal and state level with many 
businesses and states declaring outright opposition to the plan, while other states and 
businesses have signalled their approval citing economic performance and job improvement 
as key benefits that the plan will incur (Bang et al., 2016:215; Vaughan, 2015). Principally, 
there are two main areas of controversy surrounding the CPP. Firstly, the controversy 
revolves over whether the president and the EPA have sufficient authority under the Clean 
Air Act to establish extensive regulations for CO2 emissions that do not include Congress 
thereby overstepping the president’s executive powers and incurred federal overreach (Bang 
et al., 2016:215). The second controversy hearkens back to the political economy of the US 
energy system and the emerging tensions between coal states and those states with renewable 
energy deployment. Due to the protracted absence of federal legislation regarding a 
regulatory response towards reducing GHGs; in this vacuum, a number of states have stepped 
in and implemented either by themselves or through regional agreements, restrictions on 
emissions by electric power plants within their jurisdiction (MacDougald, 2008:431).  
Thus far, these initiatives have produced mixed and limited results. In spite of these states’ 
efforts, due to the impact of leakage, such systems have provided a comparative advantage to 
those states that have not placed such restrictions on their power plants (MacDougald, 
2008:1431). Thereby, without federal regulation it has been difficult for this system to be 
effective. Fossil fuels such as coal are pervasive in the US economy with coal being produced 
in large amounts and used for electricity generation; thereby states, especially those which are 
heavily dependent on coal mining such as West Virginia, Kentucky and Wyoming, oppose 
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measures to limit coal-based electricity generation since this would distribute significant 
losses to them and lead to slower economic growth as well as job loss (BBC, 2015; Bang et 
al., 2016:215; Leaf et al., 2003:306). This illustrates the difficulties the executive 
administration faces in implementing comprehensive legislation at the unit-level due to the 
divergences at the federal level  concerning the factors that lead to economic prosperity, and 
thereby power and security in an anarchic system and the related asymmetrical distribution of 
costs and benefits to different sets of actors at the federal level. 
The Obama administration’s second term in office had been characterised by the use of 
executive actions to circumvent Congressional opposition and inaction at the federal level in 
the midst of a changing energy system and material constraints. Within these complex 
dynamics, the Obama administration’s policies were designed in light of but to also influence 
the UNFCCC. As such, the Obama administration’s use of executive actions indicate the 
feasibility of what can be practically achieved in the US federal system. 
7.6 The Obama Administration, the US Position in the UNFCCC Negotiations and 
US Energy Policy  
Under the Obama administration, the United States has consistently articulated its willingness 
to play a leading role in global efforts to address climate change and had taken precedent-
setting steps to meet this goal (Kerry, 2015; White House (a), 2015). To attain the 
international leadership goal set out by the CAP, in November 2014, the United States 
released jointly with China
151
, their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) 
in anticipation of COP 21 at the end of 2015
152
 (Tubman, 2015:3). The two countries also 
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 The administration has also emphasised other multilateral efforts to deal with climate change (Tubman, 
2015:4). In January 2015, the United States issued a joint announcement with India regarding clean energy 
cooperation and climate change in anticipation of COP 21 and as part of the CAP (Tubman, 2015:3). An 
important initiative has been the joint pledges given by the USA, India and China in 2015 “to advance efforts 
under the Montreal Protocol to phase out HFCs” (Tubman, 2015:4). The administration also engaged 
multilaterally with other states to decrease tariffs in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on environmental 
goods (Tubman, 2015:4). Market-based mechanisms continue to be supported by the Obama administration to 
achieve these goals (Tubman, 2015:4). 
152
 Alongside this renewable energy agreement, Barack Obama and Chinese premier Xi Jingping further agreed 




described “joint research projects on clean energy, carbon capture, and other collaborative 
efforts.” (Tubman, 2015:3). 
Certain decisions that have been taken at recent COPs, most notably at the Warsaw and Lima 
COPs, point out that Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs)
153
 to reduce 
emissions will likely be part of the final decision taken at the negotiations at COP 21 
(Bodansky, 2015(a):1). In order to sustain US leadership on climate change, the United States 
submitted its INDC in April 2015, making it one of the first countries to do so, and indicated 
its willingness to reduce its economy-wide emissions by 26 to 28 percent below 2005 levels 
by 2025, and 17% below 2005 levels by 2020, in order to meet the objective of the 
Convention (Vine, 2016:1; Tubman, 2015:3 – 4; INDC, 2015; White House (a), 2015). The 
target contained in the US INDC was grounded in an analysis of cost-effective carbon 
pollution reductions that could be attained under existing legislation and which could assist 
the United States to achieve economy-wide reductions of 80% by 2050 (INDC, 2015).  
In the agreement reached between the two major emitters, China agreed to reduce its 
emissions by 2030, while the United States agreed to reduce its emissions by 26 to 28% in 
relation to a 2005 baseline by 2025 (EIU, 2014). This marked an important turning point in 
the politics of climate change as this was the first time that China pledged to reduce its 
emissions - it usually alluded to its economic development and energy strategy as an excuse 
to not have done so in the past – as a developing country the need to increase the population’s 
prosperity will be correlated to increased energy consumption from fossil fuels (EIU, 2014; 
Lewis, 2007-08; Gao, 2005:1). Not long before the historic announcement by the United 
States and China, the EU also announced a 40% reduction below 1990 levels by 2030 (WRI, 
2014). Part of the USA’s agreement to limit its emissions was on the condition that other 
countries pursued similar goals. And it is evident that US leadership is essential in 
accelerating the negotiations as other countries soon followed its example in submitting 
INDCs (Office of the Press Secretary, 2015; Parker and Karlsson, 2018:525).  
Obama needed to secure cooperation from China to implement “ambitious actions to reduce 
emissions” before the COP 21 negotiations in Paris (Moore, 2015). At first glance, it would 
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 At the Nineteenth Conference of the Parties (COP 19) held in Warsaw, Parties decided to submit Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs)  by March 2015 if these will be prepared in preparation for COP 
21 (WRI, 2014).  At COP 20, one of the major areas that countries had to consider during negotiations was how 
these INDCs were to be presented and assessed (WRI, 2014).  
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appear that the collaboration between China and the United States on climate change would 
appear to negate the main assumptions of realism. Since in an anarchic international system 
states are mainly concerned with relative gains and cheating, the Obama administration had 
to secure the cooperation of China and other major emitters in order to ensure that they would 
not disadvantage the United States in the negotiations, especially in relation to the 
competitiveness of US industries and carbon leakage. The increased production of shale gas 
would allow the United States to achieve two related goals that had previously inhibited it, 
that is, securing the cooperation of developing countries to accept mitigation targets, and that 
the US economy would not be undermined. Since natural gas produces less CO2 per unit of 
GDP, the USA could consequently mitigate its emissions without incurring costs to its 
economy and not undermine its security, thereby pressurising other countries to do likewise 
because of its hegemonic position. 
At this point, it may be useful to briefly compare the Bush and Obama administrations’ use of 
bilateral and multilateral agreements to advance their respective positions regarding climate 
change
154
. Both the Bush and Obama administrations placed emphasis on multilateral and 
bilateral agreements to deal with climate change. The goals relied on by US administrations 
to reduce US GHG emissions arising from energy production indicate “two distinct and 
contrasting perspectives” (Pugh, 2015). The type of action used to mitigate climate change 
was influenced by the administrations’, and their political parties’, ideological position 
concerning the role of government and the private sector in the scope and content of such 
actions and regulations (Pugh, 2015). This ideological division was evident in the types of 
engagement and activities that the Bush and Obama administrations promoted: the Bush 
administration’s policies favoured investments that enhanced existing technologies which 
juxtapositions to the Obama administration’s investment in new forms of technology which 
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 The USA supports multilateral efforts that promote sharing scientific information as well as clean and 
efficient technologies (US EPA, 2016). Some of these multilateral “instruments” include the Global Methane 
Initiative which focuses on capture and use of methane (CH4) gas, the Global Data Centre Energy Efficiency 
Task Force to improve energy efficiency, and the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum focused on the 
development and improvement of technologies for the separation and capture of carbon dioxide for transport 
and long-term safe storage (US EPA, 2016). Related to these multilateral efforts, the US participates in bilateral 
partnerships relating to energy and sequestration technologies as well as advancing methodologies for the 
monitoring and measurement of emissions such as the Energy Efficiency Promotion which focuses on 
partnerships with developing countries, mainly China and India, and also Economic Modelling Workshops, 
Greenhouse Gas Inventories and Low Emission Development Strategies (US EPA, 2016). 
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“could have an impact on existing market structures and technological preferences” (Pugh, 
2015). Ideological differences also predisposed these administrations to pursue their goals in 
multilateral institutions such as the UNFCCC, with the Bush administration being more 
hesitant to engage with such multilateral forums, while the Obama administration took the 
opposing stance in juxtaposition to his predecessor, however both administrations pursued 
their goals on climate change using regimes that were also run in parallel to the UNFCCC 
(Pugh, 2015). The USA’s hegemonic position was used to design regimes on the basis of US 
power and with the intent of meeting US national interests. 
Under these circumstances, the Twenty-first Conference of the Parties (COP 21) was held 
between the 29
th
 of November and the 11
th
 of December 2015 whose Paris Agreement, the 
result of a four year negotiating process
155
, has been described as a historical turning point in 
the UNFCCC regime (Leggett (b), 2015; Dimitrov, 2016:2), introducing a new framework 
surrounding the legality of the agreement, and a distribution of obligations and 
responsibilities
156
 to all Parties. Therewith, the Paris Agreement finalised the paradigm shift 
from the Kyoto Protocol’s division between developed and developing countries in the 
Annex I/Non-Annex I categorisation, to the global framework that emerged with the 
Copenhagen Accord (Bodansky, 2015(b)). 
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 The Lima Call for Climate Action reiterated that an ambitious agreement must be made in 2015 which is 
based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities within the context of different national 
circumstances (IISD, 2014:41). Caveats between developed and developing nations continued to disrupt the 
Lima negotiations (EIU, 2014). Developing nations protested that since developed nations are responsible for 
the majority of emissions they should bear responsibility for its associated costs; however developed nations 
point out that it is developing nations which currently are responsible for the majority of emissions (EIU, 2014). 
In addition to the controversy surrounding the principle of CBDR, the negotiations were further divided about 
the legal status that the final agreement would have (EIU, 2014). The US negotiating position has remained 
strongly opposed to any agreement that would be legally-binding should developing nations be exempt from 
adopting legally binding emission reduction targets because of its fears of being disadvantaged by its 
competitors in an anarchic international system (EIU, 2014; Harvey, 2011). 
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 One of the key developments in Lima was the support for a long-term mitigation target by over one hundred 
countries indicating support for a transition to a low carbon economy (WRI, 2014). Whether this is merely 
rhetorical or a genuine commitment to sustainability remains to be seen. However, it does indicate changing 




The UNFCCC negotiations that took place in Paris were set to come up with a global 
agreement to reconsider, review and extend the legal architecture concerning global climate 
change (Wirth, 2015:3; Robinson, 2013:2). To hearken back to the Durban Platform adopted 
in 2011, the discussions sought to establish a new round of negotiations to “develop a 
protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the UNFCCC 
applicable to all Parties’” and which maintains the principle of CBDR “in light of different 
national circumstances” (Bodansky, 2015(a):1; Leggett (b), 2015:1; IISD, 2014:41; UNFCCC 
Lima Call for Climate Action, Decision -/CP.20; EIU, 2014). The outcome of the Durban 
Platform was intended to be adopted at COP 21 and to be applicable from 2020 (Bodansky, 
2015(a):11; Leggett (b), 2015).  Bodansky warned that, “The success of ongoing negotiations 
to establish a new global climate change agreement depends heavily on the agreement’s 
acceptance by the world’s major economies, including the United States.” (2015(a):v) 
For two decades the UNFCCC revolved around a division between developed and developing 
countries (Levi, 2015). The global political economy has changed significantly since the 
establishment of the negotiations making it increasingly difficult to support such a division 
(Levi, 2015). Thereby, a precedent is set under the Paris Agreement in that it establishes a 
“single framework to promote transparency and track progress of Parties’ efforts applies, for 
the first time, to all Parties.” (Leggett (a), 2015; Levi, 2015). Nonetheless, the UNFCCC 
continues to draw controversy in the United States because of the association that it bears 
with the Kyoto Protocol (Wirth, 2015:52). The emphasis placed on the binding nature of “a 
protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force” has proven to be 
particularly difficult to pass domestically, both amongst the branches, especially between the 
executive and congressional branches of government, but also between the federal 
government and the states (Wirth, 2015:52). If the final agreement were a political 
agreement, much like the Copenhagen Accord, then the president would have the legal 
authority to endorse it without Congressional approval (Bodansky, 2015(a):1, 13). However, 
if the outcome in Paris were legal in nature, then it was unclear under which conditions the 
United States would be able to accept such an agreement (Bodansky, 2015(a):1). By being 
ratified by the Senate, these treaties attain the status of federal law and are therefore binding 
in terms of their implementation (Skodvin and Andresen, 2009). The consequence is that the 
Senate is weary of ratifying agreements which contain specific commitments unless these are 
“already established under federal law” (Skodvin and Andresen, 2009). However, there does 
not exist a lack of legislation for the United States to accept a legally-binding agreement at 
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COP 21 unlike the domestic conditions which existed in 1992 when the UNFCCC was  
enacted, or the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, and the Copenhagen Accord in 2009 (Wirth, 
2015:53). Ultimately, at the unit-level, the real challenge continues to be political rather than 
legal (Wirth, 2015:53).  
Per consequence, the legal nature of the Paris Agreement was one of the most contentious 
issues during the negotiations and in many ways reflects the changing circumstances of the 
global political economy and international relations that had occurred over the last two 
decades (Bodansky (a), 2016; Bodansky (b), 2016:2 – 3; Leggett (b), 2015:1). While the Paris 
Agreement is a treaty as understood by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, not 
every provision carries a legal obligation such as the reduction of emissions (Bodansky (a), 
2016; Leggett (a), 2015; Goldenberg, 2015). Thereby, the Paris Agreement is a legally-
binding instrument, although with some non-binding elements, unlike the Copenhagen 
Accord which is merely a political agreement (Bodansky (b), 2016:3). The Paris Agreement 
therefore has a bottom-up framework which reflects rather than dictates national policy, and 
thus allows individuated national circumstances to influence policy content (Bodansky (b), 
2016:2). In order to incentivise more ambitious action, INDCs are enforced by norms that 
enhance their accountability and transparency and that such actions become more ambitious 
over time (Bodansky (b), 2016:2). It is thus possible to hold states accountable as well as 
increase ambition with the progression of time (Diringer, 2015, Levi, 2015). 
The Paris Agreement is in many ways built on the foundations of the Copenhagen Accord 
and bears little resemblance to the Kyoto Protocol to which the United States is not a Party 
(Bodansky (a), 2015; Bodansky (b), 2015; Leggett (b), 2015). The Paris Agreement is global 
and is thus devoid of the developing/developed; Annex I/non-Annex I dichotomy and instead 
has commitments that will be applicable to most Parties (Bodansky (a), 2015; Bodansky (b), 
2015; Bodansky (b), 2016:3). The significance of Paris is that it has adopted a new paradigm 
that allows states to accelerate the ambition of their actions to mitigate climate change 
(Bodansky (b), 2016:3). 
7.6.1 Structural Influences 
The USA occupies a central role in the UNFCCC negotiations because it is the world’s 
second biggest emitter of GHGs as well as the biggest economy and its actions influence 
other states to adopt similar policies (Bang et al., 2016:214). Moreover, as a hegemonic state, 
its role in the design and functioning of the UNFCCC is indispensable, and the USA’s role 
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therein can be understood as the pursuit of its self-interest and the enhancement of its 
hegemonic position while preventing other countries from accumulating relative gains and 
cheating. The Obama administration has made the enhancement of US leadership in the 
UNFCCC one of its key goals (UNFCCC, 2015). As such, there has been a development of 
the link between the energy policy it developed during its second presidential term and US 
cooperation within the UNFCCC in order to attain its key goals in the UNFCCC. In the past, 
US non-participation was justified by the exclusion of developing nations from mandatory 
mitigation and flawed treaty design along with the high costs that would be borne by the US 
economy (Bang et al., 2016:214). As such, within the distribution of power in the 
international system, US cooperation within the UNFCCC would have implications for its 
relative position of power and self-help while enhancing the material and latent  power of its 
rivals, resulting in US hesitation to cooperate. Under these circumstances, it was pivotal for 
the USA that the negotiations produce a bottom-up framework so as to not undermine US 
power and thereby hegemony within the international distribution of power by limiting the 
costs to the US economy (Bang et al., 2016:215).  
The UNFCCC negotiations have long been a battleground for countries’ geopolitical 
ambitions and wider national interests. Since 2009, the UNFCCC negotiations have seen a 
shift in the relative positions of countries therein reflecting altering trends in the distribution 
of power in the international system, with ascending developing nations, especially China, 
bearing greater influence over the design of its architecture (Parker and Karlsson, 2018:524). 
This is not to negate the centrality of the USA in negotiating outcomes and wielding power 
within the negotiations as it is still a hegemonic power and its role in the UNFCCC is central, 
but it is not the unbridled power of the early period of hegemonic ascent, but a declining 
power that increasingly clashes with emerging economies. Thereby, policy-makers play a 
chess game that has to consider the moves of opponents. Although still hegemonic, the rise of 
China, India and other developing countries, placed parameters on the USA’s participation in 
the negotiations and required it to cooperate with China to design the agreement reflecting the 
changing distribution of power in the international system (Parker and Karlsson, 2018:524). 
Yet, the changing positions of states in the international hierarchy came with changing 
interests, interests that were closer aligned to that of the USA in the design of the agreement. 
This is unlike the Copenhagen negotiations of 2009 wherein China and the USA had 




As the world’s two most powerful countries within the international distribution of power, the 
USA and China
157
 have for a number of years been the two central players in the negotiations 
and while the USA was a key actor in the drafting of the final Paris Agreement, especially 
concerning certain legal provisions therein, it was the interaction between China and the USA 
that developed some of the major provisions in the agreement reflecting their positions of 
power and material capabilities in the international distribution of power (Oberthür, 2016:4 – 
6; Bodansky, 2015(b)). In the changing distribution of power in the international system, the 
Paris Agreement reflects the changes that occurred in states’ material capabilities since the 
USA had to actively engage emerging states to secure the final agreement. While 
international regimes reflect the interests of powerful states, an important aspect that worked 
to the United States’ favour was that China as the world’s second largest economy and 
biggest GHG emissions producer has substantially different national interests than it did 
twenty years ago, and has less in common with developing countries, than earlier eras within 
the UNFCCC and as such China has “decreasing interest in a sharp differentiation between 
countries based on per capita and historic emissions” (Clémençon, 2016:6 - 7). The Paris 
Agreement thus worked out to the interest of both the United States and China as their 
hierarchic positions began to change. By designing an agreement that emphasised that all 
countries are to bear responsibility, albeit based on national circumstances, the USA could 
reduce the likelihood of other countries attaining relative gains and cheating, and instead the 
Agreement could meet the USA’s national interests. 
States respond to the distribution of power in the anarchic international system and have to 
consider other states’ positions relative to themselves, but likewise pursue those policy 
objectives that can enhance their power and security by enhancing their material capabilities 
and latent power. Yet, the particular circumstances that administrations find themselves in 
can either hinder or enhance their ability to do so by influencing the costs and benefits of 
various actions, alongside concerns for other states’ ability to cheat and attain relative gains. 
The Obama administration has sought increased cooperation in the UNFCCC since 2009 as a 
means to enhance US power and compete with its rivals. Although it struggled to attain this 
goal in the Copenhagen negotiations, by the negotiations in Paris in 2015, it was able to have 
a position in the UNFCCC that was less circumscribed. Since 2012, the increased domestic 
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 On the 22
nd
 of April 2016, the United States and China were the first nations to sign the Paris Agreement on 
the first day that it opened for signature, a move of joint resolve that was intended to spur other countries to sign 
the Agreement as soon as possible (Davenport, 2016). 
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production of shale gas has led to a resurgence in US manufacturing and other sectors while 
its emissions have declined in the transportation sector, thereby delinking the long-term trend 
of economic growth and a correlated increase in emissions, while its energy security and 
economic competitiveness were enhanced (Fielden, s.a.). This had important implications for 
the US position by enhancing its ability to produce an agreement in the Paris negotiations that 
would not disadvantage it structurally while giving its hegemony the necessary leverage to 
persuade other states to cooperate since the costs to the US economy have been reduced as a 
result of the above-mentioned trends. The Obama administration’s energy policy reflected the 
changes which took place in the USA due to the increased production of shale gas. The 
Obama administration could rely on executive actions encapsulated in the Climate Action 
Plan (CAP) and the Clean Power Plan (CPP) to build on the effects of the increased 
production of shale gas and to pursue the objectives that it established at the start of this 
administration related to augmenting US power through the synthesis between economic 
growth and environmental regulation to enhance its ability to compete with China as well as 
other rivals in the international system.  
7.6.2 Domestic Influences 
Achieving a successful agreement at COP 21 has been one of the highest priorities for the 
Democratic Obama administration (Kerry, 2015; Parker and Karlsson, 2018:520, 523; 
Clémençon, 2016:6). Therewith, the US stressed its willingness to assume leadership in the 
UNFCCC and secure an agreement in Paris (Tubman, 2015:3 - 4). The Paris Agreement had 
to match certain US specifications and the US delegation had to ensure this occurred and in 
the end, “(t)he new climate deal meets all key demands of the US” (Goldenberg, 2015; 
Dimitrov, 2016:8). Moreover, it has emphasised that major Greenhouse Gas emitting 
countries should be included in the agreement (Clémençon, 2016:6). At the unit level, the 
USA needed a particular kind of agreement, one that could be implemented in the US 
domestic system (Goldenberg, 2015). The Paris Agreement is the fruition of the Obama 
administration’s climate efforts in the wake of the Copenhagen Accord and the non-existent 
cap-and-trade legislation (Goldenberg, 2015). In his remarks on the Paris Agreement, Obama 
announced that,  
“…the historic agreement is a tribute to American leadership. Over the past 
seven years, we’ve transformed the United States into the global leader in 
fighting climate change. In 2009, we helped salvage a chaotic Copenhagen 
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Summit and established the principle that all countries had a role to play in 
combating climate change. We then led by example, with historic 
investments in growing industries like wind and solar, creating a new and 
steady stream of middle-class jobs. We’ve set the first-ever nationwide 
standards to limit the amount of carbon pollution power plants can dump 
into the air our children breathe…Now sceptics said these actions would kill 
jobs. Instead, we’ve seen the longest streak of private-sector job creation in 
our history. We’ve driven our economic output to all time highs while 
driving our carbon pollution down to its lowest level in nearly two 
decades…In short, this agreement will mean less of the carbon pollution 
that threatens our planet, and more of the jobs and economic growth driven 
by low-carbon investment.” (White House (c), 2015).   
At the unit-level, the Obama administration played an active role in designing the architecture 
of the Paris Agreement so that it could withstand Senatorial opposition (Goldenberg, 2015; 
Bodansky, 2015(b)). To circumnavigate this opposition, the Obama administration had to 
negotiate within existing demarcations and as a result opposed legally-binding mitigation 
targets and likewise opposed a concrete, long-term mitigation goal and the inclusion of a set 
deadline (Dimitrov, 2016: 3 - 4). Although under the Obama administration, US climate and 
energy policies have changed in contrast to preceding administrations due to this 
administration’s policy-makers’ perception of the compatibility between economic growth 
and environmental regulation and the reduction in costs within the context of an altered 
energy system in the USA, the Obama administration was deliberate in designing an 
agreement that could bypass Senatorial approval and thus it secured an agreement that was 
compatible with the USA’s domestic structure (Clémençon, 2016:6). At the unit-level, the 
Senate continues to exert an influence over the negotiations since the interaction between the 
executive and the Senate “defines the scope for US pledges at Paris, as well as the prospects 
to fulfil them” (Bang et al., 2016:215). As such, the Agreement had to not stipulate 
mandatory emissions targets for developed countries unlike the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 
(Clémençon, 2016:6).  
The issue of legality has been a key source of concern for the USA in Paris, and throughout 
the negotiations. Unlike international law, under US domestic law, the term treaty narrowly 
refers to an international agreement that requires the Senate’s advise and consent to 
ratification as part of Article 2, Clause 2 of the US Constitution (Bodansky (a), 2016). While 
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the EU insisted that the INDCs be legally-binding, the USA opposed this notion - alongside 
China and India (Bodansky (a), 2016). Should the INDCs have been formulated in legally-
binding terms this would have placed a similar legal status on the INDCs as the Kyoto 
Protocol’s emissions targets, which could not be supported by the USA (Bodansky (a), 2016). 
The USA did agree with the EU that the INDCs should be formulated in strong procedural 
obligations such as the mandate to communicate each country’s INDCs every five years as 
well as to provide an overview of the efforts to implement and achieve INDCs (Bodansky (a), 
2016).   
The USA pointed out that should the agreement be legally-binding, its effectiveness may 
have been undermined had fewer countries chosen to participate, or otherwise produced 
watered-down INDCs (Bodansky (a), 2016). Additionally, the legal character of the Paris 
Agreement was a concern for the USA since it would have influenced its ability to be part of 
the agreement as part of its domestic political process (Bodansky (a), 2016). At the federal 
level, depending on the type of agreement produced in Paris, the USA had to be concerned 
about the legal nature of the Paris Agreement to the degree that it contained obligations that 
were already approved by the Senate, complemented current US law, or that the obligations 
were procedural (Bodansky (a), 2016). In the end, the USA was able to secure an agreement 
that did not require the executive to exceed his authority (Bodansky (a), 2016).  
In the US domestic context, there have existed two  ideational frameworks related to climate 
change mitigation and energy policy that have influenced policy goals due to the costs 
associated with such policies and their consequences for the US economy. After a forty year 
stalemate, a notable change occurred between the Obama administration’s first and second 
terms in office in its approach to climate and energy policies. Not so much the perception and 
the ideas related to its policy goals, but rather the context in which policy is designed 
changed. That is, changing material circumstances enhanced the Obama administration’s 
ability to cooperate in spite of Congressional opposition because of altering costs related to 
material incentives.  
While achieving international leadership on climate change has been paramount to the 
Obama administration, US energy policy creates the context for assessing the costs, benefits 
and trade-offs of such actions. Historically, amongst the congressional and executive 
branches within the US federal system, the main argument against climate change mitigation 
was the cost to energy and the economy (Parker et al., 2011). The increased production of 
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shale gas and oil altered the policy environment by achieving three related policy goals: (i) 
reducing US dependence on foreign petroleum, (ii) reducing US GHG emissions, and (iii) 
strengthening the US economy (QER, 2015:1-6). This altered the policy context by 
diminishing the trade-offs between the goals of economic growth and environmental 
regulation. Although there was a reduction in the costs that would have resulted from the 
acceptance of a climate change agreement, at the federal level the Obama administration still 
had to design such an agreement within the parameters set by Congressional opposition and 
had to make use of executive actions to enhance its goals towards energy policy and the 
UNFCCC. Per consequence, the Obama administration had to make certain that the design of 
the Paris Agreement was legally non-binding, distributed mitigation obligations to developed 
and developing countries and whose actions were grounded in national circumstances. Thus, 
while the Obama administration was less inhibited in pursuing its domestic and international 
policy goals because of the changing costs of such actions in relation to system-level 
constraints and opportunities, at the unit-level, important constraints still remained in place 
that would influence the final policy outcome. 
Therefore, in spite of this progress, the US political system continues to be divided over 
climate change since certain actors and constituent interests continue to view its mitigation as 
an unnecessary cost with negative consequences for the US economy. Because of this 
opposition, the Obama administration had to make use of executive actions, namely the CAP 
and the CPP to circumvent Congressional opposition and inaction, and attain its goals at the 
COP 21 negotiations. The historical development of US energy policy that centred on a set of 
economic assumptions to enhance US economic growth by maintaining low energy prices in 
lieu of higher capital and labour costs to enhance US competitiveness in global markets has 
heightened the resistance to the incursion of environmental regulation in order to maintain 
this competitiveness. In spite of favourable circumstances, domestic politics determine the 
extent and the form in which certain types of policies can be implemented.   
7.7 Linking the USA’s Energy Policy and Position within the UNFCCC 
By the Obama administration’s second term in office, the USA’s energy system had changed 
significantly, and impacted the USA’s energy policy. This had considerable implications for 
mitigation and the position of the USA in the global climate change negotiations since 
economic growth was uninterrupted yet, since 2005 the USA’s annual net emissions were 
reduced by 1.3% on an annual basis (CAR, 2016: 9-10). The most important changes related 
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to the decline of the USA’s dependence on foreign petroleum, and increased domestic 
production and consumption of natural gas which also led to a decline in the USA’s 
emissions. Thereby, US dependence on foreign sources of petroleum has declined, and was at 
its lowest level since 1971, while its gross domestic product (GDP) has grown by 13% 
between 2005 and 2014 (QER, 2015:1). In reaction to these events, the USA’s energy policy 
altered from concerns surrounding increasing prices and imports, and instead US energy 
policy focused on the quantity and the type of energy that should be set aside for export, the 
increased uptake and generation of renewable energy in numerous countries, while 
considering how the transformation in US energy supply and demand could be attained for 
the USA to mitigate global climate change reflecting altered material circumstances (QER, 
2015:1). Within this context, the objectives that the Democratic Obama administration 
wanted to achieve were intended to meet the challenge of China’s ascent in the international 
system, while circumventing Congressional opposition, and enhancing US security and 
power in the international system (Hirschfield and Davenport, 2015; Bang et al., 2016; 
Johnson, Cha and Searight, 2016). This administration’s policy-makers’ perception was 
influenced by the compatibility between economic growth and environmental regulation 
which had been augmented through the reduction of costs associated with such goals and the 
benefits for the US economy (QER Report, 2015:1; Minsk, 2017:5). At this point the changes 
in the US energy and legislative systems could allow the Obama administration to make use 
of executive actions at the unit-level to put in place the necessary measures to meet their 
objectives in the international system. The CAP, the All-of-the-Above-Energy Strategy, and 
the CPP reflected the changes that occurred regarding the enhancement of the USA’s energy 
security, economic growth and ability to mitigate climate change, which enhanced the Obama 
administration’s ability to meet their objectives based on policy-makers’ perception of the 
reduced costs to the US economy but at the same time in the midst of constraints found at 
both the domestic and international systems.  
In this regard, since 2013, the Obama administration has enacted two pieces of legislation not 
requiring Congressional approval but having wide-ranging implications for energy and 
climate change policy as well as outcomes in the UNFCCC: the Climate Action Plan (CAP) 
and the Clean Power Plan (CPP). At the structural-level, the significance of US energy policy 
is that the Obama administration was able to utilise US energy policy to influence the 
dynamics of the UNFCCC and enhance US leadership therein relative to other states (Parker 
and Karlsson, 2018:525). Within this context, US energy policy was designed in response to 
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the USA’s competition with China which placed emphasis on a transition to a low carbon 
energy system but within altered material constraints (The Economist, 2014; Hirschfield and 
Davenport, 2015)). The enhancement of the USA’s energy security, the reduction of 
petroleum imports and the increased domestic production of natural gas which could facilitate 
the transition to a low carbon system, along with the reduction of the costs of mitigation 
which also did not impede economic growth, altered the economic and security implications 
of different policy actions while the Obama administration could rely on these changes to 
influence other states on the basis of the USA’s hegemonic position within the international 
distribution of power ((Mitchell, 2013; White House, 2013; Freed and Fitzpatrick, 2012:3; 
All of the Above, 2014:2). One crucial aspect of the USA’s focus on assuming a greater 
leadership role within the UNFCCC under the Obama administration is motivated by its 
competition with China driven by the economic and technological change that have been 
alluded to throughout this chapter.   
While a great deal of policy change occurred during the Obama administration’s second term 
with the changes that occurred in the US energy system, at the unit-level, US energy policy 
reflects the constraints of Congressional opposition and inaction which necessitated that the 
Obama administration rely on executive actions to circumvent Congressional opposition 
towards the enhancement of climate change mitigation and renewable energy technologies 
that would be based on market-based solutions (Robinson, 2013:1; Leggett, 2014:1; Bang et 
al., 2016:215;). Significantly, at the unit-level, in spite of the changing costs related to 
different policy goals, the divergences between the executive and Congress continue to 
influence the politics around energy policy and climate change in the USA, and policy 
outcomes. At the unit-level, establishing such federal legislation was necessary as it would 
facilitate the USA to become a signatory to a global climate agreement that would be based 
on domestic support (Robinson, 2013:2).  
The Paris Agreement was a historical turning point in the climate change negotiations. 
Although the Paris Agreement reflected increasing cooperation between China and the USA, 
it was still based on their rivalry within the international distribution of power and the 
significance of cheating and relative gains for the ability of the USA to cooperate (Bodansky, 
2015(b); Oberthür, 2016:4 – 6). As such, the USA was willing to reduce its emissions on the 
condition that other states pursued similar goals while its cooperation with China was driven 
by the need to secure China’s agreement to reduce its emissions. While the distribution of 
power in the international system has altered to reflect the growing influence of developing 
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countries, especially China, changes in the USA’s material context permitted the Obama 
administration to pursue its policy goals with fewer costs incurred to the US economy. As a 
hegemonic state, the Paris Agreement reflects the USA’s national interests, however, 
alongside China’s ascent within the international system that has likewise also seen an 
alteration in its national interests, and the USA and China developed the major provisions 
within the agreement (Bodansky, 2015(b); Oberthür, 2016:4 – 6). 
From a theoretical point of view, this raises important considerations since realism contends 
that cooperation between countries is inhibited while liberal institutionalism indicates that 
cooperation is possible (Powell, 1991:1304). The differences between the two theoretical 
frameworks regarding cooperation arise from the emphasis that realism and liberal 
institutionalism place on relative and absolute gains respectively (Powell, 1991:1304; Grieco 
1988:603). Realism emphasises that states will place more emphasis on relative gains leading 
to competitive interstate dynamics while neoliberal intuitionalism indicates that states focus 
on absolute gains in spite of anarchy (Powell, 1991:1305; Glaser, 1994-1995:50). Glaser 
(1994-1995:50) further argues that, “Anarchy discourages cooperation because it requires 
states to worry about the relative gains of cooperation and the possibility that adversaries will 
cheat on agreements. In short, the standard structural-realist argument predicts that 
cooperation between adversaries, while not impossible, will be difficult to achieve and, as a 
result, will be rare and contribute relatively little to states' well-being.” However, it is not 
impossible for states to cooperate in spite of the emphasis placed on relative gains if the 
cooperation should increase a state’s security, realism therefore does not preclude the 
possibility that cooperation rather than competition is possible, although it is more difficult to 
achieve and maintain than what neoliberal institutionalism may indicate (Glaser, 1994-
1995:51). Mastanduno (1991:81) further indicates that hegemonic states may be less sensitive 
to relative gains considerations when cooperating with other states although when its 
“relative power declines” a hegemonic state will focus more on relative gains. Within 
realism, interstate cooperation and competition are complex, whose dynamics are reflected in 
the Obama administration’s position towards the UNFCCC. 
The Obama administration’s goal was to assume a leadership role in the UNFCCC based on 
US hegemony and crucially, the CAP reiterates the importance of US leadership in the 
mitigation of global climate change (Percival, 2014:148, 149). Although different presidents 
have understood and applied US leadership in different ways, whether more as a cooperative 
or unilateral position, ultimately all administrations designed international regimes to meet 
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their national interests with changing international and domestic circumstances. Perhaps 
another way to think of US leadership is leadership as self-interest. Throughout the history of 
the negotiations, the US position has continuously reiterated its leadership, that is the US has 
engaged with the UNFCCC on its terms and structured its behaviour to meet its national 
interests as a reflection of its hegemonic position within the international distribution of 
power. The USA has relied on its hegemonic position to design the architecture of the 
UNFCCC, a role that has continued under the Obama administration, especially in light of the 
increasing influence of emerging economies on the negotiations and the architecture of the 
UNFCCC due to the changing distribution of power (Bang et al., 2016:214 – 215; Parker and 
Karlsson, 2018:524). Although it could secure greater cooperation from other countries, in 
particular China whose changing position in the international hierarchy allowed it to have a 
different set of priorities in respect to previous decades, the Obama administration still had to 
design the Paris Agreement within the boundaries of senatorial opposition at the federal level 
(Goldenberg, 2015; Dimitrov, 2016: 3 - 4). It could thus use the increased leverage that it 
gained from the above-mentioned change in legislation and the energy sector to secure an 
agreement that was legally non-binding, distributed obligations to all Parties, and whose 
actions would be based on domestic circumstances (Goldenberg, 2015).  
At the structural level, this was intended to enhance US leadership within the negotiations in 
response to the USA’s rivalry with China (Oberthür, 2016:4 – 6; Bodansky, 2015(b)). This 
leadership role was facilitated by energy policy goals which were based on the perception of 
the reduction in costs to the US economy and therefore the enhancement of US hegemony 
related to the minimisation of the costs associated with the mitigation of climate change 
indicating the importance of the material context within which policies take place. However, 
such actions were facilitated by the use of executive action in light of Congressional 
opposition. This Congressional opposition was influenced by worries related to the negative 
costs to the US economy as a result of the environmental regulation mandated by the 
UNFCCC and the relative gains accrued by US rivals and the possibility that these states will 
cheat and therefore structurally disadvantage the USA (Goldenberg, 2015; Bang et al., 
2016:214 - 215). What the above analysis illustrates is that the US federal system influences 
an administration’s ability to cooperate within the UNFCCC in response to the changing 
distribution of power as the USA attempts to maintain its hegemonic position and design 
policies to suit its self-interest.  
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At the unit-level, the Obama administration had to pursue a position in the negotiations that 
could result in an agreement that could be accepted within the USA’s domestic system 
(Goldenberg, 2015; Bang et al., 2016:214 - 215). The Paris Agreement had to meet certain 
US specifications, especially with the distribution of responsibilities and obligations to all 
Parties reflecting a continuous focus on the importance of relative gains (Goldenberg, 2015; 
Bang et al., 2016:214 – 215; Bodansky, 2015(b)). Although the Obama administration had 
more leverage in the negotiations through the use of executive actions in the midst of 
changing material circumstances to meet its energy policy and UNFCCC goals, the final 
agreement had to be able to withstand Congressional opposition (Bodansky, 2015(b)). At the 
structural level, the USA as a hegemonic state, designed the Paris Agreement to reinvigorate 
US leadership and therefore enhance its influence over the international system in response to 
the ascent of China (Tubman, 2015:3 – 4; Parker and Karlsson, 2018:524). The use of 
executive actions at the federal level would facilitate the Obama administration’s ability to 
attain its goals in both the UNFCCC and US energy policy. The Obama administration 
nevertheless had to adhere to the structure of the USA’s domestic system through its use of 
executive actions and the kind of agreement that the USA could accept in Paris (Goldenberg, 
2015; Bang et al., 2016:214 – 215; Bodansky, 2015(b)). The Obama administration 
responded to challenges and opportunities at both the structural- and unit-levels, with the two 
levels interacting to produce an outcome at the UNFCCC and US energy policy that was 
intended to meet the challenge of the changing distribution of power and the USA’s role 
therein, while  reflecting the challenges embedded in the USA’s domestic system pertaining 
to divergences regarding the costs of different policy goals and the historical development of 
US energy policy and its position in the UNFCCC.  
One can gain insights into the interactions between two levels when contrasting the Paris 
Agreement to the Copenhagen Accord. That is, while the structure of the international system 
remained constant, the Obama administration could make use of important new opportunities 
at the federal level related to an altered material context because of the increased production 
of shale gas and executives actions to attain its goals. Power relations with Congress remain 
important constraints on an administration’s development of its policies. 
7.8 Conclusion 
The start of the Obama administration’s first term in office in 2009 coincided with a time of 
turmoil in the USA as the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 represented the worst economic 
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recession since the 1930s. It appeared unlikely that the Obama administration would be able 
to develop an innovative energy policy. However, this administration would instead design 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 which tried to merge the mitigation of 
climate change while simultaneously enhancing economic recovery, which was an endeavour 
to solve two goals that historically were viewed as incompatible. The support for renewable 
energy was further sought in order for the USA to compete against China in this issue area. 
These policies were thus designed as a means of enhancing US leadership on the international 
stage which was paramount for the Obama administration. Yet, Congress would stall the 
passage of the cap-and-trade regime which was intended to reduce US emissions by more 
than 80% by 2050. For the duration of the Obama administration’s first term, it had to be 
content with pursuing its policy objectives within the narrow confines established by 
Congress. With the inability to secure the cap-and-trade regime in 2009, the United States 
would negotiate from a weak position in the Copenhagen negotiations at the end of the same 
year, as well as clash over the design of the agreement with strong emerging economies, 
China in particular.  
However, by 2012, the USA’s increased production of shale gas, alongside trends towards 
environmental protection and the procurement of renewable energy technologies that began 
to change in the 2000s, would alter the policy context and have important implications for the 
USA’s domestic and foreign policies. That is, three important trends occurred: the US 
dependence on petroleum imports diminished, and its economy has grown while its emissions 
from the transportation sector decreased. By it second presidential term, the Obama 
administration could make use of executive actions, namely the Climate Action Plan (CAP) 
and the Clean Power Plan (CPP) to pursue its objectives of enhancing economic growth, 
environmental regulation and international leadership. This would also assist this 
administration to enhance its leadership and attain its goals in the UNFCCC. 
Under the Obama administration, the historic Paris Agreement was accepted by the 
international community, signalling a turning point in the evolution of the UNFCCC. Its 
promotion of nationally determined actions, and the distribution of responsibilities to all 
countries, bears the closest resemblance to the USA’s position in the UNFCCC. The 
transformation of the USA’s political economy because of the increased production of shale 
gas has allowed the USA to gain the necessary position to establish the design of the Paris 
Agreement and have other countries agree to its demands. Therewith, the Paris Agreement is 
a reflection of the changing political and economic circumstances that have occurred both 
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domestically and internationally and is perhaps a more pragmatic framework to mitigate 
climate change when contrasted to some of its predecessors (Levi, 2015; Davenport, 2015). 
Yet, the Senate still exerts an influence on the type of agreement that the Obama 
administration could design, since it had to preclude legally-binding obligations on the 
United States and distribute obligations to both developed and developing countries (Leggett, 






Policies at both the domestic and international levels reflect the historical circumstances 
faced by decision-makers as they attempt to grapple with multiple and conflicting pressures. 
Since 1992, successive US administrations have displayed varying degrees of cooperation 
towards the UNFCCC that have been based on the domestic and international distribution of 
power, and critically their perception of the related costs and benefits of pursuing a set of 
policy goals. Although a caricature of the US position within the negotiations would merely 
narrow it to an obstructionist actor that impedes progress and cooperation therein, this 
however is an incomplete picture. Rather, the positions of various administrations have been 
highly nuanced and complex, and thereby their ability to cooperate within the negotiations 
has altered on the basis of a number of highly intricate factors.  
Since the combustion of fossil fuels for energy production is a major contributor towards 
anthropogenic climate change, any attempts to mitigate climate change would have serious 
implications for the USA’s economic growth and competitiveness, and per consequence 
economic position, which historically have been based on cheap fossil fuel prices instead of 
higher labour and capital costs, in spite of the externalities
158 associated therewith. Since the 
1970s, efforts to design US energy policy to factor in environmental externalities have 
resulted in protracted progress as two ideational frameworks emerged, one that viewed 
economic growth and environmental regulation as compatible, and another that promoted the 
opposing view, which has resulted in stalemate and a cyclical approach as various 
administrations supported either one or the other position. The result has been a highly erratic 
approach towards any attempts to reconcile US energy policy and climate change mitigation 
within the UNFCCC since successive administrations were involved in a two-level game in 
their attempts to meet domestic and international goals within US energy policy and the 
UNFCCC negotiations.  
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 This underlying perception, which is based on mainstream economics, usually excludes the external costs of 
fossil fuels - renewable energy is able to “reduce externalities by at least USD 1.2 trillion” (The National 




The highly fragmented US political system combined with contrasting ideational positions 
has resulted in a schizophrenic approach towards energy policy involving often irreconcilable 
viewpoints amongst actors. Successive administrations have adopted varying foreign policy 
positions based on the global and domestic distribution of power, and their particular 
perception. The result is that the USA has responded to the global climate change 
negotiations by pursuing a set of unilateral, bilateral as well as multilateral measures both 
within the UNFCCC but also within regimes that it has designed. More often than not, the US 
Senate has proven to be ambivalent and obstructionist towards both policy areas (Hovi et al., 
2010:4). The USA’s role is thus far more complex than what critics may be willing to 
acknowledge.  Structural realism asserts that it is the relative distribution of power amongst 
states within the international system that determines the behaviour of states and maintains 
that security and power remain the primary goals of states within the international system 
(Gilpin, 2001; Russett, 1979:192). Although this assertion has been reinforced by the findings 
of this study, a number of intervening variables influence states’ response to the distribution 
of power and the policy goals that will be pursued in this regard.  
This thesis has grappled with understanding the interactions between US energy policy and 
its position in the UNFCCC. Toward this aim, the study has made use of the theory-guided 
case study method to interpret and understand this phenomenon in a qualitative, historical and 
interdisciplinary research design. By using neoclassical realism as its theoretical framework, 
the study has integrated two levels of analysis consisting of the unit- and structural-levels. 
The study has collected both primary and secondary data. Since the study is interpretive in 
nature, the research needed to rely on scholarly synthesis as well as inference and inductive 
logic to reach the main conclusions (Bearman and Dawson, 2013:253 and 256; Tong et al., 
2012:1). Since a vast array of state and private actors play a role in influencing both US 
energy policy as well as its official position in the UNFCCC, at the unit-level, the study has 
limited its examination to the relationship between the executive and Congressional branches 
of the US government since an important factor to influence the US position in the 
negotiations has been the Constitutional separation of powers between the legislative and 
congressional branches of government.  
The complexity and multi-dimensional nature of energy and climate change politics in the 
United States have evaded a satisfactory analysis by scholars. Although various studies 
would trace the USA’s participation in the UN climate change negotiations to either system-
level (Schreurs and Economy, 1997:5) or unit-level (Bang et al., 2012) variables, this 
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research has shown these arguments to be misleading and incomplete. Rather, it is the 
interaction between the unit- and structural-levels as described above that influence   a 
multitude of issues ranging from climate change, energy and economic growth and that 
impact policy outcomes within the constraints presented by the international and domestic 
systems. How else to contrast more dissimilar policy positions of the administrations of 
George H.W. Bush (1989 – 1993), Bill Clinton (1993 – 2001), George W. Bush (2001 – 
2009), and  Barack Obama (2009 – 2017)? What accounts for such differences? While the 
international system remains an essential yet ultimately permissive cause (Waltz, 2001:232 – 
233), it is a combination of perception and a nation’s political system that act as a filter 
during a particular historical epoch to produce policy outcomes. 
8.2 A Discussion of the Main Findings  
In the following section, the thesis will elaborate on the insights that have been obtained 
within the above analysis. Within this thesis, the historical overview of this study allowed 
certain patterns to emerge which helps to illuminate certain aspects of US energy policy and 
its interaction with the US position in the UNFCCC within two levels of analysis. The study 
thus concurs with Jervis that, “Problems arise in a context and out of a history, and not all 
patterns are the product of careful or even conscious choice.” (Jervis, 1988:320). To present 
the main findings of the study, the overview of the development of US energy policy within 
the preceding chapters indicates that the USA’s current energy policy is historically rooted. 
During changing circumstances, it had to accommodate and meet trade-offs between the 
goals of economic growth and competitiveness, energy security, as well as environmental 
protection (Yacobucci, 2016). The hierarchy and tension between these goals has altered over 
the successive decades and amongst different administrations. In this regard, there are three 
issues that have been contested in US energy policy: the attainment and mix of energy 
sources, the redistribution of income and costs, and the role of government and regulation, 
leading to policy impasse between the executive and Congress within the USA’s federal 
system (Yergin, 1979: 84, 89 - 90). Therefore, since policy-makers have access to limited and 
incomplete information that is further influenced by the inability to differentiate the costs and 
benefits of various policy goals, policy-making can at best be characterised by bounded 
rationality (Simon, 1983). Moreover, Gilpin reminds us that “...every benefit has a cost and in 
a world of scarcity painful choices must be made.” (2001:24). An ideational division in the 
USA is evident wherein different administrations displayed divergent approaches to the costs 
of the hierarchic ordering of policy goals leading to a contestation of policy options. There is 
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nevertheless a degree of continuity characterising US energy policy with the historical 
significance of fossil fuels, petroleum in particular, influencing the development of US 
energy policy, along with the limited role for government regulation and the importance of 
free market operations. Within this historical context, different administrations have been 
circumscribed in their attempt to design energy policy by Congressional influence at the 
federal level often leading to contradictions arising within US energy policy. 
The link between the cost of energy and economic strength is recognised and plays an 
important role in the US political context. The context in which policy-makers in the 
executive find themselves in relation to the international and domestic context, but also 
within the dynamics of the domestic and global energy systems, which in the US case, is 
characterised by a complex array of supply and demand trends, influence policy-makers’ 
ability to attain their goals and impact policy outcomes. Changing circumstances within these 
areas can either impede or enhance the ability of policy-makers to pursue their goals 
reflecting that there is a multi-causal interaction of factors influencing policy-makers and 
policy-outcomes. However, the perception of policy-makers will influence their calculation 
of the cost of energy and the compatibility between the policy goals of environmental 
regulation and economic growth and influences their willingness to recognise opportunities 
and constraints in their approach towards policy goals. Within this configuration, the 
international system remains a permissive cause, while unit-level variables influence the 
scope and content of policy goals and what is permissible within a particular context (Waltz, 
2001:232 – 233; Taliaferro et al., 2009:4-5). The approach towards energy policy is thereby 
politicised and polarised in the US context, with the interaction between US energy policy 
and its position in the UNFCCC reflecting the interplay of the complex factors outlined 
above. The US position in the UNFCCC is a reflection of the constraints and opportunities 
faced by policy-makers and their approach towards economic growth and environmental 
regulation wherein the historical context indicates the nuanced factors that would influence 
policy-makers.     
As indicate in chapter three, since its industrialisation in the mid-nineteenth century, US 
energy policy would be based on three economic assumptions: (i) private industry, markets 
and capital are the basis for innovation and wealth, therefore competition rather than 
government regulation is required; (ii) there is a correlation between energy production and 
economic productivity therefore, the more energy is produced and consumed, the stronger the 
economy will be; and (iii) the price of energy would decrease as refineries and utilities 
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increased in size. Within this framework, due to the correlation between energy consumption 
and economic growth, whereby higher energy consumption is correlated to a higher Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), access to and supply of cheap energy has been an important source 
of competitive advantage to the United States as an alternative to higher capital and labour 
costs (Parker et al., 2011). Per consequence, historically US energy policy has been 
concerned with the focus on the goals of maintaining low energy costs for US industries and 
consumers, as well as energy security.  Since the nineteenth century, the United States has 
had abundant and inexpensive energy resources which helped to maintain industrialisation 
and energy security during both World Wars, relative to other nations. Moreover, since the 
mid-twentieth century, the USA, through its hegemonic position, had an important role to 
play in the anarchic international system in maintaining access to and supply of Middle 
Eastern petroleum for its allies in the post-War era in order to limit Soviet involvement in 
these regions and solidify these alliances within the bipolar distribution of power. Within this 
context, the USA relied on diplomatic and military means to secure the supply of petroleum 
which were augmented by its bipolar rivalry with the USSR. The hegemonic position of the 
United States within the distribution of power in the international system allowed it to play an 
important role in stabilising world petroleum prices and energy security, and the re-building 
of its allies before the OPEC nationalisations. 
During this era, the access to and supply of inexpensive petroleum would become a primary 
feature of US energy policy, and as shown in this chapter, this would somewhat limit the US 
government’s support for other energy resources, such as coal, and the US government relied 
on international and domestic petroleum companies to attain its goals. As the USA’s 
dependence on foreign petroleum increased, various administrations viewed this dependency 
with unease and implemented measures in an attempt to limit this dependency. Moreover, in 
the pre-1973 era, although the United States played an important international role which was 
based on its hegemonic position and rivalry with the Soviet Union in an anarchic system to 
secure the supply of petroleum, the federal government had a more limited role in the design 
of domestic energy policy. In addition, environmental externalities were not factored into the 
price of energy, allowing these to remain artificially low.  
The OPEC oil embargo would have an impact on the design of US energy policy. It 
highlighted the vulnerability of the US economy to supply disruptions and altered the US 
trade balance to a deficit. This was made more complex in the bipolar distribution of power 
in the international system and the gradual decline of the US hegemonic position therein. The 
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role of the US government became more interventionist as it attempted to design an energy 
policy that could maintain a secure supply of energy and improve the USA’s security in an 
anarchic system by enhancing its power in terms of its material capabilities and latent power. 
Although the executive administrations of Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter 
attempted to alter the design of US energy policy in light of these new challenges, and 
emphasised either production or conservation strategies to enhance US security in an anarchic 
system, these administrations increasingly encountered Congressional opposition and 
inaction at the federal level which resulted in an incomprehensive approach to the challenges 
of the 1970s. Integrating environmental protection into US energy policy proved to be a 
formidable challenge since it was perceived as irreconcilable with economic growth, the basis 
of US power in the international system, as such measures were perceived to increase costs to 
US industries and consumers. The 1970s were thus a remarkable era in US energy policy for 
three reasons, there was a considerable amount of policy change which witnessed an 
alteration of the traditional role of government towards energy policy and was indicative of 
the gravity of the situation faced by policy-makers at the time; secondly, no standardised 
approach towards the crisis could be realised by these administrations, and significantly, as 
highlighted in this chapter, when faced with similar challenges and constraints at the 
structural-level and its distribution of power, these administrations emphasised different 
policy goals to manage the energy crisis highlighting that the international system is at most a 
permissive cause. 
Crucially, this chapter demonstrated that after the oil shocks of the 1970s, a pervasive feature 
of US energy policy has been its concern with the USA’s dependence on foreign petroleum 
because of its significance for the strength of the US economy, and the role it played in 
facilitating US hegemonic rise in the post-World War Two era. Since the oil crises of the 
1970s, this has been a source of concern for all administrations because of the structural 
hegemonic decline that the increased price of petroleum would result in and the interrelated 
implications for national security and economic growth, and the position of the USA relative 
to other states within the international distribution of power. This would have far reaching 
consequences. Only in times of crisis, such as conflict and the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, 
was there a fundamental change in the objectives of energy policy and the role of 
government– otherwise there is a remarkable continuity to US energy policy, that is an 




By the early 1980s, the international system was beginning to alter with the gradual relative 
economic decline of the USA (Painter, 2014:187). This decline was aggravated by continued 
US military competition with the Soviet Union, its financial support for the alliance order 
under its control, and increased government expenditures towards domestic services (Gilpin, 
1987). The economic threat presented by Japan and European countries further undermined 
US structural decline in the international system (Mastanduno, 1991). While responding to 
the USA’s structural economic decline and the shifts in the international system within the 
bipolar rivalry with the Soviet Union, the Reagan administration’s response would be based 
upon its ideological predisposition which influenced this administration’s policy-makers’ 
perception of US energy policy. In this context, the Reagan administration strongly advocated 
the use of market measures to support energy security such as and the decentralisation of all 
government authority (Elliot, 2013; Axelrod and Wilson, 1991:841). While facing similar 
structural incentives to the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations, the Reagan 
administration’s ideological beliefs predisposed it to reduce the federal government’s role so 
that the free market and the private sector were able to set priorities (Department of Energy, 
1994:3). Thus, what was highlighted in this chapter was that during the 1970s and 1980s, 
while the logic of the international system compelled these administrations to aim for the 
goals of maintaining US competitiveness and energy security to enhance US power, security 
and its hegemonic position vis-à-vis its rivals within the bipolar distribution of power, these 
different administrations supported different policy responses towards their era’s respective 
challenges and were circumscribed by Congress in the design of their policies. This chapter 
further indicated the centrality of inexpensive fossil fuels, petroleum in particular, for US 
energy policy during this era, as this was an important component of US competitiveness in 
international markets in lieu of higher capital and labour costs. Moreover, the ideational 
division related to the compatibility between economic growth and environmental regulation 
became a key policy debate in US energy policy and would subsequently have implications 
for the design of US energy policy and its position in the UNFCCC.   
Chapters four to seven would emphasise the constraints imposed by the ideational 
assumptions surrounding the goals of US energy policy in relation to the perception of their 
costs within the federal structure of the US political system, which would establish the 
context US administrations would attempt to design the US position in the UNFCCC relative 
to other states within an anarchic international system that presents them with incentives and 
constraints. Since the late 1980s, climate change became an acute challenge to the design of 
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US energy policy due to its historical responsibility in the origins of the problem, as well as 
the perceived costs involved in its mitigation to the US economy, and per consequence the 
implications for its hegemonic position. As these chapters would highlight, although the USA 
would play a dominant role in the design of the UNFCCC because of its hegemonic position 
relative to other states, certain aspects of its architecture would prove to be extreme hurdles 
within the US federal system because of the possibility that it would have consequences for 
the US economy, undermine the USA’s relative gains and enhance the prospects for cheating 
by other states. The perceived trade-offs between energy security and economic 
competitiveness on the one hand, and mitigation on the other, were made more complex with 
the introduction of ascending developing nations who were exempt from having to accept 
mitigation targets, while the USA would. The relative gains that would be accrued to these 
states and their ability to cheat would undermine the UNFCCC’s efficacy as various US 
administrations would struggle to accept its conditions for the duration of its history. The 
limited ability to cooperate within the UNFCCC chiefly arises from the USA’s response to 
the changing distribution of power, whereby its relative structural decline occurred with the 
ascent of its rivals, thereby it could not accept an agreement that would weaken the USA 
economically while strengthening its rivals by incurring costs to the US economy through the 
mitigation of climate change and the raising of energy costs. Under these circumstances, it is 
important to recall that states compete militarily and economically since the former depends 
on the latter (Waltz, 1993:45, 50). 
It is at this point of analysis that the interaction of the two levels becomes highly complex. 
Throughout the historical period under analysis, policy-makers within these administrations 
had particular policy goals that they wanted to enact based on their perception of the costs 
associated with various policy goals within energy policy and their position in the UNFCCC 
but at the same time they faced unit- and structural-level constraints in their attempts to 
achieve this. The US position has – with a few exceptions – been based on the support of 
nationally determined actions rather than quantified, legally-binding mitigation targets, and 
objections to the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), and in its 
place an emphasis that most countries should bear some actions in the mitigation of climate 
change.  
At the structural level, in the beginning of the 1990s, the international system changed from a 
bipolar to a unipolar system, wherein the focus on defence capabilities subsumed somewhat 
while economic competition would become a key aspect of interstate rivalry and the pursuit 
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of power. Subsequently, at the Rio Earth Conference of 1992, the Republican George H.W. 
Bush administration favoured a cautious approach to the climate change negotiations, and 
mitigation in particular, thereby watering-down the resultant UNFCCC. As such, the resultant 
agreement was designed on the basis of the US hegemonic position and reflected many of its 
key demands since international institutions reflect the interests of powerful states. At the 
federal level, Congressional opposition over the high costs that could be incurred to the US 
economy and the implications thereof for US competitiveness would pressurise the 
administration to preclude the use of legally-binding mitigation targets within the UNFCCC 
and strongly influenced the US position therein (Parker et al., 2011:3). As indicated in 
chapter four, according to the neoclassical realist framework, at the unit-level, the USA’s 
ability to cooperate in and ratify the UNFCCC depended upon a bargaining process between 
the executive and Congress. The federal structure of the US political system enhanced the 
ability of Congress to impact the USA’s cooperation in an agreement that would have 
implications for the design of US energy policy and potentially increase the price of energy in 
the USA. The interaction between the structural- and unit-levels configured to prioritise the 
USA’s hegemonic position relative to its rivals, and to prevent its competitors from acquiring 
relative gains at its expense. These dynamics would impact the debate around US energy 
policy and its position in the UNFCCC at the unit-level. Although the Republican George 
H.W. Bush administration was less ideologically inclined and indicated that the market could 
not be solely relied on (Miller, 1995) and supported environmental regulation, albeit to an 
extent, indicating that theoretically, policy-makers can approach and perceive policy goals in 
nuanced ways; yet this administration was circumscribed by worries related to the cost of 
energy and US competitiveness, complicating the endeavour to comprehensibly integrate the 
mitigation of climate change into US energy policy, especially as economic competition 
became a prime feature of interstate dynamics with the demise of the military imperatives of 
the Cold War’s bipolar order.  
As discussed in chapter five, the subsequent Democratic Clinton administration, on the other 
hand, supported legally-binding mitigation targets which were endorsed by its hard law 
stance towards the climate change regime in the lead up to the negotiations for the Kyoto 
Protocol between 1995 and 1997. In this regard, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent 
unipolar distribution of power would have important implications for US domestic and 
foreign policies wherein, while there was still an emphasis on security, economic competition 
would become a central preoccupation. Hence, the perception of policy-makers within the 
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Clinton administration regarding the goals of energy policy focused on simultaneously 
linking environmental regulation, economic competitiveness and energy issues which led to 
the promotion of a BTU tax on the heat content of the fuel and the Climate Change Action 
Plan of 1993. At the structural-level, these policies were intended to reinvigorate the US 
economy especially in respect to the economic rivalry with Germany and Japan whose 
manufacturers had greater energy efficiency and thus lower production costs. However, at the 
federal level, Congress would not support the BTU tax citing concerns for the increased costs 
to consumers and industries and its implications for US competitiveness in global markets 
and thereby hegemonic position (Parker et al. 2011:7). While the Clinton administration 
supported the Kyoto Protocol, at the federal level, the Republican-dominated Congress 
impeded this citing that the USA would not accept an agreement that does not include 
developing countries, and that would harm the US economy. Congress thus impeded US 
participation in the negotiations on the basis of the altering distribution of power within the 
international system and the relative gains that could be gained by developing nations and the 
negative consequences for the US economy. In this regard, assessing the relative costs and 
benefits of different policy goals, and their implications for US power and security, reveals 
that different actors at the unit-level have divergent and irreconcilable views thereon which 
influenced the USA’s domestic and foreign policies during the Clinton administration. 
Nevertheless, what the analysis of the Clinton administration highlights is that when faced by 
a unipolar distribution of power, this administration responded differently towards US energy 
policy and the UNFCCC than the Bush administration in its attempt to enhance the USA’s 
competitiveness through its attempt to link environmental regulation and economic 
competitiveness. There is thus no one fit-all solution as to how policy-makers will respond to 
the incentives of the international system. However, in the US context, Congressional 
influence remains an important restriction on what different administrations can achieve both 
within their energy policies and the UNFCCC indicating that the structural- and unit-levels 
have a complex interaction.    
After the relative stability of energy markets in the 1990s, the Republican George W. Bush 
administration would face a number of challenges in the 2000s as discussed in chapter six. In 
light of these challenges the Bush administration’s energy policy primarily focused on the 
USA’s dependence on foreign petroleum and its energy security. As indicated in this chapter, 
since at the structural level, an increasingly multipolar distribution of power would begin to 
be evident and therein, the risks to the USA’s energy security increased in the midst of 
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competition with developing nations for an energy resource that is central for US hegemony, 
at the unit-level, the Bush administration favoured a pro-production strategy to meet these 
challenges. At the unit-level, this strategy was further based on this administration’s policy-
makers’ ideological predisposition, and also the incursion of vested interests, which also 
limited this administration’s support for environmental regulation. At the federal level, 
Congressional stalemate would limit the emergence of a coherent energy policy that could 
meet all the goals of this administration, especially related to the reduction of environmental 
regulation.  
It was discussed in this chapter that within these dynamics, the Bush administration was 
unable to support the Kyoto Protocol as it was based on legally-binding mitigation targets 
while simultaneously designing an energy policy overtly based on increased fossil fuel 
production since policy-makers’ perception supported this energy policy goal as a means of 
enhancing the competitiveness of the US economy by maintaining low energy costs, 
especially relative to its rivals. US energy policy was per consequence characterised by no 
proposal that the USA “would achieve the UNFCCC goal of returning greenhouse gas 
emissions to their 1990 levels” (Parker et al. 2011:8). This chapter highlighted that the 
confluence of these influences and challenges, as well as the historical importance of fossil 
fuel supply for US power and security in the anarchic system and the perceived high costs of 
mitigation, would lead the George W. Bush administration to not support the Kyoto Protocol, 
especially as at the federal level, Congress would not support the Kyoto Protocol either. US 
energy policy has always been influenced by the anarchic structure of the international 
system, since the main concern was enhancing US competitiveness, and thereby hegemony 
and security, in relation to other countries by enhancing the supply of low cost fossil fuel 
energy, but these policy goals, would be influenced by the federal structure of the US 
political system and policy-makers’ perception of the costs that different policy goals would 
accrue to the US economy. In the midst of the challenges presented by the altering 
distribution of power in the international system and the relative gains that would be accrued 
to developing nations therein, at the unit-level, policy-makers’ perception of the costs that 
mitigation action would accrue to US energy reduced the Bush administration’s cooperation 
within the UNFCCC while the Bush administration supported market-based approaches 
towards the mitigation of climate change, technology cooperation and that such actions had to 
be voluntary and nationally-determined which was more feasible in the US domestic context.   
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As was discussed in the seventh chapter, during the Democratic Obama administration, the 
USA was still a hegemonic state, however the international distribution of power would be 
altered by the ascent of China at the structural level which threatened the USA’s hegemonic 
position and security within an anarchic system. While the Obama administration claimed its 
support for the UNFCCC and environmental regulation at the start of its presidency, the 
global financial crisis of 2008, rising US emissions, and projections of increased dependence 
on foreign petroleum presented formidable challenges to this administration at the start of 
2009. In this regard, to enhance US leadership in a number of related sectors and maintain its 
hegemonic position, at the unit-level, the perception of policy-makers within the Obama 
administration would advance policy goals that incorporated greater emphasis on renewable 
energy technologies and specifically a green economy framework to compete with China and 
other rivals, and to give the US economy a competitive advantage after the recession of 2008. 
Thereby there was an attempt to link energy and economic recovery with climate change in 
its energy policy - in a similar manner attempted by the previous Clinton administration - but 
in the midst of new trends wherein the goals of this policy were framed differently. Since the 
structural-level acts as permissive cause at most, its influence is filtered through the unit-
level, whereby the Obama administration could not pursue its objectives due to 
Congressional opposition to the cap-and-trade regime at the federal level due to the costs that 
the legislation would impose as well as criticism of China’s accumulating emissions. At the 
Copenhagen negotiations at the UNFCCC, the Obama administration focused on enhancing 
US leadership but found itself circumscribed by China and other developing nations whose 
influence at the negotiations had increased with the changing distribution of power, and 
consequently the divergences between the USA and China towards the “the architecture of a 
future legal regime”   had a marked impact on the outcome at the Copenhagen negotiations 
(Legget, 2011:5). At the federal level, since Congress would not support the cap-and-trade 
regime, along with the continued historical influence of the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, the 
Obama administration entered the negotiations in a weakened position with implications for 
the resultant agreement (Bodansky, 2010; Leggett, 2011:4).  
However, crucially, this chapter indicated that while the structure of the international 
distribution of power did not alter, the increased production of shale gas transformed the US 
energy system by the Obama administration’s second term in office. A number of related 
trends were altered because of the increased production of shale gas, allowing for the trade-
offs between economic growth and environmental protection to decrease, decreasing the 
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tension between the two competing goals that have besieged US energy policy since the 
1970s. These trends, which altered material constraints, were combined with the Obama 
administration’s use of executive actions at the federal level within the Climate Action Plan 
(CAP) and the Clean Power Plan (CPP) to pursue its perceived objectives domestically and 
internationally and to re-frame the USA’s energy policy. Therewith, the USA was in a 
position to advance its objectives in the UNFCCC and to finalise the Paris Agreement at the 
Twenty-first Conference of the Parties (COP 21) although this agreement had to be designed 
in light of Congressional opposition at the federal level and thus had to include non-legally 
binding elements, distribute obligations to all states, and have mitigation actions be based on 
national circumstances. The elements of this outcome can be traced to the continuous concern 
with the maintenance of US hegemony and the distribution of power in the international 
system whereby in spite of the altered material constraints there is emphasis placed on not 
giving developing nations relative gains in relation to the USA and not diminishing its 
hegemonic position. The USA’s rivalry with China and the necessity to regain US leadership 
in the negotiations at the structural-level indicated that the Obama administration had to find 
a new strategy to meet its objectives at the UNFCCC.  
Significantly, the international distribution of power did not alter between the Obama 
administration’s first and second terms in office, rather the Obama administration was 
capable of pursuing its preferred policy goals through a combination of executive actions at 
the federal level and minimised material constraints which reduced the costs accrued to US 
energy policy through the mitigation of climate change. Moreover, the USA agreed to limit 
its emissions on the condition that other countries pursued similar goals, indicating a 
continued emphasis on relative gains and cheating. As a hegemonic state, the USA played a 
key role in ensuring that the Paris Agreement reflected its key demands. While the USA 
designed the Paris Agreement on the basis of its interests, the agreement nonetheless had to 
be implemented in the USA’s domestic system at the unit-level. There is thus a tension that 
the Obama administration had to face between the structural- and unit-levels since it had to 
ensure that the agreement was able to enforce the USA’s national interest as a hegemonic 
state while been acceptable at the federal level with the agreement having to be permissible 
within the parameters of Congressional opposition.  
Theoretically, neoclassical realism is advantageous in that it is far more nuanced than other 
forms of realism, as well as other theoretical frameworks in IR and in public policy analysis, 
because of its incorporation of two levels of analysis, this being the structural- and unit-
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levels, and its overview of the manner in which the influence of the structure of the 
international system is filtered through unit-level factors, and therefore it can be applied to 
better understand complex policy areas such as energy policy and the UNFCCC negotiations.  
Neoclassical realism can therefore be used to better understand why it has been difficult to 
reconcile US energy policy and the UNFCCC position within altering unit- and structural-
levels. The importance of neoclassical realism, much like other forms of realism, is that it 
highlights the importance of power at both the structural- and unit-levels, in influencing 
outcomes. That is, NCR highlights the contradictions between US energy policy and its 
position in the UNFCCC and the difficulties involved in estimating the perceived costs, 
benefits and trade-offs between mitigation and other policy goals within the ideational divide 
in the US federal system over these issues in the midst of structural constraints, and the 
power dynamics at both these levels. Since realism as a theoretical approach has had limited 
application towards non-traditional security threats such as climate change, the application of 
this theoretical framework towards energy policy and the climate change negotiations would 
have contributed towards the development of this theory. From a methodological point of 
view, NCR has the added advantage of being sufficiently rigorous to systematically study the 
interaction between the structural- and unit-levels while still being flexible and allowing the 
inclusion of concepts developed in other disciplines to inform analysis thus broadening the 
analytical scope of realism. The historical, interdisciplinary nature of this study was enhanced 
by the use of neoclassical realism as it could identify new and intricate patterns of 
interactions between US energy policy and its position in the UNFCCC as described in 
chapters four to seven and also highlighted above.  
While the above analysis indicates that the basic assumption of realism are valid in that under 
international anarchy, cooperation is inhibited since states are concerned that others will 
achieve relatively greater gains and thereby become more powerful relative to themselves 
over time (Grieco et al., 1993:729), it is nevertheless necessary to understand how these 
dynamics are influenced within the structural- and unit-levels. Although realist theory does 
not necessarily preclude that cooperation between states is possible, such cooperation is more 
difficult to gain and maintain (Grieco et al., 1993:729). This is in contradiction to liberal 
institutionalism and its claims that international institutions facilitate interstate cooperation 
and that states are concerned about their absolute gains (Grieco, 1988:486).  Furthermore, it 
is not always clear how states will determine what their relative gains are and how to make 
sense of the perception of the costs of competing policy goals that all have an influence on a 
state’s relative gains. On the basis of the analysis undertaken within the thesis, this study 
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concurs with Grunding (2006:782) that should the relative gains within negotiations be big 
enough to be security relevant, cooperation between states is limited since the USA showed 
hesitation to cooperate within the UNFCCC due to the risk that the costs of energy in the 
USA would increase, thereby undermining its competitiveness, and fears that other states, 
especially developing countries, will attain relative gains and cheat, thereby undermining the 
USA’s power and security within an anarchic international system.   
This thesis has captured the contradictions of US energy policy and its foreign policy towards 
the UNFCCC. Thereby, the US position in the UNFCCC is influenced by its energy policy in 
three interrelated ways. When viewed within a historical perspective, all energy policies had 
unintended consequences that at the time were unforeseen by decision-makers during the 
design and implementation stages and whose effects subsequent administrations had to find 
solutions for in the midst of new challenges, leading to more contradictory options. Moreover, 
US energy policy is historically based on a set of economic assumptions which most 
administrations have closely adhered to. This is made more acute by the federal structure of 
the US political system and its two party system, and the ideological positions of its two 
dominant parties, Democrats and Republicans which influence the perception of the costs 
related to US energy policy and its position in the UNFCCC while Congressional politics 
have often acted as a constraint on the development of a comprehensive US energy policy. 
The historical role of low energy prices in enhancing US competitiveness, and per 
consequence its hegemony, has become an important policy goal that often subsumes those 
goals that appear to undermine it. In this regard, petroleum has historically occupied a central 
position in US energy policy due to its low cost, but also the influence that it allows the USA 
to have both within the Middle East and over its allies. In light of new challenges, the 
confluence of these factors has made the task of integrating contradictory policy goals 
strenuously acute. As a consequence, the main ideas presented towards the design of energy 
policy continue to be disputed because of policy-makers’ differing perceptions of the costs 
associated with these policy goals. This had significant implications for the US position in the 
UNFCCC negotiations. It may be surmised that in the US context, 
energy security is a matter of economic security. The irony is that the pursuit of power often 
makes a state more insecure. What is often taken for granted in analysing US global climate 
change politics and its mitigation is the role of intellectual and ideological differences 
amongst administrations concerning the perceived costs and benefits of such actions and the 
related hierarchy of policy objectives in this attainment vis-à-vis Congressional support or 
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opposition. It is thus policy-makers’ perception which forms the link between the structural- 
and unit-levels.  
At the unit-level, ideology has been an important influence on perception, with ideology 
influencing policy preferences (Mirilovic and Kim, 2017:179 - 180). The influence of 
ideology on perception can be attributed to its ability to act as a category through which 
events are interpreted thus forming an informational shortcut (Mirilovic and Kim, 2017:180). 
As such, Democratic administrations are more supportive of environmental regulation, and its 
ability to enhance economic growth, within US energy policy, and thus are more likely to 
support cooperation with the UNFCCC, in contrast to Republican administrations. Political 
polarisation related to these issues has also been a significant influence on Congressional 
politics (Schmalensee and Stavins, 2018:4). Nevertheless, what administrations may aim to 
achieve must be situated within the US federal system and the restrictions therein on the 
ability of administrations to pursue their preferred policy goals.  
US energy policy and its position in the UNFCCC are characterised by short-term planning as 
each administration designs its policies within the time it is in office. However, the intricate 
problems faced by the US energy system and the requirements of mitigation require stable, 
long-term solutions. As an analogy, US energy and climate change politics can be thought of 
as a game of snakes-and-ladders, as one policy replaces another every few years with the 
introduction of a new administration, leading to a revolving-door policy cycle and incremental 
progress rather than continuous development. 
From a theoretical perspective, it is important to consider which level of analysis accounts for 
which outcome in a general sense. Broadly, the international system provides the incentives 
and constraints that decision-makers respond to, but which are then interpreted through 
intervening variables found at the unit-level to influence policy outcomes in terms of scope 
and content. The US position in the climate change negotiations is the result of the interplay 
amongst its domestic and international policies. Four consecutive administrations have 
displayed varied positions within the negotiations but ultimately were circumscribed by their 
domestic politics by Congress within the federal political system regarding the goals of 
energy policy and the US position in the UNFCCC in the midst of a changing distribution of 
power. Within the constraints provided by the domestic system at the unit-level, the 
international system provides the incentives that policy-makers heed in their policy 
formulation. What complicates any analysis of the USA’s position within the UNFCCC is that 
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the politics surrounding these dynamics within the United States are highly contested and 
intricate. Rose articulates this by stating that (1998:147), “…systemic pressures and 
incentives may shape the broad contours and general direction of foreign policy without being 
strong or precise enough to determine the specific details of state behavior.” 
Both the executive and Congress responded to the changing distribution of power within the 
international system and the US hegemonic position therein which formed the broad goals of 
energy policy and its position within the UNFCCC. These goals related to the need to 
maintain energy security and low energy costs which were needed to maintain US 
competitiveness relative to its rivals in order to maintain and enhance US hegemony and 
security within an anarchic international system. That is, policy-makers designed policies in 
response to the changing distribution of power and likewise halted policies that were deemed 
to undermine US hegemony while giving its rivals a source of relative gains. While the broad 
goals in relation to the distribution of power were evident, that is the maintenance of US 
hegemony, power and security, relative to its rivals within the international system, the scope 
and hierarchy of competing policy goals based on the perception of the costs associated with 
these goals, was less easy to form consensus over amongst different administrations. The 
federal structure of the US political system acted as an important constraint in the adoption of 
policies that could diminish the US position within the international distribution of power.  
The international system therefore determines the broad goals that US policy-makers are 
concerned with which are related to power, security and the need to maintain the US 
hegemonic position. While the international system provides a set of incentives and 
constraints to policy-makers, there does not exist a single approach as to the interpretation of 
these; nor in the precise manner that policy will be designed in response. In this regard, it does 
appear that the perception of the costs related to environmental protection and its 
compatibility with economic growth are important in influencing support for a particular 
policy design within the domestic and international context present at the time amid the 
perception of the costs borne to the US economy which is central for US hegemony. 
However, such policy goals are either facilitated or constrained by Congress at the federal 
level in response to the changing distribution of power in the international system which 
influence policy outcomes. The power play between the executive and Congress in response 
to the changing distribution of power sheds much light on the development of US energy 
policy and its position within the UNFCCC. In this regard, power relations play a critical role 
in determining policy outcomes. 
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The perception of costs, within the federal structure of the USA, help to gain insight within 
the neoclassical realist framework into what facilitates or complicates US cooperation within 
the UNFCCC. These insights contradict the notion that the observed behaviour of the USA is 
idiosyncratic. While it is difficult to form predictive generalisations, the ideational division in 
the US federal structure related to the cost of policy objectives influence policy design and 
outcomes, especially in response to the changing distribution of power at the structural-level. 
As such it may be surmised that this division will continue to exert an influence on US 
cooperation, and depending on the factors outlined in this study, either inhibit or promote US 
cooperation within the UNFCCC. The significance of the different perceptions of cost in the 
USA within the framework is that it highlights that there does not exist a standard, objective 
set of criteria that guide the estimations of cost in relation to US energy policy. Rather, 
different administrations exhibit widely different calculations of the cost related to hierarchic 
policy goals, which are influenced by ideology. Within this context, US policy-makers are 
situated within a complex, two-level game wherein they respond to the opportunities and 
constraints presented by the structure of the international system as well as the USA’s 
domestic system and its federal-level politics and ideational division.  
Although it relies on the logic of realism, neoclassical realism takes standard realist concepts 
and underscores their complexity, such as power, security and rationality. Having examined 
the historical development of US energy policies and its consequences for certain issue areas, 
the most poignant theoretical implication is for the assumption of rationality within Waltz’s 
structural realism. Instead of an objective evaluation, decision-makers’ response to system 
level constraints and incentives is highly unceirtain. Security is a fluid concept, and like 
energy security, it is also multidimensional (Baldwin, 1997:23). Likewise, security competes 
with other values, which often involves trade-offs amongst these and requires an analysis of 
its importance relative to other values (Baldwin, 1997:18; Ullman, 1983:130).  Baldwin offers 
an important point to consider by arguing that security must be thought of in terms of 
“…which values to protect, from which threats, by what means, and at what cost” (1997:23). 
Rothschild (1995:57) reminds us that, “The new political preoccupation with these old ideas 
corresponds…to new political interests.” The close relationship between security and 
ideology may allow security to be easily manipulated. By classifying a phenomenon as a 
security issue, the phenomenon acquires a sense of urgency which requires some form of 
political intervention, usually for ideological purposes. The close association between security 
and vested political interests remains the grey area in the analysis of the utility of security in 
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modern society (Rothschild, 1995:57). Security as such is used as a guide to the sort of 
policies that government should design (Rothschild, 1995:57). 
As a final remark, the thesis would like to ponder upon three lessons that have been gleaned 
from this study. Firstly, there is no standard approach through which policy-makers will be 
able to evaluate energy policy, nor international opportunities and threats. Rather than an 
objective set of criteria, policy-makers are influenced by a complex range and interaction of 
factors in their approach to energy policy, international negotiations, as well as international 
opportunities and threats, especially given that decision-makers can at best have incomplete 
and limited information which impacts their ability to differentiate the costs and benefits of 
different policy goals. Secondly, the structure of the international system is essential in 
understanding state behaviour. The influence of the distribution of power in the international 
system therefore complements domestic factors in analysing the motivation and behaviour of 
policy-makers acting on behalf of the state. The international system; however, acts as a 
permissive rather than as a necessary cause, and it is imperative to understand how its 
influence is filtered at the unit-level (Waltz, 2001:232 – 233; Taliaferro et al., 2009:4-5). 
Thirdly, showing a sensitivity for the historical context permits deeper insights into the multi-
dimensional influences on decision-makers. It is therefore necessary to delve into the 
historical origins of state behaviour and the evolution of their domestic and foreign policies. 
8.3 Limitations 
There were two main limitations faced by the study which will now be reflected on. These 
limitations relate to the macro-level processes that the study focused on and the limitations 
within the theoretical framework adopted by the research. Firstly, the macro-level approach 
of the study has required that certain variables and processes be excluded in the analysis. This 
broad sweep has precluded the analysis of fine-grained processes that can better be analysed 
in micro-level studies. There were thus certain limitations within the methodological 
framework in its application to gain insight into the more micro-level aspects of US energy 
and climate politics such as the influence of various vested interests and the roles played by 
national and sub-national departments as it analysed broad-based, historical patterns. As such 
micro-level trends could not be incorporated into the study due to their scale, and the study’s 
objectives. Within these micro-level trends, it was also not possible to include in greater 
depth the influence of other actors on US energy policy and climate change position such as 
the various US federal departments, US states, vested interests, and constituents; and while 
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these aspects were observed at an aggregate level, the limitations of space and focus did not 
permit an in-depth discussion of these. Moreover, as the focus of the study was on the 
distribution of power in the international system and the perception of costs
159
 within the 
federal US system, other influences on the executive regarding the above-mentioned areas 
could not be included.  
Secondly, the use of neoclassical realism
160
 presents particular challenges. The integration of 
two levels of analysis and deciding which variables to include and how these ought to be 
combined formed limitations to the use of this theoretical framework in a more coherent 
manner. The ad-hoc approach to this application of levels and variables made the theoretical 
application clumsy. A careful consideration had to be made of which variables should be 
included as part of the unit-level analysis. By developing an interdisciplinary and historical 
study, the development and use of neoclassical realism was made analytically coherent 
through the integration of energy policy goals (Hall, 1993:278). It could thus be emphasised 
that a multi-causal interaction of factors influence US domestic and foreign policies. 
The approach did not permit a greater analysis of the various areas of these policy domains 
due to the limitations of space. Since US energy policy and its position in the UNFCCC are 
multifaceted policy areas involving numerous actors at both the national and sub-national 
levels, this required a careful assessment of which aspects of US energy policy and its 
position in the UNFCCC would be analysed within the thesis. By analysing historical 
processes in combination with the integration of concepts from different sub-disciplines, the 
study could indicate the broad themes that have characterised the interaction between US 
energy policy and its position in the UNFCCC, as well as the synergies and trade-offs 
between the two arenas. 
The random integration of variables therefore remained one of the main weaknesses of the 
neoclassical realist framework and finding a manner to overcome this challenge was a key 
issue that this study grappled with. The thesis was able to develop a framework consisting of 
carefully selected factors at the unit-level to analyse while being aware of the complexity of 
these policy areas. Nevertheless, the flexibility of this theoretical framework lent itself to 
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identify concepts from other sub-disciplines that could allow the analysis to be carried out in 
a more systematic manner while identifying novel patterns that would have been missed had 
a more traditional approach been undertaken. In order to limit the haphazard selection of 
variables, unit-level variables based on the federal level structure and differing perceptions 
are integrated by tracing the link between a) the goals of energy policy and b) the US position 
within the UNFCCC, along with the impact of the distribution of power at the system-level 
on the goals of US energy policy and its position in the UNFCCC. Due to the ability of 
neoclassical realism to identify nuanced interactions, it is able to reveal the opportunities, 
difficulties and contradictions involved in reconciling US energy policy and the UNFCCC 
position within the US political context due to policy-makers’ perception therein regarding 
the cost accrued to the US economy through the estimation of the costs, benefits and trade-
offs between mitigation and other policy goals within the ideational divide in the US political 
system over these issues. While neoclassical realism has its strengths, there are certain 
processes it cannot account for such as the more complex interplay between domestic factors 
at the unit-level and which are isolated from the influence of a state’s position in the relative 
distribution of power in the international system. The use of other theoretical frameworks 
may be beneficial in accounting for these such as constructivism and theoretical frameworks 
in the policy process literature. 
8.4 Recommendations for Future Research 
There are a number of avenues that future research can profitably explore. While this 
particular research focused on decision-makers’ perception along with its implications for 
energy policy, other important intervening variables include the role of state institutions, and 
non-state actors such as the media, think tanks and non-profit organisations and their 
influence on the US position in the UNFCCC negotiations. While this study focused on broad 
macro-level trends, analysing micro-level trends may yield important theoretical and 
empirical evidence. In this regard, analysing the role of vested interests, especially those with 
contrasting sets of goals such as the fossil fuel and renewable energy industries, in 
influencing both domestic and international policies, can be beneficial in increasing scholarly 
understanding of the policy process. Another important area of scholarly research could be a 
comparative study of the security implications of the UNFCCC and similar negotiating 
spheres and their implications for the determination of relative gains by decision-makers.  
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The findings of the study may be used to interpret the evolution of other countries’ energy 
and climate policies. By highlighting the importance of the historical context, domestic 
political system along with the ideational predisposition of policy-makers and how power 
relations between different sets of actors entrusted with policy formulation results in policy 
outcomes within the international distribution of power and states’ positions therein, it is 
possible to gain insight into how alternating administrations will respond to policy proposals 
within an alternating distribution of power at both the domestic and international levels. 
Countries such as Australia, Canada, South Africa and the United Kingdom would be 
important avenues for research in this regard either in a historical case study or within a more 
comparative approach. 
8.5 Final Reflections 
Anthropogenic climate change has emerged as an important policy preoccupation as 
compelling scientific evidence has shown the negative consequences that this will have for 
societies in decades to come. Yet at the same time, it has also revealed the difficulties that the 
international community has in finding its solution in global multilateral forums as evidenced 
by the haphazard results of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) as self-interested actors will remain concerned with their relative gains and fears 
of cheating. The history of the United States’ position in the negotiations and the analysis of 
the influences on this position reveal that simple mono-causal explanations cannot 
satisfactorily attribute the differences amongst US administrations therein. Rather, a multi-
causal set of processes based on ideational differences amongst these administrations within 
the constraints posed by the domestic and international system influence both domestic and 
foreign policies. 
This thesis has provided a historical overview of the intersection of energy policy and the 
UNFCCC negotiations in the United States in the 1989 to 2015 time frame. Creating a 
comprehensive policy that can effectively respond to the challenge of global climate change 
mitigation is complex because such a policy would essentially restructure the internal 
political and economic structures of states (Paterson and Grubb, 1992:294). Domestic 
constraints, à la the two-level game, place an important limitation on US participation and 
ratification of climate change agreements and highlights the important role played by 
domestic institutions with bipartisan politics forming a staggering fissure (Bang, 2011; Bang 
et al., 2012:755). The Senate, in particular, has proven to have a tenacious grip on 
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administrations’ ability to support and enact global climate change agreements (Bang et al., 
2012:756). Therein, differing perceptions of the costs and benefits that will be accrued as a 
result of the hierarchy of policy goals has led to stalemate between the executive and 
legislative branches of government. With the election of Donald Trump, the fluid US political 
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